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Chapter III
COOPERATION OF STATES IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
 
1. THE PROBLEM OF DRAFTING PROVISIONS
AGAINST ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
 

p Representatives of 93 nations referred to international terrorism in the general debate at the Twenty-Seventh Session of the UN General Assembly.  [208•1 

p The debate was certainly affected by the tragic events at the Munich Olympic Games in September 1972. Not a single State went on record in support of terrorist activities, but the stand taken on the prohibition of terrorism as a method of violence did reflect the essential differences between national policies. Representatives of Israel, the Portugal of the day, and South Africa devoted their speeches entirely to the need to fight terrorism in general, actually taking up the cudgels against the legitimacy of the national liberation struggle.

p It was typical of the capitalist countries in general to lay emphasis on the fight against all violence in whatever sense or form.  [208•2  The US representative stressed, in 209 particular, that it was a matter of urgent necessity to punish offenders for international crimes committed not only in the air but everywhere.

p The reason why the American initiative won nothing like extensive support at the General Assembly was because, above all, acts of terrorism against diplomats and officials of foreign missions continued and still continue to be committed in the US itself with official connivance. It was pointed out with perfect reason in the course of the general debate that everybody was rather surprised to see the US Government so much in a hurry to head a campaign which it called fighting terrorism while the UN itself and permanent missions in New York were being threatened or attacked by American terrorist organisations with the US authorities taking no effective action against terrorists thus neglecting their own commitments towards the United Nations. It should be noted that this initiative of the US was directed towards debating and adopting a Convention on the suppression of terrorism, taking advantage of the favourable situation for that problem to be discussed in the UN, especially after the tragic events in Munich, so as to have it subsequently applied against the national liberation struggles. The representative of Israel struck a peculiar posture when, devoting all of his speech to the "problem of Arab terrorism”, he concluded by linking Middle-East settlement up with fighting it, declaring that national, regional and international action against Arab terrorism was an indispensable prerequisite for the fruitful exploration of the avenues for peace in the Middle East.

p The representative of Egypt, exposing Israel’s policy of terrorism in occupied territories, stressed that Israel was a State of terrorists and for terrorists, a State aiding and 210 abetting the policy of terrorising the nations around it.

p The representatives of Algeria, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon joined in calling for stamping out the underlying causes of the disease terrorism was a symptom of.

p The representatives of socialist countries emphasised, on the one hand, the need to stem the mounting wave of international terrorism which jeopardised the life of innocent people and imperilled the development of normal international relations and cooperation; and, on the other, pointed out that steps to suppress terrorism must not be allowed to be used to suppress the national liberation struggle. That was the position of the representatives of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland and the Soviet Union. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, speaking at the Twenty-Seventh Session of the UN General Assembly, declared, in particular:

p “We likewise support the righteous struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for the restoration of their inalienable rights recognised by the UN. On the other hand, one cannot, of course, approve of the terrorist actions of some elements within the Palestinian movement, which led, notably, to the recent tragic events in Munich. Their criminal acts strike at the national interests and aspirations of Palestinians as well. These acts are being exploited by the Israeli criminals to cover up their predatory policies against the Arab peoples. The Soviet Union stands by a position of principle against the acts of terrorism disrupting the diplomatic activity of States and their representatives, lines of communication between them, normal course of international contacts and meetings, and against the acts of violence which do not serve any useful purpose and entail loss of life.”

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p So one can single out three major lines of approach to the problem as became clear in the general debate: 

p (1) Combating violence and terrorism in general (this was the position of colonial regimes and imperialist States); 

p (2) Condemning terrorist acts, such as the tragic events in Munich, and pressing for the very causes of terrorism to be eliminated (this was the position of representatives of Arab States and of other countries of Africa and Asia); 

p (3) Distinguishing between violence used in pressing for the exercise of the rights of peoples to national liberation, and criminal terrorist acts which disrupt the diplomatic activity of States and their representatives, or lines of communication between them, and which serve no useful purpose and entail loss of life (this was the position of the representatives of socialist countries).

