155

1

p Ho Chi Minh s reunion with his friends and associates at Paqho in July 1911, was all the more joyous because the rcvolutiemary movement had made considerable headway of late, and the outlook was bright. The Vielminh front had overspillcd the Vietbac guerilla base and was gradually becoming naiionu ide’. National salvation societies and Vielmmh bases had already sprung up in main provinces e>l the Red River delta, in Central Viclnani, and even in Saigon. A strategically important step was the setting up of "sennit} /.ones" around Hanoi and then in Bac Clang and Thai Nguyen provinces north of Hanoi, thus eslabhshing a direct ce)rridor between the guerilla-e’ontrolled /one- and the capilal. which laler enabled the Party’s Central Commitlcc to keep eleveiopments in Hanoi under control both before and during the armed uprising.

p The growth of Vietminh influene-e was above all due- to objective factors the- change of the- tide’ in the- Second World War following the Sovie’t Army’s successes; the- setbacks of the Japanese militarists in China and the Pacific’; the- sharp worsening e)l the- ccemonnc situation in Vietnam as a result of the- Japanese policy e>( mass requisitioning, and, finally, the escalation of the- conflict between Japanese and French interests in Indochina and, as a consequence, the weaken ing of pro-French and pro-Japanese forces in Vietnamese political circles.

p There were- also tangible- results from (he- Party s persistent campaign to secure as main allie-s as possible in the- effort to bring down the FrancoJapanese occupation regime. This activity followed two basic: lines. One objective was to broaden the- Vietminh’s social base-, drawing into it moreurban petty-bourgeois cle-menls, well-to-do village strata, the national bourgeoisie, and patriotic-minded landowne-rs.

p The Communist Parly established contact with prominent Vietnamese intellectuals and student leaders. This resulted in the- setting up of theDemocratic Party of Vietnam in June 1944. It was a revolutionary parly of the national bourgeoisie, which immediately declared its desire- to join the- Vielminh. For the- first time- in Vietnamese history a polilical parly of the- bourgeoisie fought for the country’s independence within a united national front under the- guidance ol the- Communist Party and the working class. The- Communist Part)’ had again scored a major success in applying the- basic’ principles of Marxism-Leninism in the- complex selling of Vietnam.

p The Parly also stepped up its agitation campaign among the- royal armed forces. This resulted in ihe establishment of the- Union of 156 Servicemen for National Salvation, which later joined the Vietminh. In Hanoi alone, underground revolutionary cells were set up in the First Indochina Rifles Regiment, and the 4th Colonial Artillery Regiment. Vietnamese officers of the French General Staff formed a cell and another cell was set up at the Bach Mai military airfield.

p The Party published an important, well-timed programme document, "Principles of Cultural Policy”, which called for the promotion of a national in form and democratic in content Vietnamese literature and art. This platform was joined by many of the country’s progressive intellectuals, among them such outstanding writers as Nguyen Dinh Thi, Nam Cao, Nguyen Hong, To Hoai, and Nguyen Tuan, who established a Cultural Association for National Salvation.

p And finally, the Communist Party called for the establishment of an anti-Japanese democratic front, which would encompass foreign antifascists, including Frenchmen supporting General de Gaulle. This move was prompted by de Gaulle’s promise given on December 8, 1943 (which he never kept, however), that after defeating Germany, France would grant independence to Indochina. In order to set up a working relationship with all those Frenchmen who opposed to Vichy regime and were prepared to back de Gaulle, the Vietminh in Hanoi held a secret meeting attended by Communists, left-wing Socialists, and de Gaullists in the Foreign Legion and the French military administration in Indochina. The Vietminh representative proposed joint action against the Japanese and Vichy forces and requested those de Gaullists who carried any weight with the colonial administration to help the Vielminh with food and arms, and to release political prisoners. However, the de Gaullists did not have the political foresight to establish an alliance with the Vietminh.
 

p The moment Ho Chi Minh reached Paqbo, he sensed the general elation there and especially the excitement of local Party activists. An extended conference of the inter-provincial Party Committee of the CaoBae-Lang /one had been held the day before, and the following conclusion was drawn: "An examination of the international situation, the situation in the country, and the revolutionary movement in Caobang, Bakkan and Langson provinces shows that conditions are ripe there for an armed insurrection and guerilla warfare."

p Ho Chi Minh had arrived just in time for the second session, which was to decide the exact timing of the uprising. After si/ing up the situation, he declared that the decision had been premature.

p “In your plans to mount an offensive in three northern provinces,” heexplained, "you have taken into account only local conditions. You ignore the complex situation in the country as a whole and the fact that 157 the enemy is still strong, whereas the revolutionary forces are scattered, lack organisation, and don’t have enough trained personnel or weapons."

p As if thinking aloud, he continued: "True, the peaceful stage of the revolution is over yet the moment for nationwide insurrection is not yet ripe. Lenin used to say that insurrection is an art. Insurrection requires careful preparation hasty action is out of place and dangerous."

p He thought a moment, then continued: "Of course, if at the present stage we confine ourselves to political struggle alone, that wouldn’t be enough to sustain the revolutionary movement. But it would be reckless to immediately proceed with an armed uprising while our enemy is strong enough to crush it. I’m sure the day will soon come when political struggle will have to give way to armed struggle. But at the present moment we still must give priority to political struggle. We must find new forms of revolutionary action that would best suit the present complicated situation."

p In the days that followed, Ho Chi Minh pondered over what course of action the Party and the Vietminh should take in a situation where conditions were ripe for an armed uprising, but the enemy was still a force to be reckoned with. He thought of the Vietnamese military leaders of the Middle Ages who responded to the invasions of Chinese feudal lords by organising a levy en masse under the motto, "The Whole Nation Is Our Army”. The experience of the CPSU(B), too, suggested that a revolution, whether national-democratic or socialist, must rely for its strength on a people’s army. During the first Russian revolution, Lenin wrote: "No power on earth will dare to encroach upon free Russia if the bulwark of her liberty is an armed people which has destroyed the military caste, which has made all soldiers citizens and all citizens capable of bearing arms, soldiers.”   [157•1 

p In short, Ho Chi Minh was sure that the only correct policy would be to create a people’s liberation army. The experience of the Russian and Chinese revolutions confirmed this, and so did the Vietnamese people’s own experience in repulsing foreign invaders. Much had already been done in this respect. Late in 1941, he remembered, the first armed detachment had been formed to protect Party headquarters and direct the training of self-defence units in the national salvation societies. Later other armed units appeared. In August 1943, two armed detachments of patriots, one from Caobang and the other from Thainguyen, met in the middle of the “corridor” linking the two provinces, thus uniting two major revolutionary bases, which later helped to establish a large liberated area.

