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p The war of resistance against French colonial rule began on December 20, 1946, and went on for almost nine years. And Ho Chi Minh, as Comrade Pham Van Dong wrote in his book years later, "became the heart and soul of that great people’s war, our struggle for freedom. His image was borne in their hearts by soldiers at the front, by guerillas deep in the rear, by workers at arms repair shops, by peasants working the fields."

p The defenders of Hanoi inscribed the first fine chapter into the chronicle of that war. The French had hoped to gain control of the capital in twenty-four hours; it was not until two months later that they actually did so. On December 19, the day after the French delivered their ultimatum, Hanoi’s self-defence force assembled in the City Hall. The soldiers took an oath to light to the death, and declared that they only awaited orders from the government.

p From the start, the French saw they were dealing with an enemy whose shortage of weapons and combat training was fully made up for 206 by heroism and readiness for self-sacrifice. ’The siege ol’Bakbofu Palace lasted several days. Two national guard platoons held off a besieging French force that had tanks and armoured vehicles. Shells smashed thewall around the palace. But the French legionnaires did not risk an allout assault until quite some time later. The Vietnamese fought to the last man, killing more than a hundred enemy soldiers.

p On January 6, when the fighting was at its height, all Vietnamese forces in the city were combined into what came to be known as the "capital regiment”. The regiment consisted of a national guard battalion and two self-defence battalions. Seventy per cent of its personnel were workers. The 2,500 young soldiers had only 1,500 serviceable rifles. Yet they fought staunchly for every street and house, holding back the enemy’s advance.

p The heroic example of the Hanoi defenders was emulated by the people of other cities. The defenders of Hue held out to the end of February. Similar fortitude was shown by self-defence units organised by the cooperative of rickshaw men. The residents of Namdinh, the centre of the textile industry, kept the enemy at bay for three months.

p The heroic resistance at Hanoi, Hue, and Namdinh won time for evacuating everything that could be evacuated to bases of resistance in the mountains and the jungle. By March 1947, when the government issued orders to abandon Hanoi, many thousands of tons of industrial equipment, raw materials and machinery had been taken out to the guerillacontrolled /.one. The workers organised raider squads which made their way into the French-occupied cities at night, where among the ruins of factories they collected machinery and spare parts and look them into the jungle. Volunteer divers salvaged machines, generators and metal parts from Japanese vessels sunk in the Bay of Tonkin during the Second World War. All this went, sometimes at the price of people’s lives, to jungle workshops manufacturing weapons and goods the liberated areas could not do without.

p The French colonialists had hoped that with superior weapons and numbers they would soon rout and destroy the poorly armed and inexperienced Vietnamese army, capture the leaders of the country and “solve” the Vietnam problem once and for all. However, their blit/.krieg plan was foiled in the first few weeks. And although, by the middle of 1947, the invaders had captured large parts of the provinces of Nam-bo and Trung-bo, and some areas in the north of the country (a strip along the Chinese border, the cities of Hanoi, Haiphong, Namdinh and other major centres), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam fought on.
 

p At the start of the war, the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam moved to the province of Hadong, a short distance south-west 207 of the capital. However, by the spring of 1947, when the enemy had captured all the principal cities and it was clear that the war would be long and arduous, the headquarters, headed by Ho Chi Minh, returned to Vietbac, where the guerillas had their old bases.

p In spite of his age (he was 60) and his far from robust health, Ho Chi Minh was a model of stamina and courage and seemed to bear the hardships of guerilla life with ease. A member of his bodyguard recalls:

p “When the President arrived in the guerilla /.one his escort was a mere eight men who were responsible for his safety, for communications and food supplies. We built a long bamboo hut and divided it into two parts. The smaller part was for Baq Ho, while the other served as our quarters, the dining-room, and conference hall. As bodyguards we were constantly ready to repel an enemy attack, to spot enemy spies, and also protect the residence against wild animals. Comrade Hoang Him Nam (then Deputy Minister for Internal Affairs) once brought us a sheep dog. But it was soon carried off by a tiger.

p Our life was not easy. The daily ration consisted ofunpolished rice and wild plants sprinkled with vegetable oil. Whenever we got meat, we chopped it up, and mixed it with large quantities of salt and chili powder. That way it could be kept for an emergency. Baq Ho called it Vietminh preserves."

p It was clear that al this early stage of the war the colonialists were in a superior military position. To counter the enemy’s blitzkrieg plan, Ho Chi Minh and the Standing Bureau of the Party’s Central Committee worked out a strategy of their own to launch a protracted people’s war of resistance with elements of guerilla warfare. Ho Chi Minh said that the main idea, as in any guerilla war, was not to hold on to territory, but to keep intact the organs of revolutionary government, the armed forces of the people, and the main bases of resistance. Only this, he said, would ward off the initial enemy onslaught and pave the way for a counter-offensive. To those who did not understand the need for a protracted war, Ho Chi Minh explained:

p “We have no right to overestimate our strength and to throw ourselves into an attack against the enemy. Today we can well be compared to a raw youth and our enemy to an evil old man. When we reach the age of twenty, and our enemy grows very old and feeble, then, taking advantage of an opportune moment, we shall deliver the death blow... There is many a glorious page in the heroic history of our nation. Today, for instance, we should draw on the fighting experience of Tieu Quang Phuk."

