33

Opinions of Soviet philosophers who have concerned themselves with the problem of the ideal in recent years are widely divergent on a number of issues. This is not to be wondered at, since Marxist-Leninist philosophy is a living creative^^1^^ theory which is inseparably linked with life and constantly enriched and tested by practice. In the light of the latest achievements of the natural and social sciences the problem of the ideal acquires new important aspects: within its classical conceptual framework new theoretical questions arise requiring fresh creative research.

p ,

p The Marxist philosophers are unanimous in the solution of basic problems related to the nature of the ideal and in the criticism of idealist and dualist conceptions of the ideal. Yet alongside the consensus on matters of principle there are differences in the understanding of a number of specific questions pertaining to the content of the category of the ideal, to the evaluation of its logical links with other categories of dialectical and historical materialism, its world-view and methodological * functions in the system of scientific knowledge, etc. These differences are sometimes referable to the complexity of the many-sided problem of the ideal: different authors approach it on different planes which have but loose theoretical connection with one -another. In such cases disagreements are usually overstated or even 34 non-existent. Some questions, however, are indeed disputable and they will become the object of our analysis.  [34•* 

p Most writers who have touched upon various aspects of the problem of the ideal in recent years unequivocally declare in favour of the reflective character of the ideal and its intrinsic connection with the brain processes and underscore the logical opposition of the ideal and the material viewing the ideal predominantly in epistemological terms. Usually avoiding the term "subjective reality", they in fact limit the notion of the ideal to this particular sense, i.e. describe the ideal as a subjective image, the idea of an object, a cognitive reflection, etc. This is, for instance how P. V. Kopnin characterises the main specific feature of the ideal: "The ideal is a reflection of reality in forms of man’s activity, his consciousness and will; it is not a kind of intelligible mental object, but a man’s ability to reproduce an object mentally, in his thoughts, aims, will, needs, and to manipulate images.”^^36^^

p Emphasising the dependence of the ideal on the brain processes on the one hand, and material activity, on the other, A. M. Korshunov writes: "The ideal is a sense image instrumental in reflecting reality.”^^39^^ Making a stand against the so-called two-aspect interpretation of the ideal, he justly observes that the ideal retains its identity when viewed both from the standpoint of epistemology and ontology, since the ideal only exists within the framework of the psychic, and the relation of the psychic to the brain is inseparable from its relation to the outer world: "The essence of the psychic consists in ideal reflection which is the property of the brain. Both in relation to the object and to its material vehicle this property takes the form of ideal image of external objects" (ibid., p. 59).

p The concept of the ideal as subjective reality has been consistently defended by Alexander Spirkin: "Thought, consciousness are real. Their reality, however, is not objective, but subjective.”^^40^^ The importance of such a definition of the ideal is also underscored by other authors.^^41^^

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p Spirkin takes a firm stand against vulgar materialist tendencies in the approach to the problem of the ideal and criticises attempts to turn subjective reality into objective reality, to dissolve, as it were, the ideal in objective activity: "The ideal is not objective activity as such, it is only the spiritual aspect of this activity. The reduction of the ideal to objective activity does not take us beyond the limits of vulgar materialism in its behaviouristic variety.”^^42^^

p The author underscores the unity of the two main aspects of the problem of the ideal: the organic connection of the ideal with the brain processes and with the social activity of man. These aspects should not be counterposed to one another. Spirkin also points out that it is wrong to contrast the social- historical and individual-psychological approaches to the problem of the ideal (ibid., p. 73). Like Korshunov, he comes out against the current opinion that consciousness is only ideal from the epistemological standpoint and must be treated as material from the ontological angle since a different approach allegedly runs counter to the principle of the material unity of the world (ibid., pp. 66-67).

p Of special interest is the approach of V. S. Tyukhtin who insists on the reflective, functional character of the ideal. He holds that the ideal is only linked with mental processes, human consciousness, and regards it as a specific property of highly organised material systems, as a function of the brain. According to Tyukhtin, the problem of the ideal should be studied not only from the epistemological angle; the ideal "can and must be explained in terms of natural science on the basis of the interrelation between basic material factors ... as a special functional property of the unity of these factors.”^^43^^

p For Tyukhtin the starting point in the analysis of the ideal is the division of all properties of things into two types: substrate properties and properties-relations (ibid., pp. 206-207). "Despite the fact that properties-relations are inseparable from substrate properties, the former can be singled out by their specific \ unctif)n, role, actual use, application. At a definite level of their organisation material systems acquire the ability to respond to the relations of orderliness (organisation, structure) overriding the effect of substrate (material-energy) relations. Put another way, such systems are characterised by the functional separation 36 of the relations of orderliness from the substantive properties of things and by the actual use of such relations in a definite function" (ibid., pp. 208-209). The concept of the ideal, in the author’s opinion, is usually connected with the advanced stage of the separation and use of such relations (ibid., p. 210). Here a new factor comes into play, the "factor of signal-informative causality expressing the activity of self-organising systems" (ibid.).

p Thus the author makes out a case for the functional essence of all those phenomena which come under the head of subjective reality, since the latter is conceived as the subject’s image of a definite relationship, structure, content with the respective substrate eliminated. Such, or nearly such functional view of the ideal is shared by Korshunov,*^^4^^ Spirkin^^46^^ and a number of other authors including myself.