p At its 2037th Plenary Meeting, held on September 23, 1972, the General Assembly recommended the following item to be included in the agenda and brought before the 6th Committee: “Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes."  [211•1 

p Divergent stands on terrorism found themselves reflected also in the deliberations of the 6th Committee. For example, the United States tabled a draft resolution marked off by a provision about the responsibility of Governments for 212 taking appropriate measures to guarantee to all foreign diplomats in the performance of their regular functions and to all foreign citizens travelling, visiting or residing abroad, full legal protection from physical damage or threat thereof.

p This section of the American draft resolution has two legal errors in it. First, within the meaning of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, immunities and privileges are granted to a diplomatic agent regardless of whether he is in the performance of his official duties or not, and, second, the treatment of the status of a diplomatic agent as that of an ordinary foreign citizen on a private journey abroad removes all reason for granting immunities and privileges to a diplomatic agent, even from the standpoint of legal protection frorn physical damage. Naturally, disregard for the right of nations to self-determination and also the legal inaccuracy of a number of provisions of the American draft made it unpopular among national representatives in the 6th Committee.

p Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Italy, Japan and New Zealand, which have subsequently been joined by Austria, Great Britain, Guatemala, Honduras, Iran, Luxemburg and Nicaragua, submitted another draft resolution. One point to note about that draft, was that, unlike the American one, it reaffirmed the principle of equal rights and self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter as well as the proposal that nothing in that resolution could be interpreted as extending or narrowing in any way the scope of operation of the Charter’s provisions relating to cases in which the use of force is legitimate with certain means pointed out as illegitimate and contrary to the Charter under all circumstances.

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p In spite of certain positive elements, the draft failed to win the support of a number of African and Asian countries because it said nothing to denounce the colonial, racist and foreign regimes which pursue a policy of terrorism and violence.

p A group of non-aligned nations  [213•1  submitted a draft resolution which, upon a 6th Committee recommendation, the Twenty-Seventh Session of the UN General Assembly adoptted on December 18, 1972 as its Resolution 3034, by 76 votes  [213•2  against 34,  [213•3  with 16 abstentions.  [213•4  This resolution acknowledges the importance of international cooperation in working out measures towards an effective prevention of acts of terrorism and an investigation of their underlying causes with a view to finding quick, fair and peaceful solutions. The resolution reaffirms the inalienable right of all peoples oppressed by colonial and racist regimes and other forms of foreign domination, to self-determination and independence, and underlines the legitimacy of their 214 struggle and, in particular, the struggle waged by the national liberation movements in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter and appropriate resolutions of UN agencies; at the same time the resolution condemns the repressive and terrorist acts of colonial, racist and foreign regimes depriving the peoples of their legitimate right to self-determination and independence and of other human rights and fundamental freedoms. Of the specific measures contained in that resolution, one can point out the proposal for the nations to take appropriate measures at national level with a view to an early and final solution of this problem, and also to consider the matter as an urgent one, and make their observations and specific suggestions available to the Secretary General by April 10, 1973, for an effective solution of this problem.

p The resolution provided for an Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism to be formed of 35 members who were to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly, guided by principle of fair geographical representation.  [214•1 

p Of the socialist countries, observations were sent in by Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, the Ukraine, the USSR, and Yugoslavia; of the capitalist countries of Europe, by 215 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Great Britain, Finland, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and Vatican; of the countries of Asia and Africa, by Iran, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Syria, Turkey, and the Yemen Arab Republic. Observations were also sent by Australia and New Zealand. It is noteworthy that it was only Canada, Guatemala and the United States that sent in their observations from the American continent; that is to say that many of the States which had voted for the Resolution 3034 at the Twenty-Seventh Session did not take part in the opening stages of the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee—the presentation of the observations the Committee had subsequently to build on in making essential studies and bringing in its own recommendations, while other nations which had voted against the resolution sent in their observations which could well create conditions for the discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee to develop in a way different from the spirit of the resolution.

p The US observations emphasised that a faster procedure of taking action against international terrorism would be preferable. Yet the US agreed to cooperate with the new committee and help it achieve some tangible results. Fearful of isolation, the US pointed out that it was opposed to the use of force to deny the right of self-determination and would not be party to any action adversely affecting that right.  [215•1  There had previously been no statement to that effect either in the draft Convention or in the resolution submitted by the United States. While admitting the draft Convention to be insufficiently elaborated, the US 216 pointed out in its observations that this draft was a way of approach to the problem. Along with that, the US found it necessary for determined action to be taken without any delay whatsoever towards resolving that serious and urgent problem  [216•1 . The US accepted the important principle that while defending the right to self-determination, one had to rule out the possibility of violent action that would endanger international order, infringe basic human rights and impair the very cause of setlf-determination.

