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p The intrusion of the USA into what were once the African “preserves” of the European metropolises began during the war and proceeded at an ever increasing rate afterwards. The expansion of West German imperialism into Africa was renewed during the fifties. Japan followed suit later on. The attempts to redivide the African colonies became one of the important factors in the imperialist struggle in the "black continent”.

p In order to justify its claims to Africa in the eyes of its allies, the United States adduced a variety of arguments, not the least prominent of which were those concerned with military and strategic considerations. An example is contained in the secret report drafted by US Admiral Fechteler and published in the French paper Le Monde.^^1^^ The Americans naturally challenged the authenticity of the document, claiming that it was just an article that had been previously published in the Proceedings of the American Naval Institute. Denials of this sort only had the effect of corroborating the existence and the alleged contents of the report. Having assessed the situation in Western Europe, Admiral Fechteler proposed, in effect, to replace European colonial rule in the whole of North and North-East Africa by American “patronage”. He also stressed that "Arab nationalism ... could be heard and understood by the American leaders".^^2^^ But the United States launched its main attack on colonial Africa in the economic field.

p On the 20 January 1949 in his inaugural address President Truman announced a broad campaign for redistributing the colonial world and spheres of influence. "Point Four" of this programme, which dealt with the increased export of American private capital under the guise of "aid to backward areas”, was of direct relevance to Africa. The US Chamber of Commerce hastened to declare the African continent a highly favourable area for "American capital investment”, while business circles indicated that 6,000 million dollars would be invested in Africa over the coming 10-15 years. This did not in fact happen, of course. Direct American 57 capital investment in Africa over the period 1950-61 grew from 300 million to only 1,000 million dollars. Nevertheless, US plans for financial and economic expansion into Africa caused grave anxiety during these years in the capitals of the colonial powers.

p The USA launched its onslaught on British colonial Africa from three bases: from the Republic of South Africa, where branches of the largest American monopolies had established themselves with comparative ease; from London, since the American monopolies were widely represented in the City; and from the USA directly. Typical examples of US penetration are not hard to find. In Ghana (then the Gold Coast), despite the resistance of British firms, US companies began exploiting bauxite and manganese ore deposits. In Nigeria the American Smelting and Refining Corporation organised in the spring of 1952 a mixed syndicate for mining zinc, lead and silver ores. In Tanganyika in 1952 American capital was used to help expand the lead- and copper- mining industries. The United States also started to penetrate Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia. In August 1950 a government mission from Southern Rhodesia visited the USA at the invitation of the Americans. It was agreed that American capital would henceforth be granted the same privileges as British investment. Soon the American Metal Company had taken over the two largest copper- mining concerns, Roan Antelope and Mufulira Mines, and in 1959 the Americans secured the transfer of the Board of the Rhodesian Selection Trust, which managed these and a number of other companies, from London to Northern Rhodesia.

p In 1955 the Rhodesian branch of the Vanadium Corporation of America, called the Rhodesian Vanadium Corporation, which mined for chromites in Southern Rhodesia, bought up the shares of the Wihdons Mineral Company, which extracted manganese ore in Northern Rhodesia.

p In 1957 the American Newmont Mining Company set up in Tanganyika the company Western Rift Exploration in order to prospect for radioactive elements and rare and nonferrous metals and extract them.

p US oil monopolies also made their debut in Africa. The Socony Mobil concern began drilling for oil in Nigeria and 58 then tried to obtain as a concession an oil-rich area of 4,000 square miles. Standard Oil (New Jersey) made a similar move. Between 1956 and 1957 the Gulf Oil Corporation intensified its search for oil in Ghana. It is significant that the total capital investment by the American oil monopolies in British East and British West Africa amounted by 1956 to about half of all private direct US investment in this group of British colonies.

p American capital had already acquired a strong position in the Belgian Congo during the war years as a result of mining uranium ore there for the manufacture of atomic bombs. The next step, in the spring of 1950, was the purchase by a group of American monopolies of a large packet of shares in the British Tanganyika Concessions. This move made the British ruling circles very unhappy. In November 1950 Tanganyika Concessions bowed to British Government pressure and gave an undertaking not to sell to anyone for at least ten years its holdings of the share capital of other companies without first obtaining Treasury consent. In the meantime, though, American monopolies had secured direct access to the Belgian Congo’s uranium and copper mines, as well as its railways.

