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p Widespread in pre-Marxian and particularly in modern non-Marxist philosophy are conceptions which endeavour to solve the fundamental problems of epistemology starting from the premise that cognition is determined by the structure of individual consciousness. The latter is treated as a completely autonomous phenomenon, dependent on nothing else and determined by nothing else. Clearly these conceptions express the positions of subjective idealism.

p These idealistic conceptions exploit the real problems that cannot be passed over in silence in analysing the cognitive relation. It is a question, first and foremost, of the norms and standards functioning in cognition and permitting to distinguish between knowledge and absence of knowledge. In other words, the reference here is to the problem of substantiating knowledge, which is a pivotal one for the subjectivist idealistic conceptions to be analysed in this chapter. These conceptions do not merely proclaim the need for starting out from the traits of individual consciousness in studying cognition. They propound a system of arguments to prove that only adopting the subjectivist idealistic stand in epistemology can solve the problem of substantiating knowledge, and that any other philosophical interpretation of knowledge and cognition fails to cope with this problem. These conceptions are not only influential in bourgeois philosophy: they also exert a great influence on specialists in the sciences (mathematics, psychology, etc.). All of this compels us to analyse in detail the arguments of the principal adherents of this interpretation of the cognitive relation, to show the untenability of their reasoning and to clearly separate the real problems of epistemology, the true facts of cognition and consciousness (the representatives of the conceptions criticised here encountered a number of such facts) from their idealistic, false interpretation.

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p Let us, first, tackle the problem of substantiation of knowledge itself.

p If knowledge is a specific formation inherently possessing the property of truth, that is, correspondence to the objectively real state of things, there must obviously exist some norms or standards permitting to judge whether we do indeed deal with knowledge, and to separate knowledge from ignorance.

p If we have such standards at our disposal, we shall be able to make judgements concerning the degree of truth of all those specific products of human activity which claim to be knowledge; in other words, we shall evidently be able to show the falseness of the claims of some of them and at the same time to finally confirm others in their status of knowledge. The task, consequently, consists in singling out the normative constituents of any knowledge.

p Let us take into account that the very formulation of the problem of substantiating knowledge implies a critical attitude to various existing kinds of knowledge, beginning with the current opinions of "common sense" and ending with theories of the special sciences and philosophical constructions. Not one of the various kinds of knowledge regarded outside of special epistemological analysis can lay claims to absolute truth merely because it is now believed to be true—that is a necessary premise of the approach to the problem discussed here. And that means allowing the possibility that epistemological research will result in recognising the insufficient substantiation not only of certain propositions of "common sense" but also of some propositions and probably whole branches of theoretical knowledge. Indeed, the discussion of the problem of substantiating knowledge in the history of philosophy was necessarily accompanied by rejection of the justifiability of a number of theoretical constructs that for a long time were regarded as generally accepted (consider, e.g., Kant’s rejection of the whole range of the problems of rationalist ontology in the 17th and 18th centuries). The study of the foundations of certain scientific disciplines, which became so vital in the 20th century, also necessarily involves recognising the justifiability of some modes of specifying problems and methods of discourse, and rejecting others (of precisely this nature are the arguments between different trends in the foundations of mathematics and the modern debate concerning the interpretation of quantum mechanics). The theoretical activity in substantiating a given scientific discipline, including as it does analysis of the modes of reasoning and evaluation of knowledge in 50 this area, assumes, as a rule, not only solving special questions pertaining to the given science but also, to some extent or other, investigating some general philosophical problems. It is therefore not accidental that the problems of the foundations of mathematics are often referred to as the "philosophy of mathematics”, while problems in the meaningful interpretation of modern physical theories are included among the "philosophical questions of physics”. At the same time, the general problem of substantiation of knowledge as posed in philosophy has certain features distinguishing it from substantiation of the special sciences.

p In philosophy, it is not knowledge of a given type that is substantiated but any knowledge in general regardless of its concrete content, that is, criteria are sought which permit to distinguish between knowledge and ignorance in any given case.