p The observations presented by France, along with the proposal for a study of the causes of international terrorism to be found in the observations of most States, said that "it would no doubt be pointless to seek the causes of acts or remedies for those acts without defining precisely the notions involved".  [216•2  This proposal is extremely important because any international convention has to be based on a clearly specified range of issues it is supposed to deal with.

p The Israeli Government submitted what actually amounted to a full-scale report on the questions of “ international terrorism”. As noted earlier on, Israel had voted against the Resolution 3034 and its observations contained the arguments that had prompted Israel to do so. In the opinion of the Israeli Government: 

p (1) the Resolution is utterly oblivious of the imperative urgency of taking effective steps against international terrorism; 

p (2) the resolution took no account of the events that led to the General Assembly being seized of the matter.  [216•3 

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p That is to say that in this case, too, Israel tried to reduce the issue of international terrorism to that of “Arab terrorism”. Israel proposed the following definition of the corpus delicti of an act of terrorism: “terrorism consists of an unlawful (criminal) act directed against a State, its organs, its nationals, interests, or property, including its means of transportation whenever such act is meant or calculated to engender a state of terror or panic in the minds of the public as a whole, or of an individual, or of groups".  [217•1 

p Israel’s position should be viewed in close association with the policy of terrorism conducted by Israel’s governing quarters in respect of the Arab people of Palestine as well as with the practice of individual terrorism against the national liberation movement and its leaders.

p In its observations, the Government of Israel did not mention the right of nations to self-determination, trying to bypass this issue by separating the commission of an act of terrorism in peace time from one at the time of hostilities, with the reservation that the hostilities are understood as actions carried on in conformity with international conventions. That is to say that the Government of Israel reserved the right to decide whether any particular military operations fall within the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims with all consequences following therefrom. Proceeding from the foregoing, the Government of Israel underlined on several occasions that “the members of the Arab terrorist groups do not belong to any of the categories of persons enumerated or described in the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 218 of War of 12 August 1949; consequently, Israeli courts and tribunals have consistently dismissed the contention that members of the groups arrested are entitled to the status of prisoners of war".  [218•1  These groups, in the opinion of the Government of Israel, are not belligerent parties and have no title to any right of belligerent parties. In actual fact, the members of Palestine resistance movement perfectly conform to the definition of guerrillas in accordance with paragraphs A/2 and A/6 of Art. 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Under international law, the organised Arab resistance movement operating in Israeli-occupied Arab territory has the status of a belligerent party, while any members of the movement have that of prisoners of war in case of captivity. Reference is made to the effectives of organised resistance movements operating in or outside their own territory even if that territory is occupied, and to the population of occupied territory who, with an enemy approaching, take up arms spontaneously upon their own initiative to fight the invading forces without having had the time to form a standing army, provided they openly carry arms and observe the laws and customs of war.

p The substance of the proposals of the Government of Israel does not correspond to its actual performance. For instance, while proposing that diplomatic or consular immunity should not be taken into account in the prosecution of an offence falling within the Convention, the Government of Israel did not renounce the diplomatic immunity of the Israeli diplomat and security officer Yigal Eyal.  [218•2  It 219 was in his apartment that two out of the six men charged with the murder of a Moroccan, Ahmad Bouchiki, in Lillehammer, Norway, on July 23, 1973, were arrested. Moreover, Meir Rosen, Chief of the Legal Department of the Israeli Foreign Office, demanded the release of an Israeli, Zwi Steimberg, arrested in Yigal Eyal’s home. The Norwegian authorities are known to have rejected that demand.

p Some points in the Israeli Government’s observations have been borrowed mainly from the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism drawn up under the auspices of the League of Nations in 1937.