p Pointing out that consciousness can and must be studied not only from the epistemological, but also ontological angles, Tyukhtin, however, is inclined to view research into the substrate of consciousness only in natural-scientific terms.^^46^^ This approach appears to us rather narrow, as the ontological aspect of the phenomena of consciousness cannot, in our opinion, be limited to the investigation of their relation to brain processes, let alone the technique of natural studies, since the ontological aspect includes also an inquiry into subjective reality as such (i.e. its structure, dynamic properties, axiological orientation, internal self-organisation, etc.). Besides, investigation of the relationship between phenomena of subjective reality and their material vehicles necessarily presupposes going beyond the bounds of brain neurodynamics to the sphere of social activity and intercourse and, consequently, includes not only natural, but also social research. One gets an impression that in some instances Tyukhtin is prone to view the ,ideal as only expressing the epistemological aspect of consciousness (ibid., p. 212), thereby revealing his tendency towards the so-called two-aspect theory of the ideal.

p The authors whose views have been outlined above unequivocally subscribe to the conception of the ideal as subjective reality and seek to integrate both the natural-historical and socio-historical perspectives helping to overcome a "one- dimensional" view of the problem.

p The proponents of a different approach which is also 37 represented in relevant literature recognise the basic definition of the ideal as subjective reality and also underscore the functional nature of the ideal. At the same time they hold that the category of the ideal only characterises consciousness from the epistemological standpoint and has no meaning in ontological terms. They support the view that consciousness is ideal from the epistemological perspective and material from the ontological perspective.

p The most detailed exposition of this conception has been given by Ya. A. Ponomarev^^47^^ and V. N. Sagatovsky^^48^^ whose views were supported by other philosophers.^^49^^ This standpoint often referred to as "two-aspect approach" has already been subjected by us to extensive critical analysis^^50^^ and we shall limit ourselves here to just a few temarks.

p In our opinion, the so-called two-aspect interpretation of consciousness is based on a similar two-aspect interpretation of the concept of matter and this implies highly doubtful corollaries. Sudh an approach is in fact traceable to the hypostatisation of the notions of the ontological and the epistemological which seem to acquire independence from the categories of the material and the ideal. Actually, however, the notions of ontology and epistemology are essentially determined by the categories of the material and the ideal, and not vice versa. The notion of the ontological implies existence. Yet existence as such has no definite sense without indication of the kind of reality that exists—objective or subjective.

p However, when we say that objective reality exists (or that subjective reality exists), we add nothing to the above-indicated categories, since the attribute of existence is inherent in them. Therefore the definition of the category of consciousness through the notion of the ontological does not change its meaning to the opposite and does not warrant consciousness being identified with matter (and the ideal with the material).

p It would not be correct to treat the ideal as a purely epistemological category. The ideal is always a reflection of some object, yet the content of this category is not limited to such reflection, since the ideal is also the reality of a conscious act and, moreover, the reality of a person’s inner world. This is precisely what is meant by the unity of the epistemological and ontological aspects of the category of the ideal.

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p In our view, the thesis that consciousness is only ideal in the epistemological sense and material in the ontological sense derives, besides the excessive isolation of each of them, also from the rigid restriction of the cognitive relationship to the reflection of an external object. As a result, the reflectiveness of every conscious act is either disregarded completely, or relegated to a secondary plan. Not infrequently the cognitive relationship is viewed exclusively from the standpoint of veracity, i.e. in terms of the truth-falsity antithesis only. Such an approach leaving out of account the axiological component of cognitive relationship is bound to oversimplify the problem of the ideal.

p The proposition of the unity of the ontological and epistemological aspects of philosophical knowledge rules out their excessive separation as incompatible with the monistic basis of the content of such fundamental philosophical categories as matter and consciousness, the material and the ideal.  [38•* 

p As a matter of fact, every category of dialectical materialism, first and foremost the categories of matter and consciousness, represents the unity of the ontological and epistemological aspects. This unity consists in that the content of these categories represents both the object of reflection and the reflection of the object. Therefore a purely ontological treatment of the content of the category of matter (or consciousness) is illusory being a product of naive ontologism (in which thought is unaware of itself and identifies the reflection of an object with the object of reflection; naive ontologism here passes into naive epistemologism which cannot conceive of any externalisation of the object of a cognitive act).

p The need for consistent implementation of the principle of the material unity of the world induces the adherents of the so-called two-aspect approach to seek ways for overcoming difficulties involved in the conceptual correlation of the material 39 and the ideal. The attractiveness of this approach consists in its orientation on experimental research into the nature of psychic phenomena and in its attempts to substantiate the conception of consciousness as a property of highly organised matter, as a function of the brain. Yet such views tend to place the categories of the ontological and the epistemological too wide apart which brings about a number of theoretical inconsistencies and contradictions. It is our opinion, therefore, that the "two-aspect approach" hardly holds out much promise.  [39•* 

p In contrast with the opinions outlined above our philosophical and psychological publications often expound a different conception of the ideal which is characterised by special emphasis on the socio-cultural aspect of the problem and persistent disregard of the possibility and warrantability of research into the relationship between the ideal and the activity of the brain. In this conception the ideal is construed as synonymous with universal and necessary forms of spiritual activity materialised in objective social phenomena—social relations, scales of values, linguistic structures, logic of thinking.

p This conception has a number of variations, particularly in the interpretation of the ideal in terms of activity and in explaining the mode of existence of what is called the ideal. However, despite various shades and some conceptual vagueness, we have here a definite theoretical platform uniting a number of authors, a general trend in the interpretation of the category of the ideal which is predominantly oriented on the problems of historical materialism, ethics, aesthetics, culturology. This conception of the ideal has found its most brilliant and consistent proponent in E. V. Ilyenkov, a distinguished Soviet philosopher who died in 1979. His theory has a large following and this is precisely the reason why its critical analysis is so topical.