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p At the present stage, however, (he Victminh’s armed units were nol battleworthy, since they were short ol weapons and military experts. In time all that, of course, would be remedied, bill al present it was essential to rouse the masses out ol their slumber, show them the capacity ol the revolutionary lorces, destroy their lear ol the enemy, and instil confidence in their own unlimited possibilities. Frederick Kngcls once wrote of the Picdinontcsc who had risen in arms against the Austrian Kmpire: "A nation that wants to conquer its independence cannot restrict itsell to the ordinary methods ol warfare. Mass uprising, revolutionary war, guerilla detachments everywhere that is the only means by which a small nation can overcome a large one, by which a less strong army can be put in a position to resist a stronger and better organised one.”   [158•1 

p Applied to Vietnamese conditions, this meant that the Party strategy "cannot restrict itself to the ordinary methods of warfare" or of preparing revolution. Ho (’hi Mmli came to the conclusion that the only effective strategy would be a llexfble combination of political and armed struggle, with one form prevailing over the other, depending on the situation. Bearing this in mind, the Vietminh needed armed units that could, on the one hand, conduct political propaganda among the population and, on the other, mount bold sorties against the occupation force’s, showing the- nation the growing strength of the revolution and the possibility of complete victory.

p On December 22, 1944, Ho Chi Minh signed a directive forming a Propaganda Brigade for the Liberation of Vietnam. "The name of the Propaganda Brigade for Liberation,” he wrote, "means that the political side is more important than the military. It is a propaganda unit...

p “A main-force unit will be created by selecting the most determined and eager members and cadres of the guerilla units... and concentrating a large part of the weapons available...

p “Our war of resistance being a war of the whole people, the whole people should be mobilised and armed; therefore, while concentrating forces to set up a first army unit, the local armed forces should be maintained so as to conduct concerted action and assist it in every field...

p “Concerning tactics, we must apply guerilla warfare; maintain secrecy, prompt action and initiative (now in the east, now in the west, arriving unexpectedly and departing without a trace)."

p The First Propaganda Brigade headed by Vo Nguyen Ciap initially numbered only thirty-four men, armed with one light machine-gun, two pistols, and twenty-nine rifles, seventeen of which were old-fashioned flintlocks. On the day before the men took their oath of allegiance, Vo 159 Nguyen Giap received a note from Ho Chi Mmh |ust a lew lines on a scrap of paper hidden in a pack ol cigarettes: "Remember, your unit must concentrate more on political propaganda than on armed warfare. Your unit can be called an elder brother who, I am sure, will soon have many younger brothers. Although you are starting out as a small unit, you have a great future. You are the embryo of a Liberation Army, whose glorious victories will sweep the country from North to South."

p Two days later the unit was to receive its baptism of fire. The thirtyfour men made surprise attacks on the French outposts in Phaikhat and Nangan districts, capturing the garrisons, killing their commanders, and sei/.ing large quantities of weapons. News of these first successes quickly spread among the population of the guerilla-controlled /one, causing a great wave of enthusiasm. A week later, Vo Nguyen Giap’s unit had already grown to the si/.e ol a company.

Ho Chi Minh’s directive on armed propaganda brigades became the basic Party line in military questions. The Marxist-Leninist principle of combining political and armed struggle in preparing a revolution, creatively applied by Ho Chi Minh to the local conditions of Vietnam, was the corner-stone of Party policy in preparing the August Revolution and in the resistance war against French colonialists. The success of combining military, political and diplomatic effort was especially striking when the Communist forces fought to get the U.S. invaders out of South Vietnam.

2

p The Second World War was drawing to a close, spelling disaster for the fascist aggressors. The clash between French and Japanese interests in Vietnam was becoming increasingly acute. Fears were voiced in Tokyo that in the event of an Anglo-American landing in Vietnam, the French colonial forces would stab the Japanese in the back. Such fears were not unfounded: according to Japanese intelligence reports, in June 1944 a messenger from General de Caulle had been parachuted from a British plane near the Sino-Vietnamese border. He managed to reach Hanoi unnoticed and transmitted de Gaulle’s instructions to General Mordant that the French lorces in Indochina should be ready to hit the Japanese at the first opportunity, so as to re-establish French rule in the region before the Axis countries surrendered to the Allies. General Mordant officially retired from his post of Commander-in-Chief of the French forces, ostensibly because of old age, and started secret preparations for an antiJapanese offensive. In late 1944 and early 1945, there were numerous 160 cases of British and American planes airdropping troops, weapons and supplies in areas of Vietnam and Laos out of the reach of the Japanese.

p Having learned of France’s intentions and also spurred on by her own serious setbacks in the Pacific’, Japan proceeded to prepare a large-scale operation to wipe out the French presence in Indochina. This had been all the easier since by early 1945, Tokyo was no longer bound by any obligations to the Vichy government, the latter having ceased to exist with the liberation of France. On March 9, 1945, the Japanese attacked French garrisons throughout Indochina. In less than two hours, the bulk of the French forces were destroyed or captured.

p The surviving French troops lied to China through Vietminh-con trolled areas. In Bac Kan Province, a propaganda unit of the Liberation Army contacted the commander of one of the French units and even negotiated setting up a Franco-Vietnamese Committee for Anti-Japanese Action. But the idea was doomed from the very outset the French crossed the Chinese border a few days after the talks, leaving, however, a quantity of their weapons to the Vietnamese. The French forces were demoralised, the officers complained of the hardships of rural life, but most importantly, the former colonialists feared the Vietminh more than the Japanese, since the Vietminh’s declared aim was to liberate Vietnam from any foreign domination. In refusing to co-operate with the Vietminh, the commander and his officers were following de Gaulle’s instructions. In a policy-making speech at Bra/./aville on February 8, 1945, the General mapped out France’s intended strategy in Indochina: it was to be turned into a federation of five states Laos, Cambodia, Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China, ruled by a French governor. Thus it was clear that French colonial policy vis-a-vis Indochina and especially Vietnam remained virtually unchanged.

