p The question of the jurisdiction of natural science over the problem of the ideal deserves special consideration if only for the fact that a. number of Soviet philosophers answer it in the negative. Moreover, a positive answer is sometimes declared incompatible with the Marxist understanding of the ideal and qualified as “naturalism”. Carried to a logical conclusion, this view denies any relationship between natural science and the problem of consciousness in general.^^15^^ Such is one of the results of a narrow sociological approach to the mind-matter antithesis.

p By contrast with such extreme views some writers, for instance, L. A. Abramyan, contend that "the problem of consciousness clearly reveals a natural-scientific aspect, whereas the problem of the ideal is entirely free from it.”^^18^^ Regrettably, the author fails to provide any convincing arguments in support of this conclusion. "The ideal," he writes, "is a socially conditioned product of spiritual activity which has acquired the significance of a social phenomenon" (ibid.). So, the ideal lies beyond the limits of natural science for the simple reason that it is a purely social phenomenon. Now, human consciousness is also a purely social phenomenon, yet the author, somewhat at odds with elementary logic, does not exempt it from the laws of nature.

p Abramyan underscores that the ideal is "an aspect of consciousness and cannot in any way be separated from it" (ibid.). This is an important statement amounting to an acknowledgement that the category of the ideal is a necessary predicate of “consciousness”. But it can mean only one thing: in all scientific contexts the notion of consciousness should be inseparably linked, explicitly or implicitly, with that of the ideal. A researcher cannot reasonably probe into the problems of human consciousness unless he regards it as subjective reality.

p Though Abramyan justly observes that the notions of 24 consciousness and the ideal are not identical, we cannot accept his general conclusion. Indeed, if one concedes the problem of consciousness a natural-scientific aspect, one is bound to do the same in relation to the problem of the ideal, since the notion of the ideal represents the basic characteristic of consciousness which cannot be side-stepped whatever the scientific interpretation of the nature of consciousness. This side of the problem is worth discussing in more detail.

p Let us first clarify the notion of "natural-scientific aspect" as used in the context of the problem of consciousness. Granting this problem a natural-scientific aspect, we evidently mean that the Marxist interpretation of the notion of consciousness is based not only on social, but also on natural sciences. As is well known, Lenin attached top priority to the natural-scientific substantiation of the dialectical-materialist understanding of consciousness as a property of highly organised matter. He frequently adduced the natural scientific (not philosophical) proposition "consciousness is a function of the brain" as an important argument against idealistic conceptions of consciousness. The assertion that "mind is not a function of the body" is, according to Lenin, idealism.^^17^^ Expounding his view, Lenin wrote: ".. .the ordinary human idea became divine with Hegel when it was divorced from man and man’s brain" (ibid., p. 227). "Sensation depends on the brain, nerves, retina, etc., i.e., on matter organised in a definite way" (ibid., p. 55).

p Lenin’s propositions underlining the necessary connection of philosophy and natural science are directed not only against the idealist divorce between consciousness and definitely organised material substratum, but also against vulgarised abstract sociological conceptions of consciousness disregarding its “ natural” aspect. To be sure, the philosophical and natural-scientific aspects of the problem of consciousness should be clearly demarcated and the “mind-matter” philosophical problem should not be confused with the “mind-brain” scientific problem. Yet it is equally important not to lose sight of their essential connection which represents nothing else than the scientific aspect of the philosophical problem of consciousness. Indeed, one hardly needs being reminded that progress in the investigation of consciousness as a function of the brain enriches the philosophical concept of consciousness and stimulates its further development.

p The latest achievements in animal psychology, psychophysiology, neurophysiology, neuropsychology, psychopharmacology, neurolinguistics, neurocybernetics, psychiatry and a number of other fields in natural scientific research play an important part in the enrichment and deepening of the philosophical problem of consciousness. A review of these achievements and an analysis of their impact on the investigation of philosophical problems might make a subject-matter of many monographs. For our purpose it will be sufficient to cite only a few examples.

p First of all we should like to point out great progress achieved by animal psychology and animal semeiology in the study of animal psyche.^^18^^ The results of these investigations raise many new questions regarding the prerequisites for human consciousness and its qualitative specificity. At the same time they reveal extreme complexity of animal psyche, particularly the subjective reality of higher animals. There is no doubt that animals have their own, still largely closed to us, subjective reality, their own "internal world", in some respects similar to ours. Yet not infrequently we are content with oversimplified notions of their psyche.

