178

p Ho Chi Minh is the symbol of Communist
wisdom in Asia

Rodney Arismrndi

1

p The Democratic Republic of Vietnam came into the world in a critical situation. The already backward Vietnamese economy had been completely ruined by the Japanese. Famine and epidemics were taking a heavy toll. The young republic was threatened from abroad by numerous enemies. The Party’s ability to retain power was a life-and-death matter for the Vietnamese revolution. Gold is tested by fire, a man’s strength by adversity, says a Vietnamese proverb. It was in those difficult days that Ho Chi Minh demonstrated the lull extent ol’his talent as a leader. He needed great self-control and tactical flexibility to steer Vietnam past numerous rocks. His most reliable compass was Lenin’s experience, in which he found answers to many questions. He often reminded his closest associates of Lenin’s warning: it is not easy to take power, to retain it is still more difficult.

p The next day after the proclaiming of the republic the ministers of the Provisional Revolutionary Government assembled for their first meeting in the palace in Tonkin. Its wrought-iron gates, which had never before admitted a commoner, were now opened wide to the people’s elected representatives. When Ho Chi Minh entered the reception hall, everyone present thought he would address the Cabinet: “comrades”, " citizens”, or perhaps “gentlemen”. Ho Chi Minh smiled and said:

p “Good morning, my dear friends!"

p The President’s unusual greeting immediately produced a relaxed, friendly atmosphere, showing perhaps more than anything else that new times had come.

p Ho Chi Minh’s speech was brief and to the point:

p “For eighty years, our nation lived under the French colonialists in slavery, exploitation, ignorance, deprived of the most basic human rights. It is not surprising, therefore, thai neither you nor I have much experience in running a country.

p “But that should not dishearten us. We will work hard and we will learn. There will be mistakes, of course. But we will have enough courage to correct them. In the end, I am confident, we will succeed, because we are moved by love of our country and our people.

p “Now, what are the most urgent problems facing our government? First, the famine, ll is the most shameful legacy left by the French and Japanese. More than two million Vietnamese have already died of 179 hunger. How shall we save the rest:’ 1 suggest we mount a nationwide foodproduction drive. All arable land should be planted with vegetables, sweet potatoes, manioc, and inai/.c. But since a new harvest can be taken in only in three or four months, we must immediately start collecting rice lo aid the- famine-stricken areas. Let all my countrymen and I’ll be the first to do so give up a meal once every ten days. The saved rice will go lo the poor.

p “Second, illiteracy. One of the ways the French held our people in slavery was by keeping them ignorant. An ignorant nation is a weak nation. Yet it takes only three months lo learn to read and write our native Vietnamese. I suggest launching a mass literacy campaign right now.

p “Third, we should hold general elections as soon as possible so as to guarantee the people’s democratic rights. All cili/.ens should have the right to elect and be elected irrespective of property status, religion or ethnic background.

p “Fourth, in trying to weaken our people, the colonialists taught them the use of alcohol and opium, and corrupted them with other vices. We must educate a new type of man who would be devoted to his country. 1 suggest an education campaign to make all our people hardworking, thrifty, honest and truthful, and lo root out the disgraceful leftovers of colonialism.

p “Fifth, I suggest abolishing the three most humiliating taxes: the poll tax, the market tax, and the river-crossing tax. Opium smoking should be banned.

p “Sixth, we should proclaim freedom of religious worship."
 

p In a matter of months, Ho Chi Minh’s programme brought the first tangible results. Millions responded to his call to defeat the famine. People ploughed up every free patch of land, planting vegetables even in parks and public gardens. Fvery family saved rice for victims of the famine. By the end of the year, the nation brought in a good harvest of sweet potatoes, maix.e, and soybeans, while the following spring and summer (here was a bumper crop of rice. Hunger retreated.

p A package of social and economic measures gave a boost lo the economy. An eight-hour working day was introduced at factories, and workers were guaranteed their rights. The agrarian reform was temporarily removed from the agenda, since it would have aggravated class antagonisms in the countryside, undermining national unity, which Vietnam needed so badly in the face of the threat from its enemies abroad. Certain important measures were taken, however: land which had belonged to the French colonialists and Vietnamese collaborators was confiscated and distributed on a temporary basis among landless peasants. The ground rent for peasants was cut by 25 per cent.

