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p There have been quite a few violations of the personal inviolability of diplomatic agents in recent years. These have, for the most part, been direct criminal acts against the individual, the freedom and dignity of diplomatic agents.

p By no means in all of these cases have the offenders been traced and punished. In a wide range of instances, the official authorities concerned have failed to take proper action to prevent criminal assaults on the person, freedom and dignity of diplomatic agents, or take measures 1o punish the guilty parties.

p These acts of violence and arbitrary practices in respect of official representatives of States abroad have placed in 121 jeopardy the “principle of inviolability" of the person of a diplomatic agent (Art. 29 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations) as well as the principle of protection of consular officers “to prevent any attack on their person, freedom or dignity" (Art. 40 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations).

p The provision to ensure the inviolability of the person of diplomatic agents means recognition of the fact that certain immunities and privileges for such agents are indispensable for the relationship of sovereign and independent nations. Special protection in this sense means more reliable protection than that which these States are obliged to grant to private persons.

p The principle of inviolability of the diplomat and diplomatic mission was formalised in Arts. 22 and 29 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It should be noted that in its commentary on the final version of the draft Art. 27 on diplomatic relations and immunities, which was basic to Art. 29 of the Vienna Convention, the International Law Commission emphasised that this principle did not preclude measures of self-defence in respect of a diplomatic agent or, under emergency circumstances, measures to prevent him committing an offence or a misdeed.

p The provisions concerning the protection of consular officers and premises are to be found in the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Arts. 31 and 40) and in upwards of 10 thousand bilateral consular conventions.

p The inviolability of the representatives of the sending State and that of the memliers of the diplomatic staff of a special mission as well as the premises of that mission is envisaged by the provisions of the 1969 Convention on Special Missions (Arts. =5 and 29) and by the draft Articles 122 on the representation of States in their relations with international organisations worked out by the International Law Commission.

p A whole series of other categories of persons involved, as official representatives of a certain State or international organisation, in the exercise of international contacts are also granted special protection in conformity with the customs of international relations or specific international agreements.

p As a rule, most of the offences are committed with a view to deriving political benefit or settling political issues through seizure, isolation, acts of violence, acts of provocation or even assassination of official representatives of particular States.

p In view of this, the International Law Commission, at its 22nd Session in 1970, considered a letter of May 14, 1970, from the Chairman of the Security Council, accompanying a copy of a document sent to the Chairman of the Security Council by the Dutch Ambassador to the UN. The document referred to the need to undertake certain action to ensure the protection and inviolability of diplomatic agents because of the increasingly frequent attacks on them. The Commission found this problem urgent but deferred decision on the subject because it was necessary to finalise the drafting of the Articles about the representation of States in their relations with international organisations.

p The UN General Assembly, in its Resolution 2780 (Twenty-Sixth Session) of December 3, 1971, while approving the views expressed by the Commission in its report, notably, the Commission’s opinion regarding the importance and urgency of consideration of the problem of protection and inviolability of diplomatic agents and other 123 persons entitled to special protection under international law, requested: 

p 1. The Secretary-General to invite comments from Member States before 1 April 1972 on the question of the protection of diplomats and to transmit them to the International Law Commission at its Twenty-Fourth Session; 

p 2. The International Law Commission to study as soon as possible, in the light of the comments of Member States, the question of the protection and inviolability of diplomatic agents and other persons entitled to special protection under international law with a view to preparing a set of draft articles dealing with offences committed against diplomats and other persons entitled to special protection under international law for submission to the General Assembly at the earliest date which the Commission considers appropriate.  [123•1 

