p However, can one remain in the framework of transcendentalism without claiming to deduce the substantive dependences of knowledge from the fact of self- consciousness "I am I"? In this case the philosopher is forced to set himself the task of establishing the conditions of the possibility of knowledge by logical analysis, by breaking down and making a preparation of knowledge that actually exists and is recorded both in the truths of everyday consciousness and in the propositions of the special sciences. Clearly, in this approach to knowledge, the relation between knowledge and self-consciousness has to be understood in a way different from that of Husserl and Fichte.

p This possibility was realised in Immanuel Kant’s “ critical” transcendental epistemology.^^69^^

p Kant does not at all discuss the question "Is knowledge possible?”, and in this his philosophy differs significantly from, let us say, that of Descartes. One of the fundamental premises of Kantian epistemology is that knowledge is not only possible but also real, it actually exists. In other words, Kant faces the fact of knowledge, as neo-Kantians later put it. He believes this knowledge to be expressed 80 at any rate in the special scientific disciplines relating to pure mathematics and pure (i.e., theoretical) natural science. The main preoccupation of his epistemology is finding out how mathematics and pure natural science are possible, that is, how knowledge is possible in general. Kant proceeds from the existence of indubitable and recognised product of cognitive activity, of scientific knowledge, endeavouring to reconstruct the logical conditions of its production through analytically breaking it down; that is to say, he proceeds from the study of the result to revealing the possibilities of its generation.

p From the Kantian standpoint, this approach is justified by the fact that, while the existence of pure mathematics and pure natural science is beyond doubt, the assertion of the reality of metaphysics as true knowledge is extremely problematic. Finding out the universal conditions of the possibility of knowledge could not only provide an answer to the question of whether or not metaphysics is possible: should the answer prove to be affirmative, the methods of working in this area most fruitfully might be discovered, Kant believes.^^70^^

p Moving towards the realisation of this task, Kant arrives at the conclusion that experience as knowledge of objectively existing things independent of the given empirical individual and the states of his consciousness implies at the same time continual references to the subject. These references are of twofold nature. First, it is the singling put of the objectiveness of experience and the distinguishing of the processes fixed in it from subjective associations, from the accidental flow of representations, etc. that signify constant (actual and potential) correlation of the world of objects and the processes of consciousness. Second, the unity of experience itself implies the unity of consciousness. The latter circumstance is especially important, Kant believes. The unity of objective experience would be impossible, in his view, if the flow of objective experience could not be continually accompanied by a certain act of self-consciousness in the form of recognising the identity of the ego to which experience belongs (this act is, according to Kant, expressed in the assertion "I think”).

p The objectiveness of experience is inseparable from the existence in it of various dependences, including necessary ones. The object is an embodiment, as it were, of a certain rule for linking up various sense impressions. The flow of objective experience presents an internally coherent picture of necessary interaction of all its components; there is a certain continuity about this flow, that is, the subsequent state necessarily follows from the previous one. If 81 there were “gaps” in experience, that is, if subsequent events did not follow from the previous ones according to obligatory rules, we would have no grounds to believe experience to be objective, Kant affirms; instead we would be forced to describe it as a subjective connection between associations, that is, as pertaining to individual consciousness rather than the world of material objects. At the same time any experience is my experience, that is, it belongs to me as the person experiencing it; there is no experience that would be nobody’s. Let us now assume, Kant argues, that the ego as the subject of experience retains no identity, that is, that it can entirely disappear as one ego and be reborn as another having nothing in common and no links with the former.

p In this case, experience itself must change, for its relevance to the ego is a necessary characteristic of experience, as we have just recognised, and if the ego becomes different, so does experience. But if there is no connection between the first and the second egos, there is no connection between the first and second experience either. That means that there are “gaps” in the flow of experience. In this case, experience itself is therefore subjective and not objective. It follows, Kant concludes, that a necessary condition of the objectiveness of experience is the selfconsciousness of the ego as identical to itself in the assertion "I think”, which potentially accompanies the flow of experience (in Kant’s view, the act of self-consciousness "I think" does not have to accompany experience in actuality; the objectiveness of the latter merely implies constant possibility of this self-consciousness).^^71^^

