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p As stated earlier on, the major international legal problem in preventing acts of terrorism at the present time is that of uniting the efforts of States against those acts 167 which are committed in peace time. But there is yet another aspect of this problem arising from the fact that a large number of terrorist acts are committed in the course of subversive activity against national liberation movements and civil war. The men who commit such terrorist acts are “soldiers of fortune”, paid murderers and "whores of war"—mercenaries. Their story is as old as that of palace revolutions and intestine wars. One particular aspect of the present moment is that reactionary forces form organised groups of mercenaries of persons from different countries extensively used both against national liberation and strike movements and against progressive democratic leaders of certain countries. Therefore, mercenarism today is peculiar as such not only to the periods of armed conflict but to peace time as well, while the methods mercenaries use are terrorist ones, which requires the matter in question to be considered as part of the fight against international terrorism.

p Mercenarism was a widespread practice even in ancient Rome and, subsequently, quite common to the feudal States of the Middle Ages. The period of capitalism, and more particularly, that of its highest stage—imperialism, has produced traffic in "cannon fodder" institutionalised as national policy. For example, the uprising of the Taipings in China in the 19th century was quelled by mercenaries together with local Chinese reactionaries and armed forces of Britain and France.

p The fundamental change in the world’s power balance in favour of socialism, peace and progress has made impossible outright and direct intervention by imperialist Powers against new-born independent States or embattled peoples. In the situation thus created, imperialist States 168 and racist regimes have resumed a large-scale practice of using mercenaries, if more covertly.

p In 1977, for instance, the army of the racist regime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia had two thousand mercenaries in it. After a rather short spell of training and adaptation to the local climatic conditions, the mercenaries started to kill off African civilians, burn their cabins and destroy their crops, in short, do everything to scare the natives and prevent any strengthening of the patriotic forces in battle for liberation. In an interview to the French Nouvel Observateur magazine on July 3, 1978, a mercenary who had been to Rhodesia blurted out that he and his companions were the killers of civilians. He gave an account of punitive expeditions against whole villages, the torture of captured peasants, and the use by mercenaries of the ways and means of warfare forbidden by international law. It is indicative that this was taking place at a time when Great Britain and the USA were trying hard to convince the Africans that the disbandment of Smith’s army must not be demanded as a condition for granting independence to Zimbabwe, and thus attempted to preserve intact that strike force of racism even after the granting of independence to that country.

p It is quite obvious that the most effective way to end the recruitment of mercenaries would be by drawing up strict and effective national legal standards to ban mercenary service, recruitment, dispatch and transportation of mercenaries to different parts of the world and also by drafting international agreements for the prosecution and punishment of mercenarism under criminal law.

p The record of the last few years has shown that most of the mercenaries have been supplied by the USA, Great 169 Britain, France, West Germany, Belgium and Sweden—and that in spite of the fact that all of these countries have appropriate legislation directed, in one way or another, against the institution of mercenarism.

p The USA, back in the days of George Washington, promulgated its first laws to control the recruitment of citizens of one State for service in the army of another State. Subsequent regulations have provided a more articulate definition of the ban on mercenarism. The well-known trial of mercenaries in Luanda, some of whom were US nationals, drew the attention of American public opinion to the mercenary recruitment practice in US territory. The official authorities recognised the fact of such recruitment stations being in operation. Robert L. Keuch, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, giving evidence before the Subcommittee on International Relations of the House of Representatives in March 1976 declared that the Criminal Division “has been aware of numerous allegations regarding recruitment efforts and is conducting appropriate investigations".  [169•1  However, no measures were ever taken, in spite of the unequivocal Section 959 of Title 18 of the US Penal Code headed “Enlistment in Foreign Service": “Whoever, within the United States, enlists or enters himself, or hires or retains another to enlist or enter himself, or to go ’beyond the jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district or people as a soldier or as a marine or seaman on board any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer, shall be 170 fined not more than $ 1,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.”

p The Code contains other articles designed to assure the United States’ neutrality or good relations with foreign nations. Section 956 provides that persons who would conspire to injure or destroy specific property situated in a foreign country and belonging to a foreign government, as any railroad, canal, bridge, etc. shall be fined not more than $ 5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. Section 960 envisages punishment for involvement in expeditions against a foreign friendly nation.

p Appropriate provisions are to be found in the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 349 provides for United States nationality to be taken away from a person who is found guilty of taking up foreign armed service. US authorities applied that provision to Hermann F. Marks who had left for Cuba in 1958 to join Fidel Castro’s detachment and returned to the USA after his victory in 1960. However, the US Government did not stick to “principle” as much in respect of Bufkin, Lobo del Sol and other mercenaries who had committed offences against the legitimate government of the People’s Republic of Angola and later joined the Rhodesian Army.

p The US Government appears to have “forgotten” about the existence of that Act when it came to the recruitment of US nationals to the Armed Forces of Israel to go to war against Arab states and against the national liberation movement of (he Arab people of Palestine. On October 14, 1969, a spokesman for the US Embassy in Tel Aviv interpreted the American Nationality Act as not only allowing persons of Jewish origin to retain American nationality while in the Armed Forces in Israel but, as a 171 matter of fact, encouraging their recruitment for war in the interest of the top leadership of the Zionist state. The Jordanian Al-Dustour newspaper was perfectly right in qualifying that American explanation as a “new phase" in the development of hostilities in the Middle East when the USA passed on from “supporting Israel to direct involvement in the war against Arab countries by permitting American citizens to serve in the Israeli Army while retaining their own political nationality".

p In 1870, Britain adopted a Foreign Enlistment Act to forbid British subjects from going to serve in a foreign State in order to participate in hostilities against another State if Great Britain was not at war with it. It is significant enough that the Act is still the only law on mercenaries for many of the Commonwealth nations. British Parliament confirmed the validity of the Act during the Spanish Civil War. In May 1968, Great Britain promulgated an Act forbidding her subjects to enter any service in Rhodesia. However, the Scotland Yard totally ignored press reports about mercenary recruitment within the territory of Britain to fight the legitimate government of the People’s Republic of Angola and to serve in the racist army of Smith. Moreover, British police authorities facilitated the dispatch of mercenaries to Angola through the airline terminals of Britain into Belgium, having rescinded the essential customs and border formalities in a number of cases.  [171•1 

