p The epistemology of metaphysical materialism starts from a premise that is entirely correct: reality is understood as a system of material structures connected in definite ways by certain relations and actual dependences. This conception emphasises that both subject and object must be considered as definite interconnected material systems. It is correctly noted that the subject is not some supramaterial being outside the objective real world but is included in the objective reality itself. “Subject” and “ object” are distinctions within this reality. Therefore both the interactions of subject and object and the processes within the subject are objectively real.

p In metaphysical materialism, however, these correct materialist premises are combined with assumptions which drive the study of some fundamental epistemological questions into a cul-de-sac, and also compel one to make serious concessions to subjectivism on some points, abandoning the materialist theory of reflection. We refer here to the interpretation of the subject as a purely natural physical body or biological being interacting with the world of material objects according to natural laws, laws given by nature. This conception of the interrelation between the cognizing subject and the cognized object is unacceptable in a scientific, dialectical and materialist, epistemology.

Let us try to point out the fundamental defects of interpretation of cognition as interaction of two natural systems.