p Individual empirical self-consciousness, enabling us to distinguish between the subjective connection of associations and the objective dependences between the things external with regard to this self-consciousness, Kant calls subjective unity of consciousness. As for the unity of consciousness which makes possible, in his view, the objectiveness of experience itself, it is termed in Kantian philosophy objective unity of self-consciousness or transcendental unity of apperception, and is distinguished from the former in principle.^^7^^ *

p The subjective unity of self-consciousness has to do with the flow of individual representations, characterising the "internal sense”. The manifold given in the internal sense is also ordered in a certain manner (the rules of this ordering are determined by the apriori form of time), although this ordering is not objective, that is, it is different from types of order in the world of external objects existing in the forms of space and time and given 82 to the subject through the "external sense”. The subjective unity of self-consciousness is extremely specific. As distinct from the unity pertaining to objective (“external”) experience, the former does not characterise any constant substance remaining identical to itself under the various changes of its states. Kant therefore believes that it is impossible to reveal, through the internal sense, the necessary dependences and rules of succession of sense impressions which would permit the construction of an object of cognition in its own right. The objects of external sense given not only in the forms of time but also in those of space (the latter thus appearing in Kant’s epistemology as the necessary condition of objectiveness) assume apriori categorial schemes as their substantive basis, schemes on which to develop theoretical (“pure”) natural science. As for the objects of inner sense, they are not objects in the strict sense of the term, for states of consciousness are unstable, indefinite, and ephemeral. Of course, they are also ordered in a certain manner—in temporal forms. This ordering, however, cannot create the possibility of a theoretical (“pure”) science about the phenomena of individual consciousness. Psychology, in Kant’s view, is only possible as an empirical descriptive science stating accidental links in the subjective flow of representations and, in principle, incapable of using the methods of mathematics (in Kant’s view, true science must speak the language of mathematics).

p More than that, inner experience is not only devoid of some essential features of external experience, those that permit the latter to be the basis of theoretical science—it is also impossible without external contemplation. Determination of time, which is a form of ordering internal experience, exists only through implementation of the flow of time in certain spatial processes, that is, in processes involving given material objects. "...It is possible to perceive a determination of time only by means of a change in external relations (motion) to the permanent in space; (for example, we become aware of the sun’s motion, by observing the changes of its relation to the objects of this earth). But this is not all. We find that we possess nothing permanent that can correspond and be submitted to the conception of a substance as intuition, except matter... It follows, that this I has not any predicate of intuition, which, in its character of permanence, could serve as correlate to the determination of time in the internal sense—in the same way as impenetrability is the correlate of matter as an empirical intuition."™

p A highly important consequence follows from this, 83 namely, "internal experience is itself possible only mediately and through external experience".^^74^^

p Kant regards this consequence as a direct refutation of "the problematical idealism of Des Cartes, who admits the undoubted certainty of only one empirical assertion ( assertio), to wit, / am".^^15^^ Idealism "assumed [writes Kant] that the only immediate experience is internal, and that from this we can only infer the existence of external things. But, as always happens, when we reason from given effects to determined causes, idealism has reasoned with too much haste and uncertainty, for it is quite possible that the cause of our representations may lie in ourselves, and that we ascribe it falsely to external things. But our proof shows that external experience is properly immediate, that only by virtue of it—not, indeed, the consciousness of our own existence, but certainly the determination of our existence in time, that is, internal experience—is possible.”^^76^^

p From Kant’s viewpoint, that means that where it is a question of concrete individual consciousness, of the subjective, we cannot regard it in the spirit of Husserl as "pure consciousness" but must necessarily correlate it with those processes which are implemented by material objects or bodies. True, Husserl also speaks of the need for correlating any subjective act with the object at which this act is directed. But Husserl speaks only of the intentional object, that is, the object which exists in the framework of transcendental consciousness and does not have to be real. In principle, therefore, Husserl does not go beyond the boundaries of the Cartesian position at this point. Kant’s approach to the problem is fundamentally different: the consciousness of self, the "internal sense”, must be mediated by the consciousness of external objects, of real material things. Kant certainly realises that not always does representation of external things signify their actual existence, as the facts of illusions, hallucinations etc. show, that is, precisely those facts which form the starting point of the assertions of Husserl and Descartes on the “ certainty” of the givenness of consciousness to itself and the “uncertainty” of the givenness of external objects to consciousness. But Kant writes that the illusions, hallucinations, etc. "are themselves created by the reproduction of previous external perceptions, which ... are possible only through the reality of external objects... Whether this or that supposed experience be purely imaginary, must be discovered from its particular determinations, and by comparing these with the criteria of all real experience. "7 7