p In 1954 Belgians were completely ousted from control of the uranium mines by the Americans. There was sharp reaction in Brussels. Belgium’s Foreign Minister sent a special message to the President of the USA pointing out that the Americans had broken a standing agreement and demanding recognition of Belgium’s right to joint management of the uranium workings. Many deputies in the Belgian Parliament also protested against the US action. Nevertheless, Washington remained deaf to these and subsequent protests.

p In 1949, at the suggestion of the USA, a Franco-American corporation for stimulating joint investment in the French colonies was formed, as well as the North American Oil Society, in which Standard Oil (New Jersey) came to have the major stake. At the same time, making use of France’s weakened position, the American monopolies gained concessions in Senegal, the Cameroons, French Guinea, Dahomey, Morocco and Algeria. The last two countries provided a base for representatives of the US non-ferrous metal and 59 mining industry: the Newmont Mining Company, Mines Incorporated and Joseph Lade moved in. They were interested in mining lead ore and other minerals. These firms managed to take over a non-ferrous metal plant in Zellija (Morocco). In Gabon the United States Steel Corporation swallowed up 50 per cent of the shares in the SOMIFER company, which mined for iron ore, and 65 per cent of the shares in the Compagnie Miniere de 1’Ogooue S. A., which extracted manganese. It was only after sharp protests in France that the American holding in the Compagnie Miniere was reduced to 49 per cent. In Togo and Senegal American groups gained respectively 31 per cent and 12 per cent of the share capital of the companies that were mining for phosphates in Benin and Tigba. This list of examples is by no means exhaustive.

p Although the scale of the operation differed from place to place, American capital made an all-out effort to open the door into every African country. The USA wishes to maintain is right to equal economic opportunities in African territories —that is how the USA’s African policy was summed up by George McGhee, the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and African Affairs, speaking in May 1950 in Oklahoma City. These words expressed not so much the US claim to "equal opportunities" in Africa as the desire to occupy a monopoly position. Naturally, this course was not acceptable to the European colonial powers, and their resistance to American expansion into Africa mounted. Both in the US Congress and the American press repeated attacks were made (for good reason) on London in particular. In theory London agreed to the influx of American capital into its colonies, but in practice raised one obstacle after another. In November 1951 the National Foreign Trade Council, a very influential body in US business circles, even adopted a special resolution demanding that the governments of the European colonial powers create normal conditions for American capital investment.

p However, despite the military and political alliance with the USA, Britain was not prepared to surrender colonial advantage without a fight. This is shown in the speech Churchill made before the US Congress on 17 January 1952. In it he warned the USA and other pretenders to the British 60 legacy: "Let no man underrate the abiding power of the British Commonwealth and Empire ... the British Commonwealth of Nations, spread all over the world, is not prepared to become a state or group of states in any continental federal system on either side of the Atlantic.”^^3^^ This rebuff was backed up with practical measures. Between 1950 and 1955 the British Government extended the system of empire preference.

p West Germany’s penetration of Africa during the period preceding the liberation of the continent was accomplished mainly through trade. In 1951 the FRG’s exports to Africa far exceeded the prewar level and over the following five years increased 2.3 times. Over the same period West German imports rose 1.7 times.

p The fastest growth occurred in the export to West Germany of the African countries’ raw materials and foodstuffs. Imports of Nigerian rubber increased from 20 tons in 1949 to 5,200 tons in 1956. During the same period imports of timber went up from 127,000 to 3.4 million cubic feet; cocoa beans from 400 to 8,200 tons; iron ore from Sierra Leone from 200 tons (1950) to 464,000 tons; coffee from Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika from 21,000 to 280,000 tons; and cotton from Tanganyika from 700 tons (1953) to 5,900 tons. Trade was particularly intensive between the FRG and the countries of British East Africa. Although lagging far behind Britain, the USA and Japan in terms of the volume of its exports to these countries in 1950-57, the FRG’s export growth rate was higher. During the last 2-3 years of the period Britain had good reason to contemplate the West German penetration with alarm and even with jealousy, as The Times pointed out.

p Meanwhile Bonn was making far-reaching plans. The familiar figure of Hjalmar Schacht was talking of " restoring the German colonial empire in a new form".^^4^^ The West German monopolies—Krupp, Heinkel, Haenschel, Volkswagenwerke and Siemens—followed in the footsteps of the trading firms. West German capital began to be invested in a number of African countries. During the colonial period, however, the sum invested was small: in 1958 it amounted to only 108 million marks, spread throughout Africa. Britain and France placed rigid limitations on their 61 traditional enemy’s investment in their colonies. Nevertheless, the annual increment in West German capital investment in Africa (averaging 55.6 per cent) was higher than in Europe (38 per cent) or Asia (25 per cent).

