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p The new philosophical trend known as "scientific materialism" appeared in the West a few decades ago and has been in the ascendant, particularly in the USA and [Australia, ever since. Its adherents (Herbert Feigl, John Smart, David Armstrong, Richard Rorty and others) declare themselves champions of the materialist world-view and many of them castigate idealism and dualism in a broad debate upon the mind-brain problem. The "scientific materialists" in the person of their most eminent representatives seek to solve this problem from the position of radical physicalism. In contrast with the adherents of idealism and dualism who absolutise the category of the ideal, the "scientific materialists" strive at all costs to discard it altogether as false and meaningless. To them the ideal (consciousness, the mental, the psychic) is nothing more than a physical process. The theoretical premises of "scientific materialism" which purports to uphold the fundamental principles of materialist philosophy deserve a careful critical analysis.

p A characteristic feature of "scientific materialism" as a philosophical trend consists in its conceptual orientation towards the classical mind-body problem treated in the naturalistic manner. This problem, known as psychophysical in relevant literature has a long-standing philosophical tradition. Whatever its interpretations, it is closely related to the basic question of philosophy and, precisely for this reason, figures prominently in the works of 110 Western philosophers. Time and time again it was declared a pseudo-problem, yet, according to Jerome Shaffer, the author of the corresponding article in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, it " remains a source of acute discomfort to philosophers".^^1^^ Ever since the time of Rene Descartes, if not even earlier, the mind-body problem has exercised the minds of the empiricists, and the achievements of psychology, physiology, medicine and cybernetics over the past few decades have given it a new lease of life which largely accounts for the emergence of "scientific materialism”.

p It is highly significant that the question of the relationship of the mental and the physical is directly linked with two other fundamental problems: the nature of man and the unity of scientific knowledge. These links have always been underscored not only by leading representatives of "scientific materialism", but also by their opponents. Hence the heated controversy over the conceptions of "scientific materialism", their methodological and world-view significance.

p Central to "scientific materialism" is the thesis that man is essentially a part of nature and, consequently, a physical object; therefore, ".. .the methods of natural science, in particular physics, can be counted upon to give a comprehensive description of a human being".^^2^^ In other words, mental phenomena are essentially identical with physical phenomena and should be regarded as a subclass of the physical. The possibility of complete reduction of the mental to the physical can be proved on a strictly scientific basis—hence the name "scientific materialism" underscoring the reliance of the new trend on science and its means for substantiation of materialism (“science” is, of course, limited to natural science, predominantly physics).

p The "scientific materialists" trace their views to the philosophical tradition originating from Deinocritus and invoke La Mettrie, Hobbes and other pre-Marxist thinkers as their ideological predecessors; some of them profess atheism and make a firm stand against religion.

p In order to get a better idea of the genesis and philosophical background of "scientific materialism" and localise it among the numerous trends and doctrines on the philosophical scene, we shall turn to the conventional classification of approaches to the mind-body problem. According to this classification adopted by many current writers on the subject (including "scientific 111 materialists"), all solutions to the problem fall in two main categories: monistic and dualistic (some also add pluralistic). Monistic solutions include only those which reduce completely the mental to the physical (radical physicalism) or, vice versa, the physical to the mental (radical mentalism). Under the head of dualistic solutions come the conceptions which reject such reduction and regard the mental and the physical either as independent entities capable of interaction (after the fashion of Cartesian interactionism), or as entirely unrelated phenomena. The class of dualistic conceptions also includes “parallelist”, “ epiphenomenalist” and other theories. Among the monistic approaches, too, are distinguished several trends, e.g. “idealism” by which is understood Berkeleian reduction of the physical to the mental; the “two-aspect” theory treating the mental and the physical as two sides of a single entity and approximating to the idea of panpsychism; "neutral monism" including the conceptions of Hume, Mach, and James, and a variation of it represented by logical positivist Ayer.

p Understandably, this classification (described in detail in Shaffer’s entry in the Encyclopedia mentioned above) is absolutely unacceptable from the Marxist standpoint, as it confuses the ontological and epistemological principles and tends to eliminate the borderline between materialism and idealism; its inadequacy results, among other things, from a certain vagueness of terms "the mental" and "the physical" as will be shown later. However, this classification is very enlightening in the sense that it epitomises the assessment of various solutions of the traditional mindbody problem from the standpoint of analytical philosophy, the cradle of "scientific materialism" which owes it a number of categorial definitions and creeds. Besides, the cited classification provides, as it were, a clue to the genesis of "scientific materialism" representing to a great extent the naturalistic tradition in contemporary bourgeois philosophy and indicative of a profound crisis of neopositivism (its latest stage notable for the revival of ontology and “metaphysics” is often called post-positivism)."’