180

p The country’s financial system was in a shambles. The revolution had inherited from the monarchy the ridiculous sum of one million paper piastres, which rampant inflation reduced into a heap of worthless paper. The French-owned Bank of Indochina (the revolution could do nothing against that stronghold of international big business) sabotaged the Provisional Government’s instructions and did its best to throw Vietnam’s finances into still worse disarray. The Chinese occupation authorities also contributed to the mess by paying for all transactions with their depreciated paper yuan despite the Vietnamese government’s protests.

p The DRV government started by issuing a decree on the establishment of an independence fund. Ho Chi Minh asked the nation to contribute gold and other valuables to it. The whole nation responded. Married couples turned over their wedding rings, women gave up earrings and bracelets inherited from their grandmothers, monks brought articles of worship. Over a short period, the population had donated 20,000,000 piastres and 370 kilograms of gold. This enabled the government to lay the foundations of an independent national economy, issuing a new currency—the dong - first in Trung-bo Province and later in the whole country.

p The government issued a decree on compulsory free instruction in the quoc ngu alphabet. The Public Education Board set up over 70,000 literacy courses in town and country. People learned to read and write at home, at work, and while travelling. Young and old studied side by side. In one year, two and a half million people learned to read and write.

p A new political structure was gradually taking shape. The old administrative machine was dismantled and the institution of mandarins abolished. A week after the DRV was proclaimed, the government announced that elections would be held to a National Assembly within several months. Newspapers published the draft Constitution and called upon the population to submit proposals. People’s Committees were elected by a direct vote at commune, district and provincial level; these committees were the foundation of people’s power and did much to consolidate national unity and the worker-peasant alliance.

p Ho Chi Minh personally went into every matter concerning the new administrative bodies, seeing to it that a healthy relationship should develop from the very outset between local government and the people. In a message to provincial, district and commune committees, he warned the people’s representatives to beware of the ways of the old administration. "We must bear in mind,” he wrote, "that all Government organs, from the central to the village level, are the people’s servants, that is to say they must work in the public interest... We have now founded the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. But without happiness and freedom 181 for the people, independence would be meaningless...We must love the people: they will love and respect us."

p Ho Chi Minh constantly returned to this topic al meetings of the Standing Bureau and in conversations with Party activists.

p “Don’t turn into bureaucrats,” he warned them. "Otherwise \ou can lose the support of the people. Your words should always be translated into action. The best way to lead the people is to set a good example."

p Every day. Ho Chi Minh had to receive numerous visitors. Some of them were foreigners arrogant Chiang Kaishek officers, who were constantly demanding something, representatives of the U.S. and British missions, and foreign journalists. But most often they were people’s deputations from all parts of Vietnam. The number ol visitors was becoming so great that one minister suggested to the President that it should be restricted. Ho Chi Minh disagreed:

“Our government has just been set up,” he said, "so, naturally, our citizens have a lot of questions. Besides, such personal contact is an excellent opportunity to explain our policies to people. How can we afford to have people think that we are as inaccessible as the mandarins used to be?"

2

p The threat of imperialist invasion continued to grow. By midSeptember, Chiang Kaishek’s occupation troops in North Vietnam numbered 200,000. Obviously, the purpose of such a big army was not confined to just disarming the surrendering Japanese troops. The Chiang Kaishek government had decided the time was ripe to annex Vietnam, and to start by installing a puppet regime to the north of the 16th parallel. A puppet government was to be made up of officials of the Revolutionary League and National Party. To help implement its policies in Vietnam, the Chiang Kaishek administration had secretly enlisted the services of hundreds of declasse Vietnamese.

p These mercenaries disarmed local Vietnamese self-defence units and disbanded People’s Revolutionary Committees.

p On September 11, Chinese Commander-in-Chief Lu Han arrived in Hanoi. Next morning, the houses and lamp posts were covered with posters announcing new regulations. The Chiang Kaishek authorities pretended there was no government in Hanoi and that, therefore, they had to take over and restore order.

