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p On March 2, 1946, the National Assembly opened its first session at the Grand Theatre in Hanoi. The day before, Ho Chi Minh had been working late, chain-smoking as usual. Since he had become President, with all the responsibilities this implied, he had smoked two, even three packs daily. Now, too, driving down the Street of Necklaces past the Lake of the Redeemed Sword towards Theatre Square, he was smoking. His tired face was calm, and only his bright eyes showed that his mind was at work. The President’s eyes had been much talked about ever since he took office. Even in portraits they looked different from those of other people.

p The National Assembly had delegated two deputies the oldest of them, Ngo Tu Ha, and the youngest, Nguyen Dinh Thi, who later became a celebrated writer to meet the President at the state entrance to the theatre. Ho Chi Minh smiled broadly as he bowed to the people in the hall and then mounted the platform of the presiding committee, accompanied by the members of the government.

p The seat of the Vice-President was empty. Nguyen Hai Than had earlier announced that he would not be able to take part in the session because of illness. It was rumoured, however, not without irony, that he was afraid to take part in the debate for he was in poor command of his native tongue.

p Also absent were many delegates from Nam-bo who could not make their way to the North across the frontline.

p Ho Chi Minh came up to the microphone, visibly excited:

p “This is the first forum of our people’s true representatives in the 190 history of Vietnam, the result of a long and hard struggle of many generations of Vietnamese, a struggle that has broughl casualties and suffering. Our meeting is also the result of the cohesion of all of our fellow-countrymen, old and young, people of different religions and different nationalities. Acting in concert, our countrymen have built a firm monolith that can stand up to any dangers and any losses."

p Ho Chi Minh spoke of the government’s proposal to expand the National Assembly by 70 people representatives of the National Party and the Revolutionary League. The deputies welcomed this proposal. Thereupon, the representatives of those two parties entered and filled the empty seats. While the session had still been in preparation, some comrades voiced the idea of dividing the seats in the pit into two halves the right and the left and accommodating the new 70 deputies on the right side. But Ho Chi Minh was strongly opposed to this senseless imitation of the Convent in the days of the French Revolution. In the lace of the growing outside threat he sought to buttress national unity. The need to evade anything that might foment dissent and deepen the split between the Vietminh and the other organisations was stressed in all his speeches and newspaper articles. He also spoke about national unity from the rostrum of the first session of the National Assembly.

p “Our National Assembly symbolises our national unity. All the political parties of our country have their representatives here. There are also many non-party people, representatives of women’s organisations and of ethnic minorities. Therefore, I firmly believe that each deputy represents not merely some individual party or organisation, but the whole of our Vietnamese nation."

p The National Assembly session was the first public meeting at which Ho Chi Minh met the elected representatives of the people after the proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It took place in the presence of numerous guests journalists and representatives of public organisations. All of them could see Ho Chi Minh’s extraordinary popularity. His simple manners, his prepossessing smile, his persuasive manner of speaking, free from affectation and gesticulation, created an atmosphere of fraternity and unity. And that was not easy lo achieve in such a mixed audience made up of people of different political persuasions, including representatives of reactionary parties. The proposal of one of the deputies that the National Assembly should, on behalf of the nation, thank the Provisional Government for what it had done, and commend President Ho Chi Minh as leader of the new Vietnam, was met with cheers.

p The participants in the session unanimously adopted a proposal to appoint President Ho Chi Minh head of government and appoint the absent representative of the Revolutionary League, Nguyen Hai Than, his 191 deputy. After Ho Chi Minh was sworn in as President and Prime Minister, the National Assembly endorsed the list of members of the coalition government he had submitted for approval. The National Assembly adopted a special resolution on vesting the government with extensive powers in lace of the complicated military and political situation. The executive functions of the supreme body of state in the period between the National Assembly sessions were to be discharged by a specially elected Standing Committee. All principal executive jjosts on the committee were filled by members of the Vietminh.

The first session of the National Assembly showed, as Ho Chi Minh had predicted, that in spite of the considerable concessions to right-wing parties, the main commanding posts in the state apparatus were firmly under Victminh control, and the key executive jobs were filled by Communists with years ol experience.