In the middle of the 6th century A. D., Ho went on to say, Vietnam rose up against the oppressive rule of Chinese feudal warlords in a revolt

208 led by Li Hi and ”supported by the courageous men of all the districts”. In three months’ lighting, the invaders were driven out. An independent Vietnamese slate. Van Suan (a Thousand Springs) was established. However, the rulers of the Celestial Umpire did not leave Vietnam in peace. Fresh Chinese troops invaded the country, and Li Bi was defeated. But that was not the end. Tieu Quang Phuk took what remained of his army into the Dyalakh fortress and wore the enemy down in a drawn-out struggle. He sent small groups on night sorties to wear down the enemy, and soon after mounted a counter-offensive, defeating the enemy, and regaining the country’s independence. Now, hundreds of years later, Ho Chi Minn concluded his tale, his countrymen should again make use of that strategy.

p Three types of troops existed: a regular army, local troops, and a people’s militia. These military and paramilitary formations acted in close cooperation. The well-trained regular troops were the backbone of regional army detachments and guerilla units operating independently. The guerillas were wearing down the French, and forced them to disperse their forces. This enabled the regular army to prepare and carry out major operations.

p By the middle of 1947 the DRV armed forces were over 100,000 strong. Auxiliary and self-defence units numbered several hundred thousand combatants. The resistance was steadily gaining strength and assuming nation-wide proportions. Probably the most telling proof of the confidence of the Vietnamese people in victory and of the growing authority of the Communist Party as their organising force, was that its membership grew. It had 20,000 members in 1946, and as many as 50,000 in 1947.

p Ho Chi Minh always wanted to see the party perform its role honourably as the true political vanguard of the people in the struggle for national salvation. He showed concern for the expansion and strengthening of its ranks. "Now that our nation is at the crossroads to die or to live, to perish or to exist each comrade and the whole organisation must devote all their heart and strength to turn the entire people in one direction aiming at one goal. To drive out the French colonialists and bring unity and independence to the country,” wrote Ho Chi Minh in his Letter to Comrades in North Vietnam in March 1947.

p He called upon all party members to be circumspect, restrained, resolute, resourceful and disciplined, to learn to endure difficulties, to be modest, and to always remember Lenin’s behest: "Learn, learn, and learn again”. Ho Chi Minh held that the moral make-up of Communists must combine humanism, justice, courage and honesty. He wrote in a pamphlet, Let’s Improve Our Style of Work, in the autumn of 1947: " 209 Revolutionaries must have good moral qualities, without which they would not be able to lead the people, however talented they may be."

p There was still another point of principle that Ho Chi Minh called attention to: "The party must be remodelled along military lines. It must stay united both in the sphere of ideology and in practical work. The party is in the vanguard. If, when on the offensive, its members act each in his own way, if the trumpet plays one tune and the drum another, there will be no chance to succeed."

p The pamphlets that Ho Chi Minh wrote during the war helped a great deal to promote the leadership role and militancy of the party as the organiser of all victories of the revolution in Vietnam.

p The government of the DRV stirred the masses to action against the invaders, and at the same time redoubled efforts to settle the FrancoVietnamese conflict by political means. Kven during the tragic hours after the French ultimatum in Hanoi on December 19, 1946, Ho Chi Minh still tried to save the peace. He sent the then French Prime Minister Leon Blum message after message, urging a cease-fire, withdrawal of French troops back to positions they had occupied prior to December 19, and resumption of the talks. Blum, however, was silent. Later, hesaid the telegrams had come too late. He could not possibly have thought of a lamer excuse. He had certainly had enough time to bring the high-handed general d’Argenlieu and his zealous supporters back to their senses.

p The real attitude of the French rulers to the DRV peace proposals came to light in the course of the so-called peace mission of Professor Paul Mus in May 1947. At the request of the Communist deputies in the National Assembly, the French government instructed the new French High Commissioner in Indochina, Fmile Bollaert, to "contact all political and intellectual forces in Vietnam”. Bollaert sent Professor Paul Mus to Vietbac to meet Ho Chi Minh. Professor Mus, a former director of the Extreme Orient College in Indochina, delivered what was virtually an ultimatum: disarmament of the Vietnamese army, free movement of French armed forces throughout Vietnam, extradition of all French and other foreign soldiers who sided with the Vietnamese Resistance movement, and release of French-born prisoners and Vietnamese- who had collaborated with the French.

