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p Of the well-tried "ideological formulas" (to use de Gaulle’s phrase) with which the USA concealed its expansionist drive into Africa the most important must surely be “ anticolonialism”. American propaganda and numerous official statements aimed at the countries of Africa constantly recall the "traditional anti-colonialism" of the USA. This claim is used not only as a means of misleading the African peoples, but also as a weapon against imperialist competitors, especially the former metropolises.

p During the Second World War it was quite common in US political and scientific circles to hear views which could have been considered to be anti-colonialist in spirit. But such sentiments were only anti-colonialist in appearance. They were not inspired by any conviction in the right of the colonial peoples to self-determination. Two factors 35 contributed towards the anti-colonial tenor of some of the statements made at the time: amazement in Washington at the ease with which Japan had swept away the colonial regimes of South-East Asia, and the conviction, especially on the part of Roosevelt and Hull, that the European colonial powers were not just incapable of running their colonies efficiently: they were also unable to defend them. The person mainly responsible for creating the myth of the USA’s “anti-colonialism” was the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. He suggested several times that the European metropolises should fix dates upon which the colonial peoples would be accorded full independence.^^1^^

p These and many other, similar facts might, of course, mislead the inexperienced. But these statements were only made for use in the inter-imperialist struggle, and had no connection whatsoever with anti-colonialism as such. The USA’s "traditional anti-colonialism" was no more than a fiction. In his book The Myth of the State^^2^^ the philosopher Ernst Cassirer concluded that in the 20th century, with its unprecedented breakthroughs in science and technology, man learnt to create myths that were just as sophisticated and efficient as the tanks and planes that were built for the same purpose. Skilful myth-makers have appeared, producing a highly dangerous commodity, since it is aimed at the most sensitive of all targets—the human mind. This conclusion is amply illustrated by the “anti-colonial” myth concocted by prominent members of the state apparatus of the USA.

p The American “anti-colonialism” myth stems largely from speculation over America’s history and from attempts to attribute to modern US imperialism some of the progressive traits of American democracy in the 18th century. These tendencies can be found not only in propaganda publications, but also in the works of certain academics. Professor Walt Rostow, for example, who held responsible posts in the White House for a number of years, wrote: "Despite all the Communist talk of American imperialism, we are committed, by the nature of our system, to support the cause of national independence.”^^3^^ Yet a brief dip into history reveals a completely different picture, as the facts relating to Africa show clearly.

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p Leaving aside the shameful role of American slave- traders in Africa (they led the field up to 1865), one can find examples of direct US aggression against North African countries shortly after the declaration of independence. The American war with Tripolitania lasted from 1801 to 1805. The ruler of Tunisia was induced to capitulate in 1805 when threatened by the guns of American warships. In 1815 a seaborne expedition was sent to Algeria. From 1849 to 1852 the shores of Africa were patrolled by a squadron of American warships under the command of Commodore Perry. Landing parties went ashore systematically, plundering and massacring Africans. In 1858 under the pretext of " protecting American citizens”, US naval forces were directed to Egypt. More such incidents could be listed.

p Not very convincing either is the contention that the United States never acted as a colonial power in relation to Africa. It is true that the USA did not participate directly in the imperialist division of the continent of Africa, but the reason is not to be found in any “anti-colonialist” attitude. At that time American capitalism was not in a position to compete with West European capitalism. In any case, there was sufficient scope for US expansion elsewhere. It was at this time that the Philippines were seized, the Hawaiian Islands annexed and a protectorate established over Cuba.

p One other historical fact is beyond dispute. Throughout the period preceding the Second World War not once did the USA ever demonstrate its “anti-colonialism” in relation to Africa. The conferences on the Moroccan question held in Madrid in 1880 and in Algiers in 1906 and the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 which enabled Belgium to take possession of the Congo are instances of this. President Cleveland even declined to submit the Final Act of the Berlin Conference to the Senate, since the document failed to take sufficient account of America’s commercial interests.^^4^^

p During the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 the USA formally adopted a policy of non-interference, but John Hay, the Secretary of State, repeatedly made clear his attachment to Great Britain and his assumption that Britain could count on "American friendship in the war".^^5^^