p In South Vietnam, the situation was just as threatening. On September 6, the first British units entered Saigon. The British Command refused to recognise the Vietnamese authorities and demanded that the Liberation Army should disarm. Soon after, French expeditionary units 182 started arriving in British transport planes and vessels. Admiral ’I Inerry d’Argenlicu, formerh a Catholic monk named I’alher Louis and now dc (iaulle’s close associate, was appointed France’s High Commissioner lor Indochina and Commander-m-Clnel of all the I’rench forces in the Far East.

p In die early hours ol September 23, the French launched an offensive in South Vietnam, InM in Saigon and then in several other towns in the Mekong River delta. The cilv organisations of the Party and the Victniinh had managed to move out to rural areas and proceeded to set up guerilla bases. In Saigon, street battles weni on lor several days. ()u September 2(>, Saigon patriots heard I lo Chi Minh’s radio address from Hanoi:

p “Dear southern compatriots! Our newly-won independence is jeopardised by the foreign invasion... I believe and our compatriots throughout the country believe in the staunch patriotism ol the southerners. We should remember... ’I’d rather die as a free man than live as a slave...’ The (iovermuent and our compatriots throughout the country will do (heir utmost to support the lighters and people who are making sacrifices in their struggle to maintain national independence... Victor) will definitely be ours because we have the united nations behind us. We are sure to win the battle because our struggle is just..."
 

p The Party’s Central Committee decided to send revolutionary uniis to Nam-bo. Following the Vietminh General Committee’s appeal, people formed volunteer units throughout the country. Liberation Army units and many Parly activists were sent south, to Nam-bo.

p The defence of Saigon suddenly acquired a new meaning. Someone called upon the fighters to "defend Ho Chi Minh’s city”, and this phrase soon became a slogan that drew more and more volunteers into die Liberation Army. Gradually the people began to call Saigon Ho Chi Minh City, and thirty years later this became its official name.

p An extraordinary Party conference of the Nam-bo organisation was convened in the guerilla-controlled area near the town of Mitho in the Mekong River delta, attended by Le Duan, who had just returned from penal servitude. Ton Due Thang, and Hoang Quoc Viet. They decided to set up a people’s army with the help of rural democratic People’s Committees and fight a large-scale war of resistance.

p Early in October, Hanoi learned thai a U.S. Air Force plane was heading for Dialam airfield. On board were Chungking War Minister Ho Yingchin and General McClurc, commander of U.S. forces in China. Nothing was said of the purpose of their visit. Ho Chi Minh ordered a mass demonstration in Hanoi to show the nation’s resolve to defend the revolution. Nearly 300,000 Hanoi residents marched in orderlv 183 columns past the former residence ol the French Governor-General, chanting: "Vietnam for the Vietnamese! Long live the Provisional Government! Long live the Vietminh! Long live President Ho Chi Minh!" Before flying to Hanoi, Minister Ho Yingchin had been instructed in Chungking to get rid of the Communists in Hanoi and to arrest Ho Chi Minh. After arriving in Vietnam, however, he saw that his 200,000 troops were not enough. He, therefore, ordered Lu Han to continue with the policy of gradually replacing Vietminh representatives in the revolutionary administration with his own men.

p Especially active among Lu Han’s men was Revolutionary League leader Nguyen Hai Than. He declared he had the backing of the Chinese army and that if the Vietminh did not take him and his accomplices into the Vietnamese government, he would stage a coup. This whitehaired astrologer went around Hanoi in his limousine, two bodyguards with a machine gun on its top, and two others on the running boards with submachine guns.

p Much more sophisticated were the leaders of the Nationalist Party. They started a newspaper with blatant anti-Vietnamese, propaganda. At the entrance to its editorial office in Quan Thanh Street, close to one of Hanoi’s main Buddhist temples, a powerful loudspeaker spread lies about Ho Chi Minh’s government day and night. Nationalist Party agents murdered Vietminh activists, abducted government ollicials, and raided financial offices.

p Party members demanded that the government crack down on Chiang Kaishek’s fifth column. At a meeting in the Presidential Palaee, one of Ho Chi Minh’s bodyguards stood up and said:

p “How long are we to endure these bandits? Give us your orders, Comrade President, and we will wipe them out.” Ho Chi Minh smiled and said:

p “Imagine that this room was invaded by mice. What would you do.? Would you throw stones at them, or would you try to catch them?" "Well, it’s stupid to throw stones in a room,” the young man answered sheepishly.