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p Other European countries, principal suppliers of the “soldiers of fortune”, also have legal provisions to forbid nationals of these States to take up foreign armed service in any capacity, including that of mercenaries. In Belgium, for instance, the Penal Code bans the recruitment of any person for a foreign army without royal permission and provides for those guilty of such action to be punished by imprisonment of from eight days to six months (Art. 135). Art. 123 of the Penal Code envisages imprisonment of from five to ten years for hostile actions exposing the State to hostilities on the part of a foreign power, and if hostilities result, by imprisonment of from ten to fifteen years. In June 1937, the Parliament of Belgium outlawed not only recruitment for profit but also the dispatch and transit of persons for service in Spain, having established imprisonment of up to six months for a breach of that ban. It is common knowledge that during the events in Congo in the early 1960s, there were many Belgian mercenaries over there, but none of these laws were ever applied against them.

p The Government of Belgium took a series of measures (for instance, it withdrew foreign passports from former mercenaries) and got a commitment from the individuals bound for Katanga never to serve in foreign forces. But those measures failed to produce a due effect. It was only after the Security Council Resolution S/161 of February 21, 1961, which called on the UN Member States to take vigorous action to prevent the dispatch of mercenaries and their transit, the Belgian Minister of Justice issued the necessary instructions with regard to Belgian subjects and foreign nationals. But many were already in Katanga by that time.

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p Neither were any effective measures taken when mercenaries were shipped from Britain via Brussels to Angola in January 1976.

p French legislation has but one provision concerning mercenaries. Art. 85 of the Penal Code provides for imprisonment of from one to five years and a fine of from 3,000 to 30,000 francs for the recruitment of soldiers on behalf of a foreign power in time of peace. But, as everybody knows, many French mercenaries have been fighting with the extremist forces in Lebanon. Most of them have been recruited in France.

p In Sweden, it was considered criminal as early as the 19th century to recruit subjects for foreign armed service without royal sanction. In 1918, the Prime Minister of Sweden banned the formation of units in that country’s territory for participation in the civil war in Finland. During the civil war in Spain, in 1937-1939, there was a special Act in force in Sweden to forbid recruitment for military armed service in Spain. In 1948, it adopted a special law (it is now set out in the Swedish Criminal Code)  [173•1  envisaging a fine or imprisonment of up to six months for recruitment for foreign armed service without the Government’s permission or for unlawful illegal exit from the country to that end, and up to two years of imprisonment for the same kind of action in time of war.

p It is on record, however, that Swedish pilots joined the separatists during the civil war in Nigeria. There was information to the effect that Swedish airmen piloted transport aircraft of the forces fighting against the legitimate government of Angola. However, the Swedish Public 174 Prosecutor General declared that there had boon no need since 1948 to apply legislation in force relative to the matter.

p Mercenaries were used by racist South Africa during the aggression against Angola in September 1981. The 32nd Special Buffalo Battalion, comprising over 1,200 mercenaries iccruited in the USA, West Germany, Britain, Israel and some other countries, was the strike force of terror against the local civilians in Angola. Its core was made up of former “veterans” of the dirty war of the USA against Vietnam, former SS-men, former Rhodesian punitive squads, agents of the Portuguese secret police and common criminals out of the French Foreign Legion. The battalion has been used principally against the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and against the civilian population of Angola and Mozambique.

p Mercenaries were also used in November 1981 against the new-born African state of the Republic of Seychelles where a government that has carried through a number of progressive reforms in the interest of the people has been in power since 1977. Besides, oil has been struck off its shores, and the archipelago itself is seen by the Pentagon as strategically important. This was enough for about a hundred armed mercenaries to land on the Mahe Island on November 25, 1981, to attempt a coup. The Armed Forces of the Republic crushed the mercenaries, but 44 of them, having hijacked an Indian airliner, flew to South Africa and landed at Durban. Significantly enough, the authorities of South Africa never extradited them, as the Government of the Republic of Seychelles demanded.

p Passengers of the hijacked airliner subsequently related that among the mercenaries, there had been some citizens of South Africa, officers of the former Rhodesian army, 175 West Germans, Frenchmen, Italians, nationals of the USA, Britain, Portugal and New Zealand. A veteran mercenary Mike Hoare boasted that he had not only plotted the abortive coup in Seychelles, but was actively involved in it himself. South Africa’s Minister of Defence M. Malan admitted the involvement of South African .servicemen in the abortive coup attempt.

p One Martin Dolinchek, a career officer of South Africa’s Intelligence Service, captured on Seychelles, testified later on to the subversive activity against the Republic which is conducted from the territory of African countries hosting American military bases in them.

p It must be said that the first attempt of this kind was made in Africa against the legitimate government of Benin in 1977 as if plotted by the same man, which has been noted by President Mathieu Kerekou of Benin, as the President of Benin has pointed out in his message of congratulations to the Republic of Seychelles upon the defeat of the mercenaries. The Times of Zambia said in this connection that the Botha regime of South Africa had special forces hired and trained to topple the governments of such countries as Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia.

p The Johannesburg newspaper Star admitted that money to recruit the mercenaries came from American sources. The Seychelles Government asked the UN to set up a United Nations-sponsored international commission of inquiry into the circumstances and sources of financing that attack. The UN Security Council condemned the aggression committed by mercenaries against the Republic of Seychelles. It decided to form a commission of three members of the Council to investigate into all the circumstances 176 of that aggressive action and assess the economic damage caused to that State.

p New African of London in mid-1982 reported a whole series of new facts about the activities of mercenaries and their close association with the monopoly quarters of a number of imperialist States. For example, the magazine, referring to the American Covert Action publication, told the story of Pretoria mercenaries engaged against the tiny Republic of Domenica in the Caribbean in 1981. The leader of the mercenaries, Michael Perdue counted on getting 150 thousand dollars for the overthrow of the legitimate Domenican Government as well as a profitable concession for his Texas company Nortic Enterprises, Inc. The leader of Domenica, Eugenia Charles unequivocally accused South Africa of involvement in the attempted coup.