p In this connection we would like to draw attention to the fact that, in discussing a very real and fully justifiable problem of substantiation of knowledge, the adherents of the approach to the cognitive relation analysed in this chapter proceed from two premises which appear to them quite natural but actually predetermine the subjectivist nature of their epistemological conceptions. This is, in the first place, the metaphysical notion of the existence of standards which permit once and for all to separate genuine knowledge from error, to draw a sharp boundary between knowledge and absence of knowledge, and to single out "in pure form" some systems of “absolute” knowledge that could be used as the foundation for the entire system of scientific theories. The epistemological conceptions considered here are also based on another assumption: since the problem of substantiation of knowledge implies a critical attitude to certain kinds of it, the problem itself was interpreted as the need to reject the reliance on the results of the special sciences or the propositions of pre-scientific "common sense" in the philosophical analysis of the cognitive relation between subject and object. In other words, since the degree of substantiatedness of scientific knowledge is to be determined through philosophical analysis, a philosophical investigation of knowledge cannot assume certain propositions of the special sciences to be truths substantiated in themselves (it assumes them only as its subject-matter, just as the propositions of "common sense" and philosophical theories). That means that the field of philosophy which is concerned with this problem, i.e., epistemology, must be understood as a specific sphere of theoretical activity 51 fundamentally different from all kinds and types of special scientific knowledge, that is, as a field where the data of the special sciences cannot be used. (Thus the approach to the study of cognition analysed here differs in its attitude to the special sciences from the approach considered in the first chapter: the latter, as we remember, presupposed wide use of the data of mechanics, physics, biology, physiology, and other sciences.)

p We must agree that the task of cognition consists in overcoming errors and obtaining true knowledge. Epistemological reflexion about knowledge indeed plays an important role in the solution of this problem. It is also true that positing the problem of substantiation of knowledge implies a critical attitude to certain areas of existing knowledge. At the same time, the view that “pure” or “ absolute” knowledge can be established is false, and so is the assertion that in substantiating knowledge we must ignore all the facts of the special sciences. In the second part of the present work we shall characterise an approach to the substantiation of knowledge which does not accept these false premises, namely, Marxist-Leninist epistemology.

p The question of substantiation of knowledge was first formulated, in classical form, by Descartes. The positing of this problem and its acuteness were largely due to the specific traits of the socio-cultural and scientific situation in which Descartes’ theoretical activity took place, a situation which was characterised, on the one hand, by the emergence of the bourgeois mode of production (and thus by a growing acuteness of individual self-consciousness) and, on the other hand, by the emergence of the science of the New Times which set itself in sharp opposition to the scholastic tradition. On the whole, however, Descartes’ theoretical arguments transcend the concrete historical situation, for the mode of analysis which he accepted proved to be archetypal and was many times reproduced with various modifications in western bourgeois philosophy.

p The starting point of Descartes’ reasoning is his distrust for the cultural tradition: "I learned not to believe too firmly anything of which I was only persuaded by an example or custom.”^^34^^ "As soon as my age permitted me to be free of the supervision of my tutors, I abandoned the study of letters entirely... resolving not to seek any other science but that which I could find in myself or in the great book of the world...”^^35^^

p For philosophy "had been cultivated by the most excellent minds that ever lived for many centuries, and yet there _{was no}t a single thing in it which could not be 52 disputed and consequently which would not be doubtful...”;^^36^^ that was Descartes’ formulation of the proposition which was later repeated by numerous philosophers who tackled the problem of knowledge. And further: "As for the other sciences, since they borrowed their principles from philosophy, I judged that it was impossible to construct anything that would be solid on such infirm foundations.”^^37^^

p Thus the question here is one of a radical attempt to substantiate the entire system of theoretical knowledge.

p Where could one look for the solution of this problem?

p Descartes starts out from the premise that only that should be taken as true which is cognized as such quite obviously, that is to say, it appears to the mind so clearly and distinctly that there is no reason to call it in question.