p “It’s the same in politics. We should be cautious and think of the possible repercussions. Pull at a liana, and you may rouse the whole jun-

p gle."

p After the revolution. Ho Chi Minh was officially the President and also chairman of the Vielminh’s General Committee. But the Party was not openly mentioned anywhere. On November 11, 1945, the Central Committee announced that the Party was being disbanded. In lad, however, it went underground. Such a move was necessary to consolidate people’s power on a patriotic’, national basis and deprive its enemies of their weapon ofanti-communism. Although Party activists held many 184 government posts, ollicially they were Vieimmh representatives. It was important to conceal Party activists from enemy eyes in that difficult period and conserve forces for a possible underground struggle. Moreover, since the general public had been exposed to anti-communist propaganda Cor so many years, advertising the Party’s leading role would alienate Victminh supporters among the bourgeois and pettybourgeois elements in town and countryside. Finally, the Party had to take into account Vietnam’s hostile surroundings.

p ’Fhe Vietnamese revolution was in a critical situation. At the time, it was unable to establish direct contact with the Soviet Union, while the people’s revolution in China was still some four years away. At all costs, the Vietnamese Republic’ had to breach the imperialist-inspired political and diplomatic blockade. But how was that possible if the North of the country was occupied by Chiang Kaishek’s troops and the South by a French expeditionary force?

p ’Fhe Western media contributed to the hostile atmosphere around Vietnam by spreading lies about its revolutionary government. Besides, it was no longer a secret for the West that Ho Chi Minh was the new name of Nguyen Ai Quoc, head of the Communist Party of Indochina and an old-time member of the Comintern. ’Fhe imperialist West boycotted the Vietnamese government and all its moves. U. S. Secretary of State Ge.orge C. Marshall wrote to the American Ambassador in Paris:

p “Ho Chi Minh has direct Communist connections and it should be obvious that we are not interested in seeing colonial empire administrations supplanted by a philosophy and political organisation directed from and controlled by the Kremlin."

p ’Fhe Standing Bureau was aware that Vietnam could not fight all its enemies at once and, therefore, had to concentrate its war effort on one front. After lengthy discussion, the Party concluded that the French were the greatest threat. "Sooner or later,” the Central Committee pointed out, "the French will strike a bargain with Chungking on Indochina’s return to French rule if France promises to respect Chinese interests elsewhere."

Therefore, it was decided to launch an all-out war of resistance in the South against the French, while avoiding an open confrontation with Chiang Kaishek’s forces in the North, and doing everything possible to placate them.

3

p Elections to the DRV’s National Assembly were drawing near. The Chiang Kaishek people and their stooges in the Revolutionary League and Nationalist Party realised that they stood little chance at elections, 185 and resolved to wreck the election campaign. Fate in December, General Hsiao Wen, Chiang Kaishek’s political representative in North Vietnam, demanded that Ho Chi Minh reorganise the Provisional Government before the elections, replacing Communist ministers with men from the Revolutionary League and Nationalist Party, giving these parties 80 per cent of the scats in the future National Assembly, and also replacing the country’s red flag with the gold star, which "looked too much like the Comintern’s".

p Fhe leaders of the two pro-Chinese parties went even further, claiming the posts of President and Prime Minister and seven of the more important Cabinet portfolios, including that of internal aflairs, defence, and economy.

p Negotiations produced a compromise: the Provisional Government would become a coalition government consisting of the Vietminh, the Revolutionary League and the Nationalist Party; Nguyen Hai Than of the Revolutionary League would be Vice-President, while Nguyen Tuong Tarn would be Foreign Minister; both parties would be guaranteed a substantial number of scats in the National Assembly; for their part, both parlies would agree to hold national elections as soon as possible, combine all the country’s armed forces in a single army, and cease the confrontation.