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p The patient tactics of Ho Chi Minh and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indochina gradually reduced the threat coming from Chungking. Chiang Kaishck, who apparently had his hands full at home, was inclined lo withdraw his troops from North Vietnam. At the same time, the military threat from the French colonialists was growing appreciably.

p In an effort to pull out of the bothersome Indochina affair, Britain, which was increasingly under pressure from her French ally, delegated, late in January 1946, her “authority” in Indochina to France and withdrew her troops from South Vietnam.

p The United Slates had by then also modified its position. After Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s death, President Harry Truman announced his consent to the return of the French army and the French administration to Indochina. The Americans made it clear lo Chiang Kaishek, who was full) dejx-ndent on them militarily, that he should let a French expeditionary corps replace the Chinese troops in North Vietnam, although the disarmament of the Japanese troops thai had surrendered in Indochina (the formal reason for the French occupation of that country] had long been completed.

p On February 28, 1946, reports came from Chungking that the French and the Chinese had signed an agreement on the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam and their replacement by French troops before March .SI, 1946. In compensation, the Chinese persuaded the French to relinquish their privileges in China under the unequal treaties, and regained control over the whole of Kwangchowan. They also secured free 192 passage for goods to China through Vietnam, the use ol’the so-called live /.one in Haiphong and extensive privileges lor ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam.

p The agreement between Chiang Kaishek and the French put the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in a very difficult position. Ho Chi Minh and his associates realised that France had been given what seemed a legitimate pretext for aggression and would try to regain her colonial hold on all Vietnam. That the French would not hesitate to destroy the gains of the Vietnamese revolution (as proved by the events in Nambo) was obvious. The young republic laced the choice of either going to war against a formidable enemy or negotiating a political compromise.

p The charged atmosphere of those days, when the fate of the revolution hung in the balance, can be judged from one of the meetings of the Provisional Coalition Governmeni. When Ho Chi Minh urged achieving a compromise with France, there was a counter-proposal to ask for China’s military support to prevent the French from returning to Vietnam. At the height of the debate, Ho Chi Minh rose to speak:

p “Can’t you understand what would happen if the Chinese stayed? You ignore our past history. Whenever the Chinese came, they stayed a thousand years. The French, on the other hand, can stay for only a short time. Eventually, they will have to leave."

p But as the Vietminh referred to official talks with the French, the mere mention was jeered. Particularly vociferous were the Viet each and Vietquoc, who posed as the only revolutionaries. Their newspapers and radio stirred up the masses with the ultra-revolutionary slogan, "Victory or death!" Their ulterior aim was clear: to foil a settlement with tinFrench, prod the government to rash, ill-advised action, and pull off a coup in Hanoi. But there were also opponents of negotiations inside the Vietminh and the Communist Party of Indochina. Carried away by emotions, some members of the Communist Party and of the Vietminh sincerely believed that any talks with the oppressors of the Vietnamese people would be a betrayal of the revolution.

p In those days, Ho Chi Minh wondered whether there was a workable alternative to a war with the French and, as usual, checked his thoughts with Lenin’s. The situation in Vietnam was similar to that in Soviet Russia when Lenin and his associates had thought it advisable to sign a separate peace treaty with Germany. All counter-revolutionary forces from the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries down to the most reactionary of reactionaries were dead set against such a treaty. And they had an ally in Trotsky and the so-called Left Communists. They opposed Lenin and demanded that the hostilities be carried on to a victorious end. This provocational policy was skilfully camouflaged 193 with ultra-left rhetoric. Trotsky, who headed the Soviet delegation at Brest, declared, in breach of his directives, that lie refused to sign tinpeace treaty on German terms. As a result, the German army mounted an offensive and sei/.ed a large chunk ol’the Soviet Republic. The peace terms that Germany proposed the second time were even more onerous. Yet Lenin insisted that they be accepted. Ho Chi Minh remembered Lenin’s words: "The peace terms are intolerably severe. Nevertheless history will come into its own. The future, in spite of all trials, is ours."  [193•1 

p Lenin’s priceless experience enabled Ho Chi Minh and the Central Committee ol’the Communist Party of Indochina to find the best tactical line that would accord with the existing correlation of forces, namely, to make reasonable concessions to the enemy, achieve a compromise in order to save the people’s power, and buy time for regrouping and preparing for a decisive battle against the colonialists.

p On March 3, the Standing Bureau of the Party’s Central Committee adopted a directive that Ho Chi Minh had worked out for members of the Party concerning the current political situation.