p But can we trust our sense perceptions? They often deceive us. Thus towers which seem round from a distance prove to be rectangular at close quarters, while giant statues at the top of these towers seem small if looked at from below. Errors may result not only from the evidence of our external senses but also from that of the internal ones. "...For is there anything more intimate and interior than pain? And still, I have heard on several occasions from persons who had their arms or legs cut off that it sometimes seemed to them that they felt pain in the parts that had been cut off, which gave me reason to believe that I could not be certain that any of my limbs is ailing though I should feel pain in it.”^^38^^

p True, one can believe that there are things with regard to which our senses can hardly deceive us. For instance, it can hardly be doubted that I am sitting here behind this table, informally dressed, holding this paper in my hands, etc. "And how could I negate that these hands and this body are mine? Perhaps, only then when I compare myself to these insensates...”^^39^^ It may very well turn out, however, that all this is merely my dream. "Stopping to consider this idea, I see so clearly that there are no conclusive features or sufficiently unquestionable marks by which it would be possible to distinguish neatly between being awake and sleeping, that I am quite astounded; and my astonishment is such that it can nearly persuade me that I am asleep.”^^40^^

p At the same time, our mind faces such clear and distinct propositions concerning the elementary and universal things studied in arithmetic and geometry (these propositions pertain to the extension of corporeal things, their configuration, magnitude, number, time, etc.), that they 53 cannot be doubted. Arithmetic, geometry, and similar sciences are not concerned about the actual existence in nature of the objects that they study. At the same time, these sciences contain something indubitable and reliable. "For whether I sleep or stay awake, two and three joined together always form the number five, and the square will never have more than four sides.”^^41^^

p But can we not allow, Descartes continues, that God or better say some evil spirit, just as cunning as he is powerful, used all his art to deceive me? In this case, however, the sky, air, earth, colours, sounds, all external objects will be mere illusions and dreams.

p “And then, as I judge sometimes that the others err, even in things which they believe to know with the greatest certainty it may be that he wanted that I should be mistaken each time that I add two and three, or count the number of the sides of a square, or judge about things that are even easier, if one can imagine something easier than that.”^^42^^

p Thus, Descartes concludes, one may doubt even mathematical proofs.

p But is there anything certain, in general? Descartes believes that the original and basic certainty lies in the idea of myself as something existing. "There is no doubt, however, that I exist, if he deceives me; and let him deceive me as he will, he will never make it so that I shall not exist as long as I think myself to be something... This proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time I pronounce it or conceive it in my mind.”^^43^^

p One can doubt anything, but I cannot doubt that I, the doubter, exist, insists Descartes.

p “So, we have so much repugnance to conceiving that that which thinks does not exist at the same time as it thinks, that, notwithstanding all the most extravagant suppositions, we shall not prevent us from believing that this conclusion: I think, therefore I exist, is true, and consequently is the first and the most certain conclusion presenting itself to him who conducts his thinking in an orderly manner.”^^44^^

p Thus, the idea of my existence, self-consciousness, is the most reliable and indubitable truth, asserts Descartes. My essence is thinking, he believes, i.e., "everything that takes place in us in such a way that we perceive it immediately by ourselves".^^45^^ (Thinking thus includes not only understanding but also desire and imagination, that is, all those psychical processes that are accompanied by self-consciousness.) Descartes believes that I therefore cannot deduce my existence from the facts which are 54 expressed in such representations as "I see”, "I walk”, etc., for the content they render is not absolutely unproblematic: "I may myself believe that I see or walk, although I have not opened my eyes or budged from my place; for this sometimes happens when I sleep, and might even happen to me even if I had no body."46 it is quite different when I have in mind only the "consciousness that is in me, which makes me believe that I see or walk...” In the latter case, "the conclusion is so absolutely true that I cannot doubt it".^^47^^