p In view of its position in the first half of 1950, the FRG was, of course, still "gathering strength" and simply followed in the wake of the USA, France and Britain. West German diplomacy and the monopolies were obliged to be cautious and conceal their true objectives. Gerhard Schroder, the Foreign Minister in the Adenauer Government, even went so far as to state: "We have no African policy.”^^5^^ In fact, there was an African policy, and it was conducted in terms that were far from welcome to the other imperialist powers. Thus, West German spokesmen stressed that, since the Germans had lost their colonies as early as in the First World War, they were free of the "psychological burden" that weighed upon the European colonial powers. From the FRG, defeated in war, could come no "imperialist threat as, for example, from the USA”. The fate of West Germany, it was said, was very similar to that of the African countries: both were underprivileged and were "extras on the stage of world politics”. And so on. Bonn clearly wished Africa to regard the FRG as a “dependent” country "on the end of a leash" held by the Western allies.

p Japanese trade expansion began in British East Africa, where the cheap products of Japanese light industry, especially textiles, started to compete successfully with British goods. Next, Japanese businessmen appeared in West African countries, where, according to the Kyodo Tsushin Agency, trade was of “enormous” benefit to Japan. By 1960 Japan’s exports to Nigeria were 7 times greater than her imports, and in the case of trade with Sierra Leone exports exceeded imports 80 times. A number of West African countries were obliged to introduce import quotas on Japanese goods. The unique feature in the Japanese penetration of Africa was that it took place under direct US patronage —the American monopolies then viewed Japanese capital as an ally.

p Since the imperialist rivals of the European metropolises concealed their drive for expansion by championing “ anticolonialism”, the "liberalisation of trade”, "joint aid for 62 the colonies’ development”, etc., which, naturally, went down very well in Africa at the time, the old colonial powers had to resort to various defensive tactics. In fact they had to wage a war on two fronts: against the growing national liberation movement and against the pressure of their imperialist competitors. Hence the duality of many of the measures taken.

p Britain, France and Belgium formulated their own " colonial development plans" in opposition to the American programmes for "aid to backward areas”. This too produced clashes between the colonialists and the “pretenders”.

p Speaking in the House of Commons on the 22 January 1948, Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, made it perfectly clear that the measures taken by the government were intended primarily to serve the interests of the European colonial powers. He said: "In the first place, we turn our eyes to Africa, where great responsibilities are shared by us with South Africa, France, Belgium and Portugal. ... The organisation of Western Europe must be economically supported. That involves the closest possible collaboration with the Commonwealth and with overseas territories, not only British but French, Dutch, Belgian and Portuguese."^^6^^ And not a word about the overseas ally whose capital was stubbornly carving out for itself an equal share in the British programmes for exploiting the colonies! Congressional reaction in the USA was violent. Britain came in for a barrage of criticism: here was a country which was in receipt of considerable sums of money from the USA, was investing them in the colonies and raking in the profits, and yet was placing obstacles in the way of an American colonial expansion! In 1950 under pressure from Washington, London acquiesced to the holding of negotiations between the Colonial Development Corporation and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). However, the negotiations foundered, and it was only in February 1953 that the Bank managed to sign an agreement with Britain about a loan of £60 million to finance colonial development.

p It is understandable that Britain’s policy towards her African possessions in the postwar years was preoccupied by the fight against the national liberation movement. This 63 applied to both the Labour Government of 1945-51 and to the Conservative Government which succeeded it. However, the policy did not lose sight of the need to defend the colonial empire against inroads made by imperialist competitors.

p Once dependent on Washington, London was in no position to decline discussion of colonial matters. The question of the access of American capital to Empire markets was a topic that cropped up on any occasion, even though the actual aim of a meeting might be to examine the Marshall Plan, the Mutual Security Programme, Britain’s eligibility for fresh loans or the possibility of setting up joint military bases. Great Britain would invariably agree—admittedly, with reservations—to an influx of American capital and would promise to see that it financed her "colonial programmes”. In practice, though, Britain did everything to impede this process. As The Economist put it, "... a Commonwealth whose development was financed predominantly from America would not long remain a British Commonwealth".^^7^^

p Somewhat daunted by this prospect, British ruling circles adopted more subtle tactics. Basically, British capital had to be boss in the colonies. Therefore, more of it had to be exported. So American capital was welcome—provided that it was under the strict control of the City.