p Literaturnaya Gazeta, No. 27, 1982, published a curious document—an authentic letter from a representative of the American Aviation Personnel International Company to one of the top-ranking members of South African Air Force Lieutenant-General A. M. Muller. Here it is:

p “Dear Sir, 

p “Based on our agreement dated 12 December 1981 .. . we now forward the personal data of pilots who—-according to our evaluation—meet standards stipulated by you. Said pilots are qualified to operate Type YAH-64 combat helicopters and are well-trained in jungle warfare.

p “We repeatedly wish to direct your attention to the fact that we only recruit and recommend the pilots and the engagement procedures are the responsibility of your representatives. On instructions received from the competent bodies of the U.S. Government and because of political factors, this go-between activity of our organization calls 177 for top secrecy from your side in full accordance with earlier guarantees. This especially justified by circumstances that emerged as a result of the Seychelles action. We do not desire to undertake another similar risk that stems from the lack of careful judgement of given circumstances.

p “We believe you will understand our motives and can be mutually satisfied with how our business relations are shaping up. . .”

p This document speaks for itself—the practice of mercenarisin rampant in the USA has been organised by the US authorities and is under their wing.

p That is to say, almost all the countries supplying mercenaries have legal provisions against those “soldiers of fortune" and those who recruit them, but these provisions have been practically unused, since the imperialist powers need mercenaries to fight the national liberation movements.

p So what has been the record of international legal action against the mercenaries?

p Mercenarism has always been connected with aggression, seizure of foreign lands and gross violation of the rights of nations to self-determination. Its practice today is contrary to the fundamental principles and standards of international law. And whenever we analyse any specific situation, the conclusions we have to draw from it are quite obvious. For example, in Angola, the mercenaries were used as a strike group of the aggression of imperialism against that independent country of Africa. The government of the fledgeling republic had to face a foreign armed intervention using as cover some of the misguided Angolans who had fallen under the influence of the breakaway FNLA and UNITA groups. The ultimate purpose 178 of that intervention was to overthrow the legitimate government of the People’s Republic of Angola.

p Regular forces of South Africa and Zaire with US instructors and arms were thrown into action against the people of Angola in 1976. That action was in direct violation of such provisions of the UN Charter as paiagraph 4 of Art. 2 providing that all UN Members “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations".

p In December 1965, upon the initiative of the Soviet Union, the UN General Assembly, building on the appropriate provisions of the Charter, adopted a special Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States and Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, which said in part: “No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference . .. are condemned”. Further on, the Declaration calls upon States to refrain from organising, financing or otherwise encouraging “subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed toward the violent overthrow of the regime of another State".  [178•1 

p Prohibition of armed intervention and all other forms of interference in the affairs of States was written as an independent section into the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 179 Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the UN General Assembly in October 1970 with active participation of African countries. In the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, of December 16, 1970, the UN General Assembly called upon all States “to desist from any forcible or other action which deprives peoples ... of their inalienable right to self-determination, freedom and independence”, and reaffirmed that “States must fully respect the sovereignty of other States and the right of peoples to determine their own destinies, free of external intervention".  [179•1 

p The action of South African racists cannot be qualified as anything short of undisguised armed aggression against the independence and territorial integrity of Angola committed in violation of the UN Charter. In December 1974, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a Definition of Aggression, calling upon all States “to refrain from all acts of aggression”. Art. 3 qualified as an act of aggression “the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State" and also “the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State ... or its substantial involvement therein".  [179•2  These points of the definition fully apply to the direct armed attack on Angola by South Africa.

p There is no excuse whatsoever for the Western press efforts to absolve the South African racists by references to 180 a “Communist menace" for Africa and to the “threat to the civilised world" alleged to have arisen with the coining of revolutionary democratic forces to power in Angola. It is exactly as aggression that the bestialities of racist troops in Angola were qualified in a special statement by the OAU Secretariat in 1976. In fact, within the meaning of the above-mentioned definition of aggression, there can be no considerations to justify aggression, and a war of aggression is a crime against international peace.

p The involvement of rightist elements of the USA and, above all, of the notorious CIA in the conspiracy of internal and external reaction against the independence of Angola is a gross violation of international law and the legislation of the USA itself. The Christian Science Monitor said that some 300 mercenaries from the USA were involved in the invasion of Angola and as many were about to complete their training under CIA control.  [180•1  There were openly operating centres in quite a few states to recruit American military specialists to be sent to Angola. The paper reported that the US had smuggled 32 million dollars’ worth of arms into Angola by January 1, 1976.  [180•2 

p Faced by the armed aggression against its independent and sovereign country, the Government of Angola exercised its right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Art. 51 of the UN Charter and turned to the Government of Cuba for aid in 1976. The Government of Cuba, in fulfilment of its duty to help the victim of aggression, sent its troops to Angola which, together with the forces of the legitimate government of Angola, repulsed 181 the aggression and restored peace. The action of Angola and Cuba was consistent with the above-mentioned legal provisions and within the limits of international law.

p A joint communique by the Foreign Ministers of Angola and Cuba, in February 1982, said, notably: “The presence and withdrawal of the Cuban troops present in Angola is the prerogative of the two sovereign nations—the People’s Republic of Angola and Cuba in perfect agreement with Art. 51 of the UN Charter. Within a single month after the expulsion of the South African troops from Angola, on April 22, 1976, the Governments of Angola and Cuba decided on a step-by-step reduction of the invited Cuban troops, which were cut by more than a third in less than a year. However, further reduction was suspended because of renewed threats to Angola. South Africa’s subsequent aggression in May 1978, and the threatened landing of NATO airborne forces in North-East Angola were a serious danger to the Republic and required the continued presence of Cuban forces to help safeguard its security and territorial integrity. In mid-1979, the Governments of Angola and Cuba once more agreed to start a further programme of step-by-step withdrawal of Cuban troops. However, in September 1979, the South African army launched yet another large-scale aggression in the Cunene and Unga provinces.