p Man believes, Descartes continues, that he perceives actually existing objects through his sense organs, but their reality can well be doubted. At the same time, there can be no doubt that it seems to me that I perceive them. "In any case, it is certain at least that it seems to me that I see, that I hear, and that I feel warmth.”^^48^^ "For if I conclude that wax is or exists, from seeing it, it is certainly much more evident that I am, or exist myself, from the fact that I see it. It is quite possible that what I see is not in fact wax; it may also happen that I have no eyes even to see anything; but it cannot so happen that when I see or when I think that I see (which I do not distinguish), I that think am not something.”^^49^^

p It is important to stress that from Descartes’ point of view my existence and my thinking are not just two properties equally belonging to reasonable substance (res cogitans). That substance itself is a certain unity of the activity of thinking and its product, the reasoning “I”, so that when activity ceases, “I” itself ceases to exist, too. "/ am, I exist: that is certain; but how long? As long as I think; for it may so happen that if I should cease to think I would at the same time cease to be or exist."^^50^^ Thus, according to Descartes, self-consciousness, the idea of one’s own existence, is characterised not only by clarity and distinctness, i.e., immediate obviousness, but also by the greatest certainty.

p But what, is to be done about recognising the actual existence of the world external relative to consciousness? Are there any convincing instruments for proving it?

p At this point in his arguments Descartes is compelled to invoke God, for his system possesses no other instruments for the solution of this question. Descartes endeavours to persuade the reader that present in consciousness is a clear and distinct idea of an all-perfect being, that is, God, whose existence follows from his very essence. This being cannot be a deceiver, Descartes continues. And that means that everything that is conceived clearly and distinctly, must be true, that is, it must pertain 55 to a really existing object.

p Now, Descartes concludes: "I no longer think verily that I must admit with temerity all things which the senses seem to teach us, but I do not think either that I must generally doubt them all.”^^51^^ "At least it is to be avowed that all the things which I conceive in them clearly and distinctly, that is to say, all the things, generally speaking, that are comprised in the subject-matter of speculative geometry, are really in them.”^^52^^

p Let us single out certain fundamental points in Descartes’ reasoning that are important for our subsequent analysis.

p First of all, Descartes believes that the knowledge by the subject of the states of his own consciousness in their relation to “I” is something different from the knowledge of external objects. From his standpoint that means that the subject has direct access to the subjective sphere, whereas the knowledge of external bodies is only something mediated. For this reason, although cognitive activity in ordinary experience is directed, first of all, at external material objects, and although the role of the subjective world and its characteristics usually remain in the background, as it were, Descartes believes that logically it is the cognition of subjective states in connection with the “I” that produces them that is the simplest matter. (Let us note that it is this point of Descartes’ reasoning that served as the starting point for empiricist introspectionist psychology.)

p Let us further take into account that Descartes links substantiation of knowledge with the degree to which it is assimilated in reflexion. He insists that precisely that knowledge is the genetic and logical starting point of any other which has been most thoroughly reflected upon, that is, contains not only an indication of its object but also a reference to the conditions of its own obviousness and certainty. It is this knowledge, in Descartes’ view, that is contained in the proposition "I think, therefore I exist" which must, in his opinion, be made the foundation of the entire system of knowledge.

p An important element of Descartes’ conception is the thesis that the subject, the thinking “I”, does not exist side by side with his activity but is its product and at the same time permanent condition, that is, it exists only insofar as the activity of thinking is realised (and is in a certain sense even implied by that activity).

p Finally, let us point out Descartes’ fundamental distinction between judgement about objective reality and positing the reality itself. Precisely these fundamental 56 elements of the Cartesian conceptions were assimilated by later idealistic philosophy in its attempt to solve the problem of substantiation of knowledge.

p Let us critically analyse some of these attempts and also Descartes’ reasoning.