p Vietnamese patriot Ho Chi Minh had offered his friendship and cooperation to French patriot Charles dc Gaulle. But the latter rejected the offer. These two great leaders turned out to be poles apart. For both men, national unity and national resurgence was the motive force of their political careers yet they belonged to opposing camps. Whereas Ho Chi Minh’s patriotism was profoundly democratic, progressive, aimed at the future, de Gaulle’s inevitably pushed him in to the reactionary camp. It is hardly surprising that de Gaulle, an experienced politician and sophisticated diplomat, suddenly revealed such shortsightedness in relation to Indochina which ultimately led to another long and bloody war in Vietnam, ending in France’s humiliating defeat.
 

p In the meantime, the Japanese propaganda machine was working full blast in a bid to secure Vietnamese popular support for the Japanese army. Japan’s blit/, takeover was presented as the liberation of Vietnam 161 from French colonial rule. The next day alter the coup, Radio Tokyo declared the colonial status ol French Indochina null and void. Thai same evening, the Japanese proposed to Lmpcror Bao Dai thai he collaborate wilh them, and received his consent.

p However, all this did nol in the least change Vietnam’s colonial status, since supreme power was now in the hands ol the Japanese Commandcr-in-Chief, while Bao Dai and his new Cabinet, headed by the historian ’Fran Trong Kim, an agent of the Japanese secret police, were nothing but obedient servants. As early as March 30, Japanese Governor Minoda in Cochin China laid his cards on ihe table, declaring that Cochin China would henceforth not only be controlled, but actually governed, by the Japanese army. Indeed, in their official documents and in private conversations the new invaders referred to Indochina as Japan’s overseas province.

p Rhetoric about "Vietnam’s newly found freedom" was accompanied by a torrent of propaganda in favour of an alliance with Japan. Throughout Vietnam, local compradores, reactionary landowners and various declasse elements were encouraged to form numerous pro-Japanese parties and organisations, which called upon the people to join in (he war for "the Great Fast Asian Co- Prosperity Sphere" and recruited young Vietnamese for the Japanese army.

p The Japanese high command made various overtures to the Vielmmh and other patriotic organisations, who, however, had no illusions about thcjapanese and understood very well thai the takeover of March 9 was liltle more than replacing one colonial regime with another. In the Vietbac guerilla-controlled area, Japanese planes dropped leaflets and letters addressed to Vietminh leaders, offering them two options: either cooperation with Japan or death.

p And finally, ihe Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Tonkin sent a message personally to Ho Chi Minh, attempting to win him over by flattery. Addressed "to ihe esteemed Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Vielininh, and our dear friend”, it read: "We sincerely consider yon a true patriot. The courage of your men is admirable. But you must recognise that by driving oul the French we have helped your country lo achieve independence.

p “Furthermore, are we not neighbours:’ Are we not brothers within the same yellow race? Why can’t we fight together for the glory of our two nations? Perhaps something stands between us? No, nothing stands between us. There is only misunderstanding, but that is easily remedied.

p “We do not advise you lo put your trust in America or China. They have honey on their lips, but poison in their hearts. We sincerely hope you will reconsider your policy and begin cooperating with us. We are ready to help you, and await your reply."

162

p The Japanese never got a reply. The order issued by the Party’s Central Committee and the Vietminh’s General Committee was: "Answer the Japanese not with words, hut with fire."

p The attempts of the Japanese military to put on sheep’s clothing did not fool anyone. It became more and more evident to ordinary Vietnamese that their country’s “independence” was a fiction and that in fact Vietnam had been turned into a Japanese colony. The Vietnamese wenoutraged at the ways of the Japanese in their country. Requisitioning rice and other food for their troops, they soon exhausted the Vietnamese countryside, leaving the peasants with empty rice bowls. In many places, even seed rice was taken. To cover its chronic budget deficit, the Japanese command had the Bank of Indochina print enormous amounts of paper money. The Japanese occupation brought Vietnam widespread famine, epidemics, runaway inflation, mass unemployment, and economic devastation. In 1944-1945, some two million people died of hunger and disease in Bac-bo and northern Trung-bo provinces. The situation in the country was becoming explosive, with the cities packed with hungry peasants fleeing from their ruined villages.

p Amid the chaos, the Communist Party of Indochina showed itself to be the best organised and most efiicicnt contingent of the patrioticmovement. On the day of the Japanese takeover, an extended meeting of the Standing Bureau of the Party’s Central Committee was held in the village of Dinhbang, near Hanoi. Ho Chi Minh, who was at Paqbo at the time, helped to prepare the meeting, although he was unable to attend it. The meeting produced a document entitled, "The JapaneseFrench Conflict and Our Plan of Action”, which said that thcjapanesc invasion had brought about a profound political crisis, thus preparing the ground for a nationwide armed uprising and the takeover of political power by the people. The Japanese militarists were now the principal enemy of the nations of Indochina and it was against them that the people should turn all their fury. Yet one should also beware of the de Caullists, who might attempt a comeback.
 

p The meeting drew up instructions on setting up national salvation committees at plants, factories, mines, villages, army barracks, schools and colleges wherever the Vietminh had a reliable base to lead tinpeople into battle as soon as the situation warranted. Simultaneously, the instructions said, a large-scale guerilla offensive should be mounted wherever conditions were ripe, so as to liberate district after district and establish revolutionary bases everywhere.

p The resolution said that an allied landing in Indochina would, naturally, contribute to the success ol’the uprising, but that the Party and the 163 revolutionary masses should not wait for such a landing, but rely on their own resources.

The Party Committee of the Cao-Bac-Lang district was among the first to launch a major guerilla offensive. The propaganda unit of the Liberation Army was ordered to descend from its base in the mountains and start an operation southward, in the direction of Hanoi. The move was successful from the outset. By April 1945, the revolutionary forces had gained control of a vast area spanning several provinces north of Hanoi, dissolving the local Japanese-controlled government bodies and handing over power to the people’s revolutionary committees.