p In accordance with Section 3 of the Resolution 2780 (XXVI) of the UN General Assembly, dated December 3, 1971, the Member States submitted their comments on the question of protection and inviolability of diplomatic agents and other persons entitled to special protection under international law. Comments were submitted by 26 States; an overwhelming majority of them—19 countries  [123•2  spoke up for a special convention to be adopted on that subject. However, the community of views about the necessity of adopting such a convention did not mean an identical approach to the said problem. Some countries had simply accepted 124 the need to adopt the convention (Brazil, Iran, Kuwait, Niger, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Jamaica, Japan) while others saw the Convention as designed to link the definition of an international crime with certain offences affecting international relations (Belgium). The United States, for instance, considered that a major purpose of such a convention should be to eliminate to the greatest extent possible “safe havens" for persons who committed crimes of this nature. Denmark, apart from the draft Convention (the Rome Draft), put forward the idea of establishing a system of international cooperation in the suppression of terrorism without, however, specifying the structure, purposes and objectives of such a system. The comments by the representatives of the Netherlands and Great Britain suggested the States should be offered certain possibilities of “escape” in respect of the obligation “to prosecute or to extradite”. The Canadian Government stressed that the convention should contain as few innovations and obligations as possible, so that a large majority of States might quickly accede to it. It is the positions of France and Australia that were of particular interest among the States which reacted negatively to the idea of having an international convention drafted.  [124•1  On balance, this group of nations considered it inexpedient to create new standards in this area and pointed Out that it was necessary to have the existing conventions better complied with (Norway, Rouanda). Colombia and Argentina proceeded from the assumption that their domestic legislation was sufficiently effective. The comments 125 submitted by the Government of France were more detailed. They said, in particular: 

p —the French Government objects to the very principle of any new standards being devised in this area; 

p —the problem is one of effectively applying the standards that already exist, and theic is no need to dilute the old standards by fixing new ones; 

p —it is the agreement of the majority of States that should make the new convention effective; 

p —it is necessary to specify the range of persons entitled to special protection under international law; 

p —the States already know, from the standpoint of their national legislation, about all acts of violence on the human person subject to criminal proceedings, so all that remains to be done is to specify the form of the offence; 

p —the French Government could not accept a text which did not reserve the principle of the expediency of the prosecution. The only obligation which could possibly be considered is that of referring the case to the authorities competent to institute criminal proceedings; 

p —the convention should not exclude the possibility of refusing extradition in the event of a crime of political significance; 

p —the convention may have the character of a treaty on legal aid only in matters relative to the punishment, not the prevention, of a crime.

p Let us note, first of all, that these comments are not free from certain contradictions. For example, while denying the principle of drafting a new convention, the French Government found it necessary to introduce a certain measure of precision^ in the definition of the form of the offence. But, as is wc^\ known from the theory of criminal 126 law, a penalty under this law has to be selected, considering the degree of the social danger of the offence. Besides, the only way to specify the form of a crime of international significance is through direct consultations between states, which have to be formalised by a certain document ( agreement on legal aid or a convention codifying appropriate standards of law).

p It is likewise necessary to add that an offence against an official representative of a state involves, as a rule, political complications.

p In consequence, France’s comments on this subject imply refusing extradition in general as a means of criminal proceedings on an international scale. One positive point in these comments is the emphasis laid on the need for faithful observance of the existing standards in this area and a clearer definition of the corpus delicti in drafting the Convention.

p One interesting idea has been put forward by Australia which proposed producing a “code of desirable practice".  [126•1 

p This proposal could be interpreted in two ways, either as practice that has already taken place in respect of the offences of this kind or practice of uniform application of the given standards in this matter. In either case, the unclear wording and reliance on actual experience alone could produce no solution without a detailed elaboration of the issue as a whole.

p The Twenty-Fourth Session of the International Law Commission, meeting from May 2 to June 7, 1972, set up a working group to consider the problems arising from the 127 comments made by various States and draft a series of articles to be submitted to the Commission.

p The working group held seven meetings before it could provide the Commission with the first report containing 12 Articles on the prevention and punishment of crimes against diplomatic agents and other internationally protected persons. The Commission examined the report of the working group and referred the draft articles for reconsideration in the light of the comments made during the discussion. Most of its members supported the general approach adopted in relation to the Articles. Some doubted again whether there was any point in specifying the principle of territorial asylum in the context of political crimes. It was pointed out that Art. 6 of the OAS Convention specifically provided that “none of the provisions of this Convention shall be interpreted so as to impair the right of asylum" and it was also pointed out that the right of territorial asylum was traditional in Latin America. It is likewise necessary to stress that other members of the Commission doubted whether the Convention would be really effective in assuring protection since the relevant experience of the League of Nations had been unsuccessful: for example, the League of Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, dated November 16, 1937, had been ratified only by one State. However, the positive value and also the area of application of the draft Articles on this subject had been indicated by Resolution 2780 of the Twenty-Sixth Session of the General Assembly.