p In Descartes’ view, only those propositions fully satisfy the criteria of clarity and distinctness whose content is correlated with the act of subjective reflexion. For instance, mathematical propositions are only clear and distinct to the extent to which we do not ascribe an objectively real meaning to them (that is, we consider the properties of a triangle without going into whether triangles exist in reality). In principle, Descartes believes, sense perception can also be clear and distinct but only if we correlate it solely with the states of our consciousness (i.e., include it in the act of self-consciousness) ignoring the question of the objectiveness of its meaning. It is easy in ordinary life to neglect the objective meaning of mathematical propositions; mathematics is therefore, in Descartes’ view, an absolutely reliable science and a model of science in general. It is extremely difficult to apply this operation to sense perceptions, therefore sciences based on the sense organs’ data are far from the ideals of strict science. To be more precise, they can approach these ideals only to the extent to which they can be mathematised. Sense perceptions, Descartes believes, are often clear but they are rarely distinct (“I call clear that which presents and manifests itself to an attentive mind; ...[I call] distinct that which is so precise and different from everything else that it does not contain in itself anything that does not appear manifest to him who properly considers it... For example, when someone feels strong pain, the consciousness that he has of that pain is clear in his view, and yet it is not always distinct, for ordinarily he confuses it with the false judgements which he makes about the nature of that which he believes to take place in the wounded part...”).^^53^^

p These arguments confirm the rationalist nature of Descartes’ epistemological conception.

p But can we agree that the act of cognition of the states of one’s own consciousness, that is, the act of subjective reflexion, is a means of obtaining the most obvious and indubitable assertions, without departing from the positions of empiricism in epistemology?

p This possibility, far from being excluded logically, actually proved to be one of the principal ways of the development of metaphysical empiricism in West European philosophy—a path on which empiricism becomes subjective idealist phenomenalism.

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p Attempts at cardinal solution of the philosophical problem of substantiation of knowledge through subjectivist interpretation of the sense data took a most sophisticated and technically elaborate form in the doctrine of the "sense data" which was the subject-matter of lively debate in English and American philosophical literature in the first half of the present century.

p The adherents of this doctirne (which in different variants developed within the philosophical systems of neorealism, critical realism, and logical positivism) tried to combine the view that obvious and directly given knowledge expresses, in one way or another, the subject’s reflexion about himself, with the assumption that experience contains knowledge about really existing objects, and not merely to combine these propositions but to deduce the latter from the former without invoking God, unlike Descartes. With this aim in view, certain specific objects, "sense data”, the knowledge of which is intuitive and indubitable, were postulated to be the results of reflexion about the content of perception.

p Here is a typical mode of introducing "sense data" as objects of epistemological study: "When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt. I can doubt whether it is a tomato that I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted piece of wax. I can doubt whether there is any material thing there at all. Perhaps what I took for a tomato was really a reflection; perhaps I am even the victim of some hallucination. One thing however I cannot doubt: that there exists a Ted patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape standing out from a background of other colour-patches, and having a certain visual depth, and that this whole field of colour is directly present to my consciousness.”^^54^^

p It is these colour-patches, sound tones, etc. that are regarded as "sense data”. Importantly, they are not identified with sense perceptions. The "sense data" are ascribed the status of objects of a special kind while sense perceptions are the result of direct, intuitive knowledge of these objects. The elementary process underlying any cognition is regarded as special “sensing”, direct perception of the "sense data" in the act of directly grasping their content. At the same time, the "sense data" are not material things either, for possession of certain "sense data" is no guarantee yet of the actual existence of the material object to which they will prove to pertain. Each cognizing subject has his own private "sense data" different from the "sense data" of another person.

p H. H. Price, one of the well-known theoreticians of this conception, thus describes the main characteristics of "sense 58 data": (1) They are individuals, not universal. (2) They are not substances, for they are created ex nihilo and return in nihil; they depend for their existence, origin and properties on the state of the person sensing. (3) They may be regarded as events, but they are not phases of material things. (4) They are not phases of the conscious subject, for they are in some respects constituents of the surfaces of extra-cerebral physical objects existing in this sense "at a long distance from the skull”. (5) Hence, unlike other events, they seem to be phases of no substance and inhere in none; they are thus neither mental nor physical.^^55^^

p This description shows the paradoxical nature of the objects postulated. The attempt at reconciling the thesis of immediate, intuitive, unquestionable nature of grasping the "sense data" (a thesis which compels the theoreticians of this conception to emphasise the private character of these specific objects, their dependence on the cognizing subject) with the view that in actual experience we deal with physical, material objects rather than with the subject’s states, induced the theoreticians to ascribe incompatible features to the "sense data”.