3

p Early in May, the revolutionary headquarters left Cao-bang Province and trekked in the wake of the Liberation Army. Ho Chi Minh took a small fisherman’s junk down the river and disembarked at the village of Tan Trao in Tuyenquang Province.

p The tirst few days he lived in the dinh, the "commune house”, then moved to a shack that his comrades had built nearby, at the foot of the mountain. The dinh was surrounded by several age-old banyans. These tropical fig-trees with multiple trunks are typical for the Indochina jungle. Their crowns formed an impenetrable roof over the shack, keeping it pleasantly cool. Behind the dinh was a wellspring with water so pure and transparent that local people called it Pearl Spring. Nearby flowed the serene river Dai, its banks covered with masses of wild sugar-cane.

p Just as in Pac-bo, Ho Chi Minh tried to blend in with the local people, but with little success. His appearance, the face of an intellectual, attracted attention, as did his habit of working late by the light of an oil-lamp, getting up with the birds, cleaning up in the house, watering his kitchengarden, gathering brushwood, and then waking up his companions — from these little details they concluded that he was a man of some authority.

p Tan Trao old-timers still remember an amusing incident that happened soon after Ho Chi Minh arrived there. One of the houses accommodated a small unit of the Liberation Army. Ho Chi Minh dropped in and, seeing the place untidy, got after the commander. The latter, who did not know Ho Chi Minh personally, did not take too kindly to the criticism.

p “Who do you think you are?" he snapped. "My superiors obviously know what I should do and when."

p Unruffled, Ho Chi Minh replied:

164

p “Isn’t it the bitter pill that cures? I’m an ordinary eiti/.en, but I have a right to speak my mind. You’re an army of the people, aren’t you?"

p The young officer had no answer for that. Next day he complained to a friend, who happened to be Ho Chi Minh’s bodyguard.

p “An old man barged in yesterday and gave me a dressing-down for the way I keep the barracks."

p His friend laughed.

p “Oh you, it was Ho Chi Minh,” he said.
 

p After Ho Chi Minh and the Standing Bureau settled down at Tan Trao, the small village became the headquarters of the revolution, the heart of the New Vietnam. From here, Parly liaison men communicated with guerilla bases throughout the country. Orders were issued to prepare for a nationwide uprising. Young patriots came from every corner of Vietnam to join the Victminh. The roads and forest trails leading to Tan Trao became busier every day. It was as if people were going to an autumn fair.

p The residents of Tan Trao, and in fact the whole liberated /.one, began to feel how much the revolution was giving the common people with the introduction of universal suffrage, the election of a people’s council, the opening of literacy courses, women getting equal rights with men, and the abolition of the onerous taxes. The population welcomed the advent of the new life: people joined the Liberation Army or volunteered as guides and porters of food for the Vietminh and the Party leaders.

p On June 4, a conference of people’s representatives of North Vietnam opened at Tan Trao on Ho Chi Minh’s initiative. He suggested that the six fully liberated provinces and parts of the two provinces bordering on the capital should be integrated and that this territory become the main base in the bid to overthrow the Japanese and the Bao Dai puppet regime. The village of Tan Trao was chosen as the administrative centre of the liberated area, whose population exceeded one million.

p Thus, only a few do/.en miles away from the Japanese Commanderin-Chief ’s residence, a new, independent Vietnam was born under Vietminh control. The people’s revolutionary committees that were set up in every town and village of the liberated area proceeded to put the Vietminh’s political programme into practice. The Japanese tried several times to crush the people’s revolutionary government in the liberated area, but failed.

p Ho Chi Minh was highly active, briefing his men, signing orders and instructions, conducting meetings, and looking into the preparations of the armed uprising. His often repeated phrase was: "Now cadres decide everything.” He demanded reliable communications with Central Committee members and Party activists in the plains, so as to coordinate 165 their moves and be informed about developments in the capital and major cities. But despite his packed schedule, he found time to read political literature, write articles, and receive visitors. Delegates from faraway villages were seen more and more often especially from ethnic minorities such as the Muong, Tho, Nung, Tai, and Man, who wanted to know what was going on in the country and what their attitude should be. After talking to Ho Chi Minh, they would cluck their tongues in admiration, and say:

p “Looks like an ordinary peasant, but what a head he’s got! With such men, the Vielmmh is bound to win..."

p At the height of all this activity, Ho Chi Minh suddenly came down with malaria. "For several days he fell weak and feverish,” Vo Nguyen Giap recalled. "But he continued working. Lvcry time I visited him and asked how he was, he would say: ’Carry on I’m perfectly all right’.

p “But he looked weak and haggard. Once I found him feverish and delirious, tossing and turning in bed. Medicines were extremely hard to come by. He had already taken a few quinine tablets, but they didn’t seem to help. He was so weak he couldn’t even sit up. But he called me to his side and mumbled: ’The time has come. It’s now or never.’

p “He spoke of things that worried him. At the time I dared not even think those might be his last words. Only later, remembering that terrible night, I realised he must have felt his end was near and wanted us to know his last will. His only thought was for the revolution.

p “He also spoke of the immediate tasks facing the Party: ’The revolution is on the upswing, but we must back it up ideologically. We need trustworthy Party cadres. There must be more guerilla bases.’ "

p For several days, Ho Chi Minh’s condition was critical. His comrades were afraid for his life. Inhabitants of Tan Trao versed in folk medicine went deep into the jungle for medicinal herbs and roots for Ho Chi Minh. One grey-bearded hunter caught a giant tortoise, mixed some of its blood with rice liquor, and had Ho Chi Minh drink it. The fever subsided. Ho was better and soon after recovered.
 

p In early July, Ho Chi Minh and the Standing Bureau decided to convene a Party conference or congress at Tan Trao, to be followed by a congress of Vietminh representatives which would set the date for a nationwide armed uprising. Messengers were sent to all parts of the country, and also to South China, to summon delegates. Yet the congress was greatly delayed: delegates were arriving much later than expected, with some of them arriving on foot by roundabout routes to avoid Japanese posts.

p There was no time to lose, however. Fascism’s crushing defeat was a painful blow for the Japanese. On August 9, 1945, the Soviet Union 166 declared war on Japan and the Soviet Army mounted an oflrnsive against the Kwangtung Army in Manchuria. On August 10, a joint session of thejapanese Cabinet and the Council of War attended by Emperor Hirohito opted for surrender. Japan sent messages to Stockholm and Bertie confirming recognition of the Potsdam Agreements. The Japanese occupation authorities in Indochina were stunned. Thus, conditions were ripe in Vietnam for an all-out revolution, and the Party was quick to take advantage of the situation.

p The Standing Bureau decided to open the National Party Conference at once, although some of the delegates were still en route. Ho Chi Minh, despite his weakness after the bout of malaria, was actively involved in the preparations. On August 13, the conference was opened in Tan Trao under a shady banyan tree, which has since become a historical landmark.