p Ho Chi Minh invited Paul Mus for talks. He said: "If I accepted these terms, I would disgrace myself in the eyes of my people. What would you do in my place?"

p “I would refuse such terms."

p “Go, tell this to M. Bollaerl and come back with something more acceptable. I shall always be glad to receive you."

p Why Bollaert resorted to the farce became clear in a few days. Upon 210 Paul Mus’s return to Hanoi, Bollaert informed the I’Yeneh government: "I tried to come to terms with the Vietnamese, and failed. Bao Dai is now our only hope."

p In August 1945. when abdicating, Bao Dai had said: "Better to be a citi/,en of a free country than the emperor of a country of slaves.” However, in April 1946. he \venl against his people. Before 1’Yench troops entered Hanoi, he left for Chungking on board an .American aircraft. When the war broke out. Ho Chi \liuh sent his representative to Hongkong, where Bao Dai was residing, to try to persuade him to return and join the Resistance. He refused. The "night club emperor”, as the Vietnamese called him, had far-reaching plans. He saw the 1’Yench aggression as an opportunity lo regain the throne that the revolution had "taken away from him”. This suited the colonialists; Bao Dai was the one figure they hoped could rally against the Ho Chi Minh government various rival nationalist and pro-Western groups of the Vietnamese bourgeoisie and landowners.

p Set on turning Vietnam into a vassal state headed by ex-monarch Bao Dai, the French entered into negotiations with him. These dragged out for almost two years, because Washington joined in the game in a bid to have its own man in Vietnam; Bao Dai seemed to lit the bill. For his part, Bao Dai endeavoured to win over the bourgeoisie and landowners, and insisted that Paris recognise, in words at least, the independence of Vietnam. Not until March 1949 did President Vincent Auriol of France agree on the recognition of "the independence of Vietnam within the framework of the French Union.” The independence was no more than a scrap of paper, because Vietnam was denied the right to have its own foreign policy. The Bao Dai-Auriol agreement in effect turned Vietnam into a new type of French colony.
 

p Another thing the colonialists had in mind when they staged the farce with the Paul Mus mission was to have a credible excuse for starting allout military operations against Vietbac where the Vietnamese’ had most of their forces. On October 7, 1947, the French airlifted three combat groups to the area; altogether, 12,000 men of the expeditionary corps took part. The French sent two columns up the Red and Transparent rivers, while several infantry units were to by-pass Vietbac, operating from the border town of Langson. The aim was to rout the main Resistance forces and capture the government led by Ho Chi Minh.

p The government was in session when a liaison oflicer rushed in with word of a French airborne landing. Ho Chi Minh, who was chairing the meeting, said: "It had to happen sooner or later. Let’s get on with our work."

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p He jotted down an appeal to soldiers, guerillas and compatriots in Vielbac, the cradle of the national independence struggle.

p The Standing Bureau of the Party’s Central Committee decided to move the seat of the government to a still more remote area without delay. In the dead of night, with the tropical rain coming down in sheets. Ho Chi Minh and his eight companions, carrying heavy loads on bamboo poles across their shoulders, set out on a long and dangerous journey. Two days later they reached their destination. Soon, news came of the victories of the Liberation Army. Then word arrived that only hours after the group had left its former residence, the enemy dropped a large landing party there.

p The French expected to take the Resistance forces by surprise. But the Vietnamese launched a counter-attack and delivered several powerful blows. ’Flic colonialists also suffered severe setbacks on the Transparent River on October 24 and November 10.

p By the end of 1947, sustaining heavy losses, the French were driven out of many parts of Vietbac-, and withdrew south towards Hanoi.

p The failure of the Vietbac offensive spelled the end of the French blitzkrieg plan. It was clear that the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam could repulse the enemy, with both regular troops and guerillas operating dee]) in the rear of the French expeditionary corps. After its Vielbac defeat the French Command went on the defensive. This put them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the Vietnamese army.
 

p The first Vietnamese victories were the result of growing international solidarity, and notably the support of Vietnam’s chief ally, the Soviet Union.

p The struggle of the peoples of Indochina for national liberation always enjoyed Soviet sympathy and support. Back in the 1920s and 30s, the Soviet Communists at their Party congresses voiced their solidarity with the revolutionary movement in colonial countries, including Indochina, causing much irritation in the capitals of the imperialist powers. During the Second World War, the Soviet Union, though thousands of kilometres away from Indochina, sought to influence the course of events there in favour of the forces of national liberation.