p The Commission examined the second and third reports of the working group and adopted the 12 draft Articles on the prevention and punishment of crimes against diplomatic agents and other intfei ^tionally protected persons. In 128 accordance with Arts. 16 and 21 of the Status of the Commission, it was decided to submit the present tentative draft Articles to the General Assembly and distribute it among the governments concerned for comments. Notably, draft Art. 1 says: 

p 1. “Internationally protected person" means: 

p a) a Head of State or a Head of Government, whenever he is in a foreign State, as well as members of his family who accompany him; 

p b) any official of either a State or an international organisation who is entitled, pursuant to general international law or an international agreement, to special protection for or because of the performance of functions on behalf of his State or international organisation, as well as members of his family who are likewise entitled to special protection.

p 2. “Alleged offender" means a person as to whom there are grounds to believe that he has committed one or more of the crimes set forth in Art. 2.

p 3. “International Organisation" means an intergovernmental organisation.  [128•1 

p Therefore, the grounds for granting special protection to the above-mentioned persons are, first, their status of official representative of a State or an international organisation, subjects of international law, and, second, the fact that they perform the official functions imposed on them.

p In formulating sub-paragraph (b), the Commission found inspiration both in Art. 2 of the OAS Convention which refers to those persons to whom the State has the duty to 129 give special protection according to international law and in Art. 1 of the Rome Draft (submitted by Denmark), which refers to: 

p a) members of permanent or special diplomatic missions and members of consular posts; 

p b) civil agents of States on official mission; 

p c) staff members of international organisations in their official functions; 

p d) persons whose presence and activity abroad is justified by the accomplishment of a civil task defined by an international agreement for technical cooperation or assistance; 

p e) members of the families of the above-mentioned persons.

p In this case, special protection is provided in accordance with the official function of a representative of a State in any particular field.

p Therefore, a diplomatic agent who is on leave in a State which is not an accrediting or receiving State will not, as a rule, be entitled to special protection. However, some members of the Commission said that if the object of the Convention was to reduce the incidence of attacks on internationally protected persons as such, the operation of the Convention must cover them irrespective of whether they are on an official visit in a foreign State or on holiday. The Commission, however, arrived at the conclusion that such an extension of the existing rules concerning the requirements of inviolability and special protection would not be justified.

p This proposition does not appear to us to be altogether correct since immunities and privileges are accorded to a person abroad in virtue of the diplomatic passport he 130 carries, issueH by the accrediting State, and following the recognition by the host State of the diplomatic character of the given passport. By the very issue of a passport, the accrediting State is asking for the given person to be considered vested with no ordinary immunities and privileges during his sojourn abroad.

p Art. 40 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Art. 54 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Art. 42 of the 1969 Convention on Special Mission and Art. 78 of the draft Articles of the Commission on Representation of States in their Relations with International Organisations concerning the transit through the territory of a third State are known to stipulate that this third State shall accord the appropriate person proceeding to take up or to return to his post in the host State or the receiving State, or returning to his own country, inviolability and such other immunities as may be required to ensure his transit or return.

p In view of the fact that the main object of the adoption of this draft is to render inescapable the punishment of the crimes committed against persons entitled to special protection, it has to be borne in view that special protection in this case must mean: 

p 1) qualifying offences as criminal regardless of motive; 

p 2) choosing maximum penalties under internal law for the crimes committed against persons entitled to special protection as distinct from penalties for similar offences against private foreign persons or nationals of the given State; 

p 3) ensuring the inescapability of punishment which may be meted out by the principle of aut dedere aut judicare. The Choice of the maximum penalties under the criminal 131 law of a State removes considerable differences from the standpoint of the extent of consequences for the crimes committed in different States.

p Draft Art. 2 says, in particular, that 

p 1. The intentional commission, regardless of motive, of: 

p a) a violent attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected person; 

p b) a violent attack upon the official premises or the private accommodation of an internationally protected person likely to endanger his person or liberty; 

p c) a threat to commit any such attack; 

p d) an attempt to commit any such attack; and 

p e) participation as an accomplice in any such attack, shall be made by each State Party a crime under its internal law, whether the’commission of the crime occurs within or outside of its territory.

p 2. Each State Party shall make these crimes punishable by severe penalties which take into account the aggravated nature of the offence.

p 3. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over these crimes.

p The provisions of Art. 2 refer to two different but interrelated questions: a) that of delimiting the scope of the Convention through the definition of the crimes it is to be applied against and b) that of specifying the competence of the State Party in respect of criminal proceedings and punishment of these crimes.