p The boundaries of analogies between the subjective reality of animals and man are known to us but very vaguely. The latest achievements of animal psychology and animal semeiology give grounds to believe that these analogies are more numerous than it was thought earlier, that the categories of the higher and the lower are by far inadequate to characterise the relationship between human consciousness and the psychic reflection of animals, and that the genetic connection between them is not at all simple, as animals are endowed with certain mechanisms of psychic reflection and psychic self-regulation unknown to man.

p Some Soviet philosophers, recognising the existence of animal subjective reality, deem it possible to include this specific field of psychic phenomena under the head of the ideal. Such is, for instance, the opinion of Alexander Spirkin.^^19^^ Pointing out a number of features common to the psyche of man and animals, Tyukhtin treats the subjective reality of animals as the " intermediate level of the ideal",^^20^^ i.e. as the lower level of reflection in ideal form. He convincingly shows the need to take into account the natural-scientific aspect of the problem of the ideal, the results of specific investigations into the reflective activity of the 26 brain of man and higher animals which reveal the nature of psychic reflection as a function of material substratum organised in a definite way.

p What is called the ideal is for Tyukhtin nothing more than a specific functional property of highly organised matter. From this ensues the chief objective of scientific investigation: to get an insight into the mechanisms actualising this property and to understand the workings of the brain translating external objects into man’s subjective reality. We whole-heartedly subscribe to this approach which leaves no room for an artificial divide between the philosophical understanding of the subjective image of the objective world on the one hand, and concrete scientific investigation into the nature of psychic reflection, on the other. Of course, this is only one of the aspects of the problem of the ideal. Theoretical generalisations in this field are logically compatible with the results of research into the problem of the ideal from the epistemological and other angles. Moreover, the results of fundamental scientific investigation can modify philosophical concepts of one or another form of reflection. Suffice it to recall achievements in the physiological research of sensory processes which revealed the code nature of sensations and a number of important mechanisms in the process of conversion of the energy of external irritation into the phenomenon of consciousness.^^21^^ The results of these investigations which, regrettably, have not yet become the object of a serious philosophical analysis pose new fundamental questions before the epistemology of sense reflection, giving, for one, good reason to speak of the image-sign dialectic in each act of sense reflection.^^22^^

p As regards the use of the category of the- ideal, it should be limited, in our view, to the sphere of man’s subjective reality which is qualitatively different from the subjective reality of animals; the latter appears to be free from bipolarity and has no mechanisms of permanent self-reflection (introspection, reflection, self-projection). Primates do not know schizophrenia. In their case we have a different type of the wholeness of subjective, reality and its internal organisation. The absence of abstract thinking, the high stability of needs, the genetic predetermination of the main “norms” of mutual relations with the like and with individuals of other species clearly testify to a different 27 character of cognitive processes and psychic activity of animals.

p However, these facts do not lend probability to the widespread opinion about the primitiveness of the psyche of higher animals. The extreme meagreness of our knowledge about their "inner world" accounting for the tenacity of oversimplified models of animals psyche will evidently prevail till man develops effective means of communication with animals based on respect for every living being and recognition of its ethical value. Comparing human and animal psyches, the investigators have identified their common features and, proceeding in a similar way, seek to establish what psychic properties animals do not possess. Yet we evidently do not know quite a number of important psychic powers possessed by animals and not available to man. This is vouched for by numerous facts of animal behaviour which we cannot explain in terms of known mechanisms (reflexes, instincts, etc.) and even by analogy with human abilities (for instance, a cat flown away from its home to a distance of 170 km immediately sets on the right course back home).^^23^^

p In our opinion, the attempt to treat psyche under the category of the ideal is not devoid of sense, as it highlights the genetic connection of human consciousness with animal psyche, the properties they have in common, and, which is more important, the existence of specific animal subjective reality. However, such a broad interpretation of the category of the ideal involves certain difficulties and is not concordant with the traditional meaning of this category. Therefore, recognising the existence of specific animal subjective reality we should restrict the extension of the category of the ideal to human subjective reality, i.e. to social quality. As regards the subjective reality of animals, it should be treated under a different heading.

p This approach brings out a qualitative difference between consciousness and animal psyche conceding at the same time their affinity and making it possible to treat subjective reality as a generic notion. Put another way, it proceeds from the existence of two qualitatively different types of subjective reality and, consequently, postulates subjective reality as a general notion, i.e. as something essentially common to men and animals: the faculty of psychic reflection and control, the presence of sense images, emotional and other subjective states.