p “In August 1981, there was a fresh round of South African aggression when large contingents of regulars of the racist regime of Pretoria, supported by artillery, tanks and aircraft, invaded the territory of Angola and occupied some of its areas for several weeks. In spite of the condemnation of that criminal action by the UN, which found expression in a Security Council resolution which the US 182 blocked with its veto powers, the South African army continued to occupy some areas of the Cunene and CuandoCubango provinces. These facts indicate that the implementation of the programme for the gradual withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola has been stopped by recurrent criminal acts of aggression against the country".

p The Cuban-Angolan Communique went on to say: "The withdrawal of the Cuban forces present in the territory of Angola will be effected by decision of the sovereign Government of the People’s Republic of Angola if the threat of any aggression against, or any armed invasion of the PRA, has been removed. In this connection, the Government of Cuba reaffirms that it will not fail to fulfil the decision of the Government of sovereign Angola about the withdrawal of Cuban troops.”

p One should qualify in the same way the action of the bands of mercenaries against the Government of Afghanistan which has fallen victim to acts of aggression from the territory of Pakistan and Iran with active support from the USA.

p In these circumstances, the Soviet Union, replying to a request from the legitimate government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and in accordance with Art. 51 of the UN Charter regarding the right of individual or collective self-defence and Art. 4 of the 1978 Soviet-Afghan Treaty, has lent armed assistance to the people of Afghanistan to resist attacks fiom without.

p In 1978, American Journal of International Law published an article by H. C. Burmester, Principal Legal Officer in the Australian Attorney-General’s Department, in which the author dwelt quite at length on unlawful recruitment and use of mercenaries from the standpoint of 183 contemporary international law. In his opinion, the use of mercenaries in armed conflicts should be regarded, in the context of the new legal order established by the UN Charter, as foreign intervention, although no third State may be directly involved or approve of the use of its nationals in a mercenary force.  [183•1  The Article pointed out that the development of international law since 1945 had led to some States committing themselves to control mercenarisin to forestall any action detrimental to them.

p Going by the precepts of international law now in force, one should say that the recruitment and use of mercenaries are a gross violation of the commitment of nations to the maintenance of peace and security. And if any nationals of a given State jeopardise international peace and security by their action, the State concerned must take effective measures, from the standpoint of international law, to check their action.

p This point of view is shared by a number of bourgeois authorities on international law.

p The UN has more than once voted to condemn mercenarism and qualified it as an international offence.

p The problem of mercenaries became acute during the events in the Congo. In 1961, Tshombe had 500 white mercenaries from Europe and South Africa. In those circumstances, the UN Security Council on February 21, 1961 passed a resolution  [183•2  urging that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the 184 Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries. A further resolution authorising the use of whatever force was necessary to carry out that decision was adopted by the Security Council on November 24, 1961  [184•1 . The United Nations force managed to expel 273 mercenaries from the Congo in August 1961, but there were still 237 “soldiers of fortune" there in November 1961. The Western Powers actually took no effective steps.

p Within the framework of international law, generally, the first attempt at getting mercenaries outlawed was made by The Hague Convention of 1907 which, in Art. 4, forbade the recruitment of combatants and the opening of recruiting agencies on the territory of a neutral Power to assist the belligerents. On the other hand, Art. 6 of The Hague Convention absolved neutral nations of responsibility in the event of private persons leaving the country to take up foreign armed service. The Hague Convention was applied in respect of belligerent parties and the status of neutral nations. Consequently, The Hague Convention, on the one hand, imposed a ban on mercenarism and, on the other, acknowledged the institution of volunteers which should, beyond question, be distinguished from mercenarism.

p There has been some controversy in Western publications in recent times about the definition of mercenarism. Some have suggested that it is difficult to define and, therefore, it is impossible to prohibit or qualify it in any 185 way. For example, the above-mentioned H. C. Burmester presumes it impossible to distinguish between mercenaries and volunteers, holding both to endanger international peace and security in equal measure.

p Under Art. 6 of The 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, “the responsibility of a neutral Power is not engaged by the fact of persons crossing the frontier separately to offer their services to one of the belligerents".  [185•1 

p This means, in practical terms, that participation of individual citizens by the voluntary principle, without any material interest, is, far from being forbidden, permitted. It is likewise obvious that in the context of international law now in force, the participation of volunteers in an armed conflict of an international or not international character shall not create a danger to international peace and security. The participation of volunteers in an international armed conflict is permissible only if it is to favour the victim of the aggression and those in battle for the national liberation, the right of self-determination, against foreign occupation, colonialism and racist regimes. This is a new important element which has been introduced by contemporary international law into the institution of voluntary service. In this case, the State, although it is not responsible for the action of its volunteer citizens, is responsible for the observance of the general principles of international law.

p From this point of view, for example, the participation 186 of volunteers at the side of the Republicans in the civil war in Spain should be regarded as legitimate, while the participation of “volunteers” with the regular forces of Italy and Germany in action to aid Franco and, consequently, having committed aggression against Spain, should be considered illegitimate.

p International law does already contain a definition of mercenarism, which can be used as the ground for Slates to act on in checking it and in drafting national legislation.

p The 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims extended the status of prisoner of war to the members of such formations as militia and other volunteer contingents, and mercenaries have not been considered as legitimate combatants by many nations. There was a certain restriction on the application of the Geneva conventions to them.

p Subsequently the UN General Assembly passed a series of resolutions condemning mercenarism and calling for mercenaries to be outlawed. On Desember 20, 1968, the General Assembly in a resolution on the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples declared that the practice of using mercenaries against movements for national liberation and independence was punishable as a criminal act and that the mercenaries themselves were outlaws, and called upon the Governments of all countries to enact effective legislation declaring the recruitment, financing and training of mercenaries in their territory to be a punishable offence and prohibiting their nationals from serving as mercenaries.  [186•1 