p Indeed, what is a real material object and how does knowledge of it arise in the opinion of the supporters of this conception?

p A material object is nothing but a definite ensemble, class, or family of "sense data”, reply these theoreticians. This family consists both of actual "sense data" existing at a given moment (which, as we have been told already, are created ex nihilo and return in nihil) and of an infinite number of possible "sense data" which are not actually present in the sense field at the present moment but can become real under definite conditions. There was a debate among the adherents of this conception as to whether the status of real existence should be ascribed to potential "sense data”.

p Potential "sense data" are linked with actually existing ones by definite dependences arranged in series. All "sense data”, both actual and potential, pertaining to the given material object, are divided into two subclasses: those which characterise the “real” or “standard” features of the given object vs. those which constitute its distorted form, its “appearance”. A round object will from a certain angle be perceived as an elliptical one, while a red-coloured object in unusual lighting will look black, etc. On these grounds the "sense data" pertaining to the given material object were divided into “nuclear” and “non-standard”.

p Analysing the logic of such reasoning, we observe, first of all, that recognising the dependence of the "sense data" 59 on the subject and his states is apparently incompatible with ascribing these “data” to the material objects themselves which exist objectively and really (“at a long distance from the skull”); we even observe here an attempt at reducing the latter to an ensemble of "sense data”. Indeed, it is well known that the clarity and detail with which my consciousness perceives the various sense qualities of an object depend on the concentration of my attention, on my absorption in the procedure of considering the aspects of the given object. Moreover, a close scrutiny of the object may reveal some properties which have previously been unnoticed. But that means that the act of generation of "sense data”, which are regarded as existing "at a long distance from the skull”, is determined by the subject’s awareness!

p It also proves untenable that "sense data" as objects sui generis are discovered by reflexion about experiences, about sense perception. Sense perception is always directed, in one way or another, at actually existing material objects. These objects include, among others, mirror images, artificial presentation of some object, etc. It is a different matter that the subject may err in the process of perception, taking one object for another, e.g., a mirror image of the given object or its cleverly made lookalike for the object itself. The subject may erroneously assess the conditions of perception of an object, so that numerous illusions arise, which are analysed in detail in the modern psychology of perception. (Hallucinations are different from perception, including illusory perceptions, not only in that there is no real object corresponding to it but also in its own subjective mode.) Errors of perception are thus quite possible and occur not infrequently. It is important to stress, however, that, first, perception is always aimed at real material objects rather than at "sense data”, and second, that ordinary practice always has quite definite methods permitting to separate erroneous perceptions and illusions from those to which real perceptions correspond. Of course, in practical experience tasks have to be solved which involve qualities and sensual aspects of objects (colours, spatial forms, sounds, etc.) regarded as special objects by the theoreticians of modern empiricism. But the point is that a knowledge of these aspects is derivative from the knowledge of real objects as a whole. In other words, in real experience the dependence is the reverse of that assumed in the conception analysed here. "Sense data" as objects sui generis, neither material nor psychical, and the corresonding elementary cognitive process of “sensing” are by no means introduced into the 60 epistemological conception as a result of analysing the structure of genuine sense experience (as claimed by the authors of the doctrine) but postulated as a mode of solving the problem of substantiating knowledge on the basis of accepting the thesis about the existence of immediate and unquestionable knowledge containing a reference to the cognizing subject.