p When in 1945 the imperialists began manoeuvring over the decisions of the Potsdam Conference, and entrusted the responsibility for disarming Japanese troops in Indochina first to Chiang Kaishek and later to the I’Yeneh, the Soviet Union objected. It pointed out that the Vietnamese had been lighting for their freedom and independence, and that this was recognised at the conlerences in Teheran, Yalta and San Francisco. The Soviet Government also stressed that any occupation troops 212 temporarily brought into Indochina should not intervene in the region’s internal affairs.

p The Soviet Union denounced the "dirty war" of the 1’Yench colonialists. In January 1950, in its reply to Ho Chi Minn’s message that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was prepared to establish diplomatic, relations with all nations on the basis of equality and mutual respect, the Soviet Union, together with the other socialist countries, extended its diplomatic recognition at once.

p Besides its moral and political impact, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the DRV also had great practical significance: it boosted the prestige of the DRV government and added to the isolation of Bao Dai’s regime. "The very idea of the Bao Dai puppet government is hollow,” wrote Pravda at the time. "It represents nobody but a handful of reactionaries."

Ho Chi Minh and his associates were happy to establish direct relations with the Soviet Union. This breached the imperialist blockade of the previous five years. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam had thus become an integral part of the international democratic community. It now had fraternal relations with the Soviet Union, with which Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese Communists had been linked for many years. Commenting on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the socialist countries, Ho Chi Minh wrote: "The war of resistance waged these last few years has won Vietnam the greatest victory in her history: the two biggest nations in the world, the Soviet Union and People’s China, and the new democracies have recognised the Democratic Republic- of Vietnam as a country standing on an equal footing in the great family of democratic countries of the world... Surely these political successes will pave the way for future military victories."

2

p Ho Chi Minh’s words were prophetic. In September of the same year the Standing Bureau of the Party’s Central Committee decided upon a sweeping military campaign in the area of the Vietnamese-Chinese border to get the French invaders out. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam was in dire need not only of political support, but also of material assistance from the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies.

p When preparations began for this operation, Ho Chi Minh voiced a desire to personally verify the combat readiness of the Vietnamese troops and to take part in the offensive.

p The battle /one was many kilometres away from the government residence in Vietbac. And yet Ho Chi Minh, though in his sixties, set out 213 on the long trip across mountains and jungle. With a few of his bodyguards, a doctor and two assistants, he walked all the way to the Chinese border. From there the small party turned towards Caobang, and from Caobang back to the government residence. Altogether, it covered over 400 kilometres.

p To avoid enemy aircraft (which circled over the guerilla zone all the time) they moved mostly at night. In thick jungle they slept at night, starting out at daybreak so they could have a rest at noon beside a spring in the shade of a tree or at the foot of a hill. They cooked rice and corned beef, and slept right there on the ground, or on moss-covered stones.

p The group avoided large communities and unwelcome encounters, spending nights either in a pagoda or in a communal house somewhere on the edge of a village. Sometimes, they came upon an abandoned bamboo hut in the jungle: a kind of roadside inn, except that it had no host. In the daytime the mountain people brought bananas, manioc, sugar cane, and sweet potatoes, and hung all that on the walls. If a wayfarer came by, he ate as much as he wanted, and left the money for it in a hollow cane suspended for the purpose at the entrance. The innkeeper came from time to time lo replenish the supply of food and to collect the proceeds.

p The guide led his group along animal trails through untrodden places. On a clear day the travellers walked briskly and were in high spirits. On rainy days, however, the paths were so slippery that after a hundred steps or so their legs buckled from tension and fatigue, and the bamboo poles with their heavy load bent them to the ground. After the rain, the leafage was literally plastered with leeches. They were hard to pry away once they stuck to the skin. This had to be done carefully not to cause profuse bleeding.

p Those who were not used to walking were soon exhausted and a short halt had to be called. On one such halt Ho Chi Minh said:

p “We are properly fagged out, because we did not talk along the way. Keep closer to me, and we’ll recite our great poets from memory."

p The poetry occupied the travellers’ minds, and they forgot their fatigue, walking briskly mile after mile.

p When the group arrived at Road 4 leading to the frontier /one, they sighted a jeep sent from headquarters. Tired and spattered with orange-red mud, the travellers heaved a sigh of relief.

p But Ho Chi Minh said all vehicles should be used lo carry munitions and food to battle /ones. "I’ll walk,” he added.

p At 6 a.m. on September 16, 1950, a battle started in ihe vicinity of Dongdang, near the Chinese border, that was destined to turn the tide of the war. Ho Chi Minh and the military chiefs were at the observalion 214 post on top of a mountain which commanded an excellent view of the enemy positions around Dongdang.