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p It is noteworthy that this proposition was moved by the Soviet Union and other socialist states. Although a number of Western States did make a reservation on that point, it was restated and approved in other General Assembly resolutions, as 2548 (Twenty-Fourth Session) of December 11, 1969, and 2708 (Twenty-Fifth Session) of December 14, 1970.

p The General Assembly Resolution 3103 (Twenty-Eighth Session) of December 12, 1973, on Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling against Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes, proclaimed that the use of mercenaries by colonial and racist regimes against the national liberation movements struggling for their freedom and independence from the yoke of colonialism and alien domination was considered to be a criminal act and the mercenaries should accordingly be punished as criminals.  [187•1 

p That was an important achievement of the international community in the fight against mercenarism.

p At the diplomatic conference on international humanitarian law in Geneva in 1975, during the discussion of Article 42 of the Draft Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, socialist and developing nations insisted on the wording of the Resolution of December 12, 1973 being adopted as an Article of the Protocol. Resistance from the Western Powers did not permit that text to be adopted but there was a common consent at the conference to the effect that the mercenaries were not entitled to the status of combatants. 188 That was a major gain for the peace forces and a general democratic base for working out a definition of the mercenary. In 1977, the diplomatic conference adopted Art. 47 of the Protocol on international armed conflict additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims which contains a generally recognised definition of the mercenary. This Article considers mercenarism as an international crime and a mercenary as a person not entitled to the status of combatant or prisoner of war. The definition runs as follows: “A mercenary is any person who: a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict; e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as member of its armed forces."  [188•1 

p This definition enables a fairly clear line of distinction to be drawn between a mercenary and a volunteer, i.e., on the one hand, a person committing a criminal offence and thereby subject to prosecution and punishment, and, on the other, a person able to participate in an armed conflict in accordance with international law.

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p Within the meaning of this definition, the mercenary, far from enjoying the status of prisoner of war, is, by this very fact, punishable under criminal law because the definition contains the attributes that make this person an outlaw. It is difficult in this connection to agree with Burmester who claims that this Article does not consider the very fact of merceriarism to be punishable under criminal law.  [189•1  Also it would be wrong to apply to a mercenary Art. 45 of the Protocol Additional on international armed conflict which makes it possible for any particular person in a particular situation to claim the status of prisoner of war since Art. 47 leaves no room for doubt in that respect. This does not mean, however, that volunteers, i.e. nationals of a third State participating in an armed conflict for reasons and considerations other than those set forth in Art. 47, do not enjoy the protection of international humanitarian law and, in particular, under Art. 45 of the Protocol Additional.

p The book Fire Power by two former mercenaries, Chris Dempster and Dave Tomkins, which appeared in 1978, offers a rather circumstantial and outspoken account, based on documentary evidence, of mercenarism in action.  [189•2  The authors relate some specific undertakings they have shared in and, although the book does aim to justify their action, the reader is left in no doubt as to the criminal character of mercenaries and mercenarism.

p At a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism in 1973, a number of nations moved to include 190 mercenarism in the list of acts coming within the definition of terrorism.

p For example, the draft of Algeria, Congo, Guinea, India, Mauritania, Nigeria, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Yemen Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia, contained paragraph 2 which treated terrorism as a manifestation of tolerance or provision of assistance by any State to the remnants of fascism or to groups of mercenaries whose terrorist activities are directed against other sovereign nations.

p The Organisation of African Unity has been very active in this respect. At its Fourth Session in Kinshasa, in September 1967, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Governments once more denounced the mercenaries, calling upon its Member States and the UN to lend support in this matter, and urging all the nations of the world to enact legislation declaring the recruitment and training of mercenaries in their territory to be a punishable offence and prohibiting their nationals from serving as mercenaries.

p When the Portuguese Armed Forces and mercenaries posed a threat to the Republic of Guinea in 1970, the OAU Council of Ministers passed a resolution to condemn the mercenaries. It asked the General Administration Secretary to draft a convention to outlaw the activities of mercenaries in Africa. An appropriate resolution on the subject was adopted at the OAU Summit in Addis-Ababa in June 1971.

p The OAU’s most important contribution to the fight against mercenaries was the Report of its Committee of Experts presented to the Nineteenth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers at Rabat in June 1972. This 191 Report has influenced all subsequent thinking on the international control of mercenaries.

p The final effect of that effort was to draft a Convention  [191•1  which, once adopted along with the Protocol Additional on Internationail Armed Conflict, was to create an extensive international legal base for the fight against mercenarism.

p The Preamble of the Draft refers to the grave threat which the activities of mercenaries represent to the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and harmonious development of Member States of OAU.

p Article One gives a definition of the term “mercenary”:

p “Under the present Convention a ’mercenary’ is classified as anyone who, not a national of the State against which his actions are directed, is employed, enrols or links himself willingly to a person, group or organisation whose aim is: 

p (a) to overthrow by force of arms or by any other means the government of that Member State of the Organisation of African Unity; 

p (b) to undermine the independence, territorial integrity and normal working of the institutions of the said State; 

p (c) to block by any means the activities of any liberation movement recognized by the Organisation of African Unity.”

p So the definition of “mercenary” reflects a functional approach, i.e., predicated mainly not only on the fact of employment, recruitment or “voluntary” association with persons, groups or organisations whose activities are directed against the OAU Member States, but, above all, on the criminal nature of these actions in the light of international 192 law. Paragraph 1 of Article Two considers the actions of a mercenary, in the meaning of the above-quoted definition, as crimes against the peace and security of Africa and punishable as such. The Article likewise classifies actions which involve the recruitment or the act of taking part in the recruitment of mercenaries, or in training, or in financing their activities, or giving them protection, as crimes in the meaning of paragraph 1 of Article Two.