p The very task of identifying and reidentifying those aspects of objects which were hypostatised as "sense data" (i.e., the task of defining whether we deal with one and the same single colour shade, the given individual note, etc., rather than simply with two similar individual representatives of one and the same colour or sound as a sense universal), can only be solved if the sense properties referred to are correlated with material objects instead of being regarded as independent essences. Only by solving the task of identification and reidentification of material objects (and that task has a definite mode of solution in experience) can we identify and reidentify the separate sense aspects and qualities of the objects. Thus we can assert that we contemplate precisely the given colour spectrum rather than a similar copy of the same sensual “kind” only if we correlate it with that material object in which it inheres, e.g., the given picture, distinguishing this object from all the others (we distinguish the original from its copy or reproduction or clever imitation). We can assert with certainty that we hear the same performance of a symphony (this question may arise if we are compelled to stop listening for a while) only if we can reidentify the material source of sound and the real objective situation, that is, if we discover that we are hearing the same musicians, see the same conductor, sit in the same concert hall, etc. Thus, if "sense data" existed as independent objects, they could be neither identified nor reidentified. In this case, however, they could not form the foundation of experience.

p Let us now analyse the question of whether propositions about material objects can be deduced from the propositions about actual and potential "sense data”. This doctrine in its linguistic version, developed by logical positivists, asserts that an utterance about a material object is equivalent to a set of utterances about "sense data" (actual and potential).

p Let us take into account, however, that this set is infinite, for it must include indications of all possible conditions (the point of view, the position, the conditions of lighting, etc.) under which the given object will be observed. Each condition will characterise "sense data" that 61 are somewhat different from all the others. But elements of an infinite set cannot be enumerated in finite time, while the procedure of identification and reidentification of material objects is, in actual experience, carried out rather quickly and, as a rule, without mistakes.

p Let us further consider that utterances about material objects are characterised by a specific indeterminateness and openness with regard to the possible sets of "sense data" which are assumed to be relevant to them. Thus, the statement "There is a car in the garage" does not specify anything about the car’s colour, size, shape, style, make and so on. Hence if we start to draw up a “sense-datum” analysis of the content of this utterance we shall quickly come to the conclusion that there are a great many variants of this analysis, and whatever variant we should choose, we have no guarantee that the choice was made correctly (e.g., we may include "red sense data" in our set, and the car may prove to be blue, and so on).^^56^^

p The most essential objection to the analysis of the meaning of utterances in “sense-datum” terms is that this analysis cannot in fact be implemented in pure form even if we accept the task as meaningful. Explicating the content of an utterance about a material object in “sense-datum” terms necessarily includes a reference to both an observer and the conditions of observation. Both assume the concept of material objects (the subject is not, of course, a material object only, but it is this quality that is essential in this case, that is, the fact that he can change his position relative to other objects, move among them, etc.). Thus, from the standpoint of the conception here analysed the utterance "There is a car in the garage" means: "If the observer enters the garage and performs certain actions (e.g., turns his head in a given direction, moves his hands in a given manner, etc.), he will have the following set of ’sense data’.” It is important to note that this analysis implies a normal functioning of the observer’s sense organs.^^57^^

p Naturally, the concepts of the observer, his sense organs, action, the place of observation, direction of observation, etc., characterise definite material objects, their relations, states, processes in which they participate, etc. Thus an attempt to give an analysis of the meaning of utterance only in terms of "sense data" is unsuccessful, for it is impossible to avoid using terms pertaining to material objects in the analytic sentence. All attempts by the adherents of the “sense-datum” conception to evade this fundamental difficulty have been fruitless.

p Let us point out another paradox to which this doctrine 62 leads. Supposing I know that you have a magnet hidden in your pocket. If I stand at your side, compass in hand, the needle of the compass that should point north will deviate affected by the hidden magnet. This fact is easily explainable in terms of material objects and their causal connections. However, if I adhere to the “sense-datum” conception, I must make the strange conclusion that actual events (the actual “data” pertaining to the behaviour of the compass) are conditioned by merely potential ones (the "sense data" pertaining to the hidden compass).^^38^^

It thus proved impossible to substantiate the real sensual experiences to which, in the empiricists’ view, all cognition is ultimately reducible, by the doctrine of the “ sensedata”, essences of a special kind having a private nature and dependent on the subject. The concept of material object independent of the individual observer is a necessary characteristic of experience directed at the external world, the kind of characteristic that can in no way be reduced to some ensemble of "sense data”.