p It said, among other things, thai, while negotiating with France, il was necessary to secure French recognition of Vietnam’s independence and at the same lime maintain good relations with the French. Tinmain thing was to make sure that France would recognise the right of the Vietnamese people to self-determination. Also important was retaining national unity. In that case, the Vietnamese could agree to a temporary French occupation of the North in order to replace Chiang Kaishek’s forces, provided the French stayed for a specified time. The directive stressed that "in the course ol’the negotiations with France, preparations for a war of resistance would not cease for an instant. On tincontrary, they would be intensified. The negotiations with France must by no means affect the fighting spirit or weaken the morale of the nation."

p On March 5, the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee approved the policy for seeking a compromise with the French. Already on the following day, a preliminary Vietnam-French agreement was signed in one of the handsome mansions in the formerly European district of Hanoi. The signing ceremony was attended by members of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and by French officers, representatives of Chiang Kaishek’s General Staff, and personnel of the U.S. Legation and British Consulate, who crowded around Ho Chi 194 Minh as he affixed his signature to the text of the agreement and the additional protocol. To an outsider this ceremony may have symbolised a new, as yet weakened Vietnam surrounded by imperialist predators.

p The preliminary agreement said the "French Government recognised the Republic of Vietnam as a free stale that has its own parliament, its army, and fiscal system”. For its part, the Democratic Republic of" Vietnam agreed "to enter the Indochina Federation and French Union”. As to the future of Nam-bo, the agreement pointed out that the "French Government shall honour the decisions of a popular referendum".

p The Democratic Republic of Vietnam agreed to the temporary entry of French troops into North Vietnam to replace the Chinese troops. The additional protocol stipulated that the Chinese would be replaced bymixed Franco-Vietnamese forces (10,000 troops from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and 15,000 from France) under French Command, and "with the participation of Vietnamese representatives".

p On behalf of France, Jean Sainteny, who shortly before had been appointed French Commissioner in Tonkin, concluded a preliminary agreement with Ho Chi Minh and other representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In his book liistoire d’une Paix Manquee (The Story of a Lost Peace) he later wrote: "Already after my first lew meetings with Ho Chi Minh I was under the impression that this ascetic, whose face spoke of wisdom, energy, a keen intellect and perspicacity, was an outstanding personality, and that he would soon move into the forefront of Asian politics... His cultural endowments, his intellect and inexhaustible capacity for work, his dedication, won him unprecedented popularity among his people. Regrettably, France underestimated him and failed to understand his importance and that of the forces behind him."
 

p The signing of an agreement with the French had a mixed response in Vietnam. Even inside the Party not everybody accepted its compulsive thrust. Particularly vicious were the reactionaries and leftists, who circulated all kinds of slanderous rumours. One of them was that Ho Chi Minh was an agent of the French colonialists and that he had sold Vietnam’s hard-won independence. To scotch these rumours, the government lost no time to tell the people of the real state of affairs. The campaign culminated in a mass rally in Theatre Square in Hanoi. One after another, leading members of the government and the Vietminh, mounted the rostrum to explain to tens of thousands of Hanoians why the government had to sign the preliminary agreement.

p They said that Vietnam did not want to see any foreign troops on its territory. But. they stressed, the Anglo-American allies had changed the situation. The French troops, over 10,000 in all, would go to the North 195 to replace the 200,000 Chinese there. And after that, as it was recorded in the agreement, the French troops would eventually have to leave Vietnam. Thanks to the heroic struggle of the people, the French government was compelled to recognise Vietnam a free state. This was an important advance compared with de Gaulle’s autonomy. And now they could go further and win full independence. France had to agree to a national referendum on the unification of the three parts of the country and promised to recognise the results of the referendum. Nam-bo would eventually rejoin the rest of the country. All people of Vietnam had to close their ranks as the struggle was just beginning.

p The meeting was addressed by President Ho Chi Minh.

p “Our country became free in August 1945,” he said. "However, to this day not a single great power has recognised our independence. The negotiations with France have opened the road to our international recognition, towards strengthening the positions of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the world arena. An agreement has been signed which is a major political victory. We have become a free nation. As put down in the agreement, the French troops will gradually be withdrawn from Vietnam. Our fellow countrymen must keep calm and disciplined, and must strengthen unity and cohesion."

p He stopped for a second, and then continued in a clear voice:

p “I, Ho Chi Minh, have all my life been fighting together with my people for the independence of our homeland. And I would rather die than turn traitor to my cause."