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p Nor did the USA find it possible to manifest its “ anticolonialism” at the Versailles Peace Conference, where the fate of Germany’s African colonies was being decided. One of the main architects of the Versailles Treaty, US President Woodrow Wilson, supported the idea of sharing out Germany’s colonial legacy between Britain, France, Belgium and the Union of South Africa. This was to be done by the notorious mandate system—a camouflaged form of colonialism.

p In relation to Italian aggression against Ethiopia in 1935 Washington all but openly encouraged the aggressor. Despite the obviously colonial nature of the Italian claims to this sovereign African state, the US Congress adopted a neutrality motion in August 1935 and placed an embargo on the supply of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment to Ethiopia. Italian troops invaded the country in September 1935. Moreover, like other imperialist powers, the USA sabotaged the imposition of sanctions against the aggressor, and American exports to Italy rose considerably during the war months. Rupert Emerson writes: ".. .the Fascist overrunning of Ethiopia . . . had a poignant meaning for many Negro Americans which their white fellow citizens were unlikely to share.”^^6^^

p Some American historians try to maintain that during the Second World War the USA followed a consistently anti-colonialist line and that the American view on the colonial question was "that no people, therefore, should be denied the right to independence".^^7^^ The examples usually cited to support this assertion consist, of extracts from a foreign policy statement made in 1942 by Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State. "Secretary Hull . . . declared that it would always be the American purpose ’to use the full measure of our influence to support the attainment of freedom by all peoples who, by their acts, show themselves worthy of it and ready for it’.”^^8^^

p However, this statement diverges clearly from the view (quoted above) expressed by the Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, about the unconditional application of the Atlantic Charter principles to the world as a whole. It is hardly surprising that Hull called Welles’s statement “ premature” and later compelled him to resign. Expounding the government’s official position, the Secretary of State said 38 that colonial peoples had to "show themselves worthy" of freedom and "ready for it"! So, in Hull’s opinion, not all the enslaved peoples had an automatic right to freedom. The question arises as to who is to judge whether a people has "shown itself worthy of freedom" and is "ready for it”. There is only one possible answer—the colonial powers. Even Hull’s claim that the USA intended to use its “ influence” is hardly sufficient indication that his position was anti-colonialist.

p The main point, curiously overlooked by American historians, is that the USA’s position on the granting of independence to colonial peoples, albeit hedged round with numerous conditions, had by the end of the war undergone substantial changes. Thus, at the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA and Britain ( October-November 1943) the American delegation submitted a draft United Nations declaration on national independence. In fact, the document provided for the redistribution of the colonies and aimed to remove all obstacles to the penetration of the European colonial dependencies by American monopolies. In the guise of a suitable international body, the United States would also have been able to govern colonies. However, the true designs of American imperialism were cunningly concealed in democratic-sounding phrases. In particular, the draft contained the stipulation "to fix, at the earliest practicable moments, dates upon which the colonial peoples shall be accorded the status of full independence".^^9^^ This was pure demagogy, since the US State Department was already aware that the British would not support that clause. Eden reminded Hull that he had already informed the US Ambassador in London, John Winant, that the British Government did not accept the views incorporated in the American draft, and refused to discuss the matter at the Conference.

p Later on the Americans themselves discarded all mention of the granting of independence to colonial peoples, even in a limited interpretation. All the later numerous documents and statements from Washington dealing with the aims of an international trusteeship system omitted both the article about granting the colonial peoples independence and the point about preparing them for self-government.