p At the height of the conference, a messenger brought news of Japan’s unconditional surrender. This news was greeted by an outburst of applause, and cries of triumph. The moment marked the end of indecision and the beginning of action. There was only one way open now: a nationwide uprising, a takeover of power by the people, and at long last liberation from foreign tyranny.

p The conference adopted the historic decision to launch a nationwide uprising, drive out the Japanese occupation forces, and proclaim the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. An Insurrection Committee was set up. Delegates from more remote areas were allowed to leave before the end of the conference so as to return and direct the uprising in their localities. Messengers were sent to intercept delegates still on their way to Tan Trao and tell them the conference’s decision and relay the order to return home.

p Special importance at the conference was attached to swiftness of the takeover in the capital and the villages. The gist of the matter was that surrendering Japanese troops were being disarmed by Anglo-American troops all over Southeast Asia. And the French colonialists were planning to reinstate their colonial administration in Indochina. Therefore, the Vietnam patriots had to take over from thejapanese before the Allies moved in, and meet them as rightful masters of their country.

p Following the Party Conference, a National Congress of People’s Representatives was opened at Tan Trao on August 16, convened by the Vietminh’s General Committee. ’Faking part were sixty representatives from all three parts of Vietnam—Bac Ky, Trung Ky and Nam Ky and from emigre organisations abroad. Ho Chi Minh sat in the centre of the presiding party. Many of the delegates were seeing him for the first time and wondered who that dignified old man was with the emaciated face, greying beard and moustache, high forehead, and shining eyes. But 167 when Ho Chi Minh rose to address the Congress, whispers of "Why, it’s Nguyen Ai Ojioc!" swept through the audience, followed by a burst of applause.

p The Congress endorsed the Vietminh General Committee’s decision to go ahead with the nationwide uprising and adopted a resolution On the Takeover of Power and Implementation of the Ten Basil- Tasks of Viclminh’s Political Programme. These tasks included: overthrowing the occupation government and founding a democratic republic, arming the entire nation, granting democratic rights to the population, carrying out democratic socio-economic’ reforms, and establishing friendly relations and cooperation with the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and with all peoples lighting for national independence.

p The Congress approved the future republic’s national flag a livepointed gold star in the centre of a red banner and formed an 11-man National Liberation Committee chaired by Ho Chi Minh.

p The newly-formed National Liberation Committee was sworn in right then and there-, at the foot of the mountain. ’Flic delegates were greeted by a symbolic deputation of the local commune: an old peasant, a woman representing an ethnic minority, and a small boy. After they delivered an emotional address and presented to the presidium token gifts from their commune, Ho Chi Minh suddenly turned to the audience and said:

p “Comrades, do you know what this fine lad here docs for a living? Whereas in other countries children go to school and play all kinds of games, this nine-year-old tends buffalo every day and gathers brushwood. He has never held a book in his hands.’

p In the awed silence, Ho Chi Minh’s voice sounded stronger with every word:

p “The aim of the National Liberation Committee and all the delegates is to win independence for our country whatever the cost so that our children would have enough to eat, would have enough to wear, and could go to school. That’s the priority goal of our revolution. Let’s never forget the oath that we’ve taken today and let’s put it into practice in our everyday work."

p The delegates held their breath. There were tears, too tears of past suffering and tears of joy that the great changes would be happening at last.

p Right after the congress, Ho Chi Minh issued an appeal to the nation:

p “Dear fellow-countrymen,

p “Four years ago, I called on you to unite, for unity is strength and only strength will enable us to win back independence and freedom.

p "At present, the Japanese army has collapsed. The National Salvation Movement has spread to the whole country. The League for the 168 Independence of Vietnam has millions ol members Irom all social strata: intellectuals, peasants, workers, businessmen, soldiers, and from all nationalities in the country: Viet, Tho, Nutig, Muong, Man, and others.

p “Recently, the Victminh convened the Vietnam People’s National Congress and appointed the National Liberation Committee to lead the entire nation in the resolute struggle for national independence...

p “Dear fellow-countrymen!

“The decisive hour has struck for the destiny of our people. Let all of us stand up and rely on our own strength to free ourselves. Forward! Under the banner of the Vietmmh, lei us valiantlv march forward!"
 

4

p On August 16, the Liberation Army marched out of Tan Trao in the direction of the Red River delta and Hanoi, avoiding confrontation with fortified outposts of the Japanese. Everywhere in its wake power was taken over by the people. But several days before the Ami}’ reached Hanoi, events took place there that had a profound impact on the entire uprising.

p The Bakky Parly Committee, having got news of Japan’s surrender and acting on the Standing Bureau’s instructions, took the decision to begin the uprising and seize power in the whole of North Vietnam and above all in Hanoi, where the Japanese Commandcr-in-ChicI ’had his residence. It was important to foil attempts by the occupation authorities to hand over the reins to a puppet emperor government, occupy the capital’s vital centres, win over sympathetic officials, and overwhelm pro-Japanese and other reactionary forces.

p On August Hi, as soon as the Japanese information agency Dome! circulated in Hanoi the Japanese Emperor’s rescript on Japan’s surrender, the occupation authorities turned over power to Bao Dai’s governor, recalled its officials from the administration, and released the political detainees from the central prison.

p In the morning of August 17, Hanoi’s Imperial Palace became the venue of a gathering of the Tonkin Consultative Assembly, which was dominated by representatives of the pro-Japanese Dai Viet Party. The Assembly formed a national salvation committee and announced its decision to stage a mass demonstration of allegiance to Emperor Bao Dai in the capital’s central square in the afternoon. Yet no sooner had the agenda been announced than several young men representing the Democratic Party mounted the platform. One of them addressed the crowd, calling upon the people to rally round the Vietminh and fight for a truly independent Vietnam. A huge red flag with a five-pointed gold star rose 169 above the crowd, followed by do/ens of others. Bao Dai’s flag on the platform was lorn down and replaced by the Vielminh flag. The presidium was thrown into confusion and lost control of the meeting. The many-thousand crowd chanted: "Long live independent Vietnam!" and "Long live the Vietminh!"

p All day, on August 18, there were rallies and demonstrations under Vietminh slogans. Vietminh self-defence units set up posts in key locations of the city, stockpiled weapons and ammunition in the city’s centre, established lines of communication, and prepared flags and banners.