p Ilyenkov’s article in Soviet Encyclopedia of Philosophy published in 1962 gave a powerful impetus to the study of the problem of the ideal. It raised important questions that gave food to creative thought. Controversial though it was, neither doubts about a number of its propositions, nor even resolute 40 objections could detract from its value. This article marked an important stage in the investigation of the problem. I take this opportunity to acknowledge the great debt which I owe to Ilyenkov’s works. The above indicated article, as well as Ilyenkov’s subsequent publications played a major role in my reflection upon the subject in interest.

p Ilyenkov’s views are known to have been expounded at length in his posthumous publication "The Problem of the Ideal",⁵⁸ and it is upon this work that we shall mainly focus our attention.

p ’Ilyenkov made a start from the problems that had been brought into the philosophical foreground by Plato. The central among them was the question of the nature of universal ideas (mathematical axiomsj logical categories, ethical imperatives, etc.) counterposed to fleeting sensuous images, individual states of the soul. "Whatever Plato’s subsequent explanation of the origin of these impersonal universal prototypes of all widely varying states of individual soul, he undoubtedly has good factual reason to include them in a special category, since they represent universal standards of the culture which provides a framework for the spiritual development of an individual awakening to conscious activity and enforces upon him its demands as the law of his own life" (No. 6, p. 130).

p Justly underscoring the social essence of such kinds of “ideas” as standards of culture, Ilyenkov confined the category of the ideal exclusively to those spiritual phenomena which are characterised by universality and necessity (see No. 6, pp. 131, 132, 137, 140 and others). In his view, the category of the ideal is incompatible with the sensuously-concrete, individual and accidental: "it is senseless to extend this definition (of the category of the ideal—TV.) to purely individual mental states of a person at a given moment" (No. 6, p. 140).

p Thus, my sensuous images, my “fleeting” thought of something (and, in fact, any conscious experience, as it is woven from “fleeting” images) fall outside the category of the ideal. If this is so, they must be called material. Besides, the “fleeting” may happen to be a stroke of poetical or theoretical genius and eventually turn into the “eternal”. History knows lots of such "star moments of mankind" mentioned by Stefan Zweig.^^64^^

p Barring sensuous images and other “fleeting” experiences 41 from the category of the ideal, Ilyenkov never directly called them material. Such is the first theoretical discrepancy. It is traceable to Ilyenkov’s rejection of subjective reality.as the basic, definition of the ideal and to his failure to clearly counterpose the categories, of the material and the ideal from the very beginning of his discourse. To be sure, he made repeated references to such counterposition, yet he never stated that the contrast between the ideal and the material is the contrast between the ideal and the objective reality. The ideal was promptly defined by him as "the universal form and the law of existence and change of diverse empirically and sensuously given phenomena" (No. 6, p. 131). In this definition it cannot be clearly counterposed to the material as objective reality. As regards the elaboration that the ideal "only reveals itself and takes shape in historically established forms of spiritual culture, in socially meaningful forms of its expression" (ibid), it hardly adds anything to clarify the matter.

p Now, in differentiating between the ideal and the universal one cannot overlook the crucial fact that under the category of the universal come not only products of thinking, but also objective reality itself, which makes it necessary to distinguish between the material and the ideal in this respect too. Such a line of demarcation is clearly drawn by A. P. Sheptulin who points out that "the categories of dialectics are ideal images reflecting and expressing in pure form universal properties and relationships, the universal forms of being existing in objective reality in organic unity with the individual and the particular".⁵⁵ However, the "established universal properties and ties are expressed not only in ideal images, but also through the means of labour created by people, as well as through the forms of their activity" (p. 411).

p Ilyenkov never stated explicitly in his works that the definition of, the ideal as subjective reality is incorrect, yet actually he resolutely rejected it since in many instances he directly identified the ideal with specific "objective reality" (No. 7, p. 157). In our opinion, here lies yet another important theoretical inconsistency in his conception of the ideal. Let us look at it more closely.

p Ilyenkov conceived the ideal mainly as objectified results of human activity, thereby identifying the ideal with a specific class 42 of material objects known to be social by nature. "In the historically established language of philosophy", he wrote, " â€™the ideal’ is nothing else than a characteristic of materialised (objectified, embodied) images of socio-human culture, i.e. the established ways of socio-human activity which confront an individual with his consciousness and will as specific ’ supernatural’ objective reality, as a specific object comparable to material reality, existing in the same space and for this very reason often confusable with it" (italics mine—D.D.) (No. 6, pp. 139-140). Yet it is utterly impossible to compare "objective reality", however specific it may be, with "material reality" because they are the same thing. When the ideal is called specific (“ supranatural”, social) objective reality, it is presented as a kind of the material. What is actually meant here is, of course, not the ideal, but a specific class of material objects—social objective reality as distinct from purely natural reality (we shall discuss this question later in more detail).

p It is in place here to cite an important passage from V. I. Shinkaruk who convincingly shows the mechanism of elevating the ideal to the rank of "specific objective reality". He writes that the system of human knowledge "is, in relation to an individual, an external socially given reality subject to assimilation (conversion into internal). To be sure, this reality as such exists in people’s minds, since books and other means of storage and transference of knowledge can only acquire meaning in the consciousness of the one who writes and reads, speaks and listens. However, while assimilating spiritual (subjective) reality through material “objects” as external reality, an individual spontaneously accepts it as a kind of ’objective reality’ ".⁵⁶ If this objective reality is divorced from individual consciousness, we have an illusion of independent reality—according to Shinkaruk, precisely the kind cherished by Hegel. Actually, however, "the historical subject of knowledge is society in man and man in society. The subject is a dialectical unity of the general and the particular, the social and the individual" (ibid., p. 187). It is, first and foremost, a "living man and only as long as he is alive" (ibid.).