p During the discussion of this Article, the members of the Commission were divided along two lines. Some insisted on a more accurate formulation of the corpa delicti on the grounds that the Articles pertaining to the area of criminal justice must be as specific as possible because the 132 interpretation of certain offences would have to be done.by the restiictive principle. The Commission considered, however, that it would be preferable to use the general expression ”violent attack”, in order both to provide substantial coverage of such offences and at the same time to avoid the difficulties arising from a listing of specific crimes in a convention intended for adoption by a great many States.

p The comnientaiy on this Article says that examples of a violent attack are the murder, wounding or kidnapping of an internationally protected person.

p Important provisions of this Article, in our judgement, are: 

p —Reaffirmation of the generally accepted legal principle whereby it is the intent to commit an offence, rather than the reasons behind its commission, that is the determining factor; 

p —Paragraph (1) incorporates the principle of universality as fundamental to establishing jurisdiction in respect of the offences listed therein. It identifies the basis for jurisdiction comparable with that for jurisdiction in respect of piracy, and for purposes of jurisdiction, ranges the Convention among those providing for cooperation in the prevention and punishment of the crimes affecting the interests of the whole international community, such as slave trade, drug traffic, etc.

p It should likewise be noted that, unlike The Hague and the Montreal Conventions and the Rome Draft which use the word “offence”, the present article employs the term “crime” and, besides, it points out that the official status of the victim is readily recognised as a circumstance indicating the gravity of the crime.

p The provisions of draft Art. 3 are intended to ensure the 133 adoption of more effective measures to prevent the crimes mentioned in Art. 2.

p It says, in particular, that the States Paities shall cooperate in the prevention of the crimes set forth in Art 2 by: 

p a) taking measures to pi event the preparation in their lespective territories for the commission of those crimes eithei in their own 01 in other territories; 

p 1)1 exchanging information and coordinating the taking of administrative measures to prevent the commission of those c rimes.

p The provisions of Art. 5 concern the immediate action to be taken when the alleged oflender is discovered on the temloiy of a State Party following the commission of any ol the crimes set forth in Art. 2.

p This action, in accordance with Art. 5, is diiected towards seeming ciiminal proceedings or the extradition of the oflendei. The Article also guarantees the right of the alleged offender to contact a representative of the State of which he is a national.

p Art. 6, one of the important articles of the Convention, contains the proposition that the State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is present shall, if it does not extradite him, submit, without any exception whatsoever and without undue delay, the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State.

p In consequence, Art. 6 embodies the principle of out dedere aut judicare. This Article accords the State Party in whose territory the alleged offender turns out to be present, an opportunity of choosing between extraditing him or referring the case to its competent authorities for criminal proceedings, i.e., the present Article ensures the principle of 134 inescapable punishment without making it incumbent upon the State to extradite the alleged offender.

p Art. 7 calls for a provision which embraces the crimes set forth in Art. 2 to be included in any extradition treaty existing between States Party, if they are not listed as such therein. Besides, the Article says that Contracting States which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognise such crimes as extraditable offences between themselves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested state.

p The present Article substantially reproduces the text of Art. 8 of The Hague and the Montreal Conventions and Art. 5 of the Rome Draft.

p Yugoslavia, in its observations, notably on this particular question  [134•1 , appears to favour a more radical and more effective approach to the suppression of such crimes.

p The Government of Yugoslavia has suggested that a request for extradition may be refused, provided that the State in whose territory the crime was committed and the culprit was found institutes without delay legal proceedings against the said person. There is yet another point in Yugoslavia’s observations that, in our view, should be considered to be perfectly justified and consistent with effective defence of protected persons, namely that when several States at the same time claim the right to extradition, the extradition should be granted to the State to which the victim of the crime belongs (especially in case of death). This remark, in our view, should be included as a footnote to the Convention, not as a separate point of an Article for that would 135 lay emphasis on extradition thereby upsetting the legal equivalence of extradition and refusal to extradite the offender, as provided for by the given Convention.

p Art. 8 guarantees fair treatment of any person, against whom legal action has been taken, at all stages of the proceedings.

p Art. 9 stipulates that the statutory limitation as to the time within which prosecution may be instituted for the crimes set forth in Art. 2 shall be that fixed for the most serious crimes under the internal law of each State Party.