p The square was silent. But after Ho finished his speech, many were moved to tears. The President’s words sounded like an oath of loyalty to the nation. As he spoke, all the people raised their clenched fists and broke into loud cheers: "We shall firmly follow the instructions of the Government and President Ho Chi Minh! Long live President Ho Chi Minh!"

p Two days after the signing of the preliminary agreement, Ho Chi Minh received the commanders of Hanoi’s self-defence units.

p “The cease-fire agreement does not end the war,” he said. "We have pledged to pursue a policy of good will towards the French troops, but this does not mean we must show signs of weakness and yield to pressure. On the contrary. We must be ready for combat in order to be on top of whatever new situation emerges."

Characterising the policy of the DRV Government in that complicated period, Ho Chi Minh later wrote: "We needed peace to build our country, and therefore we made concessions. Although the French colonialists breached their promise and unleashed war, the nearly one year of respite gave us time to build up our basic forces."

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p In the seven months after the victory of the revolution, a great deal was done to strengthen the armed forces of the young republic. Prior to the August uprising, civil defence societies had sprung up primarily in the liberated zone, whereas now the process encompassed the whole country. Already by the end of 1945, self-defence units had been set up in almost all villages, rural and urban communities, at factories and mines. In one of his speeches, Ho Chi Minh called these units the steel wall of the nation.

p Members of civil defence societies underwent military training and studied hand-to-hand combat techniques. Firearms manufacturing became a nationwide drive. As in the old days, village blacksmiths switched from making ploughshares and sickles to casting swords and spearheads. Children collected scrap metal, while adults took copper flatware and even objects of religious worship to metal collection centres.

p The regular army was rapidly growing, and its organisational structure now included battalions and regiments. Although it was operating virtually underground, the Party succeeded in taking control over the Armed Forces’ build-up. Two military schools were operating in Hanoi under Party guidance. One was for training regulars and the other for training self-defence units. Many of those who graduated from these schools became prominent military leaders.

p In Ho Chi Minh’s words, by early 1946 "a new type of army had emerged from the midst of the people, an army that was supported by the people and fought for their interests”. It was affectionately called Uncle Ho’s Army.

p In the spring of 1946, Ho Chi Minh attended the opening ceremony at a military school in the northwestern province of Sontei. There for the first time he proclaimed the motto of the Liberation Army: "Loyalty to the motherland, loyalty to the people".
 

p The revolution that Ho Chi Minh and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indochina steered through those stormy days could well be compared to a boat sailing down a mountain stream: having barely negotiated one narrow passage, more rumbling cataracts loomed ahead.

p The Chiang Kaishek army, 200,000 strong, which had failed to oust the Ho Chi Minh revolutionary government and plant a puppet regime of its own, was now leaving Vietnam. The young republic was thus relieved of a dangerous presence.

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p The republic was also rid of a tremendous material burden, for Chiang Kaishek’s troops had harassed, marauded, and robbed the local population. Trainloads and truckloads of loot from Vietnam were being shipped to China by railway and along the highways. According to the DRV government, the Chinese had taken out 250 million piastres worth of plunder. Another 400 million piastres had been misappropriated through the Bank of Indochina.

p No sooner had the Chiang Kaishek troops left Vietnam than another enemy appeared. The day after the signing of the preliminary agreement, French troops began disembarking in Haiphong.That first violation was followed by many others. The French provoked armed clashes with Vietnamese self-defence units. The DRV government was informed that General Lcclerc, the Commander-in-Chicf of the French expeditionary corps, had issued a secret order to ignore Vietnamese representatives and fortify the French positions in areas of deployment, eliminate the leaders of the local Annamite organisations, and lay the ground for a coup d’etat.

p Simultaneously, the colonialists were in a hurry to set up a government in occupied Nam-bo as a first step towards restoring the old regime.

p The French expeditionary corps seized the ’Fay Nguyen Plateau in Central Vietnam and set up a new autonomous state, called Moi, formed of local mountain tribes. The French also captured the town of Dong Dang on the Chinese border and took control of the main railway of North Vietnam. As a result, the people’s government was beleaguered on all sides.