p Attempts to correlate the notion of the ideal proposed by Ilyenkov with the category of the material reveal a number of other logical incongruities. Justly pointing out that every social 43 object performs a definite function determined by the existing system of social relations, primarily those of production and consumption, and that the functional properties of a social object representing a “supranatural”, social relationship cannot be substituted for its “natural” properties (physical, chemical, etc.), Ilyenkov nevertheless regarded such substitution as the key to the problem and, like many other Soviet authors, upheld the functional theory of the ideal. Yet in contrast with Tyukhtin, Korshunov and others who view the ideal as a functional property of man’s reflective activity, including the activity of the brain, Ilyenkov treated it as essentially an extra-personal and suprapersonal relationship realised not in man’s head, but in objective social reality itself.

p “By the ideal," he wrote, "materialism ought to understand that very peculiar and clearly recorded relationship between at least two material objects (things, processes, events, states) within which one material object retaining its identity represents another object or, more accurately, its universal nature, universal form and law that remain invariant in all its alterations, its empirically obvious variations" (No. 6, p. 131). This definition of the ideal appears to me too broad and abstract. It covers any functional, coded dependence, even if it is in no way connected with human culture and is a strictly objective phenomenon. For instance, when a cat is intently watching a mouse, the nervous impulses arising in its retina carry certain information to the brain on the given external object, the mouse; this material process "retaining its identity represents another object". The same is true of any conditioned reflex: a flash of ilight or a ring represents, as it were food, etc., to a dog.

p We are none the wiser with the author’s reference to the "universal nature", "universal form", "universal law" of the object. Indeed, what "general law" is represented, say, by Tchaikovsky’s Swan Lake adduced by the author as an example of the ideal?

p Yet it is precisely the relationship of “representation” of one material object by another that was regarded by Ilyenkov as the basic distinguishing feature of the ideal. He repeatedly underscored it in his analysis of the value relationship. Speaking of those cases when the natural form of one commodity becomes the value form of another commodity, he concluded: "It is 44 precisely for this, and no other, reason that the form of value is ideal, i.e. quite distinct from the palpable bodily form of the thing which represents, expresses, embodies, alienates it" (italics mine —D.D.} (No. 7, p. 148). "It is precisely this relationship of representation which received the title of ideal in the Hegelian philosophical tradition" (No. 7, p. 147).

p At this point we must take a closer look at Ilyenkov’s frequently repeated assertion that the value form is ideal.

p (Ilyenkov wrote: "In Capital Marx quite intentionally uses the term ‘ideal’ in the formal sense imparted to it by Hegel, and not in the sense characteristic of the entire pre-Hegelian tradition, including Kant. .. The meaning of the term ‘ideal’ is the same in Marx and Hegel" (ibid.). "In accordance with the meaning attached to the word ‘ideal’ by Karl Marx, the form of value in general (and not only its money-form) is a ’purely ideal’ form. .. The price or money-form of a commodity, like any form of value generally, is ideal because it is absolutely distinct from the palpable bodily form, in which the commodity is represented, we read in Chapter ’Money, or the Circulation of Commodities’ (here the author refers to Karl Marx’s Capital —D.D.}. In other words, the form of value is ideal, though it exists outside and independent of man’s mind, in space, outside man’s head, in things, i.e. in commodities themselves (here again the same reference—D.D.]. This use of the word may very much puzzle a reader accustomed to the terminology of popular publications on materialism and on the relation of the material to the ‘ideal’. The ‘ideal’ existing outside and independent of our mind is quite an objective reality of special kind, independent of men’s consciousness and will, invisible, sensually imperceptible and therefore appearing to them as something only ‘thinkable’, something ‘supra-sensuous’" (italics mine—D.D.) (No. 6, p. 136).

p We have quoted this long passage in order to avoid any misunderstanding and reproduce the author’s reasoning with the greatest possible accuracy. Frankly speaking, I rank myself with the adherents of the "terminology of popular publications" and also view the ideal existing "outside and independent of our mind" as either the material or the Hegelian absolute spirit.

p The relationship of representation is not a specific feature of what is called the ideal. It is characteristic of a very broad class 45 of biological and social objects constituting objective reality. The value relationship is a relationship of representation, but it is purely material. Yet the notion of value relation is an ideal phenomenon, a reflection in man’s head of a real objective relation. It also represents something different from itself, namely, a certain aspect of objective reality with which it should not be confused. The ideal is rather a peculiar kind of representation, representation in the form of thought, i.e. a subjective image of what it reflects.

p For this reason one can hardly accept the view that Marx and Hegel understood the ideal in the same way and, particularly, that the form of value according to Marx is ideal. Regrettably, Ilyenkov did not cite the passages from Marx’s Capital and Economic Manuscripts which he invoked in support of his opinion. The unbiased reading of these passages gives good reason to assert that Marx always understood the ideal as phenomena of subjective reality, and his view runs counter to the interpretation of the ideal as existing "in space, outside man’s head, in things, i.e. in commodities themselves”.

p Here is Marx’s statement in Capital referred to by Ilyenkov: "The price or money-form of commodities is, like their form of value generally, a form quite distinct from their palpable bodily form; it is, therefore, a purely ideal or mental form" (italics mine —D.D.)^^57^^ This statement served for Ilyenkov as the foundation of his constructs. Yet he passed in silence over the crucial fact that the circulation of commodities is necessarily mediated through relations between people and necessarily presupposes a reflection of the value of commodities in the minds of those who participate in these relations. The manufacturer and the consumer of goods may not know the theory of value, but they always figure out, more or less accurately, their value. This mental reflection of value is an indispensable element of the process of commodity circulation.