p “Scientific materialism" that took its first steps in the USA and Australia derives from two main and closely connected philosophical doctrines: logical positivism and the so-called analytical behaviourism,^^4^^ particularly as represented by the conception of Gilbert Ryle.^^5^^ Herbert Feigl (known to be a member of the 112 Vienna Circle), Wilfrid Sellars and other American representatives of "scientific materialism" came from logical positivism. Ryle’s conception proved to be the starting point of evolution to "scientific materialism" for a number of Australian philosophers, first of all for J. J. Smart.^^6^^ It is very characteristic of the new trend that its formation and development were strongly influenced by the achievements of psychology, physiology, and cybernetics, as well as by broad discussions of methodological problems connected with rapid scientific progress.

p Rejecting the ontological “problematic”, the logical positivists ’ declared the classical mind-body problem non-existent and, as Carl Hempel put it, a “pseudo-problem”.^^7^^ "Are the so-called mental processes really physical processes or not? Are the socalled physical processes really spiritual or not? It seems doubtful whether we can find any theoretical content in such philosophical questions as discussed by monism, dualism, and pluralism".^^8^^ Psychological statements must be reduced to physical statements and this is how we achieve the unity of science which, according to Carnap, can only be comprehended as a logical, and not an ontological problem. Hempel formulated this principle in the most uncompromising manner: "Psychology is an integral part of physics".^^9^^ "All the branches of science are in principle of one and the same nature; they are branches of the unitary science, physics" (ibid., p. 382). According to Moritz -Schlick, the “mental” and the “physical” are but two methods of describing and ordering experiential data; the so-called mind-body problem springs from a confusion of both these methods of describing an experience in one and the same sentence. Very close to Schlick’s viewpoint is Ayer’s conception of "neutral monism". Criticising the basic premise of Cartesian dualism, Ayer substantiates the thesis that "talking about minds and talking about bodies are different ways of classifying and interpreting our experience. . ."^I0 In this way, in his opinion, we overcome the "Car^ tesian fallacy" and the insuperable difficulties of correlating the mental and the corporeal turn out to be imaginary ones.

p As regards Ryle’s conception, its main thrust is also against the Cartesian dualism; however, the author’s obvious interest in ontological problems has led him to a behaviourist interpretation of “mental” events. The invalidity of the Cartesian dualism is traceable, in his opinion, to a categorial fallacy which results in 113 the absurd combination of “mind” and “machine”. We actually deal with nothing else than beliefs, knowledge, wishes, hopes, joys, etc. which do not need for their denotation a special category “mind” (Ryle points out that this term is practically not used in common language the analysis of which figures prominently in his conception and predetermines the author’s inferences). For the same reason we do not need, according to Ryle, the category of “matter”. "Theorists should drop both these words. ‘Mind’ and ‘Matter’ are echoes from the hustings of philosophy"^^11^^ creating obstacles to the analysis of the “mental” and the “corporeal”. The whole class of “mental” phenomena can well be described with the category of behaviour. It is therefore absurd to speak of physical motion as having mechanical and “mental” causes.^^12^^ Expounding his viewpoint, Ryle expands the category of behaviour including into it not only actions, but also dispositions, i.e. possibilities, tendencies or inclinations to a certain action (ibid., p. 118).

p Ryle’s conception is fraught with a number of contradictions characteristic of the linguistic version of “monism” in its interpretation of the mind-body problem, particularly of the behaviourist reductionism based on the analysis of common language.  [113•*  Significantly, tribute to behaviourism was paid not only by Carnap and Hempel, but also to a certain extent by the late Ludwig Wittgenstein (as was justly pointed out by Quinton and Armstrong).

p Such was, in very general outline, the conceptual situation of the late 1940s-1950s in analytical philosophy that provided the background for the inception of "scientific materialism". Already in 1950 Feigl published an article (reprinted in 1953)¹³ in which he made an attempt to revise the traditional logico-positivist assessments of the mind-body problem, stressing the standing nature of its ontological aspects, and hazarded a thesis of the identity of “mental” and “physical” phenomena. At about the same 114 time Sellars made a resolute turn to the "metaphysical principles of science" and set himself against phenomenalism in defence of the conception of "scientific realism".^^14^^   [114•*  The views of Feigl and Sellars of this period are indicative of attempts to give “ontic” substance to physicalism in contrast with its purely epistemological interpretation characteristic of logical positivism.