p By juggling with legal terminology, the Government of Israel tried to justify its principal objective—vindicate the possibility of attacking a State through the commission of an act of terrorism by natural persons—nationals or permanent residents of that State. For example, the Israeli Government’s observations said: “The Convention envisaged would be ineffectual if it did not give categorical expression to the principle that organized society is in duty bound to protect the innocent, to prosecute terrorists, and to fetter the hands of any who succour them. Where this obligation has been neglected, a right of self-defence arises, effective against any Government which supports, finances, or otherwise abets terrorism."  [219•1 

p That was tantamount to a legal justification of any further aggression that Israel might launch against Arab countries, invoking an alleged or true act of terrorism, whether committed by persons in the service of a State or by individuals for any reason. The most dangerous aspect of 220 this approach by the Government of Israel is the exercise of the right of self-defence—an attack on a State in reply to terrorist acts committed by individuals.

p Of the Arab countries, it was Lebanon, the Yemen Arab Republic and Syria that had sent in their observations. The most detailed of these were presented by the Government of Syria, which pointed out, in particular: 

p 1) the Syrian Arab Republic has always stood against terrorism whether practised by individuals or groups or else by the State; 

p 2) the Syrian Arab Republic has supported General Assembly Resolution 3034 (Twenty-Seventh Session) as it established the clear distinction between criminal international terrorism, unrelated to the struggle of the peoples and the concept of resistance, on the one hand, and the struggle against all forms of colonialist and imperialist practices, on the other hand. Along with that, Syria was originally opposed to the inscription of that item in the agenda of the Session because of the imperialist and zionist attempt to put criminal terrorism and the struggle of oppressed peoples on an equal footing and to subject them to equal condemnation; 

p 3) the UN has more than once mentioned the legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples of Guinea (Bissau), Zimbabwe, Namibia, as well as the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Palestine; 

p 4) in the opinion of the Government of Syria, an objective consideration by the United Nations of the problem of international terrorism must begin by considering “State terrorism" as this is the most dangerous brand of violence; 

p 5) the main cause of violence is the colonialist and 221 imperialist policies and practices, as well as the crimes of racist regimes against peoples;

p 6) the duty of the United Nations is to find radical solutions and create a favourable atmosphere conducive to the realisation of the aspirations of peoples and particularly of their right to self-determination;

p 7) apart from “State terrorism”, there is a brand of terrorism practised in order to achieve criminal purposes for personal benefit to its perpetrators. It has no relation whatsoever with the struggle of peoples;

p 8) in the problem of terrorism, the fundamental difference among States does not arise over criminal terrorism caused by personal caprice or passions and making innocent victims, but on account of attempts by the imperialist and aggressive forces to legitimise colonial and imperialist terrorism and outlaw the legitimate struggle of peoples for emancipation from the claws of tyranny and despotism.  [221•1 

p It should be noted that the issue of “State terrorism" or that of aggressive action by States was examined in the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression from 1952 to April 1974. The Special Committee drafted and adopted a definition of aggression, having submitted it to the Twenty-Ninth Session .of the UN General Assembly.

p The observations by Lebanon and the Yemen Arab Republic added no new elements compared with the position of the Syrian Government.

p Observations from the socialist countries came from the USSR, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

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p The Yugoslav Government set forth the following principles which, in its opinion, should constitute the basis for the future Convention: 

p 1) The Yugoslav Government pledges its full support to the struggle of peoples against colonialist and racist forces, foreign occupation, interference and domination, and emphasises once again that no action or measure undertaken within the framework of curbing “international terrorism” can in any way be directed against, or construed as a restriction of the legitimate struggle of anti-colonial and liberation movements.

p 2) Yugoslavia called upon the nations which had not yet acceded to the Conventions concerned with various aspects of the struggle against international terrorism to accede to them.

p 3) The future convention should be based on the principle of aut dedere aut punire (extradite or punish)  [222•1 .

p The Government of Czechoslovakia submitted a document which said that: 

p 1) International terrorism has to be condemned as a phenomenon which is in strong contradiction with the efforts to promote peaceful cooperation among States as well as peaceful coexistence.

p 2) The occurrence of the phenomena of international terrorism is rooted in deep social causes which have to be analysed and identified.

p 3) The study of the causes which give rise to international terorism should not, however, impede the preparation of effective measures to be taken both on the national 223 level, if the causes involved relate to the internal affairs of individual States, and on the international level.