p During negotiations in Washington in March 1953 Eden and Butler confirmed Britain’s acceptance of American capital. The question had already been aired at a Commonwealth conference on economic affairs, which took place in December 1952. But at the same time as the Washington negotiations (March 1953) London announced that the Commonwealth Development Finance Company (CDFC) had been set up, headed by representatives from the largest financial institutions and monopolies in Britain—the directors of the Bank of England, Royal Dutch-Shell, Unilever, the British Tobacco Trust, as well as gold and diamond mining companies, including Oppenheimer himself. CDFC’s initial capital amounted to only £15 million. Nevertheless, its activities proved to be extremely profitable. The company made a clear profit of £457,000 in 1966/67. It was useful to Britain in two ways: it encouraged the private sector in the economies of Commonwealth countries and ensured the domination of British capital over its development. 64 This sector, in the words of Lord Godber, the company’s chairman, "builds up its own connections and relationships, which have a natural tendency to persist and protect themselves, however radically surrounding conditions may change".^^8^^

p Britain’s plans for "colonial development" were designed to make the Empire secure against military and political penetration by her competitors, as well as against economic penetration. The British Government set up its own programme for military construction in Africa in opposition to the USA’s “strategic” declarations on the continent. At the beginning of 1953, for example, a 3-year plan was announced in London for forming units of colonial troops in West Africa. With this aim in mind, John Harding, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, went to inspect the area. Britain’s Conservative Government continued the policy laid down by the Labour administration, aiming to preserve the sphere of Britain’s "own military and political dominance" in Africa. It was, after all, Bevin who, in his speech of the 22 January 1948, said (referring to the USA) that Britain too had the right to put her own house in order.^^9^^

p The programmes and plans for “developing” their African colonies were, on the one hand, a means of defence for the metropolises but, on the other, they gave an added twist to inter-imperialist contradictions. The reason lay in the exceptionally favourable conditions that these measures provided for private monopolies. Nor should it be forgotten that the downfall of the colonial system in Asia led to a certain transfer of private capital interests to Africa. Many British and French firms which had previously been operating in South-East Asia now started to shift their assets to the African colonies.

p Naturally, the monopolies of the colonial powers had no wish to share capital investment spheres with their competitors from the USA or the FRG, whose “development” programmes for the African countries also involved expanding the activities of their own monopoly capital.

p French and Belgian "development plans" for the African colonies had the same objectives as their British counterparts: to reinforce their own influence in the colonial possessions and to limit infiltration from their rivals.

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p The first law on drawing up.plans for "modernising the metropolis and the overseas territories" was passed by the French Government as early as 1946. Accordingly a special Planning Council and a General Commissariat for the Plan were created.

p In order to limit and control the expansion of American capital, the French made use of joint "development programmes”. Thus, American companies were invited to help build a mining complex near Oujda on the border between Morocco and Algeria and to share in a number of other ventures.

p Since the USA was reaping the benefit from France’s weak economic presence in the colonies (before the war only 10 per cent of France’s exported capital went to her colonies), Paris took a number of measures to eliminate the disproportion. By 1955 60 per cent of French capital investment abroad was in her colonial possessions. However, French colonialism selected military suppression as the principal means of holding its ground. In fact, France waged colonial wars without a break right up to 1962.

p The United States was not slow to take advantage of its rival’s errors, especially the short-sighted and ultra- conservative policy pursued by the French authorities in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. American representatives at the UN, official circles in Washington and the American press saw the opportunity to promote their interests and condemned the French Government. It was even accused of damaging not only French interests but those of all the Western powers through its actions. An influential American political yearbook, for example, commented: "Of all the conflicts of policy and interest that divided the non-Communist world, none had more harmed the material and moral position of the West than the civil war which had broken out in the French departments of Algeria on November 1, 1954.”^^10^^ Before his election as President of the United States, John Kennedy condemned French policy in North Africa, and Algeria in particular, on several occasions. The New York Herald ’Tribune of the 3 March 1957 referred ironically to the "heightened sensitivity" of the French to relations with Morocco and to speculation that the USA might "squeeze them out" of that country. In conjunction with the "anti-colonial" 66 propaganda, these tactics permitted the USA to amass a certain amount of political capital in North Africa that paid dividends over a number of years.