p The DRV government insisted on the earliest possible start of the second round of talks with France, as specified in the preliminary agreement. Late in March, the High Commissioner of France, Thierry d’ Argenlicu, suggested to Ho Chi Minh that the talks be conducted on board a French cruiser in the Gulf of Halong, some 150 kilometres southeast of Hanoi. A hoary colonialist, d’Argcnlicu hoped this would humiliate the Ho Chi Minh government, and intimidate the Vietnamese with a show of force.

p After weighing the pros and cons, considering the gravity of the situation, the Communist Party of Indochina Central Committee decided to accept d’Argenlieu’s proposal so as to secure French consent to holding talks at government level in Paris, where Ho Chi Minh and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indochina hoped the colonialist hawks, such as d’Argenlieu and Leclerc, would not be able to influence the French government as much as they did now.

p Halong, or Bay of the Submerged Dragon, is the most picturesque place in Vietnam. This is probably why people call it the eighth wonder of the world. The bay is particularly beautiful in the evening when the 198 bright orange rays of the selling sun light up the calm bluish-green water washing the denied shoreline and the numerous craggy islets about 5,000 in all. The fantastic beauty of the bay has given rise to main legends, some of them dating to the ancient past. One legend tells why the place is called the Submerged Dragon. Since time immemorial, the islands teemed with pirates and robbers who terrorised the common folk. When the celestial emperor found out about the sea-robbers he sent a dragon against them. After the dragon had killed the tyrants, he felt drowsy and plunged into the deep waters where he reposes to this day. If one takes a bird s eye view of the area, one sees that I he meandering contours of the shoreline and the numerous little islands acluallv look like the jagged spine of a dragon.

p At 10 a.m. on March 24. a (,’altilii/u amphibious plane touched down upon the surface: of the bay alongside the cruiser Entile llcrtin. Admiral d’Argenlieu and Leclerc greeted the DRV President by the gangplank of the ship. A gun salute was tired. The cruiser weighed anchor and sailed out to sea. After breakfast in the stateroom and an exchange of toasts, d’Argenlieu invited Ho Chi Minh to the captain’s bridge to review a parade of warships. The President, a straw hat on his head, stood leaning on his bamboo cane. The cruiser raised anchor, and the warships, with the covers removed from their guns, sailed by. The crewmen lined the deck and greeted Ho Chi Minh with friendly cheers.

p The talks with the French added up to an empty formality. D’ Argonlieu declined to discuss Cochin China. The two sides gave opposite interpretations of the preliminary agreement. For the French the status of the Democratic: Republic of Vietnam as a free state was a mere form of colonial autonomy. At the same time, the French regarded the Indochina Federation as the same old general governorship, which was just another word for colony.

p The French delegation held on to this posture at the talks with the Vietnamese in the small town of Dalat, which opened on April 1 7, 1946.

p Ceneral Salan, who accompanied Ho Chi Minh on his flight back to Hanoi, asked the President about his impressions.

“If the admiral thinks I was cowed by the might of his fleet, he is wrong,” Ho Chi Minh replied coldly. "Your dreadnoughts will never be able to sail up our rivers."

4

p The signing of the preliminary agreement with the French, which was a forced compromise, showed how fierce the struggle was between the young republic and the imperialists, and between the people’s government headed by the Communist Party of Indochina and the internal reactionaries, who leaned for support on their foreign patrons. With the 199 departure of the Chinese and the mounting pressure of the French, some of the nationalist parties and groups modified their attitude, which raised hopes that they would take part in the national struggle.

p Meanwhile, the relations between the DRV government and the French representatives in Indochina continued to deteriorate. French servicemen were more and more often involved in hostile provocations. The talks in Dalat ran into a deadlock. Ho Chi Minh insisted that the talks be moved to Paris without delay. In his view the entire negotiating process should be taken outside Indochina where it was prejudiced by diehards like d’Argenlieu. The Vietnam problem as he saw it, should be in the limelight of French political and public life. He also hoped to establish close contacts with the French democratic, movement headed by the French Communist Party. FA en if the talks failed, he thought, they would still be useful, because the Vietnamese delegation would be able to explain to the French public the- goals of the DRV government and in this way win new friends.

p Of course, there were many reasons against the choice of Paris as venue of the talks, which promised to be long and tedious. It would mean that many DRV leaders would be out of the country for a long time at that crucial period. Some of the members of the Standing Bureau of the Party’s Central Committee feared for Ho Chi Minn’s safety. After weighing all pros and cons, they proposed that the talks be continued in France. On April 26, a DRV delegation headed by Pham Van Dong left for Paris. And at the end of May, Ho Chi Minh was formally invited to France as the guest of the French government.