p The battle raged (or twenty days. The main French force in the area was routed. Another large force sent to its rescue was encircled. Some Vietnamese commanders wanted to let the battle-weary troops rest a day or so before the final attack. When Ho Chi Minh learned about it. he said:

p “It is true the soldiers are weary, but the enemy is wearier still more. This is the best time to finish him oil’."

p He sat down at his typewriter and typed an appeal to the men and officers: "There has been no other occasion lor our troops to light several days in a row. This is a severe test. Scorning latigue, hunger and cold, you have trounced picked enemy units. Try a little harder, my brothers, and you’ll finish off the enemy. I embrace you all. Forward to victory!"

p The Vietnamese troops did the impossible.. At night they stormed the enemy positions and by 5 a. m. had won the battle.

p For the first time in five years, 8,000 men were taken prisoner. They were housed in bamboo barracks. Ho Chi Minh visited a POW cam]) and spoke to the prisoners, among whom were white and black mercenaries from the French colonies in Africa, and also soldiers of Bao Dai’s puppet army. Dressed in a black peasant jacket, and wearing a cork helmet on his head, Ho Chi Minh looked no different than a local resident. The camp commander presented him as a local sage. Ho Chi Minh wanted to chat with a French army doctor. At first, the- doctor showed no interest in the visitor, though he was surprised at the old man’s fluent French. Ho Chi Minh said the Vietnamese wanted no war, that lor more than four years blood was being shed for nothing on both sides, and that a handful of French capitalists was to blame for it: they sought to profit from the grief and suffering of millions of working people. As the conversation proceeded, the French doctor’s eyes grew kinder. He was visibly moved. And when Ho Chi Minh saw him shivering from the cold and draped his peasant jacket over the Frenchman’s shoulders, the latter could not suppress his tears.

By the end of October 1950, the northern area adjacent to the Chinese border had been liberated. The troops of the people’s government regained control of Caobang, Langson, Laokai, Thai Nguyen and Hoabinh. The. Democratic Republic of Vietnam now had direct connections with countries of the socialist community. And, besides, the- French plan of creating autonomous puppet states in the mountain areas of North Vietnam was foiled.

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3

p Over the years, the Vietnamese Communist Parly that operaled as part of the Vietminh Front became a powerful mass organisation, the force that organised the defeat of the invading French and the building ol a new state. The Party leadership had to secure a tighter grip on affairs in order to bring the war to a victorious end. The Standing Bureau of the Party’s Central Committee convened the Second Congress at a guerilla base in Vietbac in February 1951.

p The policy report was by Ho Chi Minh. It was an in-depth analysis of the twenty-odd years of the Party’s existence. He pointed out that the revolution m Vietnam would go from victory to victory, because it was led by a strong Party, which relied on Marxism-Leninism and enjoyed the affection, trust and support of the entire nation.

p Ho Chi Minh criticised those who lacked faith and optimism, who doubted that the Resistance would win, who called the struggle of the Vietnamese against the colonialists "a war of the locust against the elephant."

p “This is so if we look at the material side only,” Ho Chi Minh said. "For we had nothing but bamboo sticks to oppose airplanes and cannon. But taking guidance in Marxism-Leninism, we look not only at the present, but also at the future. We have strong faith in the spirit and strength of the masses. We therefore tell those who waver and who are pessimistic that ’today the locust fights the elephant, but tomorrow the elephant will be disembowelled’ ".

p Al (he same time, Ho Chi Minh warned the party and the people against premature action and against over-confidence.. The victories of the 1950s in the northern part of the country made some party people ihink that henceforward they would have an easy time. They called for a nation-wide counler-oflensive immediately, and were surprised that the Central Committee insisted on thorough preparations before mounting it. Ho Chi Minh said:

p “Once the preparations are completed, we will mount a general counter-oirensive. 1 he more complete the preparations, the quicker will come the hour of the offensive and the more favourably it will unfold. We must not be rash and impatient."

p The time came for the Party to define the stage of the revolution in Vietnam.

p Speaking on the Vietnamese Revolution at the 2nd Party Congress on behalf of the Central Committee, Truong Chinh said Vietnam was in the midst of a national, people’s democratic’ revolution a transitional phase on the road to a socialist revolution. "Under the leadership of the working class, this revolution, whose main driving force is the working 216 people, will not only accomplish its anti-imperialist and anti-feudal tasks, but will also greatly stimulate the entire system of people’s democracy, sow the seeds of socialism, and create a new society. The revolution will accomplish the bourgeois-democratic tasks and will grow into a socialist revolution..."