p Now, what has Kant succeeded in showing? First, that empirical self-consciousness (the "inner sense”) necessarily 84 assumes perception of external objects independent of the given individual consciousness. Second, that the unity and coherence of objective experience also signify the unity and coherence of the cognizing subject (this fact is termed the "objective unity of self-consciousness" in Kantian epistemology). Third, that the cognitive relation to the external object is also necessarily accompanied by a relation to the cognizing subject, that is, by different forms of self-consciousness.

p However, Kant makes a further step in propounding a thesis which does not follow from the above assertions but is presented as their logical consequence. He formulates the proposition that objective unity of self-consciousness, or the transcendental unity of apperception, is the basis of the objective unity of experience. The proposition "I think" is declared to be the supreme foundation of any knowledge,^^78^^ and Kant thereby actually reverts to Descartes, and that after criticising him for "problematic idealism”.

p True, on this point, too, Kant’s position is essentially different not only from that of Descartes, but also from the position of Husserl and Fichte. For Kant the proposition "I think" (just as the proposition "I exist”), being an expression of a special kind of consciousness, or rather self-consciousness, does not, however, express knowledge. A necessary condition of knowledge, according to Kant, is the givenness of the corresponding object in experience; that is to say, knowledge and experience coincide. True, experience itself is not understood by Kant as something purely immediate at all: his position here is opposed both to empiricism and phenomenology. Nevertheless, synthesising immediate sense components is a condition of experience. Where this does not occur, there is no experience and, consequently, no knowledge.

p For this reason, to take an example, the apriori categories of intellect by themselves do not contain knowledge (and no "substantive insight" into their conter t in the sense of Husserl is possible). They can be thought of, that is, their content may be analytically broken down, but that will not be knowledge, that will not be cognition.

p Thus Kant separates thinking from cognition and consciousness from knowledge. The proposition "I think" expresses an act of self-consciousness. But that is not knowledge, for the object corresponding to it, the thinking ego, is not given in any experience. The subject of transcendental apperception cannot become the object of itself. It can only be thought of or somehow symbolically hinted at: "...This unity is nothing more than the unity 85 in thought, by which no object is given; to which therefore the qategory of substance-^which always presupposes a given intuition—cannot be applied. Consequently, the subject cannot be cognized. The subject of the categories cannot, therefore, for the very reason that it cogitates these, frame any conception of itself as an object of the categories.”^^79^^

p It is important to’ note that the Transcendental Ego which, in Kant’s view, underlies the whole experience, cannot be directly grasped in the framework of his system. Kant merely suggests that we logically deduce it as a kind of otherworldly entity of a “thing-in-itself”.

p Even if empirical reflexion (the subjective unity of selfconsciousness) is not, from Kant’s standpoint, knowledge in its own right, since its objects, given in the internal sense, are devoid of a number of traits of real objects with which external experience deals, transcendental reflexion (the transcendental unity of self-consciousness) is not regarded as knowledge at all. (Let us recall that for Husserl it is precisely transcendental reflexion that is an expression of "absolute knowledge".) According to Kant, the Transcendental Ego is absolutely outside experience. As for empirical self -consciousness, that is merely the Transcendental Ego appearing to the empirical subject as a “thing-in-itself”.80

p This means in fact that Kant fails to substantiate knowledge through transcendental self-consciousness. He is himself compelled to admit that there are no instruments for passing on from the latter to the former within the framework of finite, actually existing experience. HusserPs method for implementing this transition through "direct insight" into some “certainties” is unacceptable to Kant: the Konigsberg philosopher believes that “certainty” in no way guarantees the actual existence of the corresponding object.^^8^^ ^^1^^

p “Deduction" of apriori forms of any knowledge from the activity of the Transcendental Ego (Fichte’s method) is also impossible for him, for in Kant’s view the ego as the basis of knowledge cannot be the object of experience and of knowledge, being a fundamentally extra- experiential “thing-in-itself”. There can be even less possibility of substantiating knowledge through empirical ( subjective) self-consciousness. The latter, as we know, implies the existence of the world of material objects, and a knowledge of them is itself substantiated thereby, far from being the basis of knowledge. Besides, the empirical ego, as Kant emphasises, cannot be a guarantee of the universality and necessity of the characteristics of any 86 knowledge precisely due to the empirical and accidental nature of the processes inherent in it.