p Thousands of people in Hanoi and the adjacent areas assembled outside the University building early in the morning on May 30 to give him a send-off. One of the many posters read: "Vietnam one and indivisible, and Nam-bo is its part."

p Addressing the meeting, Ho Chi Minh said: "I have devoted my whole life to the struggle for the good of my country and for the happiness of my people. It is for this goal that I was hiding in the mountains, languishing in jail, and braving dangers and privations. I am giving all of myself to make this struggle a success. And now, thanks to the unity of the people, we have won political power in the country and I have been entrusted with my present high post. Today, following the decision of the government, I must, by the will of the people, set out on a long journey of thousands of miles. I will go, together with the other members of the delegation, to France... I assure you that we will do our best to live up to the trust of the people."

p The next day, Ho Chi Minh got up before dawn to write an address to his fellow-countrymen in Nam-bo. "The news of my going to France with a delegation lor official negotiations has caused concern to our 200 people, especially in Nam-bo. What does the future hold for Nam-bo? Please, don’t worry... You in Nam-bo are citi/cns of Vietnam. Rivers may dry up, mountains may erode, but this truth will never change. I advise you to be united. The five fingers are of unequal length but they are united in the hand. The millions of our fellow-countrymen are not all alike; but they are descended from the same ancestors... Broad unity will bring us a bright future."

p Ho Chi Mmh flew in the company of the French General Salan. When the plane touched down at Cairo Airport for refuelling, Ho Chi Minh received unexpected news: a puppet government had been sel up in Saigon to head the so-called Republic of Cochin China. This is how the French had interpreted the article in the preliminary agreement about the recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a free and independent state. Ho Chi Minh did not try to conceal his indignation from Salan. He said:

p “This is an act of duplicity on the part of the French. I would not advise you to turn Cochin China into another Alsace and Lorraine. That could start a hundred-year war."

p While in Cairo, where his plane waited for three days, he received a telegram from Paris. It read: "Dear Mr. President. We request you to stop over in Biarrit/ pending formal invitation to Paris after the formation of a new French government."

p Ho Chi Minh spent ten days in Biarrit/, a picturesque resort town on the western coast of France, not far from the Spanish border. It looked as if deliberate procrastination was part of the French plan. The French imperialists did not want to hear of an independent and free Vietnam.

On July 6, a new round of Franco-Vietnamese talks began in Fontaincbleau. The place was decorated with the French tri-colour and the gold-starred red (lags of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The negotiations revealed a wide difference of views. Acting in accordance with the preliminary agreement, the Vietnamese delegation sought recognition of the independence of Vietnam and restoration of its unity within the framework of the French Union. It also sought endorsement by France of the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic: of Vietnam in internal and foreign policy matters. The delegation regarded the Indochina Federation only as a form of coordinating the interests of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and as a form of maintaining their economic and cultural ties. Finally, the delegation was firmly opposed to any attempts to pry Nam-bo away from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. At one of the plenary meetings, Duong Bach Mai, a member of the Vietnamese delegation, said:

201 “As long as attempts are made to pry Cochin China away from Vietnam, no agreement between France and Vietnam will be possible. Kverything depends entirely on the Cochin China question: Franco-Vietnamese friendship, peace in Vietnam, and the future of our relations. It is necessary to settle this problem as soon as possible."

p Meanwhile the French side continued to insist on conditions which in eflect meant a split of Vietnam and the loss of its sovereignty in such vital areas as finance, the armed forces, and foreign policy. It amounted to an implicit renunciation by Vietnam of its independence, and to its transformation into a new type of colony. What all that would lead to could well be judged from the "autonomous republic" that the French had created in South Vietnam, whose puppet cabinet was headed by d’Argenlieu and whose Consultative Assembly was run by the French.

p Ho Chi Minh was not officially a member of the Vietnamese delegation, and thus did not take part in the proceedings at Fontaincbleau. But he was active in other ways. He was frequently visited at his hotel near Monceau Park by representatives of French mass organisations, the leading figures of the three main political parties represented in the National Assembly, and by his old friends Marcel Cachin, Maurice Thore/., Jacques Duclos, Francois Billoux, the writers Louis Aragon, Ilya Lhrcnburg, Anna Seghers, Lisa Triolet, Jean-Richard Bloch, and Pierre Lmmanuel.