p However, it was only in the late 1950s that "scientific materialism" took shape as a separate philosophical doctrine. Its formation is creditable to three publications, Place’s "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?" (1956), Feigl’s "The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’" (1958) and Smart’s "Sensations and Brain Processes" (1959) which aroused wide debates in Anglo-American and Australian philosophical literature. Let us consider the essence of these works.

p According to Place,^^17^^ it would be wrong to suppose that statements about phenomena of consciousness are statements about brain processes. For one thing, we can describe our sensations and mental images without knowing anything about our brain processes. Yet it does not mean that the statement " consciousness is a brain process" is a false one. It is a reasonable scientific hypothesis in the manner, for instance, of a statement that the lightning is movement of electrical charges. There is no logical relationship between “consciousness” and "brain process" which exists between “colour” and “red”. Nevertheless, not Only the statement "red is a colour", but also the statement " consciousness is a brain process" is meaningful just as the statement "his table is an old box", though the “table” and the "old box" are 115 logically unrelated. Therefore it is erroneous to reason from the logical independence of two notions to the ontological independence of the objects they denote. It is this kind of error that not infrequently underlies objections to the statement that consciousness is a brain process.

p Analysing logical conditions for identification of “ consciousness” and "brain process", Place sets himself against Sherrington’s dualistic interactionism tracing it to phenomenalism (" phenomenological delusion") and comes to the conclusion that it is possible and necessary to describe introspective data in terms of brain processes.

p Feigl’s article^^18^^ gives a more thorough and detailed analysis of the relation between the “mental” and the “physical”. Like in his other articles^^19^^ the author specially underscores that the psychophysical problem is not a pseudo-problem and can be resolved by scientific and philosophical means. Setting out from Frege’s theory, Feigl comes to the conclusion that the mental is identical with the physical in the sense that “mental” terms and certain neurophysiological terms have the same meaning since their referents are identical. In FeigPs opinion, progress in neurophysiology demonstrates increasing correlation between sensations and brain states and he contends that there are no insuperable logical obstacles to the proof that this correlation can be turned into actual identity.

p Such identity is not logically necessary, it is empirical by nature like the identity of "Morning star" and "Evening star", and not the identity "5 = 2 + 3". Feigl puts forward a case against phenomenalism and behaviourism (though his criticism from the position of "scientific materialism" is bound to lack in consistency, as we shall show later) and develops his conception of the “mental” and its description by linguistic means.

p Behaviourism maintains, first, that every psychic phenomenon is reducible to actual behaviour or disposition to behaviour and, second, that language is always intersubjective and cannot be personal in principle. Feigl rejects both these theses. In his opinion, when we speak about our moods, sensations, feelings, etc., we turn not to our behaviour, but to the condition and processes of our “direct” experience. These unmediated subjective experiences, called "raw feels" by Feigl, give us “direct” and “ immediate” knowledge of our psychic states and are expressed in 116 some very personal language. All empirical conceptions are based entirely on this language, since it constitutes the "deepest level of evidence".^^20^^

p Taking a stand against phenomenalism, Feigl shows here an obvious lack of consistency inasmuch as he offers no criterion for distinguishing objective physical reality from subjective phenomenology. Evidently seeking to buttress up his argument, he indicates elsewhere that in his "personal language" the term “physical” refers to a set of molecules whose action produces a sense impression.  [116•* 

p According to Feigl, "raw feels" can only be communicated to other persons in a mediated form, i.e. after being translated from the personal language into the intersubjective (common) language. The "raw feels" described in common language have, as Feigl puts it, the status of "central states" which are identified by him with definite brain processes (wherefore Feigl’s conception is often called "central state materialism" or "identity theory"). Feigl’s conception is a variety of radical physicalism which purports to give a monistic picture of the world as he regards brain processes as physical ones, and the latter, as the only objective reality.

p Feigl is not averse to “metaphysical” arguments found not only in the article under consideration, but also in other publications. Thus, he often invokes the principle of simplicity: "Does the identity theory simplify our conception of the world? I think it does.”^^21^^ Feigl says that he has nothing against his view being qualified as metaphysical though he would rather call it metascientific. It is an important statement which amounts to an admission that the empirical chastity of logical positivism has proved a fiction and that "scientific materialism" is a kind of "empirical metaphysics" (this tenet of the identity theory is a permanent target of the critical shafts of its opponents belonging to different schools of modern bourgeois philosophy). Such is, in general terms, the content of Feigl’s work, one of the corner-stones of "scientific materialism”.