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p The reason for the transformation does not, of course, lie in any US “retreat” under British “pressure”, as some American investigators maintain. Several factors led to the withdrawal of the term “independence”. Firstly, the war years saw the growing influence on US foreign policy of military circles which regarded the colonial possessions of their European allies as good sites for bases, without sparing a thought for the liberation of the colonial peoples. Secondly, influential groups which were fundamentally opposed to any international trusteeship system became active in the USA. Thirdly, and this is the main point, Britain and the USA, struggling as they were for the leading role in the postwar world, noticed that the military successes of the Soviet Union and its decisive contribution to the defeat of Hitler’s Germany were causing world opinion to listen more readily to the voice of Moscow. In the circumstances Roosevelt and his aides thought it advisable to exercise restraint in their approach to the future of the colonial peoples.

p Despite the greatly increased interest that the USA had taken in Africa during the war years, the device of America’s “anti-colonialism” was only very rarely employed in the first postwar decade, even as just a political gambit. Washington’s African policy then was to compete with the European colonial powers and gradually oust them from their traditional spheres of influence; but not to undermine their colonial rule in Africa.

p From the political, economic and strategic viewpoints, “co-existence” in Africa with the established colonialists was considered in the United States to be the most convenient way of penetrating that continent. It is not difficult to find reasons for this view. In the first place, under the impact of national liberation uprisings in Asia, US ruling circles concluded that the African colonial rule of their European NATO allies would be less of a hindrance to the expansion of the American monopolies than the possible rise to power of progressive forces. Secondly, any demand to decolonise Africa, even if it were just for propaganda purposes, would create an open breach between the United States and Britain, France and Belgium; American ruling circles wished to avoid this at all costs. Thirdly, since the USA had never really adopted an anti-colonial posture, it 40 did not occur to anyone in official quarters to state, especially in public, that Africa should be freed. Finally, as Professor Emerson points out, "even the assumption of a standard American hostility to colonialism was not taken to have any present applicability to Africa south of the Sahara, which was no doubt seen as a dark continent of primitive peoples for whom colonial tutelage was in order".^^10^^

p Also contrary to historical fact is the story put out by American sources that by the fifties the European colonial powers came under US “pressure” to grant their African colonies independence at the earliest possible moment. In fact, Washington simply looked on while Britain. France and Belgium were prompted by other factors to undertake colonial reform. Rupert Emerson observes: "The British creation of an African unofficial majority in the Gold Coast Legislative Council in 1946, for example, went at least as far as the United States was likely to suggest.”^^11^^ Other examples are not difficult to find. Henry Byroade, the US Assistant Secretary of State, stated bluntly in 1953 that "premature independence (i.e., for African colonies—author) can be dangerous, retrogressive and destructive”. Unstinting in his praise of the actions of the colonial powers in Africa, including Portugal, Byroade "called for the frank recognition that American security was linked to the strength and stability of these powers and their legitimate interest in their dependencies".^^12^^ This view differs somewhat from the spasmodic warnings delivered to the colonial powers by American spokesmen during the war to the effect that the USA was not fighting to preserve their empires!

p One other interesting detail is on record. American members of a UN mission which visited Tanganyika in 1955 insisted on a 25-year period of “preparation” for independence. Tanganyika became an independent state just six years later, in 1961.

p It is perfectly obvious from many American sources that for a certain period after the war the USA considered that it had nothing to gain from the granting of independence to the peoples of Africa. How did the US foreign policymakers of the time come to this conclusion? Ignoring the continent’s growing struggle for national liberation and 41 turning a blind eye to the European powers’ cruel suppression of any resistance, Washington considered that "nothing was happening" in Africa. George McGhee, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, stated publicly, for example, that Africa was one place "where—in the broadest sense—no crisis exists”. It was "a region of 10 million square miles in which no significant inroads have been made by Communism”. The area was thus "relatively stable and secure".^^13^^ So the conclusion was in no doubt: since Africa’s "stability and security" were a direct result of colonial rule, there was no point in the USA’s trying to upset the balance. European colonialism was regarded as a "barrier to Communism" and so should not be weakened.