p While trying to wrest the much needed recognition of Vietnam’s independence from the French, Ho Chi Minh, at the same time, relied on the strength of the French working class, the French Communists. In those days, the French Cabinet included live representatives of the Communist Party, and its General Secretary Maurice Thorez was Deputy Prime Minister. Shortly before the Cabinet meeting at which the Vietnam question was to be discussed, Ho Chi Minh sent Maurice Thorez a letter, still kept in the house of his wife, Jeannette Vermeersch. It reads: "Dear comrade, tomorrow, Wednesday, the Cabinet will discuss Indochina. The future of Vietnam largely depends on the outcome. So, I am asking you to invite all the Communist ministers.

p “Yesterday, I met with the Minister for Colonial Affairs and told him that it was necessary to secure a positive solution of two key issues, namely, the independence of Vietnam and the future of Cochin China. The gentleman replied that we should submit concrete proposals which would facilitate the Cabinet’s consent to the word independence. I am enclosing the text of the proposals that we passed on to the Minister for Colonial Affairs last night..."

p The French Communists did all they could to make the Cabinet heed the opinion of (he Vietnamese delegation. But the odds were against 202 them. In the autumn of 1946, those in the government who favoured a tougher policy came out on top, signalling a shift to the right on the French political scene. In the general election held on June 2, 1946, the French Communist Party and the Socialist Party lost their majority in the Constituent Assembly and Constitutional Commission. As a result, the government came under the control of Georges Bidault, leader of a clerical party called the People’s Republican Movement.

p The Vietnamese delegation had only one option: to propose that all decisions on key issues should be postponed and that a document suiting both sides be signed. On September 14, President Ho Chi Minh and Marius Mould, ihe French Overseas Affairs Minister, signed an interim Vietnamese-French Modus Vivendi Convention.

p The Modus Vivendi Convention provided for a resumption of talks not later than January 1947. The two governments undertook to set free prisoners-of-war and political prisoners, and to halt hostilities both in Cochin China and the south of Annam. The question of a referendum in Cochin China (Nam-bo), which was expected to lay the groundwork for the future of the southern part of the country, was deliberately couched in nebulous terms. The French were apprehensive: after the cease-fire three-quarters of Nam-bo’s territory was still controlled by the patriotic forces, and more than a thousand villages (out of the 1,250) were under DRV administration.

p Upon his return, Ho Chi Minh delivered an address to the nation about the results of the almost three months’ talks in Fontainebleau. Vietnam, he said, had gained another respite from war and that was a major result; the new Vietnam national flag had, for the first time, been seen in France; the attention of the French government and people, and indeed the world public, had been drawn to the events in Vietnam; at the same time the key problems, such as the independence and unity of the country, were still unresolved and a long struggle lay ahead.

Analysing the main reason for the failure of the talks in Fontainebleau, Jacques Duclos wrote in his Memoirs: "The French participants in the talks thought that the government of President Ho Chi Minh was not strong enough and, reckoning on the support of its opponents, did nothing towards the success of the talks. Our rulers just did not like- it that the Hanoi government was headed by such an authoritative Communist leader as Ho Chi Minh... The Fountainebleau conference failed because the French government pursued a clearly colonialist policy. I remember how disappointed President Ho Chi Minh was whom I had met on several occasions."

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p The failure of that round of the Franco-Vietnamese talks and the separatist policy that the French and their hirelings pursued in South Vietnam raised the question of what would happen to Nam-bo. The reactionary press accused the DRV government of having betrayed the country. In his address to the nation Ho Chi Minh reaffirmed the government’s position on the future of Nam-bo. "The North, Centre and South are part of Vietnam,” he wrote. "We have the same ancestors, we are of the same family, we are all brothers and sisters. No one can divide the children of the same family... No one can divide Vietnam. So long as the Fatherland is not unified and our compatriots are suffering, I can neither eat with appetite, nor sleep in peace. I solemnly promise you that with your determination and that of the entire people, our beloved South will come back to the bosom of our Fatherland."