p Next morning at 10 a.m. a 100,000-strong rally was held in Theatre Square. Representatives of the city Party Committee and the Military Revolutionary Committee called on the people to throw down the Japanese occupation regime, establish a people’s government, and proclaim the independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam. At noon, the demonstrators arrived in force at the residence of the pro-Japanese governmental committee, disarmed the guards, entered the building, and sent the committee packing. Soon after, the insurgents occupied the barracks of the security troops and sci/.cd their arsenal. By nightfall the insurgents had gained control of virtually all the city’s vital centres and arteries.

p The revolutionary take-over in Hanoi paved the way for the revolution’s rapid advance southward. On August 20, people’s power was established in Thanh Hoa, Nghe-an and Hatinh provinces. It was tune to take over Hue, the residence of Emperor Bao Dai and his puppet government. On August 21, the National Liberation Committee sent the Emperor a telegram proposing that he abdicate. Although the revolution had obviously won, Ho Chi Minh and the Standing Bureau thought it tactically more advantageous to induce the Emperor to abdicate voluntarily for that could cause a split among the enemies of the revolution instead of unseating him by force.

p On August 23, the people of Hue found their city spangled with red flags. Thousands took to the streets to demand transfer of power to the Vietminh. The insurgents occupied the building of the Tran Trong Kim government.

p The Emperor was in no hurry to reply to the abdication demand, though it was clear that the two-thousand-year-old monarchy had only hours left to live. As soon as Bao Dai received the telegram, he asked his aides (o find out if National Liberation Committee Chairman Ho Chi Minh and the legendary Nguyen Ai Quoc were actually one and the same person.When next morning he was told it was one and the same person, he sighed dolefully:

p “Then I have no option but to abdicate."

p On August 28, a delegation of the National Liberation Committee arrived at Hue to a rapturous welcome of the local people. On August 30, 170 the abdication ceremony look place at I lie Iron! gate of the Emperor’s palace. The striped yellow Hay; of the monarchy was taken down and the red flag with the gold star was raised in its place. The Emperor, clad in his bcdragoned yellow ceremonial robe, read his abdication statement. His closing sentence drew cries of approval from the crowd:

p “I prefer to become a citi/en of a free country than to remain the Emperor of a country of slaves."

p After that, Hao Dai handed over to the people’s representatives the symbols of royal power: the seal of solid gold weighing some twenty pounds and the sword of the dynast)’ with a handle of bright-green jade. In the Orient, jade is believed to protect its owner against lightning. It had failed, however, to save the Emperor from the thunderstorm of revolution.

p Things were not so easy for the revolution in Saigon, the country’s third most important city, where pro-Japanese and other reactionary forces were still strong and where the Party organisation had been considerably weakened by repressions. On August 19, the Emperor’s representative, Nguyen Van Sam, arrived in Saigon and immediately started negotiations with the Japanese to secure the transfer of Japanese weapons to pro-Japanese: parties and organisations in Vietnam. At the time, an armed force of several thousands belonging to the pro-Japanese religious sect Kaodai was stationed in and around Saigon. There were also downs of pro-Japanese groups in the city and its environs, which were in constant contact with the Japanese Command and were well supplied with weapons, food, and cash. The counter-revolutionary forces pinned their hopes mainly on the United National Front, which had been established on August 14 and included, apart from numerous pro-Japanese parties, a strong Trotskyite group that called itself The Struggle, the Kaodai sect and the Hoahao sect.

p On the side of the Communist Parly of Indochina and the Vietminh were Saigon’s proletarian organisations totalling 120,000 members, and also nearly 80,000 members of various youth organisations and soldiers from the disbanded Emperor’s army. To win over organisations that were still vacillating, Vielminh representatives approached members of the United National front and explained the political aims of the revolution.

p As in Hanoi, the Vietminh decided to take advantage of a mass demonstration in support of governor Nguyen Van Sam by the United National Front on August 25. The demonstrators carried the imperial yellow flag and posters for Vietnamese-Japanese friendship. Yet therewas a sense of doom about the demonstration: news of the Vietminh’s victories in Hanoi, Hue and other cities and of the Emperor’s abdication, had paralysed its will. In this situation, the Vietminh proposed to 171 all the patriotic organisations in Saigon to form a people’s revolutionary committee. At 9 a. m. the newly-formed committee appeared before the demonstrators. The Vietminh had six seats out of nine in it, including thai of the chairman. That was yet another victory for the August Revolution.

p Bearing in mind the difficult situation in Saigon, the Party Central Committee sent a delegation of the Vietminh’s General Committee under Hoang Qitoe Y’iel there on August 19. Here is how he remembers that trip: "We arrived in Saigon in the evening. The streets were flooded with light, which made the red flags look unnaturally bright. We were accommodated at Nam-bo Palace, formerly the French governor’s residence. We were tired from the journey and went to bed at once. But no sooner had we closed our eyes than someone knocked:

p “ ‘A deputation has come to see you. They want to speak to you at once.’

p “The deputation consisted of representatives of a broad range of political parties and groups. They showered me with questions, one of which was:

p ’"Who is Ho Chi Minh? Is he really...?’

p “’Why, of course it’s Nguyen Ai Quoc,’ I answered. ’Who else could our President be but the leader of the revolution who has dedicated all his life to his people’s freedom and happiness?’

p “A burst of applause and shouts of ’Long live the Provisional Government! Long live President Ho Chi Minh!’

p “Bat] Ho’s powerful authority, the universal prestige, of our heroic red flag, which symbolised the blood of our fallen comrades, and the prestige of our Party and of the Vietminh had worked a miracle: the hearts of all those present suddenly began to beat in unison. It was this unity, unprecedented in strength and scope, that the nascent revolutionary government relied upon.

p “That day I sent a cable to the North: ’We control twenty-one provinces. Campaign in Nam-bo mainly as planned.’

p “Hanoi cabled back: ’Declaration of independence September 2.’ "
 

p It took the Communist Party of Indochina, which at the time had some 5,000 members, a mere twelve days to score a nationwide victory, putting an end to over 80 years of colonial rule, as well as 2,000 years of monarchy.

p Immediately after the victory in Hanoi, the Standing Bureau sent Le Due Tho to the guerilla-controlled area to accompany Ho Chi Minh to the capital. The most distinguished unit of the Liberation Army was ordered to escort him all the way from Tan Trao to Hanoi. The journey 172 was a long one, partly down river and partly on foot. Some ol’the way, Ho Chi Minh, who was still very weak after his bout ol’malaria, was carried in a litter.

p On August 26, Ho Chi Minh and his retinue were met in the village of Ga near Hanoi by the Insurrection Committee. Everyone noticed that Ho looked much better than he did at the Tan Trao Congress. Having descended from the mountains, he looked like a typical delta peasant in his brown homespun outfit.

p He embraced everyone.

p Interrupting each other, the men started telling him about the uprisings in Hanoi, and other districts. Ho’s eyes sparkled as he listened, trying to control his excitement. Only when they said that the Standing Bureau considered it necessary to present the Provisional Government to the people as soon as possible, and that, as decided at the I an Trao Congress, the National Liberation Committee would automatically become the government, Ho Chi Minh said sheepishly:

“You mean I’m already head of the government?"