p Official circles in the USA maintained this position until it became clear that the growth of the national liberation movement was an irreversible process that would inevitably bring about the freedom of the African colonies. As early as 1956 the prominent American diplomat Chester Bowles wrote that "the most powerful country in the world . . . cannot declare itself to be a non-participant in the affairs of a continent boiling with change. . ,".^^14^^

p But even at the end of the fifties, when the liberation of Africa had already begun, the official US position was far from being “anti-colonialist”. Joseph Satterthwaite, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, put it this way: "We support African political aspirations where they are moderate, non-violent and constructive and take into account their obligations to and interdependence with the world community. We also support the principle of continued African ties with Western Europe. We see no reason why there should be a conflict between these two concepts."^^15^^ In other words, the USA was not exactly against political freedom for Africa, so long as Africa remained within the West’s sphere of influence.

p With the colonial system in a state of collapse, Walt Rostow was one of the first to clarify the new US role. He called the national liberation movement and the forced retreat of the colonialists a "revolution of modernisation”, and did not object to his European competitors’ loss of direct rule in the former colonies. What he did insist on was the 42 need for the United States to “protect” the processes taking place in the liberated countries and to show them a sample of what the "new partnership" might mean. This thinly veiled claim to the colonial succession reflected the new "vacuum theory”, which had recently taken shape. According to this theory, European rule in Africa should be replaced by an "active presence”, i.e., rule in all but name by the USA. The emergence of the theory also indicated that Washington’s African policy had come in for a certain amount of revision. Professor Vernon McKay, the wellknown expert on the African policy of the USA, refers to this in his memorable sentence: "By the time Britain took the crucial, precedent-setting step of giving independence to Ghana on March 6, 1957, it was obvious to even the most conservative officials that the United States could not be more royalist than the Queen.”^^16^^

p There is another important aspect to the apperance of something akin to a political doctrine governing the US attitude to Africa. Washington was in the grip of anxiety over the growing influence of socialist ideas in Africa and the initiation of co-operation between the Soviet Union and other states of the socialist community and African countries.

p Bourgeois historians and Western periodicals regularly hark back to the assertion that after a gap of about ten years since the end of the war the USA "fully adopted" an “anti-colonialist” outlook. True, there is some controversy over identifying the “turning-point” in Washington’s African policy. Some writers say it occurred in 1956, while others say 1957-58 or 1961, i.e., the year when the Kennedy Administration took over, and so on. Each view has facts to support it. In 1956 the Office of African Affairs was founded at the State Department. In 1958 Congress converted this section into a special Bureau of African Affairs and created a new post, that of Secretary of State for African Affairs for the man who presided over it. At the time of Dean Rusk’s promotion to the position of Secretary of State President Kennedy commented that Rusk’s assistant on African policies was to be the former Governor of the State of Michigan, G. Mennen Williams, who was noted for his “liberal” views. They also recall that as early as 1957 in one of his speeches John Kennedy voiced an opinion that 43 was not very consistent with the US role as an ally of France when he advocated independence for Algeria.^^17^^

p All these facts and many others certainly testify to the United States’ growing interest in Africa. But, as frequently happens in bourgeois accounts, the main topic has been allowed to slip out of focus. Neither reorganisation inside the State Department nor the remarks made by American politicians had any connection with anti-colonialism as such. The supposed swing towards “anti-colonialism” in US African policies, discernible from the middle of the fifties, must be viewed in the light of three factors: the vigorous upsurge of the national liberation struggle in Africa, the growing influence of the socialist system on the course of world events and the intensification of inter-imperialist rivalry in Africa.

p Washington saw that the African colonies would inevitably attain their freedom and so made a virtue of political necessity. There was no alternative to a show of "anti- colonialism”. Open support of the colonialists was ruled out by that time, and a “neutral” position might prove damaging to later policies. As Emerson puts it, "the intensification of African nationalism (i.e., the national liberation struggle— author) and the growing readiness of Britain, France and Belgium to yield to it forced the United States to run to catch up with a procession which it would have liked to believe it was leading".^^18^^

p The redivision of colonial Africa became a non-starter. The liberation struggle of the African peoples demolished the plans of the imperialists. A new question emerged into the limelight: how could the USA obtain advantages over the departing colonialists in the independent countries? How could US prestige be raised in the eyes of African peoples?