p 4) The measures to be taken in respect of these acts may not be misused to the detriment of the national liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples on the territories of these peoples, nor relate to any act of resistance against the aggressor on the territory occupied by him.  [223•1 

p Therefore, the position of the Czechoslovak Government contained the most general principles to build on in formulating an actual approach to the fight against acts of terrorism falling within the scope of international law.

p In the opinion of the Government of Byelorussia, one essential point in the fight against acts of international terrorism is that of defining those acts in the sense of acts of violence (murder, serious bodily injury, kidnapping) directed against any foreign nationals, irrespective of the reasons for their presence in the country concerned, if the acts are committed fundamentally for political ends or involve the interruption of transport services—for example, the hijacking of aircraft.  [223•2  The position of the Ukraine, apart from the view just cited, contains a reference to Art. 59 of the Criminal Code of the Ukraine, which provides severe penalties for acts of terrorism committed against representatives of foreign states.  [223•3 

p The USSR laid emphasis on its support for Resolution 3034 (Twenty-Seventh Session) and pointed out that the Soviet Union did not object to the drafting and adoption 224 of an international convention imposing certain obligations on States to check international terrorism, and declared it to be inadmissible to extend the interpretation of the concept “international terrorism” to cover the national liberation struggle, resistance to the aggressor in the territories occupied by him, and action by working people in defence of their rights and against the oppression by exploiters. Further on, there is, just as in the positions of Byelorussia and the Ukraine, a reference to the need to consider as international terrorism the acts of violence committed in respect of all foreign nationals regardless of their mission in the host country;  [224•1  the observations also contain a reference, in particular, to Soviet legislation dealing with the prosecution for the commission of an act of terrorism against representatives of foreign states.

p The Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism held a session in the UN central agencies from July 16 to August 11, 1973, without achieving any positive results. None of its three subcommittees—the Subcommittee of the Whole on the Definition of International Terrorism, the Subcommittee of the Whole on the Underlying Causes of International Terrorism, and the Subcommittee of the Whole on Measures for the Prevention of International Terrorism—succeeded in working out a generally acceptable point of view on the merits of the subject at issue. The draft proposals submitted by different nations contained nothing basically new compared with the discussion at the TwentySeventh Session of the UN General Assembly and the observations sent in by various States. Moreover, the 225 Government of Algeria submitted a suggestion to the Subcommittee of the Whole on the Underlying Causes of International Terrorism, saying that “the motivation of ‘individual terrorism’ is a subject for study in sociology, psychology, genetics and other contemporary human sciences. Its study is not within the terms ot reference of the Ad Hoc Committee".  [225•1 

p Special emphasis in the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee was on the need for an inquiry into State terrorism and the forms it takes. This line was most distinct in the position of a group of non-aligned nations.  [225•2 

p The Thirty-First Session of the UN General Assembly considered a report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism.  [225•3  At its 99th Plenary Meeting on December 15, 1976, the General Assembly, on a recommendation of the 6th Committee  [225•4  adopted Resolution 31/102 entitled “Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent lives, or jeopardises fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes”. The Ad Hoc 226 Committee on International Terrorism met again at the UN from March 14 to 25, 1977.

p The following nations took part in the general debate: Algeria, Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Great Britain, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the Ukraine, Uruguay, the USA, the USSR, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.

p The Ad Hoc Committee concurred in reaffirming the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all the peoples who were under the domination of colonial and racist regimes and suffered from other forms of foreign rule, and the legitimacy of their struggle, notably, the national liberation movements, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. The discussion brought out the following viewpoints (apart from disagreement on which acts should be included in the concept "international terrorism”. For example, some States held there must be no qualification whatsoever in the condemnation and suppression of international terrorism

p (1) there must be no exception in the condemnation and suppression of international terrorist activities;

p (2) terrorist methods applied by individual Governments and individual States constitute one of the categories of acts of terrorism and fall within the common category of terrorism to be condemned;

p (3) the issue of terrorism had, for a long time, been linked up with the problems of fundamental human rights and freedoms;

p (4) the issues of human rights are outside the Committee’s mandate;

p (5) it is necessary to concentrate on specific categories 227 of acts of terrorism and, to that end, work out international and joint national measures. Some States believed that only a precise definition of such acts and a thorough study of the causes thereof would produce effective measures. Piecemeal measures would do nothing but sharpen the differences;

p (6) a number of States proposed looking for effective measures at a national level, particularly in the area of protection of diplomatic missions, for instance, by banning the activities of organisations or groups which commit acts of terrorism against diplomatic missions.