5

p Hanoi was decked out with hundreds of red (lags and banners, and there was a general air of excitement. That was the first lime Ho Chi Minh had ever been lo the capital. To gel to Hanoi from his native Village of Lotuses, he had travelled across hall the world for thirty years.

p Just a few days before, Hanoi had presented a grisly sight. Emaciated corpses lay in the streets. They were taken out of town and buried in common graves. Fresh crowds of hungry peasants from nearby villages kept arriving. These live skeletons roamed the city streets like ghosts. Often, one would fall to the ground, never to rise again.

p The famine was compounded by natural disaster. In August, the Red River burst its dams in several places, flooding six of the delta provinces, the bread-basket of North Vietnam. And as if this was not enough, cholera was taking a heavy toll.

p Hanoi was in agony. Dubious individuals of every stripe emerged from their dark holes and marched through the streets, bawling proJapanese slogans. But the city was too busy to pay attention to them. Everywhere in the dark narrow lanes, on the shady boulevards, around the Lake of the Redeemed Sword the black market reigned supreme. Literally everything was bought and sold. Burglars and bandits operated in broad daylight. Japanese policemen, who had replaced the French gendarmes, prowled the streets with long samurai swords at tjieir sides. Not infrequently such a policeman would be seen beating up a pickpocket or thief.

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p The revolution came as a cleansing lire. In a matter of days, famine and violence were wiped out. The residents themselves started voluntarily establishing revolutionary order. Burglaries and muggings stopped. Even the crowd of beggars vanished.

p Under cover of darkness, Ho Chi Minh and his escort were taken to a secret address in a two-storey building, No. 48 Hang Ngang Street. That was the oldest part of town, vividly described by Thach Lam, one of the founders ol the romantic’ school in Vietnamese literature. The neighbours had been told that relatives from the- countryside would be coming for a visit. With their home-spun peasant clothes and beards and moustaches, the “relatives” really did look like old men from the village’. Although the re-volution had triumphed, the situation remained tense, so the precautions were not superfluous.

p What happened the next morning had been dreaded and anticipated for a long time. The first units of Chiang Kaishck’s troops appeared in Hanoi. Standing on the balcony, Ho Chi Minh and his comrades watched the- marching units. The Vietnamese Campaign had begun with the blessing of Britain and the United States. Back in November 1943, on the eve ol the Teheran Conference, Chiang Kaishek had told Roosevelt that he didn’t think Indochina was ready for self-government and made it known that China could bring order to it in (he event of Japan’s defeat. At the Potsdam Conference, Britain and the U.S. decided that the Japanese in Vietnam would be disarmed by the- British to the south of the 16lh parallel and by the Chiang Kaishek forces to the north of it. France was excluded from this operation. Vietnam’s attitude was, of course, not taken into consideration.

p However, the former masters of Indochina lost no time, either. No sooner had Chiang Kaishek’s forces crossed the Vietnamese border than Hanoi’s fashionable Metropol Hotel was occupied by French officers. They arrived from China, Ceylon, Madagascar wherever they happened to be when General de Gaulle issued his order to go to Indochina post-haste- and start a French comeback.

p Thus the situation demanded that the Parly and National Liberation Committee act swiftly. No. 48 Hang Ngang Street became the venue of the Standing Bureau’s first session in Hanoi. Chaired by Ho Chi Minh, thesession resolved that the Provisional Government should be proclaimed and sworn in as soon as possible, before Chiang Kaishek’s forces took control of Hanoi. It was decided that the revolutionary committees in the northern provinces should be instructed to take- advantage of the flood and to use the- apparent absence of boats and ferries as an excuse to he>ld up the- advance of Chiang Kaishek’s mam forces. It was also decided to summon to Hanoi the bulk of the- Liberation Army, since the revolutionary armed forces stationed in the capital consisted of just a few 174 small self-defence detachments and separate groups of Tonkin riflemen who had joined the revolution.

p In the morning of August 26, the first two brigades of the Liberation Army arrived in Hanoi’s suburbs. With a brass band in front the troops crossed the two-kilometre-long Long Bien bridge across the Red River to the sounds of a revolutionary march. The men marched two abreast, carbines at the ready. In Hanoi, the columns were greeted by enthusiastic crowds. They marched straight to Theatre Square, where they held a parade watched by tens of thousands of residents.

p The Provisional Government had experienced and reliable cadres, which were indispensable in setting up and protecting a revolutionary government.

p On August 27, Hanoi’s newspapers announced the formation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government. It consisted of former National Liberation Committee members as decided by the Tan Trao Congress of people’s representatives. Ho Chi Minh was appointed chairman of the government and foreign minister. But the people immediately called him President.

p At an NLC session, Ho Chi Minh said the committee should publicise its policy of forming a broad-based national union and should call upon all patriotic parties and non-party members not in the Vietminh to take part in the new government. This measure, dictated by the need to expand the social and political base of the government, which the reactionary press had branded as Communist, was welcomed in political circles.

p The committee asked Ho Chi Minh to draw up the draft of a declaration on the victory of the revolution and the proclaiming of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

p Ho Chi Minh worked on the text of the declaration the remainder of that day and the whole night in his dimly lit room in Hang Ngang Street. The neighbours wondered what the old man was typing. None of them had any idea that they were witnessing the creation of a historic document.