p Already at the first meeting of the Standing Bureau of the Party’s Central Committee, Ho Chi Minh proposed calling another session of the National Assembly. It was to draft a Constitution and discuss other matters that had accumulated over the previous stormy six months. The session opened at the Grand Theatre on November 28. ’There were markedly fewer deputies this time: out of the seventy seats reserved earlier for representatives of the pro-Chinese parties, about half were empty. Their occupants had left with Chiang Kaishek’s troops including Vice-President Nguyen Hai Than, foreign minister Nguyen Tuong Tarn, and Vice-Chairman of the Military Committee, Vu Hong Khanh.

p One of the deputies made an official inquiry about the government’s attitude to the vice-president and the ministers who had fled the country.

p “It is true that today, when our country is going through difficult times, these gentlemen are no longer with us,” replied Ho Chi Minh. "The people entrusted them with high posts, but these gentlemen abandoned them and left. You may wonder if they did that with a clear conscience. These men have no sense of duty; they either do not want or are unable to carry the burden of state affairs. All we can say is that we shall continue, as of old, to carry this burden ourselves."

p The Assembly applauded. Ho Chi Minh raised his hand, and continued:

p “However, if they consider themselves our brothers, if they muster enough strength and courage to respond to the call of conscience, to the call ol their fellow countrymen and their homeland, and decide to return, we shall be glad to receive them."

p At the first session of the National Assembly, the Vietcach and Victquoc deputies had said the flag of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 204 should he changed, for it looked too much like the flag of the Comintern and was therefore contrary to the national spirit of the Vietnamese. Similar demands were heard at the second session. Replying, Ho Chi Minh said:

p “It is true, some members of the government had earlier suggested that the colour of the national Oag be changed, and we actually meant to submit this question to the Standing Committee of the National Assembly. However, much has changed since that clay. Our red (lag with a gold star symbolises the blood of thousands of Vietnamese fighting in Nam-bo and in the Trung-bo south. It has been seen in Europe and returned to Asia and was saluted with reverence everywhere."

p His eyes flashed, there were metallic notes in his voice a very unusual thing for this otherwise most mild and gentle person: "And today, no one but the twenty-five million Vietnamese has the right to alter this flag."
 

p The hard-won respite was shortlived. By the autumn of 1946, the advocates of a military solution in Vietnam got the upper hand in France. While the Fontaineblcau negotiations were still underway, a French expeditionary corps was secretly preparing to occupy all the northern provinces. On November 23, the French Military Command in the North presented an ultimatum to the Vietnamese authorities in Haiphong to leave the limits of the port and the adjacent area within two hours. Upon expiry of this period, the French shelled Haiphong, killing thousands of people.

p After a routine meeting of the Governmental Council, Ho Chi Minh asked Vo Nguyen Giap to stay on for an eye-to-eye talk.

p “If the enemy starts a war in the North, too, how long, do you think, we’ll hold out in Hanoi?" he asked.

p “I think for not more than a month."

p “And what about the other cities?"

p “Possibly longer."

p “And what about the rural areas?"

p “Those, we’ll keep under our control."

p Ho Chi Minh reflected for a few minutes, then said:

p “Let’s go back to Tan Trao."

p On Ho Chi Minh’s instructions, Nguyen Luong Bang went to Victbac to set up emergency quarters for the government and the Party leadership. A drive was started to set up guerilla bases in the mountains and the jungle, with workshops, munitions dumps and food stores being moved there from the cities.

p On December 19, the French troops launched a sudden attack on key areas in Hanoi damaging the power station, some factories, and the 205 government buildings. The next day they captured the government’s residence, ripped down the flag of the Republic and raised the French flag. The high-sounding promises of recognising the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a free state, the peace agreements and conventions that the French government had concluded with Vietnam, were all perfidiously scrapped. That was an outright act of aggression.

p Late at night, on December 20, when fighting was still going on in the streets of Hanoi, the Voice of Vietnam radio station broadcast Ho Chi Minh’s historic address to the nation.

“Impelled by love of peace, we have made concessions. But the more concessions we made, the more the French colonialists took advantage of them to trample on our rights and reconquer our country. Can we allow this? No! It is better to sacrifice our lives than lose our country and sink back into slavery. Fellow countrymen, arise! Let him who has a rifle use his rifle, let him who has a sword use his sword! And let those who have no sword take up pickaxes and staves! Everyone must rise against the colonialists and save the country. Even though we have to endure hardships, victory will be ours if we are ready to make sacrifices. Forward to victory! Long live an independent, unified Vietnam!"