p Art. 11 makes it incumbent on the State Party to communicate the final outcome of the legal proceedings regarding the alleged offender to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

p Art. 12 stipulates that any dispute between the Parties arising out of the application or interpretation of. the present Articles may be brought by any State Party to the dispute before a conciliation commission (Alternative A), or submitted to arbitration on the understanding that if within six months from the date of the request for arbitration, the Parties are unable to agree on the organisation of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court. Furthermore, it formulates the right of any State Party to reserve its stand with regard to the provisions of the previous paragraph (Alternative B).

p Summing up the factual material just considered, it is necessary to emphasise that the International Law Commission has correctly, on balance, taken as basic to the draft convention the principle of inescapable punishment of the crimes committed against internationally protected persons, though, however, that did not save the Convention from 136 substantial shortcomings. Tn this context, we would venture a few observations which, if taken into account, could make the Convention an effective international instrument against acts of terrorism falling within it:

p 1. For the convenience of reference to Articles and also for the logical construction of the entire Convention, it is necessary to have the provisions about legal aid and cooperation to prevent the commission of crimes and about a guarantee assuring the rights of the person against whom legal proceedings are carried out formulated separately and Article by Article.

p 2. There should be a provision for action against organised crime which could be formulated as a separate Article as follows: 

p The Contracting States shall take, in accordance with their internal law, proper measures to disband the organisations existing in their territory if there is enough ground for believing the crimes set forth in Art. 2 of the present Convention to have been committed as a result of the activities of these organisations.

p 3. It is necessary to separate the elements of the crime set forth in Art. 2 into offences against the person of an internationally protected individual and those committed in respect of official private accommodation.

p 4. It is likewise important to identify special protection under international law since this protection is provided within the framework of international law and through the agency of appropriate provisions of the internal law of States. As this Convention has the object of according protection in actual practice, the insertion of the concept of special protection in the text of Art. 1 is perfectly justified.

p To conclude such a Convention would certainly 137 correspond to the fundamental position of the Soviet Union which has always considered that “the question of the protection and inviolability of diplomats and other persons entitled to special protection under international law is an urgent one, of great importance and deserves serious attention".  [137•1 

p The Twenty-Eighth Session of the UN General Assembly, having considered the draft Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Diplomatic Agents, and Other Internationally Protected Persons, submitted by the International Law Commission, adopted a Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents. Structurally, the Convention was enlarged from 12 to 20 Articles with a Preamble added. The Convention was likewise amended to specify the range of persons and objects, the commission of an act of violence against whom, or threat of such an act or attempt at committing one, or acting as an accomplice in any such act shall involve the application of the Convention.

p Art. 12 of the Convention expressly emphasises that the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the application of the Treaties on Asylum, in force at the date of the adoption of this Convention, as between the States which are parties to those Treaties; but a State Party to this Convention may not invoke those Treaties with respect to another State party to this Convention wihich is not a party to those Treaties. This provision enables the Convention to be applied in the context of Latin America where political and diplomatic asylum is a traditional institution. The Convention now contains re-edited and rearranged Articles 138 concerning the legal proceedings of States in virtue of their participation in the Convention. The Convention should be regarded as deficient because it has no Article concerning the organisations whose activities lead to the commission of crimes punishable under the Convention.

p The Twenty-Eighth Session of the UN General Assembly succeeded in drawing up a Convention to meet the interests of the overwhelming majority of States, which means it may well be expected to play an important part in the suppression of acts of terrorism creating a grave threat to the maintenance of normal international relations.

p The events of recent years have furnished ample evidence to demonstrate the necessity of effective enforcement of the standards of international law designed to protect the activities of official representatives of States, international organisations and peoples in battle for national liberation, against foreign occupation and racism. However, a whole series of States and their officials continue to commit more and more crimes against the heads of sovereign States, representatives of nations and of national liberation movements which are subjects of international law.

p For years, the Soviet Mission at the UN in New York and many other permanent representative offices of socialist and developing countries, their staff and members of their families have been the target of the terrorist action of the so-called Jewish Defence League. In June 1981, the Soviet Mission said in a note to the US Ambassador to the UN that an incendiary device had been discovered within two metres of a school bus on a bus parking lot inside the Mission’s residential area in New York on May 17, 1981. Earlier on, three incendiary devices had been found near the Mission’s country retreat in a New York suburb. These acts, 139 the note went on to say, had been undertaken in the context of an unending campaign of threats and intimidation, daily telephone calls about bombs alleged to have been planted in the Mission’s buildings, and threats from the terrorist organisations Omega-7 and the Jewish Defence League. In September 1981, the Jewish Defence League claimed responsibility for blowing up the car of a Nigerian diplomat which was parked near the Soviet Mission at the UN.