p Ilyenkov underscored the objective character of the relationship of representation of one commodity by another ignoring the human aspect of this relationship. By contrast, Marx viewed it as a unity of objective and subjective components. The “ representation” in the cited passage from Marx is nothing else than "human representation". The concept of the ideal is linked here not with the representation of one commodity by another, but 46 with "human representation" which is conceived as a mental reflection of the former. This becomes quite obvious from the subsequent passage not cited by Ilyenkov.

p Karl Marx clearly stated not only the relations of commodities, but also the relation between the value of a commodity and its reflection in the owner’s mind. The value of a commodity inherent in things themselves "is ideally mfl.de perceptible by their equality with gold, a relation that, so to say, exists only in their own heads. Their owner must, therefore, lend them his tongue, or hang a ticket on them. . . Since the expression of the value of commodities in gold is a merely ideal act, we may use for this purpose imaginary or ideal mpney. Every trader knows, that he is far from having turned his goods into money, when he has expressed their value in a price or in imaginary money, and that it does not require the least bit of real gold, to estimate in that metal millions of pounds’ worth of goods. When, therefore, money serves as a measure of value, it is employed only as imaginary or ideal money. This circumstance has given rise to the wildest theories" (italics mine—D.D.) (ibid., pp. 98- 99).

p As we see, Marx unequivocally links the ideal with the “imaginary” and distinguishes it from the material or objective reality. The term “ideal” is used by him, contrary to Ilyenkov, not "in the formal sense imparted to it by Hegel" but exactly in the sense referred to as “popular” by Ilyenkov and used by Kant in his example with imaginary and real thalers (see No. 6, p. 137). The same is true of the Economic Manuscripts of 1857- 1858. In the chapter on money Marx writes: "Price is an attribute of the commodity, a determination in which it is introduced as money. It is no longer an immediate but a reflected determinateness of the commodity. Alongside real money there now exists the commodity as something notionally cast in the role of money.”^^58^^ All these explicit statements of : Marx are clearly at variance with the allegation that he considered the ideal as existing "outside man’s head, in things, i.e. in commodities themselves”.

p Marx’s impatience with the confusion of the ideal and the material, abstractions and objective reality, is well known and his devastating criticism of corresponding conceptions in the "Hegelian tradition" preserves today all its methodological 47 value. Recall, for instance, his critical remarks on Lassalle’s commentary on Heraclitus’s pronouncement: thus gold turns into all things, and all things turn into gold. "Gold, says Lassalle, is here money (which is correct) and money is value. Therefore the Ideal, the Universal, the One (value), and things, the Real, the Particular, the Many. He utilises this startling piece of penetration in order to give us, in a long note, an earnest of his discoveries in the science of political economy. Every word is a blunder, but declaimed with remarkable pretentiousness. I can see from this one note that the fellow is proposing to present political economy in the Hegelian manner in his second great opus.”^^59^^ These words appear to be fully applicable to our opponent’s notions.

p Ilyenkov’s theory has rather a large following in philosophical and psychological circles. Very similar are the views expounded, for instance, by A. N. Leontyev who speaks of the singling out of the "ideal aspect of objects" by which he means the objectified results of human activity.^^60^^ Hence the trend to regard the result as primary and the activity as secondary, and the conviction, groundless, in our opinion, that "objectified activity is richer and truer than preceding consciousness" (ibid., p. 129).

p V. V. Davydov interprets the objectification of an image "as its transformation into an objectively ideal property of the object".^^01^^ A question naturally arises: What is the difference between "an ideal property of the object" and its material properties? Is it that the former is a product of man’s activity and the latter exists by nature? In that case the airplane wing sweep is an ideal property as it is the designer’s objectified idea, the composition of the wing metal is also an ideal property as the alloy is designed and calculated beforehand, etc. As a result, the airplane turns out to be devoid of any material properties except, perhaps, the properties of the atoms of its components.

p One can hardly take seriously this sort of division of a social object’s properties into material and ideal. As a matter of fact, every material property of an object is its real, objective quality, and if one speaks of a “ready-made” social object as such, irrespective of the process of its “deobjectification”, reflection in the mind, there is no reason for characterising its properties with the help of the category of the ideal.

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p It is also worth mentioning the viewpoint of S. L. Rubinstein who analysed the category of the ideal in its relation to the notion of the psychic. His frequently cited statement runs thus: "The term ‘ideal’ predominantly characterises an idea, an image, in so far as they are objectified in a word and included in a system of socially developed knowledge which is given to an individual as a kind of ’objective reality’ and thus acquire relative independence, breaking away, as it were, from his mental activity.”^^62^^

p This passage, indicative as it is of an affinity of the views of Rubinstein and Ilyenkov, does not yet reveal fully the former’s stand. The word “predominantly” in the cited passage is evidently not accidental, as it somewhat “softens” the statement making it more flexible and allowing for a possibility of applying the category of the ideal to psychic activity as a process. In Rubinstein the result and the process are dialectically interrelated as is evidenced from his understanding of the relationship between the mental and the logical (and this is a very important aspect of the problem of the ideal!). According to Rubinstein, thinking as a mental process is inseparable from logical structures which are "relatively independent" of the individual and have a status of cultural standards and social consciousness (ibid., pp. 48-49, 51-52 and others).