p However, by far not everyone in the Communist Party and the Vietminh were happy with this arrangement. Many were especially outraged that a man who had forgotten his native tongue and had done a lot to undermine the revolution would be the country’s Vice-President. Some expressed their dismay to Flo Chi Minh. ’Fired, his eyes puffy from constant lack of sleep, Ho Chi Minh said:

p “Manure is not very clean, is it? Yet if used as a fertiliser, it helps to get a good crop. So shouldn’t one use it?"

p In general, Flo Chi Minh had to spend much time and energy in cooling hotheads in the Party. Some young activists overrated the strength of the revolution and often violated Part) instructions on placating the Chiang Kaishek people and used force, against their provocations. ’Fhe resulting unnecessary armed clashes threatened to undermine the already precarious situation. Ho Chi Minh had to use all his experience, authority and flexibility to settle such conflicts. He would explain:

p “Before filling up on herring, think of the thirst you will suffer... I beg you, keep your temper, don’t respond to provocations. Patience is not necessarily obedience it is also a form of struggle. We should be as flexible and cunning as King Ho Chian.”   [185•1 

186

p In his dealings with Chinese generals. Ho Chi Minh was greatly aide-el by the fact that he had lived in China long and had a good knosvledge of the post-Sun Yalsen Kuomintang. The generals in charge of the divisions occupying Vietnam belonged to diflcrcnt Kuomintang (actions and were squabbling constantly. Although they were- all rabidly anti-communist, their attitude to Ho Chi Minh’s government differed. It often happened that one general would spite the other by complying with certain Vietnamese requests. There were’ even those’ who for one reason or another threatened Chiang Kaishek’s own position and the latter used the Vietnamese campaign as a pretext to keep them far away.

p Ho Chi Minh explained all these subtleties to his associates:

p “This is Chiang Kaishek’s time-tested tactic to force tigers out of their den. Relations are not so simple in the enemy camp, and we must take advantage of this."

p The best relationship developed be-tween Ho Chi Minh and i.u Han. He was the only Chinese general who respectfully called Ho Chi Minh, Chairman Ho. The two men ofte-n discussed political matters over a cup of tea, and Ho Chi Minh explained the- goal and essence of the Vietnamese revolution. At times, he would use the opportunity to censure the anti-Vietnamese actions of the Chinese representatives.

p Vo Nguyen Giap, who was Minister of Defence in the Provisional Government, recalled: "For Uncle Ho. revolutionary truth was concrete... Uncle Ho had an extraordinary flair for detecting the thoughts and feelings of the- enemy. With great shrewdness, he worked out a concrete treatment for eaeli type and each individual.

p “His own personality embodied the strength of our just cause... FAVH his enemies, men who were notoriously anticommunisl, showed respect for him. They seemed to lose some of their aggressiveness when they were in his presence.

p “Many foreigners have dwelt upon the extraordinary magnetic charm of President Ho Chi Minh. Some think that it was due to his widemental grasp, his keen intelligence, his exceptional will and energy. Others attribute it to his modesty and simplicity, his optimism and confidence, his (brthrightness and candour, his wisdom and kindness...

p All that was true. But the dominating feature in President Ho’s personality was his selflessness, his desire, his only and utmost desire to bring about the greatest happiness for his people and country. A life without the least concern for his private interests created the impression of extreme purity.

187

p Inspired by an immense love for his fellow human beings, even when applying political tactics, Uncle Ho always wanted to arouse a person’s conscience, even when in some people there hardly any of it was left.

The political and moral strength of our people, together with the clever application of the Party’s and President Ho’s line and tactics, paralysed the aggressive will of the Chiang militarists who had close to 200.000 troops under their command."

4

p To defend the revolution, Ho Chi Minh’s government needed the people’s mandate, that is, to be elected and supported by the people. I he Hindus rirctidi reached with the leaders of the pro-Chinese parties finally cleared the way for general elections, and they were oflicially scheduled for January (i, 1916.

p Long before the elections, the government was flooded with letters from plants, factories, rural communes and administrative committees begging Ho Chi Minh not to stand for election in any one town or province, so that the whole nation could vote for him. Ho Chi Minh had to write an open letter to his countrymen: "...I am an ordinary citi/.en of the Democratic- Republic of Vietnam and, therefore, have no right to go against the established electoral procedure. I am standing for election in Hanoi, so I cannot stand anywhere else. 1 thank all my countrymen for their love and commitment to me- and ask them to do their civic duty at the coming elections."