p One point that American historians pass over in silence is that, to a certain extent, the United States itself financed French imperialism’s colonial war against the Algerian people. The French military units serving in Algeria had previously formed part of NATO contingents and were partly equipped with American weapons. However, the fact that France was considered an ally did not deter Washington from making anti-French statements and taking advantage of France’s economic and military difficulties and her moral and political isolation in the eyes of the world.

p With de Gaulle’s accession to power in 1958, the ruling circles of the Fifth Republic adopted a much tougher attitude towards the USA on a number of issues, including the colonial one. This course was backed up by organisational measures. The 1958 Constitution abolished the French Union. Its place was taken by a French Community, founded on the concept of equality for its members. In this way, France strove not only to restrain the national liberation movement, but also to counter the USA’s “anti-colonialism” and refute American charges that the population of Frenchspeaking Africa were deprived of any rights.

p Belgium too devised a "10-year plan for developing the Congo" which was to cost 500 million dollars. The money was spent on airport and railway construction as well as on the expansion of mining operations for rare and non-ferrous metals, especially uranium. In an effort to maintain their grip on the country, the Belgian monopolists sided with their traditional partner, British capital, but the odds were overwhelming and they were finally obliged to allow American companies into the country as well.

p From time to time the European colonial powers were even forced to sink their differences and join forces against the expansion of their more dynamic competitors. In 1950, at the instigation of London, the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA) was inaugurated. The members were Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, the Union of South Africa, Liberia and the Gold Coast (Ghana). They were joined in 1953 by the Federation 67 of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Commission’s main task was to raise the efficiency with which the old colonial powers were exploiting the resources of the African colonies. This in effect meant resisting the penetration of American monopolies into the field. In February 1958 the Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara (FAMA) was created and made subject to the Commission. Its officially declared aim was "to assist in the provision of technical assistance for the region, such as the services of experts, instructors or advisers, the training of personnel and the supply of equipment for training purposes"^^11^^.

p These measures were the European colonialists’ direct response to similar activities that had been undertaken since the early fifties by the American Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment. They were also intended to combat the international education programme passed by the US Congress in 1948 and the subsequent American “aid” programmes for African countries. The US Assistant Secretary of State for African and Near Eastern Affairs had good reason to describe the attitude of the European powers to American programmes for the " development of backward countries" as critical and suspicious.

p As a result of the competitive struggle to redistribute the African colonies just before their liberation, significant changes took place in the line-up of forces in Africa between the colonial powers and their rivals, principally the USA. American imperialism was in the ascendancy in Africa, while the positions of Britain, France and Belgium grew weaker. Nevertheless, the resistance put up by the colonialists to the expansion from outside was not without result. Despite the scale of the US intrusion, the metropolises managed to retain their predominant influence in the economies of their African possessions. From 1950 to 1960 (“Africa Year”) US capital investment in the continent increased from 352.4 million to 1,000 million dollars, and yet it was significantly less than the sum total of British investments in the British colonies and the Republic of South Africa and French investments in the French colonies. Between 1950 and 1960 US trade with Africa grew from 863 million to 1,300 million dollars’ worth, and yet comprised only 10 per cent of Africa’s imports and exports, while Britain and France accounted for 60-70 per 68 cent. These figures relate to the continent as a whole, and include those countries in which the USA met with hardly any resistance—the Republic ol South Africa and Liberia. As for the purely colonial areas, the difference in strength between the main competitors—the USA and the European metropolises—was even more clearly seen. The colonial barriers did their job.

p The European powers did all they could to hinder the spread of American “aid” too. Even where aid to dependent territories was involved, "the metropolitan powers did not welcome foreign intrusion into their colonial domains”, as Emerson puts it.^^12^^ This is quite true. The British authorities would seize on the slightest opportunity to procrastinate, as, for example, over the admission of American experts to the Congo and Tanganyika. The report of a US Senate commission that visited Africa in 1956 mentioned that the population of Ghana had not been given so much as a hint of the presence of US specialists helping to build the TakoradiAccra railway. France employed the same tactics. It is hardly surprising that total American “aid” to Africa during the period 1946-60 amounted to less than 40 per cent of British “aid” and 30 per cent of French.

p Yet, in spite of all the counter-measures taken by the colonial powers, their competitors—the USA and, to some extent, the FRG and Japan—made good use of the first postwar years and managed to set up in Africa an array of springboards from which the later expansion drive was launched, though in changed circumstances.

p American imperialism’s breakthrough into Africa and the hotting-up of the inter-imperialist struggle there produced one other result: the exploitation of the peoples of Africa was intensified. This, in conjunction with other factors, spurred on the steady growth of resistance to the colonialists and led to a violent upsurge in the national liberation movement. As the colonies began to attain independence, so imperialist rivalry changed and adopted new forms.