p Washington’s new move did not pass unnoticed in the European metropolises. The British were the first to respond. Britain’s representative to the UN Trusteeship Council, Alan Burns, published a book in 1957 called In Defence of Colonies. He pours scorn on the "traditional anti-colonialism" proclaimed by so much US propaganda and the verbiage from statesmen and politicians. Citing numerous examples of American colonial conquests, Burns showed that US colonial policy did not differ from that of the European powers; 44 the only differentiating factor was geography. For good measure Burns adds: "Fewer of the aboriginal inhabitants were killed in the present British colonies than perished in the American wars against the Indians.”^^19^^

p The collapse of European colonial rule in Africa was, on the whole, welcomed by ruling circles in Washington. William Attwood, the former US Ambassador to Guinea and Kenya, pointed out, for example, that, with the British withdrawal, the USA was at long last presented with the opportunity for "intrusion into their East African preserve".^^20^^ These words apply equally well to other parts of the continent. The USA was more concerned with another aspect of the question: what course of development would the liberated countries follow, and might there not be an increase in the influence of progressive forces and the socialist states? The USA wished to see that African development was not hostile to the American system, that influences opposed to the American way of life were kept at bay, that access was maintained to the continent’s raw materials and that US strategic needs were catered for. All this was stated in the report made by Senator Francis Bolton’s special study mission to Africa. In other words, ideological control of Africa would have to be exercised by the United States.^^21^^ Similar views are encountered in a number of other official US Government documents. For example, the report of a task force assigned by Kennedy in December 1960 to study African policy rejected the idea that "Africa was still a semidependency of Europe and that America should not intrude... But it stressed that US ‘intrusion’ should be low-key, practical. . ,".^^22^^ The “anti-colonialism” line was supposed to provide the ideological fuel for the "new course”. The USA’s main purpose was to take control of the national liberation movement in Africa and to "turn the tide"^^23^^ of events, directing them into a channel that would suit the American monopolies.

p It was not, of course, difficult at first for the United States to pose as an “anti-colonialist”, since the general course of events in Africa did not oblige the Americans to give any practical demonstration of their feelings. The fact that they were officially regarded as allies of the colonial powers was no obstacle either. The colonialists were themselves 45 compelled to make concessions to the national liberation forces and to “grant” their colonies independence.

p The net result, as even American researchers note, was that "the United States may have received more credit than it deserved" in Africa.^^2^^’^^1^^ But the idyll was comparatively short-lived. In the first place, the contradictions between the former European metropolises and American imperialism, their would-be successor, went from bad to worse. In his press conference of the 23 July 1964 de Gaulle declared: "The colonial powers which have accomplished, in more or less difficult circumstances, the transfer of their sovereignty to local regimes felt that everywhere, directly or indirectly, they were under pressure from Washington.” In the second place, the true value of American statements began to dawn on the African countries themselves. The myth of US “ anticolonialism” received a severe setback on the 24 November 1964, when mercenary troops parachuted into Stanleyville from American planes. The sight of the USA making common cause with the Belgian colonialists was a clear indication to Africans of the reality behind Washington’s African policies and intentions.