p The Soviet Mission in its notes more than once called on the American authorities to take all the necessary measures to ensure the security and normal conditions for the activities of the Mission and its staff as well as the Soviet staff of the UN Secretariat and to put an end to provocative attacks by Zionist terrorists.

p The UN Committee for Liaison with the host country repeatedly declared such attacks to be intolerable.

p One of the Soviet Mission’s notes said that these attacks were part of a terrorist campaign and that there was no room in civilised society for terrorism in any shape or form.

p A PLO representative in Belgium, Nairn Haddar was killed with five pistol shots in a Brussels street on June 1, 1981. It was beyond doubt, the PLO Office in Brussels said, that the assassination of Haddar had been the work of Israeli secret services. The murder of Haddar was not the first crime of this kind to have been committed against prominent Palestinian and other Arab representatives in the countries of Western Europe. Five Palestinian representatives have been murdered in Paris alone during the last few years. In May 1981, the French police arrested three Israelis who confessed to having raided the offices of the Syrian Airlines in Paris.

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p According to Western press reports, back in 1972 the Israeli Government set up a special group, designed to at t against the Palestinian resistance movement, with the task of oiganising the assassination of Palestinian leaders and acts of terrorism against members of the staff of PLO missions in the countries of Western Europe. The French Ambassador to Lebanon, Louis Delamare, was assassinated in Beirut right after the visit of the Fiench Foreign Minister, Claude Cheysson, to Lebanon in 1981, his meetings with Yassir Arafat, Chairman of the PLO Executive, and his statement in favour of a fair solution to the Palestinian problem, taking into account the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

p Following the shooting at the Embassy of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in Paris with jet weapons, causing a fire and extensive material damage, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PDRY said in a statement on June 17, 1981, that this criminal act was part of a Zionist plan aimed at escalating terrorism worldwide.

p The Minister of the Interior of India, Zail Singh made a statement in parliament on April 28, 1981, about an attempted act of sabotage on the aircraft by which Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was to have set off on a foreign tour early in May that year. A check-up revealed that somebody had deliberately damaged four cables so that the aircraft was to have got out of control and crashed sometime after the take-off. Local observers noted that news about that act of sabotage spread immediately after the Indian press had reported preparations made by Afghan counter-revolutionaries for a succession of terrorist acts in Delhi. As the Hindustan Times wrote, quoting security sources, a special group had been smuggled into the Indian capital for that 141 purpose The group had been trained under the guidance ol CIA specialists. It was to have committed assassination attempts on several members of the Indian Government and also to have staged acts of sabotage against Air India and Indian Airlines, against a number of diplomatic missions in Delhi.

p President Rajai of Iran and Prime Minister Bakhtiar v\eic killed in an explosion in Teheran in September 1981. An official announcement said that act of terrorism had been planned, organised and carried out by agents of American imperialism and Zionism and the new Iranian Prime Minister, Ayatollah Mahdawi Kani declared that there was a “fifth column" in action in that country intent on destroying the existing system.

p The world was shocked by the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II on May 13, 1981. The inquiry revealed that the man who made that attempt, Mehmet Ali Agca, a Turkish subject who had close connections with the neoiascist party “Grey Wolves" of the nationalist movement in Turkey, whose leaders have since been brought before a military tribunal on a trial for subversive actions in that country, had killed the editor of the liberal bourgeois Milliyet newspaper, Abdi Ipecci, back in 1979. He had been arrested and sentenced to death, but escaped from the Istanbul jail a few days before the sentence was to have been carried out. After illegally leaving Turkey, he settled in West Germany where branch offices of that Turkish neofascist party are acting in full freedom, backed up by West German secret services. Ankara has more than once called on the West German authorities to extradite the criminal, but received no answer. An accomplice of the terrorist, Mehmet Sener, who, as the inquiry revealed, had contacted Italian 142 neofascists and received a pistol from them for Mehmet Ali Agca, was arrested in Italy late in May 1981. Now, that the Italian neofascists have the CIA behind them is a matter of common knowledge. However, the USA has been trying all the time to blame any act of terrorism on progressive forces to misguide public opinion.

p The death of the former President of Panama, Omar Torrijos in an air crash in 1980 led many to conclude that it had been a CIA-plotted act.