p At the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties, when the colonial systems of Britain, France and Belgium were crumbling under the blows of the national liberation movement, the ruling circles of the USA and the FRG posed as the "disinterested friends" of the African peoples, 69 sympathising with them in their struggle to rid themselves of the rule of the old colonial powers. This line was followed by both propaganda and official circles. An example of this is the visit to East Africa paid by G. Mennen Williams, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, at the beginning of 1961. In this case, Washington was trying to make political capital out of the difference between its position and the manoeuvres of London, which was trying to stall over the granting of independence to Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and a number of other colonies. So in Kenya Mennen Williams declared that the United States "supports the theory of Africa for the Africans”, and in Tanganyika, questioned on his overall impressions about the arrangements being made by Britain for the independence of East African countries, he said: "There seems to be an effort being made in this direction. .., but whether it is completely satisfactory is something I would have to analyse further.”^^13^^

p In a somewhat modified version this device was used by the USA later on. In March 1965, for example, Mennen Williams stressed that it was “natural” that the liberated African countries "feel they must avoid exclusive relations with the former metropolis . .. the United States can give African countries a second ’great power’ association which will increase their sense of independence".^^14^^

p The USA’s demagogic “opposition” to the European mertopolises in the colonial sphere was one of the factors compelling Britain and France to review their plans for the colonies and work out new ideas on relations with existing colonies and liberated ones. The American tactic of being the "disinterested friend" of the African peoples, which was just one step away from becoming their "spiritual counsellor”, had to be countered by an effective policy with an appropriate ideological basis. In addition, given the enormous inequality of forces between the USA on the one hand and Britain and France on the other, Washington’s position made it extremely difficult for the colonial powers to take any decisive steps against the national liberation movement. Meanwhile the growth of the movement was taking on frightening proportions for the colonialists and causing a chain reaction. The circumstances being such, it became impossible for the old order to survive.

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p The USA’s main attention at this time was focussed on the British colonies, where, as Washington imagined, the chances of seizing political influence were better than in French Africa. Caught between Scylla and Charybdis, London adopted counter-measures that had a dual aim: to find a modus Vivendi with the imperialist rival and to halt the national liberation movement (or at least do something to neutralise it).

p In accordance with these aims, the measures taken were oi three main kinds: attempts to muster US support, to depict the decolonisation process as a “voluntary” step chosen by the metropolis and, lastly, to find an equivalent to colonial rule, so as to retain the decisive influence in the African part of the former Empire.

p Seeing in actions undertaken jointly with their imperialist competitors a real possibility of bolstering up their own position in the liberated countries, British ruling circles began to systematically propagandise the idea of the European colonial powers and the USA "pooling their efforts”. In 1956 the London Times said that Britain was performing her legitimate and planned task of helping her colonies in Africa towards independence and needed all possible support from the USA.^^15^^ Other British papers harped on the same tune. In 1959 London officially proposed to Washington that British and American policies in Africa south of the Sahara should be co-ordinated. The White House, however, refused. The Chicago Sun and Times reported that, although they had interests in common, the United States and Britain had adopted different approaches to Africa.^^1^^”

p As the colonial system gradually disintegrated, so British appeals to the imperialist powers to take collective action became still more insistent. The English Conservative Quintin Hogg wrote in an American journal: "But there is every reason why we should co-ordinate all our endeavours together. . . . It’s ultimately intolerable that. . . France, Britain and America should pursue divergent policies in the Middle East or that the Congo, Rhodesia, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden and Somalia should not be considered by us all in relation to one another.”^^17^^

p These tactics bore witness to the weakening position of a Britain no longer able to withstand the onslaught of the national liberation movement and, at the same time, wrestle 71 with imperialist competitors. The once greatest coloniser of them all could not manage a war on two fronts.

p Washington’s negative response to British appeals for collaboration in Africa, together with the fact that the US position met with general approval in the African countries, forced the ruling circles of Britain into further manoeuvres and into a search for new arguments in support of their proposals.

p An elaborate programme was put forward by Andrew Cohen, a top civil servant who enjoyed great authority in the USA. He had been head of the African Division of the Colonial Office, had served as Governor of Uganda and represented Britain on the UN Trusteeship Council. Cohen’s views, suggestions and arguments, which reflected the position of the British Government, are clearly recorded in his book British Policy in Changing Africa. He did not in the least doubt that Britain could cope independently with her colonial affairs if it were not for US interference. "Through our past experience in these countries, our knowledge of their problems and our friendship with their people,” he wrote, "we are of course well qualified to provide them with assistance .. . but I believe that they will look in increasing measure to the United States. . . .”