p Ho Chi Minh’s political report and the report of’Truong Chinh were the nucleus of the Party Programme adopted at the Congress. "The main task of the Vietnam revolution,” the Party Programme emphasised, "is to oust the imperialist aggressors, to achieve true independence and unity of the nation, to eliminate the survivals of feudal and semifeudal relations, to give land to its tillers, to build up the system of people’s democracy, and to lay the foundations of socialism."

p The 2nd Congress resolved to change the name of the Communist Party of Indochina to the Vietnam Workers’ Party, and to legalise it in all areas controlled by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh was unanimously elected Chairman of the Vietnam Workers’ Party Central Committee.

p This marked a new stage in the national liberation revolution in Indochina. Soon, another two parties emerged on the basis of the former Communist Party of Indochina: the People’s Party of Lao (now the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party) and the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (now the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea).

p The division of the Communist Party of Indochina into three independent parties may be traced to the new historical situation in Indochina. The Indochina Union formed by the colonialists was no more. Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia became separate and independent states. The national liberation revolutions there were at different stages of development, which, quite naturally, meant that the Communists of these countries had different tasks to accomplish.

p The resolution of the 2nd Congress of the Vietnam Workers’ Partycontained this passage: "Considering the new conditions in Indochina and elsewhere in the world, a new party will be launched in Vietnam: the Vietnam Workers’ Party with its own political programme and rules that will take into account the conditions in Vietnam; in Cambodia and Laos revolutionary organisations will also be set up to suit the conditions there."

p The peoples of the three countries of Indochina continued the struggle against their common enemy, the French colonialists, whom they could defeat only by acting together and by strengthening their solidarity. A month after the Party Congress, in March 1951, patriotic organisations of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia held a joint conference. They decided to tighten their alliance in the light against the colonialists. The patriotic forces of the three countries of Indochina countered the 217 imperialist divide and rule policy with militant unity and political cooperati based on common interests and ideals.
 

p After the Congress, the leaders of the Vietnam Workers" Party became increasingly convinced that the party’s social policy in the liberated areas was tailing behind the needs of the day. In 1945, the Party had announced a partial suspension of its socio-economic policy, notably the agrarian reform. This was justified, because many feudal lords and landowners and the bourgeoisie could be won for the revolution. Later the situation changed. ’Fhe Resistance was headed by the party of the working class, with the United National Front drawing support from workers and peasants from its first day. Fhe war of resistance precipitated rapid social polarisation. It produced genuine revolutionaries and patriots, but it also brought to the surface a scum of traitors and reactionaries. Millions of working people, whose ideological and political level was rising more rapidly than had been the case during the peaceful period of the revolution, put their hopes for social equality, for the elimination of exploitation and oppression, more and more openly on national liberation. ’Fhe wider the Resistance, the more manpower and material resources it claimed.

p Fhe need to carry out fundamental socio-economic transformations, and especially agrarian reform, was dictated also by the fact that the main contribution to the armed struggle against the aggressor was made by the peasants, who were the overwhelming majority of the population. Ninety per cent of the men and officers in the armed forces came from the peasantry.

p And finally, the early 1950s saw greater activity on the part of various reactionary political organisations that feudal lords and big landowners put together with the help of the French colonialists and agents of the U.S. intelligence, which even at that time was reaching into Indochina. This disturbing fact pointed to the need for bringing down the big landowners, and ending the feudal system as soon as possible to ensure social progress.

p With all these considerations in view, the 2nd Congress of the Vietnam Workers’ Party set the priority of "eliminating the remaining feudal and semi-feudal elements and turning the land over to those who till it”. On December 1, 1953, the National Assembly launched an agrarian reform. All the land and other property of traitors and collaborationists was to be confiscated. Landowners who had taken part in the Resistance, and those who had not committed crimes against the people, were to sell land and agricultural implements to the state. ’Fhe confiscated land and property, and also land which had been bought by the state, was then to be turned over to poor peasants and farm labourers.

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The involvement of the broad masses in the struggle against survivals of feudalism and the implementation of the slogan, "Land to those who till it”, gave a new, powerful impetus to the Resistance. Thousands of peasants volunteered to the People’s Arm)-, tens of thousands gave all their energy to supplying the troops with food and ammunition on the battlefront or to building roads through the jungle and in the mountains under constant bombing and shelling. How timely the Party’s agrarian policy was became even more evident a few months later, when what was to be a decisive battle was fought in a sparsely populated mountain area in the north-western part of the DRV.