p This is also evidenced from Rubinstein’s resolute objections to the Platonic absolutisation of thinking, i.e. the divorce of the product of thinking from an individual’s cognitive activity (ibid, p. 47), as well as from his radical antipsychologism: Rubinstein underscores the "subjective nature of psychic phenomena", i.e. the indissoluble connection of all psychic phenomena and man as an individual (ibid., p. 61). According to Rubinstein, the ideal represents one of the aspects of the psychic: "In relation to objective reality psychic phenomena are, epistemologically, an image of it. It is precisely this relation of image to object) idea to’ thing that accounts for the attribute ‘ideal’ being attached to psychic phenomena; indeed, it is from the standpoint of epistemology that the psychic is rated as ideal. That does not mean, of course, that psychic phenomena cease being ideal when they are viewed in a different connection, e.g. as a function of the brain" (italics mine—D.D.) (ibid., p. 41, also see p. 36).

p As we see, Rubinstein does not deny the connection of the 49 ideal wi>ih the activity of the brain and does not reduce the ideal to a purely epistemological relationship accentuating the “representativeness” of logical norms in individual consciousness, in the psychic activity of the real individuals. Though Rubinstein’s views on the problem of the ideal sometimes lack clarity and consistency, his stand is essentially different from the conceptions of Ilyenkov, Leontyev and Davydov which have much in common.

p Ilyenkov opposed any attempts to interpret the category of the ideal with the help of universally recognised scientific notions (such as, for instance, the notion of information) and to establish theoretical links between the ideal and the reflective activity of the brain. These attempts were declared “naturalistic”, “ pseudomaterialistic”, etc. In his opinion, "such subversion (this time physiological) in the field of science can yield no fruit. .." (italics mine—D.D.) (No. 6, p. 129). This was Ilyenkov’s response to my proposal to treat the mind-brain problem in terms of the information theory. I have already given a detailed critical analysis of his views^^63^^ and any further debate upon this matter is hardly necessary.

p However, there is just one point that needs clarification. If the ideal is "a characteristic of things" (see No. 7, p. 157) and not of consciousness, it is senseless to establish any connection between "the ideal" and the functioning of the brain—such is the keynote of Ilyenkov’s argument. Yet even here his reasoning lacks consistency. Reiterating and rehashing with characteristic ardour the same old proposition that the ideal is a "specific object absolutely independent of the structure of the ‘brain’ and its specific ‘states’" (italics mine—D.D.) (No. 6, p. 136), he at the same time makes the following statement: "Quite a different thing is the brain polished and recreated by labour. It alone becomes the organ, nay, the plenipotentiary of ‘ideality’, the ideal plan of activity characteristic only of Man. This is where we have truly scientific materialism capable of coping with the problem of ’the ideal’ " (No. 7, p. 157). One might think there exists some other human brain which is not “polished” and not "recreated by labour"! Again, after this utterance one is certainly in the dark about the difference between “ pseudomaterialism” with its “subversion” in science and "truly scientific materialism". Such mishaps are none too rare with Ilyenkov. 50 For instance, from his viewpoint the status of the ideal is denied to the sensual-emotional. Since the artistic image falls under this head, it must be included in the category of material phenomena, yet Ilyenkov, contrary to his own logic, views it as ideal-

p Ilyenkov conceived the ideal "as a law governing man’s consciousness and will, as an objective compulsory pattern of conscious volitional activity" (italics mine—D. D.) (No. 7, p. 153). Now, is it possible for conscious volitional activity not to conform to the objective compulsory pattern? If it is, such activity has nothing in common with the ideal. If it is not, there is no room for creative activity, and free volition is nothing but a fiction. In any case, "the ideal" thus understood is not compatible with the concept of creative activity of the mind, and it is at this point that Ilyenkov’s interpretation of the problem of the ideal arouses our most resolute objections. Indeed, it rules out any autonomy of a living creative individual assigning him the role of a puppet, a functional element within "the objective compulsory pattern”.

p It is worth noting that the concept of the ideal propounded by Ilyenkov for many years has been opposed by a number of Soviet philosophers who criticised the identification of the ideal with external object forms of human activity and particularly with “ready-made” social reality, the denial of the connection of the ideal with the activity of the brain, etc.^^64^^

p There is no denying the fact that Ilyenkov’s works contain not a few sound and interesting propositions. He has given a detailed analysis of the specificity of cultural values, brought into the limelight the suprapersonal status of social consciousness, put forward a number of fruitful ideas regarding the functional nature of social materiality and products of mental activity, the invariance of the “content” of many such products with respect to individual consciousness, etc. Besides, his emotional manner of polemicising and genuine interest in the nature of the ideal coupled with the ability to pinpoint an issue have indoubtedly added impetus to the inquiry into this difficult problem.

p Nevertheless, Ilyenkov’s basic propositions and conclusions appear to us contradictory and his general stand on the problem of the ideal untenable. His conception clearly reveals the drawback which is characteristic of the present state of investigation into the problem—the tendency to analyse some of its 51 aspects in isolation from others, to overestimate the importance £>f one set of features and underestimate or even completely disregard another one. This is typically the case with such interrelated approaches as social-normative and personal-existential, epistemological and ontological, conceptual and structural, logico-categorial and axiological-semantic. Particularly characteristic is the divorce between the following major aspects of the problem of the ideal: general philosophical, socio-cultural ( including the issues that come within the scope of historical materialism, ethics, aesthetics, scientific atheism, culturology, and many other fields of the humanities), personal-existential ( covering the axiological-semantic and intentional-volitional structures of subjective reality), theoretical-cognitive (analysis of the ideal from the viewpoint of the verity of knowledge and methodology of science), and what may be very approximately called genetically natural. The latter aspect encompasses a broad spectrum of questions including the prehistory of consciousness and its relation to animal psyche, the connection between the categories of the ideal and the psychic, the ideal and information, the interpretation of the category of the ideal within the framework of the mind-brain and artificial intellect problems and, finally, the questions pertaining to the analysis of the structure of subjective reality, its functional specificity and status in the system of relationships of the material world.

p There is no doubt that ’the above indicated major aspects of the problem of the ideal are interdependent and that inquiry into one of them is bound to overstep its limits. It is highly regrettable, therefore, that the investigations carried out so far have been mainly concerned with the general philosophical issues and barely touched upon other aspects of the problem.

p The task that faces us consists in an integrated conceptual analysis of the category of the ideal from all major perspectives. This analysis should centre upon the basic concept of the ideal as subjective reality which should run as a leading thread through all discourse, including the discussion of the socio- cultural aspects of the problem and the analysis of the social dialectics of the material and the ideal.