p Certain emphasis was laid, besides on the importance of acceding to the Conventions which had already been drawn up, on the fact that the General Assembly must continue its elforts to oppose international terrorism, for international cooperation was indispensable, first and foremost, in that regard.

p The representative of the USSR stressed, in particular, that: 

p a) The documents to be adopted must repose on a consensus among nations.

p b) There must be no wider interpretation of international terrorism to cover the national liberation movement, the resistance to the aggressor in occupied territories or the activities of the working people, for instance, against the exploiters.

p c) Top priority should be given to combating acts of violence directed against foreign nationals, including the acts committed for political reasons.

p d) It is necessary to forestall a deterioration of relations between States consequent upon the commission of these acts of terrorism.

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p e) The documents to be adopted must be directed against the acts committed for criminal motives, with this category covering the activities of Zionist extremists, national emigrant centres and fascist-type organisations.

p f) Special responsibility in this context lies with the States hosting international organisations.

p g) The conclusion of bilateral and multilateral extradition agreements can contribute towards the suppression of aircraft hijacking and other terrorist activities.

p As we see, since the Ad Hoc Committee was set up little has changed in the distinctions between the positions of various States as regards international terrorism, although all nations are conscious of the need for a breakthrough in this field. This has re-emphasised the importance of taking into account the world’s record on the fight against certain types of terrorist acts of an international character.

p The 1979 Session of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism worked out general recommendations relating to practical measures of cooperation for the speedy elimination of the problem of international terrorism. These recommendations reflected a common view of fundamental importance. For instance, as an important condition for effective action against terrorism, the UN General Assembly ought to call upon all nations to contribute, both independently and in cooperation with other nations and with appropriate UN agencies, to the progressive elimination of the underlying causes of international terrorism.

p Second, the UN General Assembly ought to call upon all nations to honour their obligations under international law to refrain from organising, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts and civil disorders in another State 229 or acquiescing in organised activities within their territory directed towards the commission of such acts.

p One point of particular importance in this context is the recommendation for all nations to take appropriate measures at a national level with a view to an early and definite elimination of the problem of international terrorism, such as bringing national legislation into line with international conventions, meeting the international obligations assumed, frustrating the preparation and organisation of acts against other States in their own territory.

p One should regard as very important the special attention that the General Assembly and the Security Council should give to all situations that may breed international terrorism, such as colonialism and racism, as well as the situations arising from foreign occupation or capable of jeopardising international peace and security.

p Finally, the Committee recommended contemplating an additional international convention or conventions founded, in particular, on the principle of extradition or punishment of offenders, with a view to suppressing the acts of international terrorism still not covered by other international conventions.

p In summing up the discussion of the issue of international terrorism, one should note that not only did the distinctions between social systems have something to do with the subject in question, but the objective international realities have kept this problem from being settled: the UN aims relating to a peaceful and equitable resolution of many sensitive international problems, including those of stamping out the last bulwarks of colonialism and racism, have not been achieved; by and large, the problems of the developing nations have had a certain impact on the overall 230 situation in this respect; the UN has found itself incapable of assuring compliance with appropriate resolutions and effective application of the conventions concluded under its auspices; the policy of terrorism and violence conducted by imperialist and racist States, above all, by Israel and South Africa, creates an alternative in the employment of the means of struggle against those regimes; internal contradictions of imperialist States often spill over their confines to assume international dimensions.

p The discussion of the issue of international terrorism in the UN agencies has shown that there is no common understanding of the object or the subject of a terrorist act falling within the scope of international law; there is a considerable difference in the definition of the corpus delicti of an act of terrorism, no indication of the range of persons entitled under international law to protection from an act of terrorism, or of the grounds for such protection, or of its ways and means. The discussion has shown that the nations concerned failed to take proper account in their respective stands of the practice of international relations in the fight against terrorist acts. At certain points, the discussion escalated into a debate on violence in general.