p I am fully aware of the shortcomings inherent in the proposed definition of subjective reality as a generic notion. However, I hope that the reader will understand me. What I mean is a specific “internal” functional property of a complex self- organising system. Subjective reality may have different structural organisations and different substantive components or modality sets of psychic states, yet such differences do not in any way affect the nature of what is called subjective reality (for instance, man has a capacity for abstract thinking whereas animals are incapable of it, but both men and animals are known to experience certain analogous subjective states indicative of inner activity which only ceases in deep sleep or in a coma).

p There is a sad shortage of psychological and philosophical terms to characterise the very essence of subjective reality which constitutes a specific informational process in a complex selforganising system. Incidentally, the notion of subjective reality is not identical with the notion of the psychic, as the latter includes both the acts of behaviour in general and a number of informational processes that take place beyond the threshold of states subjectively real for a given system.

p It is only natural that we seek to comprehend the nature of subjective reality in general by analogy with the general characteristics of human subjective reality or one of its components singled out with the help of common, psychological or philosophical language. For instance., a sense image is a phenomenon of subjective reality. Making this statement, we can discard mentally all its specific features (concrete content, axiological characteristics, authenticity, etc.), retaining only one of them— being an individual, actually existing (as the "current present"), subjectively experienced process.

p Since subjective reality is a specific functional property of a self-organising system, its type depends on the specific qualities of this system (level of development, methods of functioning). So far, we know only two types of subjective reality, yet in principle there may be more. For one thing, we cannot discard the theoretical possibility of the existence of extraterrestrial intelligence. Having! acknowledged such a possibility, we have good reason to expect the representatives of extraterrestrial civilisation Z to have a qualitatively different subjective reality from ours, the gap being probably as wide as the gap between 29 human subjective reality and that of animals. However, a qualitative distinction will not exclude invariance in a number of important characteristics (just as the two terrestrial types of subjective reality are invariant in some respects). Such invariance provides in principle a basis for their mutual understanding.

p We may equally expect an important or even qualitative change of human subjective reality as a result of long evolution, or even the creation of artificial subjective reality through cybernetic engineering. The latter supposition logically ensues from the premises of the functional approach to the exposition of life and intellect. Modern cybernetic devices can excellently execute formal-logical operations and perform some other psychic functions, yet we have no grounds for assertions that they have a subjective reality of their own. However, in defiance of common sense and conventional conceptual and axiological principles one may put forward a good case for a theoretical possibility of subjective reality emerging through cybernetic engineering. I have discussed these questions at length elsewhere.^^24^^

p The multiplicity of the types of subjective reality is an important philosophical proposition as it broadens the traditional anthropocentric world-view and underlies scientific research into the problem of distinctions between types of subjective reality. This research which is mainly dependent on natural-scientific methods and has extended of late to the study of general scientific approaches and conceptions concentrates on the psyche of animals,^^25^^ the problems of artificial intelligence^^26^^ and on the search for extraterrestrial civilisations.^^27^^ One can well imagine the enormity of the impact of a scientifically attested contact with extraterrestrial intelligence on present-day philosophical doctrines!

p The denial of the natural-scientific aspect of the problem of the ideal derives from an exceedingly rigid, non-dialectical contrast between natural and social sciences^ which is patently at variance with their growing integration in the study of a number of highly topical problems of the modern world and in the already achieved results.

p Such a denial unduly restricting the scope of philosophical research and fixing a gulf between philosophy on the one hand, and science and real social practice, on the other hand, stems from an extremely narrow, dogmatic understanding of the 30 subject-matter of philosophy and tends to confine the analysis ot subjective reality, its types and axiological-conceptual structure exclusively within the domain of psychology.

p This approach appears to be totally untenable. Indeed, the study of such an important feature of subjective reality as the unique individual form of its existence is primarily a philosophical problem, yet any success in its investigation is hardly possible without due account of the results and prospects of natural-scientific and bio-social research. Special philosophical significance attaches to the investigation into the genetics of psychic distinctions which clearly shows that the unique integrity of every man’s subjective reality, its inimitability is determined not only by social, but also by genetic factors.^^28^^

p Another and potentially very important dimension of subjective reality with its structural-dynamic specificity is added by research into the functional asymmetry of the brain and the separate activity of the cerebral hemispheres.^^29^^ The obtained results provide vast material for the philosophical analysis of such problems as the identity of personality, the nature of relationships between the self and not-self modalities in the structure of subjective reality, the unity of the sensual and the rational, the interconnection of language and thought, etc.  [30•*  Directly related to the study of these problems are the results obtained by a new integrated scientific discipline—stereotaxic semeiology based on the experience in diagnosing and treating patients by implanting microelectrodes in the brain.^^31^^ This discipline undoubtedly opens a new chapter in the study of the brain equivalents of man’s psychic functions and the highly complex manifestations of his states of awareness.