p When the draft was ready, Ho Chi Minh called in the Standing Bureau members to learn their opinion of it. His face, still wan after the long illness, was radiant. As he himself later recalled, never before or after had he fell such strong emotions. He was to announce to his fellowcountrymen, and indeed to the whole world, that the goal the Vietnamese people had fought for over so many years, sacrificing their best sons and daughters, had finally been reached.

p The Declaration of Independence expressed the will of millions ofVietnaniese patriots, embodied the results of their 80-year struggle for national liberation and the victory of the August Revolution, which had 175 brought the Vietnamese people freedom, independence, and national unity. According to Vietnamese historians, the Declaration of Independence embodied the most seminal thoughts from Ho Chi Minn’s writings, from Party documents, and from the diversity of manifestoes issued by various national personalities and outstanding revolutionaries. In a word, the Declaration is considered to be the most glorious page in Vietnamese history.

p Amid all discussion of the draft, it suddenly occurred to someone that Ho Chi Minh had nothing to wear before the nation the next day. His comrades started feverishly looking for some European suit that would match the occasion. Ho Chi Minh chose a light-weight khaki semimilitary suit, the kind he had got used to in Canton. From that day on, throughout the 24 years of his presidency, Ho Chi Minh was always seen at national celebrations, at receptions for high-ranking foreign officials, in his trips around Vietnam and to foreign countries in the same modest outfit.
 

p The morning of September 2 saw Hanoi dressed up in scarlet, the colour of the revolution. A veritable sea of flags, banners, paper lanterns, and flowers decked out the streets. The banners read in Vietnamese and French: Vietnam for the Vietnamese!, No to French Colonialism!, Liberty or Death!, Long Live the Provisional Government!, Long Live President Ho Chi Minh!, Welcome to the Allied Mission!

p The streets were patrolled by self-defence units armed with lances and sabres and even ancient halberds and swords taken from temples. Thousands of peasants from nearby villages filled the streets. The peasant girls in bright national dress could be seen a long way of]’with their violet sashes and yellow turbans. Many held flowers. The demonstrators were joined by Buddhist monks and Catholic priests.

p The September sun beat down on Hanoi’s central square, which Ho Chi Minh had proposed renaming Badinh Square in honour of the three villages in Tanh Hoa Province whose peasants had valiantly fought the colonialists in the last century. Over half a million residents assembled in the square and the adjoining streets to see and hear the country’s new leaders. The name of Ho Chi Minh had quickly become known to tinwhole nation. Here is how a Hanoi newspaper described the rally in Badinh Square:

p “The people were waiting for the President. The people wanted to see the man who had changed his name hundreds of times, had had twelve different trades and professions, had been in prison many times, had been sentenced to death, and was presumed dead by his comrades. The people wanted to see not just the first president of the new republic, but a president who was so remarkable.

176

p “Although he was not like the Emperor and would lack the traditional yellow robe and pearl-studded bell, many thought he would at least have impressive attire, a majestic manner, and dignified speech.

p “But when the President appeared on the platform, we saw an ordinary man with a kind smile. He wore a weathered cork helmet, an ordinary khaki suit, and rubber sandals.

p “When the Preside-ill began reading the Declaration of Independence, his powerful voice reminded everyone of the guerilla camps in the faraway jungle:

p “ ’The French have fled, the Japanese have eapitulaled, Kmperor I5ao Dai has abdicated. Our people have broken the chains which for nearly a century have fettered them, and have won independence (or the Fatherland...

p “’We, members of the Provisional Government, representing the whole Vietnamese people, declare that from now on we break oil’all relations of a colonial character with France; we repeal all inlernalional obligations thai France has so far subscribed to on behalf of Vielnam, and we abolish all the special rights the French have unlawfully acquired in our Fatherland.

p ҉۪We are convinced that the Allied nations which at Teheran and San Francisco have acknowledged the principles of self-determination and equality of nations, will not refuse to acknowledge the independence of Vietnam.

p ҉۪A people who have courageously opposed French domination for more than eighty years, a people who have fought side by side wilh the Allies against the fascists ... such a people must be free and independent.

p “ ’For these reasons, we, members of the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, solemnly declare to the world thai Vielnam has ihe riglil to be a free and independent country and in fact it is so already. The entire Vietnamese people are determined to mobilise all their physical and mental strength, to sacrifice their lives and property in order to safeguard their independence and liberty.’

p “Applause engulfed the square. The President looked up from the lexl and said:

p “’Countrymen, can you hear me? Do you understand what I’m saying:*’

p “This simple question finally swept away anything that might still have stood between the President and the people. All were suddenly filled wilh love and admiration for the president. They saw that he was ]iist like them, a warm and sincere human being, who had a boundless love for his nation. And thousands of voices replied to the President, ’Yes!’"

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p The victorious August Revolution of 1945, which formed the first worker-and-peasant state in Southeast Asia ushered in a new era lor the Vietnamese people. It peaked Vietnam’s eighty years of struggle against colonialism, marking the beginning of the collapse of the colonial system in Southeast Asia. The August Revolution went down in history as a striking example of revolutionary fervour and creativity under the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist parly. President Ho Chi Minh later wrote:

p “The triumph of the August Revolution in Vietnam once again confirmed the correctness of Marxist-Leninist theory on the national and colonial questions, the correctness of the path mapped out by the October Socialist Revolution of 1917. It proved thai in order to be victorious the national revolution must: 

p rely on a broad national, anti-imperialist front; 

p resolve the peasant problem; 

p possess a People’s Army; 

p enjoy fraternal support from the people and proletariat in other countries; 

p follow the guidance of the working-class party.

p “Not only the toiling classes and people of Vietnam but also the oppressed people in other countries may be proud thai this is the first time in the revolutionary history of colonial and semi-colonial peoples in which a Parly, only fifteen years of age, has led the revolution to success and sei/ed power throughout the country.

p “The victory of the August Revolution of 1945 was a victory for Leninism: the first national liberation revolution thai ever swept a colony came out triumphant.’"

Ho Chi Minh always emphasised the tremendous contribution of the October Socialist Revolution and of the Soviet Union to the triumph of the August Revolution in Vietnam: "The. torch of Marxism-Leninism and the experience of the October Revolution in Russia has illuminated the road of revolution in Vietnam as well. The Vietnamese people will lor ever be grateful to the Soviet Union which has defeated the fascists in Europe and in Asia and contributed in a decisive manner to the cause of the liberation of mankind from slavery and helped bring our August Revolution to victorv."