p Article Three enumerates the measures which the Member States of the Organisation of African Unity, signatories to the present Convention, undertake to take, namely:

p (a) to prevent their nationals or foreigners living in their territory from committing any of the offences defined in Article Two of the present Convention; 

p (b) to prevent the entry to, or the passage through their territory of any mercenary or equipment intended for their use; 

p (c) to forbid in their territory any activity by organisations or individuals who employ mercenaries against the African States, Members of the Organisation of African Unity; 

p (d) to communicate to other Member States of the Organisation of African Unity any information, as soon as it comes to their knowledge, relating to the activities of mercenaries in Africa; 

p (e) to forbid on their territory the recruitment, training or equipping of mercenaries or the financing of their activities; 

p (f) to take as soon as possible all necessary legislative measures for the implementation of the present Convention.

p With a view to reducing the difference between the sanctions within the limits of the penal legislation of the 193 countries concerned, Article Four provides for every Contracting State to undertake to impose severe penalties for offences defined in the Convention.

p Articles Five, Six and Seven reaffirm the principle of inescapable punishment—aut dedere aut judicare (“extradite or prosecute”). Furthermore, it is emphasised that in case of extradition the offender shall be handed over to the authorities of the State against which the offence has been committed or would have been committed.

p That is to say that the above-quoted documents reaffirmed the following propositions: 

p —the use of mercenaries in an armed conflict is a criminal act; 

p —mercenaries are common criminals—their actions are of terrorist significance; 

p —the States must take coercive and effective measures to prevent the organisation, recruitment and movement of mercenaries through their territory; 

p —the States must bring to justice the authors of this crime and their accomplices.

p In 1976, mercenaries found themselves in the dock before the bar of the People’s Revolutionary Court in Angola. In 1975-1976, following the declaration of the independence of Angola on November 11, 1975, the breakaway groups of UNITA (which operated from the territory of, and with support from South Africa) and the FNLA (which operated from the territory of Zaire and with support from the racist regimes of southern Africa) attempted to seize power in the country, having started military operations against the MPLA (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and the civilian population supporting the MPLA. Having no support from the large sections of the population, 194 UNITA and FNLA launched a campaign of terror, relying on assistance from South Africa, racist Rhodesia, Zaire, as well as from some West European countries and the United States. There was a .large group of mercenaries from Britain and the USA operating with the breakaway contingents.

p The trial of mercenaries went on from May to June 1976 in Luanda, the capital of the People’s Republic of Angola. It was a trial of 13 British and American mercenaries (ten Britons and three Americans). A People’s Revolutionary Court had been set up and its underlying principles of proceedings adopted under Act 7/76 of May 1, 1976. The principle that “the law has no retroactive force”, whereby no action may be considered as a crime and punished accordingly if there was no appropriate law when that act was committed, was not violated, since Act 7/76 took into account the standards of Angolan law that already existed, which qualified the enlistment of mercenaries and their service as mercenaries as a crime.

p The trial was important for many reasons. First, it served as a lesson for the existing and potential mercenaries to learn. Second, it brought out and showed up the criminal nature of mercenarism for the whole world to see. Third, the trial shattered for ever the myth ol the “soldiers of fortune”, having demonstrated their sadism, cruelty, avidity, military incompetence, racism and inhumanity. Fourth, it exposed the causes that breed mercenaries in Western societies.

p It is noteworthy that the essential argument of the defence presented by British and American lawyers during the trial was that their clients were "unfortunate products" of the corrupt exploitative capitalist system. They had more than once pointed out the defects of their own countries: 195 unemployment, no opportunities for education, alienation producing wretched creatures with drugs, alcohol and violence as their sole pleasures. The enthusiasm with which the lawyers spoke about the decay of the West was amazing. It was difficult to suspect the advocates of the mercenaries of having any democratic views: they had been hired in the USA and Britain by those who had sent mercenaries to Angola.

p The trial furnished more evidence of the subversive activities by the governments of South Africa, the USA and Great Britain in Africa.

p The example of Angola was not only instructive, it was useful from the legal point of view. A broadly-based International Commission of Inquiry on Mercenaries was set up on the initiative of the Government of the People’s Republic of Angola. It comprised representatives of sixteen African countries, nine countries of Western Europe, the German Democratic Republic, the USSR, the USA, Canada, six countries of Latin America, three countries of the Arab world, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and Australia. The Commission looked into the record of international control of mercenaries, reviewed the UN and OAU resolutions on the matter, investigated the crimes of mercenaries in Angola, and drafted a Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of Mercenarism.

p The draft was based on the definition of “mercenary”, which comprised the following four elements: 

p (a) a mercenary fights in a foreign country; 

p (b) he does not fight as a soldier of his own country; 

p (c) he fights for personal profit, whether or not he also has some ideological motivation; 

p (d) the purpose for which he fights is to interfere with 196 a people’s right to self-determination, to oppose the freedoms and security of citizens.  [196•1 

p Article One of the draft contains the key definition of the crime: “The crime of mercenarism is committed by the individual, group or association, representatives of a State and the State itself which, with the aim of opposing by armed violence a process of self-determination, practises any of the following acts: 

p (a) organises, finances, supplies, equips, trains, promotes, supports or employs in any way military forces consisting of or including persons who are not nationals of the country where they are going to act, for personal gain, through the payment of a salary or any other kind of material recompense; 

p (b) enlists, enrols or tries to enrol in the said forces; 

p (c) allows the activities mentioned in paragraph (a) to be carried out in any territory under its jurisdiction or in any place under its control or affords facilities for transit, transport or other operations of the abovementioned forces.”

p Article Two considers the fact of assuming command over mercenaries as an aggravating circumstance. Article Three stipulates responsibility of the representatives of a State for the commission of crimes defined by the Convention. The responsibility of States for the commission of these crimes may be invoked by any State in its relations with the State that is responsible or before competent international organisations (Article Three).

p The Draft Convention makes mercenaries outlaws, denying them prisoner of war status if captured (Article Four).