p Proceeding from this position, Cohen proposed that the "Western world as a whole" should tackle the job of assisting the African countries. Moreover, he laid particular emphasis on the point that "the United States and Britain should realise that our interests in Africa are broadly the same”. These interests, according to Cohen, were of three kinds: "moral and humanitarian"—the need to “help” the African peoples in their development, which had allegedly been started by the colonial powers; “economic”—the West’s need for African raw materials and African markets for its goods; and, lastly, “political”—ensuring that Africa remained “friendly” to the Western world. Cohen appealed to various quarters in Britain and, above all, to the US Government to put an end to their differences over African policies: "These out-of-date appurtenances should be sloughed off.” He pointed out that on both sides of the Atlantic there was a considerable number of ill-informed people who did not understand the seriousness of the African problem and who 72 still clung to outmoded viewpoints, seeing contradictions where none actually existed. As Cohen put it: "There are still some people in Britain, perhaps not very many, who look at Africa through paternalistic spectacles and regard the transfer of power to Colonial people as a form of defeat. . . . There are still quite a number of people in the United States who, in this cold world, find anti-colonialism a comfortable blanket to wrap themselves up in.”

p Thus, Cohen, firstly, makes an indirect offer of British experience in colonial administration in return for American co-operation; secondly, he stresses the imperialist powers’ community of economic and political interests in Africa; and, thirdly, he unambiguously rates the USA’s “anti-colonialism” as political short-sightedness. In passing he rehabilitates the colonial system, whose mission apparently consisted in " helping the development" of the enslaved peoples; gently intimidates the transatlantic rival with the prospect of losing Africa’s “friendship”; and, most important of all, proposes to organise on a new basis the joint exploitation of the continent’s peoples and resources. It is hard to find another piece of British academic writing that contains such an economically phrased, yet all-embracing programme for protecting Britain’s interests in a "changing Africa".^^18^^

p The main practical measure that the British ruling circles undertook during the collapse of the colonial system was the modification of the Commonwealth, the political structure intended to replace the colonial empire.

p This stratagem served several ends. It was to keep newly independent countries within the system of the international ties of modern capitalism; to provide a formal basis for the assertion that the disintegration of the British Empire was a natural part of its transformation into the "Free Commonwealth of Nations”; to perpetuate a decisive British influence in the former colonies; and, finally, to obstruct attempts by the USA to occupy the position vacated by the metropolis.

p Ruling circles in America were most unhappy over London’s new move. Washington made cautious efforts to hinder British plans. After his visit to Africa in 1955 Chester Bowles wrote: "Gold Coast will request membership in the British Commonwealth as soon as it achieves independence. 73 Race-conscious South Africa indicates that if the Gold Coast is accepted, it will withdraw. I have no doubt that the British will make the right decision.”^^19^^ Bowles gives no indication of what he considers to be the right decision, but his subsequent arguments about the importance to Britain of the Union of South Africa speak eloquently of his choice of priority. American “specialists” on colonial problems, such as Professor Stefan Possony and Professor Vernon McKay, also recommended the British Government to seek "new forms" of military, economic and political co-operation with the liberated colonies instead of shrinking into its Commonwealth shell.

p However, Britain stuck to her chosen policy, and most of her former African colonies joined the Commonwealth. Britain’s official representatives seized every opportunity to emphasise the Commonwealth’s importance.

p When bluntly asked in the course of an interview given to the West German magazine Der Spiegel whether he considered that Britain had still not found a new role in the world after the loss of the Empire, Michael Stewart, the Labour Foreign Secretary in the Wilson Government, replied: ”. .. It is misleading to say that we have ’lost an empire’. Of course, the Empire itself, or at least a very large part of it, has evolved into something quite different. It is no longer the Empire in the original sense of the word ... it has become the Commonwealth. And for us the Commonwealth is not just an empty idea, but a living reality.”^^20^^

p The steps taken by the British ruling quarters in Africa gave rise to fresh contradictions between Britain and the USA. "That there is a quite serious divergence between the British and American views of the problems of central Africa is now plain”,^^21^^ the London Times observed in this connection.

p Since France, as distinct from Britain, used methods of direct rule in her African possessions, French defensive measures were rather different. The French Union, created in 1946, was replaced in the 1959 Constitution by the French Community. The aim of this move was to prevent a complete break between the colonies and the metropolis and to forestall the formation of large federal states under the aegis of other imperialist powers.