4

p In November 1953 the newly appointed French commander, General Navarre, concentrated picked units of the Expeditionary Corps and Foreign Legion in the north-western part of Baq-bo, so as to thrust deep into the rear of the Vietnamese army, to surround and destroy its main forces. The Party decided to take up the challenge and give battle to the colonialists near the village of Dien Bien Phu.

p As the Vietnamese prepared for this decisive battle, a group of foreign journalists arrived in Vietbac. They asked Ho Chi Minh what was going on outside Dien Bien Phu.

p “This is Dien Bien Phu,” said Ho Chi Minh, pointing to his upturned cork helmet. "And these are the mountains.” He passed his strong thin fingers along the outer edge of the helmet. "Here’s where we arc now. And down there,” he let his hand drop into the bottom of the upturned helmet, "is the valley of Dien Bien Phu. That is where the French have their positions. They will never be able to scramble out. They might hold on a long time, but they will never scramble out."

p Inside Ho Chi Minn’s helmet were the crack army units the French had mustered all over Indochina: paratroopers of the Expeditionary Corps, and the German units of the Foreign Legion 16,000 in all.

p The celebrated battle of Dien Bien Phu was a model of heroism on the part of the Vietnamese, and also a product of the superb strategy of its commanders. To transport heavy artillery to the site of the battle, they had to build more than 300 kilometres of road across mountain passes. This they did in total secrecy in spite of the enemy’s round-the-clock air patrols. Using no explosives, which might have revealed their whereabouts, the Vietnamese hewed a road through the rocky hills for heavy lorries. After dark, they literally worked by touch without light. And 219 shortly before daybreak they carefully camouflaged what they had done the night before. Soldiers earned 105-mm guns uphill by hand in pitch darkness. To prevent the heavy weapons from tumbling, they tied them to trees with ropes which often smouldered from the friction and snapped. Soldiers Hung themselves under the wheels of gun-carriages and, at risk to their lives, checked their downward fall.

p At night, right under the enemy’s nose, the Vietnamese dug more than 200 kilometres of deep trenches and underground tunnels leading to the French fortifications. But this the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu found out only after the battle started. They also hewed gun emplacements in hard rock. Incidentally, the French did not see any of these emplacements until the fighting stopped. Thousands of peasants men, women and old folk helped soldiers in their titanic job.

p On March 13, the Vietnamese mounted a massive offensive. Their artillery rained shells upon Dien Bien Phu as soldiers closed in on the beleaguered fortress.

p To take the stigma off the "dirty war”, the colonialists gave women’s names to French strongholds in Indochina. On the first day of the offensive, the Vietnamese seized a stronghold called Beatrice and on the next day another stronghold, Gabrielle. And two days later, the French left Anna-Marie outpost.

p The French were surprised at the way the battle was fought. They heavily relied on artillery and air support. But the Vietnamese now also had artillery which they hid in makeshift shelters dug out in mountain slopes, and in this way inflicted heavy casualties upon the enemy. About 20 French aircraft were destroyed by Vietnamese guns right on the runway. Their accurate fire considerably limited the operation of the French airforee. At Dien Bien Phu the Vietnamese, for the first time, used the Soviet rocket mortars popularly known as Katyushas that had inflicted heavy losses upon the Nazis in the Second World War. The foreign legionnaires, including many Germans who had fought in the Hitlerite army against the Soviet Union, screamed, "This is what we saw at Stalingrad!" They flung down their weapons and cowered in the trenches.

p As the fighting continued, the Vietnamese dug their trenches closer and closer to the French fortifications, reducing the distance for a decisive attack. Finally the trenches were quite close to the French bunkers and, like giant pincers, took each dug out and every gun emplacement in their iron grip. On May 7, after 55 days of incessant fighting Dien Bien Phu fell.

The garrison commander, de Castri, who had shortly before been promoted general, surrendered. A red flag with a gold star was hoisted 220 on a bamboo pole over the general’s command post proclaiming the historic victory ol the Vietnamese patriots.

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p When the Vietnamese troops were only yet preparing to strike at Dion Bien Phu, Ho Chi Minh said in an interview to a Swedish journalist that the Vietnamese people wanted peace. "The war in Vietnam was launched by the French Government. The Vietnamese people were obliged to take up arms and have heroically struggled for nearly eight years now against the aggressors to safeguard their independence and their right to live in freedom and peace. If the French colonialists continue their aggressive war, the Vietnamese people are determined to carry on their patriotic resistance until final victory. If the French government has drawn a lesson from the war it has been waging these last years and wants to negotiate an armistice in Vietnam and solve the Vietnam problem by peaceful means, the people and government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are ready to meet this desire."

p This opened the way for a settlement. Upon Soviet initiative an international conference opened in Geneva with the participation of Vietnamese representatives. The spectacular victory of the People’s Army at Dien Bien Phu determined the outcome of the Geneva conference and dashed the colonialists’ hope to perpetuate their domination in Vietnam.