p A Panamanian journal, Didlogo Social published an interview of the General’s brother, Monchi Torrijos. He said, in particular, that wherever he had travelled he heard everybody claim that it had been an act of terrorism. The only difference of opinion was about who had committed it—Somozistas, the Panamanian oligarchy or the ones and the others. Monchi Torrijos declared, in particular, that Omar Torrijos had been an obstacle to imperialist scheming in Central America; US imperialists could not forgive Omar for having played an active part in the liberation of Nicaragua and for his friendly disposition towards Cuba and Fidel Castro, for having spoken up against the blockade of Cuba and supporting the fighters against the ruling oligarchy in El Salvador and strongly resisting US intervention in Central America. Monchi Torrijos had, in fact, blamed Reagan for that crime. He declared that in 1976, Congressman Philip M. Crane published a book Surrender in Panama with Reagan’s preface full of invectives against the General. In an article that appeared while the election campaign was still going on, Reagan put forward an argument which he has since repeated more than once w’thout any evidence to support it: if the USA turned the Canal over to Panama, it would turn out to be in Fidel Castro’s hands.

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p The first assassination attempt on General Torrijos was made in 1971 when he called the people together in a Panama city square on May 5, and made a spirited anti-US speech. The second one was undertaken in 1973 just before the UN Security Council met in Panama. The third one succeeded. Monchi Torrijos said that American reconnaissance satellites were monitoring all the movements of aircraft and ships in the neighbourhood of the Panama Canal; the armed forces under the US Southern Command kept under their surveillance all the planes used by Omar Torrijos and all the places he visited; the Americans knew perfectly well that he was flying to Coclecito twice a week and remembered his itinerary. To bring down the small aircraft Omar Torrijos travelled by was a trifling operation for people versed in supersophisticated technology, Monchi Torrijos wrote.

p Monchi Torrijos said outright that a President that was dreaming of the neutron killer-bomb and sanctioned its production and eventual employment would not torment himself with doubts about “removing” a man he found to be in the way of his expansionist drive in the region. Besides, the mathematical probability of accidental death in air crashes of the Ecuadoran President Roldos, the Peruvian General Hoyos, and General Torrijos in the space of one year was zero. Now, what distinguished all those men was a determination to oppose the Yankee penetration of their countries. The last word about the background to the death of Torrijos has yet to be said.

p Monchi Torrijos declared that US imperialism wanted to have an easy-to-rule government in Panama so as to make that country a Yankee stronghold for any intervention in Central America.

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p The anti-Libyan campaign in the USA with Col. Muammar Gaddafi having been declared something like the supreme terrorist, is yet another case in point. In December 1981, the US authorities went as far as to announce officially that a Libyan “Hit Squad" had entered the United States with instructions to kill President Reagan and members of his family, and also, perhaps the Vice-President, White House officials, Pentagon and State Department chiefs.

p And even though that “official announcement" was actually exposed right away as a bluff by the US press itself (Newsweek of December 14, 1981, said: “The government’s information has come principally from an informant—a former Lebanese terrorist . . . now in CIA custody . . .”) and the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi dismissed it in an ABC interview as sheer lie, the National Security Council went into two-day session to devise “retribution” plans: from an economic blockade right up to a full-scale armed intervention. There were allegations that the terrorists had been trained in one of the East European countries.

p Gaddafi unequivocally declared that the only reason why Washington had wanted all that was in order to lash out against Libya. In reality, it was the US authorities that had more than once prepared to assassinate him, in various ways, as by poisoning his food. .. One of the leaders of the Libyan Revolution, Abdul SaLam Ahmed Jalud declared during his visit to Ethiopia that Libya was opposed to terrorism in any shape or form, and called on the international community to denounce the hypocrisy of the US Administration .. .

p The Washington Post columnist, Haynes B. Johnson frankly said all that reminded one of the anti-Cuban campaign at the time when the invasion of the Bay of Pigs and the 145 assassination attempt on Fidel Castro had been prepared.

p That was a conspiracy against an independent and sovereign Arab State acting from anti-imperialist positions and just one more attempt at galvanising the false stories about “international terrorism” being supported by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

As the facts indicate, the authorities of a number of States have deliberately stalled the launching of an effective conventional mechanism assuring inescapable punishment for the commission of crimes, connived at the latter and disregarded the elementary standards of international law, which could not but hamper the cooperation of nations in the suppression of terrorism.