p In Nam-bo and southern Trung-bo provinces the elections were held to the accompaniment of rifle and gun fire. In French-occupied Saigon, Mitho and other cities, ballot boxes we’re quietly carried from door to door. In the le>wns of Tanan and Khanhluu, French planes bombed polling stations.

p Yet despite the peril, over 90 per cent of eligible voters came to the polls. Ho Chi Minh got 98.6 per cent of the vote. Considering the unfavourable- correlation of class forces and the- energetic sabotage and propaganda campaign conducted by assorted pro-Chiang Kaishek, pro-Japanese, pro-French, and other reactionary elements, this was clearly an outstanding success.

p The V’ietminh front got the overwhelming majority of votes. Communists, who oflicially ran as independents, ge>t 105 seats in the National Assembly. As agreed, approximately 70 seats went te> the pro-Chinese parties and other nationalist bourgeois groupings. With the Vietminh’s consent, the National Assembly included cx-Kmpcror Bao Dai under his 188 original name of Vinh Thuy, who had previously received I lie honorary post of Adviser lo the Provisional Government.
 

p The Tct holiday that year was the fust after the revolution. According to the Lunar Calendar, the turbulent Year of the Monkey was giving way to the Year of the Hen, with which the Vietnamese connected so many hopes. Ho Chi Minh spoke on the radio. He concluded his address with a quatrain:

p When war mil end in victory
We’ll raise a cup nj wine.
Though many near one.’, are gone,
We’ll celebrate this new and peaceful 7 el.

p From that day on, the President’s address to the nation with a Tet verse became a tradition.

p Tet is Vietnam’s best-liked holiday, and is usually celebrated in the family. As if by magic, Hanoi changed. In every home, joss sticks were lit in front of the family altar to celebrate national independence. Heralds of spring appeared on the window-sills: twigs of peach trees with purple flowers in bloom and dwarf tangerine bushes with tinyyellow fruit. Paper lanterns and (lowers decorated the front doors. Sayings with wishes of happiness and prosperity were inscribed on the walls. For the first time in history, people did not have to think of gifts for the local government official. After a meal in honour of the family’s ancestors, they sat about and talked, but their conversation nowcentred on the revolution, the new-found independence’, and the new life.

p Like all other residents of Hanoi, Tran l)uy Hung, chairman of the capital’s administrative committee, was spending that evening with his family. Suddenly there was a knock on the door, and Ho Chi Minh appeared. He wanted to make a tour of the city and asked Tran Duy Hung to accompany him.

p The streets were deserted. The air was thick with the pungent smell of firecrackers. The car entered the old part of town. Ho Chi Minh asked the driver to stop in the workers’ quarter, the Wooden Sticks Lane, got out, knocked on the door of the nearest shanty, and entered. A large family was seated round a table. For a moment there was silence. Ho Chi Minh greeted everyone. In the corner of the backyard, a black cauldron was steaming, in which rice pies wrapped in banana leaves were being cooked. Ho Chi Minh wished everyone a prosperous year. At that moment, someone exclaimed: "It’s the President!" For them it was like a wonderful dream: the nation’s leader chatting with them like an equal.

p Ho Chi Minh visited several more workers’ families, and closer to midnight, accompanied by his bodyguard, merged, unnoticed, with the 189 festive crowd on the shore of the Lake ofihe Redeemed Sword. Firecrackers were bursting everywhere. A grey cap drawn over his forehead and a woollen scarf covering his mouth to avoid unwanted attention, Ho Chi Minh followed a group of youngsters, who were picking spring leaves off the trees for luck, and, crossing the hunchbacked stone bridge, entered the Jade Pagoda in the middle of the lake. According to Vietnamese tradition, anyone who wants to be happy in the coining year must visit the ancient pagoda during Tct and light a stick of incense.

For so many years, Ho Chi Minh had wanted to celebrate Tet in his native Vietnam. When that hour finally came, he made a point of celebrating it together with his people, on the shores of the Lake of the Redeemed Sword, as the people of Hanoi had done for centuries.