p The Geneva Agreements were signed on July 20, 1954, putting an end to the war. They guaranteed Vietnam peace, national independence and territorial integrity. Vietnam was temporarily divided into two parts in order to restore peace and regroup the belligerents. The demarcation line passed along the 17th parallel. The participants in the conference did not regard it as a political frontier, but as a temporary dividing line. The agreements also provided for holding in July 1956 a democratic general election in the entire territory of Vietnam with a view to unifying the country.

p The peaceful settlement was a great victory for the Vietnamese people, for all progressive and peace forces in the world. Here is Ho Chi Minh’s comment: "For the first time in history, a small and weak colonised country defeated a mighty colonial power... It was a glorious victory of our people, and concurrently a victory of the forces of peace, democracy and socialism in the world. Once again Marxism-Leninism illuminated the path for the working class and the people, and led them to triumph in the struggle to save their country and safeguard the revolutionary gains."

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p On July 22, 1954, the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam held its last session in the guerilla /.one. The Geneva cease-lire had not ye! taken ellecl, and enemy aircraft were still flying over Vietbac. This is why the government held the session in a dec]) trench at the fool of a mountain. Kxactly at the appointed hour a horseman astride a beautiful black stallion appeared in the distance. He dismounted and walked smiling towards the gathering. It was President Ho Chi Minh.

p He climbed a makeshift rostrum and looked at his associates. Their faces, like his own, radiated joy. So much blood had been shed, and so much effort spent. Now all that was over. Ho Chi Minh was jubilant. He said the army and the people had done (heir job honourably. But the next move was ]ust as important: to reunite the country, and secure national independence, democracy and peace. He spoke of sad things, too. He said, for example, that it would be hard for residents in the South to see the People’s Army leaving lor the North. The south was the first to have risen up in struggle. The population of Nam-bo had sullered more than anybody else. It was painful for Southerners to stay behind, even temporarily, under a reactionary regime. But the South and North would fight on for reunification, for early general elections.

p The new situation in which economic reconstruction was at the top of the list, was no less of a responsibility than the war, said the President. The Party’s most important task was to preserve its unity, and the unity of the people, and to consolidate the united national front.

p Among the foreign journalists invited to Vietbac long before the rumblings of the war had ceased was Soviet cameraman Roman Karmen, who had once shot a film about the fighting in Vietnam. Here is what he wrote about his meeting with Ho Chi Minh in those days:

p “A narrow path cut through the impenetrable jungle was known only to the guides. The air was laden with the aroma of bamboo thickets, palm Irees and plantains. Amidst these thickets stood the bamboo shelter of Ho Chi Minh, which looked like thousands of similar peasant huts: earthen floor, the roof made of palm leaves, and no proper walls. All around was forest, chirping birds, huge banana leaves rustling, and softly creaking bamboo Irees. ’The presidental palace,’ said Ho Chi Minh wrily. Stacks of fresh newspapers and maga/ines on the desk, a typewriter. And instead of the bed a mat on the floor.

p “’I am used to it,’ said Ho Chi Minh. ’For one thing, I can take off any moment. I have developed this style over the years of revolutionary struggle and underground work. It takes me five minutes to get up and leave.’

p “1 he conversation was in Russian. We asked him:

p “’Did vou find it hard to learn Russian?’

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p “’A revolutionary must know the language of Lenin.’

p “ ’How many hours a day do you work?’

p “’I rise with the birds, and I go to sleep when the stars appear in the sky.’

p “Later, we discovered that this was not quite so. Many times I saw Ho Chi Minh, cane in hand, the legs of his pants and his shirt-sleeves rolled up, stroll by the light of a bamboo toreh held by his companion and bodyguard, along a narrow jungle path. The President was on his way to some distant village in the mountains or coming back from a conference.

p “I asked Ho Chi Minh if I could take a picture of his forest residence. He consented.

p “I photographed him walking around the rice-fields, climbing up an almost sheer mountain path or wading across a stream. I knew theremight not be another such opportunity. I had only a few hours left of the ’jungle period’ that had lasted a full eight years. I have filmed Ho Chi Minh and his ever-present cane, walking thousands of miles about his native country, indomitable at sixty-four. And what I have filmed is history, history in the making."
 

p Seven and a half years before, the legendary Hanoi regiment was leaving the capital. Now came the day of their return.

p On October 10, 1954, Hanoi gave it a rousing welcome. The celebrated 308th division moved in with its motorised troops and artillery.

p The sun-lit streets and squares of Hanoi filled with people in holiday attire. Thousands of flags decorated houses and streamers glorified President Ho Chi Minh, the Party and the People’s Army. People had made the streamers, flags and portraits behind shuttered windows and at risk to their lives before the colonial armies had withdrawn.

p The Hanoi regiment entered the city from the west.

When they crossed the city limits, the soldiers were showered with flowers. Hanoi saluted its liberators with cheers, songs and applause.