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p Article Six binds the contracting States to enact all legislative and other measures necessary to implement fully the provisions of this Convention in their territory.

p The draft reaffirmed the aut dedere aut judicare principle. A review of Articles Seven and Eight prompts the conclusion that the drafters have found it necessary to reinforce the aspect of extradition, which appears to be absolutely correct and justified. An offender must be extradited to the State against which his offence has been aimed.

p The text of the Draft Convention contains generally recognized judicial guarantees of the rights of the defendants brought to trial for the offences set out in the Convention (Article Nine).

p A special provision predetermines the cooperation of the Contracting States in matters of criminal proceedings brought against the crimes defined in Article One, with the States undertaking to ensure effective and adequate punishment of persons guilty of committing the crime of mercenarism (Articles Ten and Eleven).

p Finally, Article Twelve envisages a machinery for settling disputes relating to the interpretation or application of the Convention.

p While positively evaluating the functional approach of the drafters to the definition of the corpa delicti falling within the Convention, its more profound legal elaboration compared with the OAU draft, one should note that mercenarism ought to be qualified as a grave criminal offence of international significance and, in the event of its being committed by states, as an act of aggression.

p It might be advisable to extend the definition of the object of the offence, since mercenarism is directed not only against the right of self-determination and national 198 liberation movements, hut movements against foreign occupation, racist regimes and legitimate governments, non-governmental organisations or public figures.

p The main asset of the draft is its stimulating influence upon the legal formulation of the issue of mercenarism. Mercenaries must not only be declared outlaws, but actually outlawed.

p The Luanda trial, with a wealth of evidence on hand, held up the issue of mercenarism as a grave danger to the cause of peace and international security, as an instrument of the ruling imperialist quarters in the struggle against progressive movements not only in Africa but in other countries as well.

p Reactionary forces have created various organisations of mercenaries, making wide use of all kinds of adventurers, castaways and traitors who had defected from their own countries at their own will or have been expelled for connections with foreign capital, criminal offences, embezzlement, bribery or work for foreign secret services. In Western Europe these organisations have been amalgamated by the ruling circles into the so-called Organisation of Free Africa (OFA). The Ajrique-Asie magazine has said that the main creditors of the OFA are French, South African and American secret services.

p One of the objectives of this organisation is to recruit and maintain the mercenaries who, apart from being directly involved in armed intervention in the internal affairs of African countries have the mission of creating a nerveracking situation in the continent, provoking conflicts, subverting or even toppling regimes that are unsuitable to the West (as the one in the Comoro Islands in 1978).

p It was believed until recently that the mercenaries were 199 recruited in each particular case. However, as the establishment of the OFA has shown, mercenaries are a standing army of international reaction, which is most extensively used not only in Africa.

p One can refer, for instance, to the international gathering of fascists in Barcelona in 1978 which considered subversive action against the Left forces in Western Europe and support for the apartheid regime of South Africa, and raised the problem of extending the scale and geography of mercenary action.

p The International Conference on the Suppression of Mercenarism, held in Benin early in 1978,  [199•1  did not only stress prevention of mercenarism as an urgent problem, but called attention to the peculiar “mobile connection" of mercenarism in the struggle against the national liberation movements in Africa and against the Left forces and working people in the countries of Western Europe. A representative of Italian Communists, Guido Bimbi, pointed out that the forces financing the recruitment of mercenaries for Africa were at the same time organising acts of provocation against the working class and progressive forces in Western Europe and getting the means for their action from one source. The story of the Globik Venus tanker spread around the world. As that vessel lay at anchor in the French port of Le Havre with her crew on strike, a group of mercenaries recruited in Britain were brought in to “pacify” the strikers.

p There is a wide-ranging front in the making to fight mercenarism, which is yet another indication of the criminal character of this institution and of the necessity of criminal prosecution of those responsible for it. Fighting 200 imperialism and promoting the cooperation of the peace-loving nations throughout the world is the way towards resolving every aspect of the problem of the suppression of international terrorism in every shape or form.

p The Thirty-Fourth, Thirty-Fifth and Thirty-Sixth Sessions of the UN General Assembly debated the drafting of universal international convention to control mercenaries and mercenarism and set up an Ad Hoc Committee to do the drafting.

p The object, in accordance with the Resolution of the Thirty-Fourth Session, is to draft an international convention to outlaw mercenarism in every shape or form and consider effective steps to ban the recruitment, training, gathering, transit and employment of mercenaries in the territory of any country. The UN has invited all nations to communicate their views to the Secretary General about the necessity of the immediate drafting of an international convention to ban the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries. By the time of the Thirty-Fifth Session of the UN General Assembly, many nations had submitted their considerations. In those documents, they did not only support the very idea of concluding an international convention but proposed its basic provisions. For instance, the Government of Venezuela held that a mercenary was a soldier involved in military operations favouring the country he is not a national of, and taking up foreign armed service for a certain recompense or a promise of some other benefit. A mercenary is distinguished, in particular, by the absence of moral motives. There is nothing but his personal interest that makes him act. The Government of Venezuela likewise emphasised that the activities of mercenaries in Africa were characterised by negative consequences for 201 the independence and territorial integrity of nations and exacerbated the situation on this continent, which set international peace and security at stake.

p The Government of Mexico called attention to the fact that an international basis for the Convention already existed in the form of Protocol Additional to the 1977 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, although it suffered from some serious flaws. Mexico considered that the problem of mercenaries remained a dramatic one, witness the events in Zaire, Angola, Rhodesia and Namibia, and that it was necessary to get down as soon as possible to the job of working out an international convention on the subject.

p The Government of Nigeria held that since most of the mercenaries arrived in Africa from other continents, it was only through carefully elaborated international cooperation that Africa and the rest of the Third World could get rid of the threat of mercenarism.

p In the notes of the Government of the USSR it was stressed, in particular, that mercenanism must be qualified as a grave criminal offence of international significance and that in the event of mercenaries being used by a State on a large scale, be qualified as an act of aggression. The mercenaries themselves should be considered as individuals having committed a crime, and be brought to justice. The agreement was to provide for the responsibility of the States which did not prevent their nationals from being employed as mercenaries and tolerated the recruitment, training and transportation of mercenaries in their own territory.

p The Ad Hoc Committee drafting an international convention to suppress the recruitment, employment, financing and training of mercenaries, in February 1981 considered 202 the draft submitted by Nigeria, which contained the following basic provisions.