p It was with a certain malicious glee that the West German periodical Aussenpolitik commented that as a result of this action and a number of others "the political capital accumulated by the USA over the last few years as a counterweight to the colonial powers . . . has melted away. The African countries have realised that the main aim of US policy is to hinder communist infiltration. Against a background of growing national awareness among the peoples of Africa, this position can only look like paternalism. Owing to this and also through its leading role in NATO, of which Portugal, the most hated colonial power in Africa, is also a member, the USA has gained the stigma of neocolonialism.”^^25^^

p However, American ruling circles saw no cause for embarrassment. Moreover, the appearance of anti-American feeling in most African countries not only failed to impede US expansion in the continent, but rather had the opposite effect: it gave added impetus to American activity and persistence. This, in turn, intensified the inter-imperialist struggle for influence. The African scholar Professor Ali Mazrui 46 writes: "Then gradually American aid, American personnel and American cultural and diplomatic influence began to touch the course of events in many of the new countries. And the crystallization of African attitudes towards the United States became a point of departure from a total African obsession with the former colonial powers.”^^26^^

p Even today the USA has not abandoned its "anti- colonialist" image. Instead, a few modifications have been made and additional arguments supplied. For example, every effort is made to stress the “anti-colonial” nature of the "Peace Corps”. Its former director, J. Hood Vaughn, declared before Congress in July 1968 that the "Peace Corps" was not an agency for promoting US foreign policy.

p Declarations of this type are supposed to back up the USA’s “anti-colonial” stance. This has become a particularly necessary step in a situation where Africa has, by and large, achieved political independence, but the economic position of the former metropolises in the young states has generally remained quite firm. This state of affairs presented a considerable obstacle to US plans for expansion. It was essential to find the key that would "unlock the door" into Africa. The “anti-colonialist” propaganda was just such a key. Its aim was to convince the African countries of the USA’s friendship and good intentions. They were to believe that colonial designs were completely alien to an America that had experienced the yoke of British colonialism. It must be said that the spreading of the myth brought great practical benefits to the USA, and many representatives of the developing world fell under its spell to some extent.

p Today the “anti-colonialist” line is intended not only to emphasise the “difference” between the USA and the former metropolises, but also to create the illusion that the USA is not an imperialist state at all; from this it would follow that US relationships with developing countries are fundamentally different from those maintained by such traditional colonial powers as Britain and France.

p Seeing “anti-colonialism” as an important device for boosting American influence in Africa, the US propaganda machine spares no effort in publicising it. Use is even made of the fact that in recent years the government has steadily whittled down the “aid” money available to African 47 countries. The reasoning paraded by American spokesmen could sound convincing to the uninitiated: the USA is not a colonial power and so bears no responsibility for the aftermath of a colonial regime; only America’s “anti-colonialist” tradition prompts it to “participate” in the destinies of the liberated peoples and "make sacrifices”, since the aid furnished to African countries brings in no profit and is simply "a burden on the American economy".^^27^^ At the same time the activities of the American monopolies are depicted as no more than "normal business”. Moreover, the point is rammed home that the monopolies are not interested in the political orientation of the African country into which they are sinking their capital. Philip Quigg, the editor of the journal Foreign Affairs, comments as follows: "The average American businessman with interests or markets in Africa . .. professes to be apolitical, is chary of giving his opinions and favours whatever status quo prevails, whether it be of the left or right. Because he is likely to have worldwide involvements, he may have no particular interest in Africa beyond the preservation of a climate in which he can achieve an adequate return on his investment. He is a conservative force, but not a reactionary one.”^^28^^

p Not only is the USA’s “anti-colonialism” substantiated in this way, but an attempt is also being made to refute any notion that penetration by the American monopolies may pose a threat to the independence of a young state. The Africans are told that American investments do not mean any increase in US influence.

The political headquarters and ideological services of the former metropolises do not just remain idle spectators as the USA endeavours to persuade the liberated peoples of its “anti-colonialism”. One of the counter-measures taken in Britain and France was the wholesale rewriting of the history of colonialism. It was depicted as "the motive force of progress”. Colonialism was not, of course, swept away by the national liberation movement, but was shown to have abolished itself, having completed its "historic mission”. In British publications one even comes across claims that Britain, unlike the USA, has "rendered a great service" to the peoples of Africa by "helping them towards civilisation”; the USA "declined to take on" this "historic mission”.