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p Thus, the law of 1956, which granted limited autonomy to the colonies in West and Equatorial Africa, was carried a little further. In accordance with this law, the government could accept decrees extending the authority of regional assemblies, but real power remained in the hands of the French governors. However, these measures failed to stave off the downfall of the colonial empire, and in 1960, when nearly all of France’s African colonies attained independence, the Community ceased to exist.

p Endeavoring to preserve its influence in the former colonies, Paris outstripped even London during this period. France bound the young sovereign states by special bilateral agreements on co-operation that were designed to ensure that France retained ultimate control over their further development. In fact, a confederation of states was set up in this "renewal of the French Community”. The President of France became the leader of the Community (he headed the Council consisting of the heads of state or government of the African countries), and the member states undertook to co-ordinate their foreign policies and defence, economic and financial arrangements.

p The ruling quarters of France saw further opportunities for preserving their African role in the creation of political and economic groupings of French-speaking countries. The economic dependence of the participants on France guaranteed the former metropolis a strong political position.

But the most effective measure adopted by the French ruling circles to counter the expansion of US monopolies into Africa and the American “aid” policy as a whole was the setting up of an “association” between 18 African countries and the European Economic Community. Back in 1957, France and Belgium had included their African colonies in the Common Market (then being created) as associated territories. Then in 1963 the Yaounde Convention instituted the Association of African States and the Malagasy Republic with the European Economic Community (EAMA).^^22^^ While offering the European neo-colonialists fresh opportunities for exploiting the associated countries, the realisation of the slogan of the "unity of Europe and Africa" erected barriers to the penetration of American capital into these countries.

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p The collapse throughout most of Africa of direct colonial rule created an entirely new situation there as regards the inter-imperialist struggle and changed its nature and forms. Firstly, since the colonial possessions had ceased to exist, the question of redistributing them became a non-starter. Secondly, the African countries were no longer the objects of colonial policy, but had been transformed into an independent active force. As a result, the imperialist powers’ struggle for political and economic influence could no longer be carried on by the old methods. Thirdly, the development of cooperation with Africa by the Soviet Union and other socialist states began to make its full impact on the forms and methods adopted by the struggle.

p Previously a factor that united the imperialists had been the plain need to resist the growth of the African peoples’ national liberation struggle. Now a new factor had been added—the problem of how to keep the liberated countries within the economic web of capitalism. This involves “ protecting” these countries from the influence of socialist ideas and limiting their contacts with states of the socialist community. Thus, antagonism again flared up in the imperialist camp between the class interests of the monopolist bourgeoisie as a whole and the selfish interests of its separate sections, since, far from weakening their interests in a re-allocation of spheres of influence, the freeing of the colonies had actually increased it.

p The collapse of the colonial system helped to further level the development of imperialism in the different states. Many of the former specific features of the “national” imperialisms (French usury, British colonialism, etc.), which, to some extent, determined the means of their expansion and the tactics used against competitors, became less pronounced and lost their significance. In conjunction with the virtual disappearance of the “classical” method for carving up the world (internecine war between the metropolises) this factor led to the formation of a new complex of means, methods and tactics, basically identical in all the imperialist states, designed to protect their own interests in the now liberated countries. This complex includes the export of capital, 76 imperialist “aid”, the involvement of former colonies in various blocs, associations and groupings, the securing of privileges in trade and the means for acquiring political influence. This complex was formed in the course of the postwar period, with certain methods and tactics being constantly tested and improved.

The analysis contained in Part One of this book points to one further conclusion, which is vital to a historically valid understanding of the succeeding parts of this study. Bourgeois historical and political writing has displayed a tendency of late to view the contradictions between the Western powers in the developing countries as merely temporary and fortuitous episodes having no historical roots. The contradictions between France and her NATO partners are thus depicted as being simply a result of General de Gaulle’s foreign policy. Anglo-American disagreements are explained away as "unfortunate misunderstandings”, while Anglo-West German friction springs from the “delusions” current among the FRG leadership. And so it continues. It has been shown,in the foregoing chapters that inter-imperialist contradictions in colonial matters have built up throughout the war and postwar years. It is precisely this objective process that conditioned the further development of the inter-imperialist struggle in the newly independent countries.