p It is necessary to note, above all, that the draft takes into account the experience gained in working out other international legal instruments on the subject. The definitions of mercenary and inercenarism given in it are of some interest. For example, the draft defines as a mercenary a person who: (a) has been expressly recruited within national frontiers or abroad to fight in an armed conflict; (b) is directly involved in hostilities; (c) plays his part in military operations guided mostly by a desire for personal gain and to whom, the Party concerned or on instructions thereof, material reward was promised, which is substantially in excess of the remuneration promised or paid out to combatants who have a similar rank and functions within the armed forces of the State concerned; (d) is not a citizen of the Party to the conflict or a person residing in the territory controlled by the Party to the conflict; (e) does not form part of the armed forces of the State Party to a conflict; (f) is not directed by a State which is not a Party to the conflict to discharge official duties as a person who forms part of its armed forces.

p The crime of mercenarism is defined in the following way: it takes place when an individual, group or asociation of people or the legal person registered in the given State or a representative of the State or the State itself, by wilful threat or armed violence directed against the territorial integrity of another State or the legitimate aspirations of national liberation movements, endangers the process of selfdetermination or commits the following through over action: (a) organises, finances, equips, arms, trains, encourages, supports or employs in any way individuals, bands 203 or armed forces consisting of (or comprising) individuals that are not the nationals of either Party to the conflict and which operate in seeking personal gain through the salary or other material recompense; (b) enrols or is recruited for military service as an individual, group or association of people or a legal person; (c) promotes, prints or has somebody else propagate any information about the foregoing; (d) allows or tolerates the exercise of the aforementioned activities on any territory or anywhere under its jurisdiction or control, or offers modes of conveyance for passage, transit and other operations of the above-mentioned forces; (e) virtually participates in any of the activities referred to in the above-mentioned paragraphs, which lead to the death of people or the destruction of their property.

p Any person, group or association of individuals, any representative of a State or the State itself which is trying to carry out any act of meroenarism, becomes an accomplice of any person who commits or tries to commit an offence, also commits an offence defined in the present Convention.

p The draft qualifies this as a crime against peace and security of the State.

p Every Contracting State provides punishment in its legislation with due regard for the grave character of these offences.

p The State finds itself under obligation to take action against this offence when the offence has been committed on its territory, when the offence has been committed by one of its nationals or by a legal person registered in that State, when the offence is committed by a representative of the State, when the offence is committed against that State.

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p Great attention is given in the draft to mutual aid, and it is underlined that the provisions of the Convention serve as the ground for the extradition. The crime of mercenarism is not considered by the participating nations as a political offence or an offence committed for political reasons. If a State does not extradite an offender, it is under obligation to refer the case to its competent authorities for criminal proceedings in accordance with its own law.

p An important provision of the draft deals with actions connected with the repayment of damage through reparations. It lays it down that the State, citizen or legal person which or who have sustained damage or human casualties may sue for a repayment of damage or reparations against the State harbouring the alleged offender.

p An important provision is for the Contracting State which has sustained damage as a result of the commission of an offence, to be entitled to demand a repayment of damage or reparations from any Contracting States guilty jointly or collectively for any misdeed or omission which constitutes a crime.

p This draft, after being discussed in the 6th Committee of the UN General Assembly and in the Ad Hoc Committee, continues on the agenda of the international community. It is the resistance of the imperialist States that is keeping the work on this important document from being quickly finished.

During the discussion of the action of mercenaries against the Republic of Seychelles in December 1981, the representative of the USSR, Oleg Troyanovsky, declared that the American delegation whose spokesman tried to sidetrack the debate from the main issue—that of the causes behind mercenarism and the ways of ending it, had struck up a 205 self-righteous posture at the meeting. Everybody knows quite well that it is the USA that is opposing an early drafting of an international convention against mercenarism.

p To sum up, what has been said in this chapter, one may say that the practice of the League of Nations and of the United Nations Organisation has been to draft conventions considering the terrorist activities of natural persons separately from the policy of terrorism pursued by the States and providing protection against international terrorist activities because of the certain functions of the person or the special position of the property the outrage has been committed against. This does not, however, obviate the need for working out additional provisions to prohibit, suppress and punish any terrorist activities against officials of the States involved in international intercourse.

p The best elaborated conventions under study have codified the following important principles: 

p 1) definition of the corpus delicti falling within the relevant convention, if it has been unknown to national legislations or there has been a difference of approach to its content and interpretation; 

p 2) qualification of the offences falling within the relevant convention as criminal, which made punishment for the offence committed inescapable; 

p 3) inescapable punishment for the commission of the offences defined in the relevant conventions by the principle of out dedere aut judicare; 

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p 4) obligation of the States parties to the relevant conventions to take appropriate measures within the framework of their national legislations to ensure the fulfilment of the commitments following from their participation; 

p 5) obligation of the Contracting States to cooperate on procedural matters arising from the operation of the relevant conventions and to exchange information and appropriate documentation relative to the cases falling within the conventions.

p In spite of some shortcomings, the conventions studied earlier on have provided a substantial theoretical and practical basis for the suppression of terrorist acts of an international character, with the result that protection of international law against terrorist acts of an international character is presently provided for: 

p —the crews of aircraft, air navigation facilities and air lines, both domestic and international, under The Hague and Montreal Conventions concerning various aspects of suppression of international terrorist acts committed against air services; 

p —persons and their living and official quarters in respect of which the host States shall ensure special protection in view of the function these persons discharge under instructions from their State or the international ( intergovernmental) organisation they are employed by. This protection is provided under the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the 1947 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialised United Nations Agencies, the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the 1969 Convention on Special Missions, and also the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 207 against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.

The Convention on the Suppression of Hostage Taking, signed on December 17, 1979, was an important step forward in promoting international cooperation in the elaboration and adoption of effective measures to prevent, suppress, and punish all acts of hostage taking. It is a matter of extraordinary relevance, as we have shown, to draft and adopt a Convention on the suppression of mercenarism which will make it possible to intensify action against this international crime and contribute towards asserting stability, strengthening the validity of the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs, and saving many innocent lives.