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p As regards Smart’s article, it did not make, in my opinion, any real advance on Place and Feigl: the author himself pointed out that his article was intended as an elaboration on Place’s propositions and as a complement to Feigl’s work "The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’ ",^^22^^

p Smart subjects typical arguments against the principle of identity of the mental and the physical to a scrupulous analysis substantiating the thesis that a sensation is a brain process. Like Feigl, he resorts to “metaphysical” arguments ("Ockham’s razor" and others) and castigates dualism contrasting it with his ”materialist metaphysics" (ibid., p. 41). There is nothing in the world except physical events, and man is nothing more than a "physical mechanism". This thesis runs right through all Smart’s numerous works and he devotes a whole chapter in his book Philosophy and Scientific Realism to its defence and substantiation.^^23^^

p The three programme works discussed above have set off an avalanche of pro and con publications; "scientific materialism" rallied a host of active supporters and sympathisers whose views were given extensive coverage in the U.S., British and Australian periodicals. The identity theory has put forth buds of new versions and become a focus of lively debates and a target of critical attacks on the part of idealists, dualists and theologians. As C. V. Borst has pointed out, the mind-body identity theory "provides one very fruitful focus of interest for discussions of problems in the philosophy of mind".^^24^^

p It is by no means accidental that "scientific materialism" became an influential trend within a comparatively short period and attracted the attention of philosophers of very diverse orientations. The popularity of the new school derives, first and foremost, from the nature of its problems which are closely associated with the basic question of philosophy and focus on the relationship between the spiritual and the material; what is more, the ontological bent of the "scientific materialists" appears to be an encouraging contrast with the rabid and often militant antiontologism of the logical positivisls. The advantages of the new teaching stand out with particular clarity against the background of the general crisis of modern idealist philosophy and the devaluation of dualism which go side by side with the marked strengthening of materialist tendencies in Western countries. 118 This general trend is largely creditable to the latest social processes including the current scientific and technological revolution and the breakthroughs in natural sciences. Western philosophers seem to be fully aware of the enormous impact of this latter circumstance. For instance, David Rosenthal, the editor of one of the collections devoted to "scientific materialism" writes: "Philosophical interest in materialism has become especially pronounced in the last decade, in large measure stimulated by advances in such areas as neurophysiology, biophysics, and computer science.”^^25^^

p : The above-indicated materialist tendencies represent a broad spectrum of views and approaches of varying conceptual maturity having different genetic links with contemporary philosophical schools in the West.

p These tendencies range from a relatively consistent materialist stand of Marvin Farber^^26^^ and a number of other representatives of so-called naturalism^^27^^ to rather eclectic conceptions exemplified, for instance, by the views of Stuart Spicker. Rejecting Cartesian dualism, he arrived, as he puts it, at a definite form of spiritual materialism which is at best a contradictory doctrine but nevertheless radically different from coarse materialism and spiritualism.^^28^^

p In this motley array "scientific materialism" ranks close to naturalism merging with it on a number of important issues. The "scientific materialists" incus their attention on the mental ( psychic) as a function and property of the brain; they accentuate the ontological aspect of the mental treating it in terms of the classical mind-body problem and subjecting to a very thorough analysis the logical questions of the mind-brain relationship (as we shall see later, certain results of their investigations are of considerable scientific interest).

p In view of the above it appears hardly justifiable to dispose of the identity theory as "one of the varieties of modern vulgar materialism".^^29^^ To be sure, scientific materialism with its radical physicalism is illustrative of the main shortcomings of pre- Marxist mechanistic materialism, yet it is very different from classical vulgar materialism if only for the fact that the latter has never raised the logical problem of the relationship between the mind and the brain, whereas the former regards it as one of the main issues. Significantly, it is precisely the logical-linguistic analysis 119 of the mind-body problem that has been steadily coming into the foreground over the past few years.

p As regards the attempts to rate the representatives of " scientific materialism" with the idealists, they appear to be absolutely untenable. Feigl, for one, has gone far beyond the bounds of logical positivism. In my opinion, there is every reason to include "scientific materialism" under the general head of modern naturalism, rather a heterogeneous trend. This view of the philosophical affiliation of "natural materialism" as a whole and of its individual exponents seems to be shared by Narsky, Bogomolov and Yulina.^^30^^

p The "scientific materialists" unequivocally rank themselves with the naturalists. For instance, Armstrong writes in his book Belief, Truth and Knowledge that he offers it as a contribution to the naturalistic explanation of man.^^31^^

In assessing "scientific materialism" as a philosophical trend, one must take due account of the fact that it draws on vast scientific material and represents a peculiar version of the natural scientists’ theoretical reflection. At any rate, the identity theory is implicitly shared by many Western natural scientists who look to it for methodological orientation. According to Shaffer, "it is a hypothesis that many scientists take seriously and use to guide their research".^^32^^