p That is why Kant’s only way out is to assure his reader that the transition from the transcendental unity of apperception (regarded as the supreme basis of any knowledge) to constituting experience (that is, on the one hand, the world of objects appearing to finite consciousness as "empirically real”, and on the other, the corresponding kinds of knowledge) is realised in certain otherworldly spheres, "behind the back" of empirical consciousness, as it were. This transition, called transcendental synthesis, expresses the self-activity of the Transcendental Ego.

p The transcendental unity of apperception therefore appears in two forms, according to Kant. Its profound essence is expressed in its self-activity, that is, in the work of transcendental synthesis. It is the synthetic unity of transcendental apperception that is the supreme foundation of cognition. As for the consciousness of the identity of the cogitating subject, given to each empirical individual as the self-realisation "I think”, it appears only as a reflection of the spontaneous activity of the Transcendental Ego, characterising not so much that activity as its result—the identity of the ego with itself (1=1). Kant suggests that the latter should be called the analytical unity of transcendental apperception.

p But, insofar as the finite empirical individual has no direct access to the Transcendental Ego but merely to a chink through which bits of its activity can be grasped in the self-realisation "I think”, the Transcendental Ego itself is given extremely contradictory characteristics in Kantian philosophy. On the one hand, it is considered as a kind of deep force in myself, and here Kant’s views have something in common with Husserl’s and Fichte’s. But the Transcendental Subject is also declared to be a thingin-itself, a kind of otherworldly entity. Here it appears as something that is not only in me but also outside me, as "consciousness in general”, as an objective structure underlying all individual consciousnesses. The Transcendental Subject should in this aspect be referred to as “We” rather than “I” (and Kant often does so). In other words, Kant’s subjective idealism is not at this point without some traits of objective idealism.

p Thus, in substantiating knowledge Kant tried, first of all, to proceed from analysis of the characteristics of the final product of cognitive activity—knowledge—to reconstructing the logical conditions of its generation. Not only certain propositions of "common sense" but, above all, the results of mathematics, of contemporary 87 mathematical natural science (classical mechanics), and the results of formal-logical studies, were chosen as the samples of knowledge that served as the reference points. Theoretically separating and analytically investigating these various kinds and types of knowledge, Kant singles out certain structures and invariants in knowledge that was actually available to him, and which characterised a definite period in the development of consciousness. In this way he obtains some results that are not merely of historical interest. But substantiation of the universality and necessity of these results was only possible, from Kant’s standpoint, through correlating them with the activity of the Transcendental Subject, with the transcendental unity of self- consciousness. It is this task that Kant fails to solve, for his system has no logical instruments for expressing the spontaneous activity of the Transcendental Ego. Therefore Kant’s epistemological conception, being indubitably subjective-idealistic, cannot nonetheless be regarded as “ egology”, unlike the transcehdentalist systems of Fichte and Husserl. Kant established a number of important moments in the study of cognition and consciousness. But the problem of substantiation of knowledge is not solved in his conception either; nor can it be solved here, for his conception remains idealistic.

Thus we see that the attempts to substantiate knowledge and fathom the nature of cognition relying on the postulate about the existence of a special kind of knowledge, indubitable, certain and directly pertaining to "pure consciousness" prove unavailing. The so-called radical reflexion about “pure” consciousness (“turning to look at the subject”, as Husserl puts it) cannot substantiate the objectiveness of experience and, moreover, cannot even guarantee in its framework the actual reality of other cognizing individuals (“other egos”). Neither is the question of the nature of the ego and of the modes of comprehending it solved. The transcendentalist version of the subjective-reflective procedure for substantiating knowledge, postulating the a priori nature of definite structures and norms of everyday and special scientific knowledge, contradicts the development of modern scientific knowledge.