52

p NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

p  ^^1^^ Frederick Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and The End of Classical German Philosophy", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Selected Works

p in three volumes, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, pp. 345,

p 346. ’ Yu. A. Petrov, Logical Functions of the Categories of Dialectics,

p Moscow, 1972, pp. 21-22 (in Russian).

p M. N. Rutkevich, Dialectical Materialism, Moscow, 1973, p. 67 (in
Russian).

p S. T. Melyukhin, Matter in Its Unity, Infinity and Development,

p Moscow, 1966, p. 50 (in Russian).

p I. S. Narsky, Dialectical Contrariety and the Logic of Cognition,

p Moscow, 1969, p. 64 (in Russian).

p V. I. Lenin, "Materialism and Empiric-Criticism", Collected Works,

p Vol. 14, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, pp. 260-261.

p P. V. Kopnin, Dialectic as the Logic and Theory of Knowledge,

p Moscow, 1973, p. 53 (in Russian).

p V. I. Lenin, "Materialism and Empiric-Criticism", p. 147.

p Ibid., p. 245; see also: idem, "Conspectus of Hegel’s Book The Science of Logic", Collected Works, Vol. 38, 1980, p. 114.

p V. I. Lenin, "Materialism and Empiric-Criticism", p. 244.

p Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p. 29.

p Karl Marx, "Economic Works. 1857-1861", in: K. Marx, F. Engels,

p Collected Works, Vol. 28, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p. 29.

p Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "The Holy Family or Critique of
Critical Criticism", Collected Works, Vol. 4, Progress Publishers,

p Moscow, 1975, pp. 82-83.

p V. N. Kostyuk, Elements of Modal Logic, Kiev, 1978, p. 175 (in
Russian).

p See, for instance, E. V. Ilyenkov, "The Problem of the Ideal," Vop-

p rosy filosofii, 1979, Nos. 6 and 7; idem, "What Is Personality?" in:

p Where Does Personality Begin? Moscow, 1979, and Spiritual Production, Moscow, 1984, pp. 36-37 (all in Russian).

p L. A. Abramyan, "The Concept of Reality", Voprosy filosofii, 1980,

p No. 11, p. 103.

p V. I. Lenin, "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism", p. 90.

p How Animals Communicate. Ed. by T. A. Sebeok. Indiana University
Press, 1977.

p A. G. Spirkin, Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, Moscow, 1972,

p p. 75 (in Russian).

p V. S. Tyukhtin, Reflection, Systems, Cybernetics, Moscow, 1972, p.

p 209 (in Russian).

p See G. Somjen, Sensory Coding in the Mammalian Nervous System,

p Century-Crofts-Meredith, New York, Appleton, 1972.

p N. I. Gubanov, "Image and Sign in Sense Reflection", Filosofskie

p nauki, 1980, No. 5; idem, "Sign Specificity", Filosofskie nauki, 1981,

p No. 4, pp. 59, 60.

53

p ’ G. Nikolaev, "Beings with a Sixth Sense", Nauka i zhizn, 1975, No. 3. ’ D. I. Dubrovsky, Psychic Phenomena and the Brain, § 18; idem,

p Information, Consciousness, Brain, pp. 106-107, 119-121;

p idem, "Cyberrtetica a niektore aspekty problemu czlowieka", Czlowiek

p i swiatopoglad, 1976, No. 4.

p ’ See, for instance, K. Z. Lorenz, King Solomon’s Ring, Methuen, London, 1971; K. E. Fabri, Animal Psychology, Moscow, 1975 (in Russian).

p  ^^1^^ See Nils J. Nilson, Problem-Solving Methods in Artificial Intellect, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1976; Yu. V. Orfeev, V. S. Tyukhtin, Human Thinking and "Artificial Intellect", Moscow, 1978 (in Russian).

p Astronomy, Methodology. World Outlook, Section "The Problem of Search for Extraterrestrial Civilisations", Moscow, 1979 (in Russian) .

p D. I. Dubrovsky, "Concerning Analysis of Methodological Aspects of a Bio-Social Problem", in: Biology and Contemporary Scientific Knowledge, Moscow, 1980 (in Russian).

p T. A. Dobrokhotova, N. N. Bragina, Functional Asymmetry and Psychopathology of Focal Injuries of the Brain, Moscow, 1977 (in Russian); R. W. Sperry, "Forebrain Commissurotomy and Conscious Awareness", The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 1977, No. 2. See the list of references in: D. I. Dubrovsky, "Some Thoughts Concerning Mario Bunge’s article ’Insolvency of Psychophysical Dualism’ ", Filosofskie nauki, 1979, No. 2.

p V. M. Smirnov, Stereotaxic Neurology, Leningrad, 1976 (in Russian).