p The natural-scientific aspect of the problem of the ideal is most closely linked with the traditional psychophysiological problem which is conventionally treated by philosophers in the conceptual framework of the psychophysical problem. This problem dealing with the relation between the spiritual and the corporeal affects the most important aspect of the relation between the ideal and the material. Significantly, Descartes’ formulation of the psychophysical problem has not lost its topicality till nowadays, as it permits demarcating the materialist, dualist and 31 idealist solutions to the problem in question. It remains in the focus of attention of those natural scientists who seek to understand the relationship between the phenomena of consciousness and the activity of the brain. The questions they are concerned with have already been discussed by me in detail.^^32^^ It was shown, in particular, that the investigation of the psychophysiological problem which pivots on the mind-brain antithesis is accompanied by a sharp ideological polemic between the exponents of materialism and dualism. The scope of research into the problem, the progress made and the philosophical conclusions drawn have been outlined in a number of publications^^33^^ reflecting both the most significant achievements in this field over the past ten-fifteen years and the most difficult issues connected with the interpretation of consciousness as an ideal phenomenon. It is very characteristic that in treating the problems of mind’s creativity and free will the proponents of dualism usually adduce age-old arguments in support of the doctrine of psychophysiological parallelism.^^34^^

p As might be expected, the champions of a one-sided sociologised approach to consciousness rejecting the natural-scientific aspect of the problem of the ideal also dismiss as non-existent the psychophysical (and psychophysiological) problem.  [31•*  Such an attitude is, of course, completely groundless and hardly needs any critical comment.

p Most of the attempts to investigate consciousness as a specific property of highly organised matter are notable for a very narrow analytic approach: the researcher concentrates on only one element, manifestation or general feature of consciousness (for instance, perception as a conscious act, the process of thinking, the state of wakefulness, various mental disorders, etc.). The researcher singles out some interpersonal invariant of a given feature or manifestation of the conscious process,^^36^^ say, "man’s visual perception" or "man’s visual perception of certain geometric forms". The result is usually a formalised functional description of the object of investigation in which the specific 32 content of a conscious act is disregarded and its personal characteristics are left out of account.

p The inadequacy and abstract nature of such "function- oriented" investigations are only too obvious, yet they constitute an important step towards the understanding of consciousness as concrete wholeness (let alone their practical value in medicine, pedagogy, engineering psychology, etc.).

p Recent years, however have been marked by rapid development of a new research strategy combining the basic naturalscientific approach with the specific methods of psychological, psychiatric, linguistic and cybernetic analysis. The researcher’s attention has shifted to personality invariants of conscious acts described now not only from the viewpoint of their formal- functional pattern, but also their conceptual content. The new strategy can be exemplified by the impressive achievements in deciphering the brain codes of psychic activity.^^37^^ They open up new vistas in the investigation of consciousness as a brain function, as a property of highly organised matter. Any characteristics of consciousness as subjective reality represent, in one way or another, the functional proper ties of the brain and are subject to study as such. The experience gained over the past few decades convincingly shows that the advance of scientific knowledge in this specific field calls for further integration of natural and social sciences. There is no doubt that the general theory of scientific cognition will play an important part in the intensification of this process.

p To sum up, then. It is obviously inconsistent to concede the natural-scientific aspect to the problem of consciousness and deny it to the problem of the ideal. This denial is rooted in the traditional gap between the categorial structures of scientific and humanitarian knowledge. Indeed, there are no direct logical links between the description of the phenomena of consciousness characterised by a definite content, set of values, intention, purpose, will, etc. (expressed in humanistic terms and included under the head of the ideal) and the description of a highly organised material system with its spatial and substrate characteristics, physical properties and chemical processes (expressed in terms of natural science). For this reason the category of the ideal, in contrast, for instance, with the categories of matter, movement, space, time, cause, law, etc. cannot be directly 33 translated into the language of natural science; this feature makes it essentially different from other basic categories of dialectical materialism.

Such translation will only become possible if we provide mediating links now being developed at the general scientific level. The functions of these links can be assigned, for instance, to the category of information and a number of associated concepts which will provide a logical link between the categories of natural and social sciences and permit interpreting the category of the ideal in different terms according to the aspect of the ideal that becomes an object of scientific inquiry. This, in turn, will heighten the methodological role of the category of the ideal in the study of consciousness at special and general scientific levels.