p In the observations submitted in accordance with the General Assembly Resolution 3034 (Twenty-Seventh Session), practically all the States (38) proposed concluding a universal convention or a series of conventions to combat acts of international terrorism or, in any case, did not object to such documents being worked out.  [230•1  The need for more standards of international law arises, besides, from the fact 231 that the existing conventions in this field do not cover all cases of the commission of international terrorist acts. Besides, they are not free from certain shortcomings.

p Of course, international law by itself cannot remove the social roots of any particular phenomenon. In respect of acts of international terrorism, the adoption of international legal documents designed to check or suppress them will optimally make inescapable the punishment of such acts as obstruct the normal course of international relations and complicate the situation. The effect of such documents will depend on how well they have been elaborated and how universally applicable they are. But that does not mean that they alone would help resolve, for instance, the Middle East crisis or other crises prompting the commission of most acts of international terrorism at the present time.

p What are, then, the possible methods of legal cooperation of States at an international level in the prosecution and punishment of acts of international terrorism?

p Depending on the corpus delicti and its social danger, cooperation of States for the purpose of preventing and controlling crime at an international level may proceed along the following lines:

p (1) unification of the standards of national legislation in respect of certain offences;

p (2) convention machinery of legal cooperation in the presence of an international element within the corpus delicti as well as its social danger for international relations;

(3) creation of a system of international criminal justice implying the functioning of an International Criminal Court.

* * *
 

Notes

[208•1]   UN General Assembly, A/C. 6/418, 2 November 1972.

[208•2]   See the speeches of the representatives of Great Britain, France, Brazil, Venezuela and other capitalist countries, more particularly those of Western Europe. In UN General Assembly, A/C. 6/867.

[211•1]   UN General Assembly, AjC. 6/418, p. 5.

[213•1]   Afghanistan, Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guyana, India, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Sudan, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.

[213•2]   Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, China, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, USSR, and Yugoslavia; all Arab states as well as a large group of countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

[213•3]   Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Great Britain, Fiji, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Laos, Lesotho, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Turkey, USA, and Uruguay.

[213•4]   Argentina, Barbados, El Salvador, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Nepal, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, and Zaire.

[214•1]   In accordance with the provisions of paragraph (9) of the Resolution 3034 (Twenty-Seventh Session), the President of the General Assembly, following appropriate consultations, appointed the following 35 member states to sit on the Ad Hoc Committee: Algeria, Austria, Barbados, Canada, Congo, C/echoslovakia, France, Great Britain, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Sweden, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, USSR, Venezuela, Yemen Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia.

[215•1]   UN General Assembly, A/AC. 160/1, 16 May 1973, p. 44.

[216•1]   Ibid.

[216•2]   UN General Assembly, A/AC. 160/1 j Add. I, 12 June 1973, p. 10.

[216•3]   Ibid., p. 14.

[217•1]   UN General Assembly, A/AC. 160/1, Add. I, 12 June 1973, p. 17.

[218•1]   Ibid, p. 20.

[218•2]   Yigal Eyal has been expelled from Norway.

[219•1]   UN General Assembly, A/AC. 16011, Add. I, 12 June 1973, p. 21.

[221•1]   UN General Assembly, A/AC. 160/1, 16 May 1973, pp. 34-37.

[222•1]   UN General Assembly, A/AC. 160/Ij Add. 2, 9 July 1973, pp. 6-7.

[223•1]   UN General Assembly, A/AC. 160/1 / Add. 2, 9 July 1973, p. 3.

[223•2]   Ibid., p. 2.

[223•3]   Ibid., p. 4.

[224•1]   UN General Assembly, A/AC. 160/I/ Add. I, 12 June 1973, p. 28.

[225•1]   UN General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-Eighth Session, Suppl. No. 28 (A 19028), New York, 1973, pp. 23-24.

[225•2]   Algeria, Congo, Guinea, India, Mauritania, Nigeria, People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Yemen Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia.

[225•3]   UN General Assembly Official Records, Thirty-Second Session, .Suppl. No. 37 (A/32137), New York, 1977, pp. 1-5.

[225•4]   UN General Assembly Official Records, Thirty-First Session, A/31/429, para 10, New York, 14 December 1976.

[230•1]   UN General Assembly, A/AC. 160/1; A/AC. 160/1/Add. 1; A/AC. 160/1.