p D. I. Dubrovsky, Information, Consciousness, Brain. N. P. Bekhtereva, Sound and Morbid Brain, Leningrad, 1980; P. V. Simonov, Emotional Brain, Moscow, 1981 (both in Russian); Cerebral Correlates of Conscious Experience. Ed. by P. A. Buser & A. Rougeul-Buser, North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1978;

p J. Szentagothai, "The Neuronal Machine of the Cerebral Cortex a? a Substrate of Psychic Function", 16th World Congress of Philosophy. Section Papers. Diisseldorf, 1978; The Brain’s Mind. A Neu. roscience Perspective on the Mind-Body Problem, Gardner Press, New
York, 1980.

p See J. Thorp, Free Will: a Defence Against Neurophysiological

p Determinism, Routlege & Kegan, London, 1980.

p Spiritual Production, Moscow, 1981, p. 37.

p D. I. Dubrovsky, Psychic Phenomena and the Brain (Chapter 5,

p §17).

p See N. P. Bekhtereva, P. V. Bundzen, Yu. L. Gogolitsyn, The Brain

p Codes of Psychic Activity, Leningrad, 1977 (in Russian).

p P. V. Kopnin, Epistemological and Logical Principles of Science,

p Moscow, 1974, p. 109 (in Russian).

p A. M. Korshunov, Reflection, Activity, Cognition, Moscow, 1979,
p. 65 (in Russian).

54

p A. G. Spirkin, Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, p. 67. I. D. Pantskhava, B. Ya. Pakhomov, Dialectical Materialism in the Light of Contemporary Science, Moscow, 1971, pp. 60-62 (in Russian).

p A. G. Spirkin, Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, p. 65. V. S. Tyukhtin, Reflection, Systems, Cybernetics, Moscow, 1972, p. 211. A. M. Korshunov, Reflection, Activity, Cognition, pp. 64-65’.

p A. G. Spirkin, Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, p. 69. V. S. Tyukhtin, Reflection, Systems, Cybernetics, p. 211. Ya. A. Ponomarev, The Psychology of Creativity, Moscow, 1976, Chapter 3 (in Russian).

p V. N. Sagatovsky, "Material and Ideal as Characteristics of Consciousness", in: Towards Building Communism, Tyumen, 1968; idem, Systematisation Principles for Universal Categories, Tomsk, 1973 (both in Russian).

p Sava Petrov, "Material and Ideal", in: Problems of Marxist-Leninist Epistemology, Sofia, 1975 (in Bulgarian).

p D. I. Dubrovsky, Psychic Phenomena and the Brain, pp. 190-193; idem, "The Psyche-Brain Problem in the Light of the Categories of Social and Biological", Voprosy filosofii, 1982, No. 5.

p P. V. Alexeyev, The Subject-Matter, Structure and Functions of Dialectical Materialism, Moscow, 1978 (in Russian). See, e.g.: A. M. Korshunov, "The Philosophical Aspect of the Problem of the Psychic", Filosofskie nauki, 1969, No. 3, p. 93; T. P. Malkova, "Concerning the Question of the Ideal Nature of Consciousness", Filosofskie nauki, 1978, No. 4, pp. 56-60; M. N. Rutkevich, Dialectical Materialism, pp. 142-143 (in Russian).

p E. V. Ilyenkov, "The Problem of the Ideal", Voprosy filosofii 1979, Nos. 6-7.

p Stefan Zweig, Sternstunden der Menschheit. Zwolf historische

p Miniatilren, Fischer Biicherei, Frankfurt a.M.-Hamburg, 1964.

p A. P. Sheptulin, "Categories of Dialectics in the Light of Lenin’s
Theory of Reflection", in: Lenin’s Theory of Reflection and Modern

p Science, Book 1, Sofia, 1973 (in Russian).

p V. I. Shinkaruk, The Unity of Dialectics, Logic and the Theory of

p Cognition. An Introduction to Dialectical Logic, Kiev, 1977, p. 179

p (in Russian).

p Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, Progress Publishers, 1974, p. 98.

p Karl Marx, "Economic Works 1857-1861", in: Karl Marx, Frederick
Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 28, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986,

p p. 125.

p “Marx to Engels in Manchester, [London], February 1, 1858", in:

p Marx/Engels, Selected Correspondence, Progress Publishers, Moscow,

p 1975, p. 95.

p A. N. Leontyev, Activity, Consciousness, Personality, Moscow, 1977,

p p. 30 (in Russian).

p V. V. Davydov, "The Categories of Activity and Psychic Reflection 55 in the Theory of A. N. Leontyev", Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, Series IV. Psychology, 1979, No. 4, p. 40.

p “ S. L. Rubinstein, Being and Consciousness, Moscow, 1957, p. 141 (in Russian).

p “ See: D. I. Dubrovsky, Psychic Phenomena and the Brain, § § 3 and 12; idem, Information, Consciousness, Brain, pp. 6-9, 136-143, 147.

“ See: A. M. Korshunov, "The Philosophical Aspect of the Problem of the Psychic", op. cit, p. 89; I. S. Narsky, V. M. Fyodorov, "Topical Problems of Dialectical Logic", Filosofskie nauki, 1976, No. 2, p. 106; Ya. K. Rebane, "The Principle of Social Memory", Filosofskie nauki, 1977, No. 5, p. 96; M. G. Makarov, The Category of Goal in Marxist Philosophy, Leningrad, 1977, pp. 98- 99; A. G. Spirkin, Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, pp. 69, 73; B. V. Biryukov, L. M. Semashko, "About an Attempt to Defend Ideas and Overthrow Idols", Filosofskie nauki, 1970, No. 4; A Theory of Personality, Leningrad, 1982, pp. 47-50.