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p According to Piaget, the subject’s activity serves as a means of reproducing the characteristics of the real object in the system of knowledge; in the view of other adherents of the naturalistic model of cognition, who focus on the subject’s active character, it is in general impossible to regard the existence of a real object of cognition as independent of the subject’s activity. Cognition is in this case no longer treated as reflection but merely as an ensemble of the subject’s individual external actions or operations. Adherents of these conceptions formulate a number of naturalistic, metaphysical-materialistic premises as their starting point (both the subject and the object being included in the structure of natural reality, and the subject’s actions or operations being interpreted as physical, or material), ending with constructing systems of subjectiveidealistic epistemology.

p Here belongs the epistemological and methodological conception of operaticnalism that was rather influential until recently among Western philosophers and natural scientists. Operationalism takes into account a very important characteristic of the cognitive process, namely the fact that in this process man introduces certain artificially created objects between himself and the cognized object: devices, measuring instruments, etc. Let us note that this fact is not duly appreciated in Piaget’s theory. However, the objects or “mediators” used in cognition are regarded in operationalism as fundamentally the same as the rest of the natural bodies. That these objects are produced by mun, not nature, and that they are included in a system of socio-cultural ties, is of no great epistemological significance for this conception.

p The main ideas of operationalism were formulated by P. W. Bridgman, a well-known American physicist.

p Bridgman drew attention to the fact that the special theory of relativity not only changed essentially our views of the world but also necessitated a new approach to a number of logical and epistemological problems involved in the interpretation of the mathematical formalisms used in physics and in specifying the meaning of physical concepts. "It was a great shock to discover that classical concepts, 39 accepted unquestioningly, were inadequate to meet the actual situation, and the shock of this discovery has resulted in a critical attitude toward our whole conceptual structure.”^^20^^

p In thinking about the logical meaning of the procedures applied by Einstein in defining the basic concepts of the special theory of relativity, Bridgman concluded that despite the generally held view that most concepts of classical physics characterise the properties of objects, of things, the actual meaning of physical concepts lies in an ensemble of experimental operations or, to be more precise, in an ensemble of measurement procedures. Bridgman reasons, for instance, that we evidently know what “length” is if we can determine the length of a concrete object. To do so, we have to perform certain physical operations. "The concept of length is therefore fixed when the operations by which length is measured are fixed: that is, the concept of length involves as much as and nothing more than the set of operations by which length is determined. In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations: the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations.”^^2^^^ If the concept is "mental, as of mathematical continuity, the operations are mental operations”. Bridgman indicates here that "we must demand that the set of operations equivalent to any concept be a unique set"^^22^^ (i.e., only one set of operations corresponds to each concept).

p In this connection, Bridgman continues, it is easy to show that such concepts of classical physics as "absolute time" or "absolute simultaneity" are devoid of meaning, for there are no physical operations that could be used to ascribe the absolute time predicate to some event.

p If we take into account that the operations to which a physical concept is equivalent are actual physical operations, the conclusion is inevitable in operationalism that concepts can only be defined in the range of actual experiment, becoming meaningless in regions as yet untouched by experiment. Therefore, Bridgman believes, we cannot express any assertions about these domains. And if we do make these assertions, we must regard them us conventionalised extrapolation, of the looseness of which we must be fully conscious, and the justification of which is in the experiment of the future.

p Thus, before the emergence of the special theory of relativity, it was believed that any two events A and B possessed this property with regard to the time of their realisation, that A takes place either before B or after it or simultaneously with it. This assertion seemed to be a 40 simpie description of the behaviour of objects given in experience. But the experience itself which this assertion claimed to describe was very narrow. When the range of experience was broadened, and research became concerned with bodies moving at high velocities, the untenability of the concept of simultaneity used by classical physics was discovered.

p Einstein showed, Bridgman writes, that the operations which permitted the statement of simultaneity of two events involved measurement by an observer, so that simultaneity is not an absolute property of the two events but one involving the relation of the two events to the observer, the subject, his frame of reference, the velocity of these events relative to the observer’s frame of reference.

p Bridgman makes further specifications in his methodological conception using a detailed operational analysis of the concept of length as his proving ground.

p He asks this question: by what operations do we measure the length of any concrete physical object? The measurement of the objects of ordinary experiment is effected by a procedure which is crudely described as follows. A rod is used as the measure of length; it is imposed on the object in such a way that one of the ends of the rod coincides with one of the ends of the object, then the position of the second end of the rod is marked on the object, after which the rod is moved along the line that is the continuation of its previous position in such a way that the first end of the rod coincides with the previous position of the second end. This procedure is repeated until the second end of the object is reached. The number of separate applications of the rod is called the length of the object in this case.

p Bridgman points out that the operation described here, which appears so simple, is in actual fact very complex. It is necessary to satisfy a whole series of conditions to really measure the length of an object. Thus we must be certain that the temperature of the rod is normal, one at which the length of given obiects is usually measured, otherwise we would have to introduce correctives in the results of our measurements to account for the effect of the temperature changes. If we measure the vertical length of an object, we have to account for the influence of the gravitation forces on the length of the measuring rod. Finally, we must be certain that the measuring rod is not a magnet and is not affected by electric forces. All of these conditions are usually taken into account by the physicist who makes measurements with some concrete aim in view.

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p However, Bridgman continues, in operational analysis we must go even further in determining the conditions of measurement and specify all the details relevant to the movement of the rod in measurement: e.g., the precise path of the rod in space, its velocity and acceleration. In practice, when objects of ordinary experience are measured, these conditions are neglected. And that is quite understandable, for in ordinary experiment variations of these conditions do not affect the end result.

p But we must recognise, Bridgman asserts, that experiment is always subject to errors, and that extending the boundaries of experiment and increasing the precision of measurement may reveal that the conditions that now seem to leave the result of measurements unaffected actually seriously affect it. "In principle the operations by which length is measured should be uniquely specified. If we have more than one set of operations, we have more than one concept, and strictly there should be a separate name to correspond to each different set of operations.”^^23^^

p If we want to measure the length of a moving object, the operations applied will be different. At first glance, it will appear enough to climb on the object and repeat the procedure that was used in measuring the length of the object at rest. In actual fact the situation is somewhat more complicated. A full specification of the operations employed assumes several additional conditions. In what way shall we overtake the object with the measuring rod in our hands? Shall we first overtake the moving object and then try to jump on it, or shall we await the moment when the object approaches us? If the object moves rather fast, one obviously cannot jump on it directly from an immovable support, and we shall have to use some special device, such as a moving automobile.

p Since operations applied by Einstein for defining the concept of length, are different from the operations used for measuring length in ordinary experience, Einstein’s “length” does not mean the same as the “length” of ordinary experience. These are different concepts, although they do have some features in common: where the velocity of the moving body relative to the measuring system reaches zero, the operations of measuring the moving object coincide with those applied in measuring the length of the object at rest.

p Bridgman’s epistemological thinking on the nature of surrounding reality is directly connected with the essence of operational analysis.

p An analysis of the logical meaning of this concept allows Bridgman to conclude that the attribute of physical reality 42 is ascribed to those concepts which may be defined by different sets of physical operations independent of each other.

p We bear in mind that the main idea of operationalism is that each set of operations essentially corresponds to one concept only. If two (or more) sets of operations independent of each other yield the same results, we may, from the operationalist standpoint, conditionally identify the differing concepts corresponding to different sets, regarding them as one concept to which the status of physical reality is ascribed. Such a concept appears as an invariant relative to different sets of operations or as an expression of some correlation between different sets of physical phenomena. At the same time we should not forget, Bridgman insists, that the identification of the results of different sets of measurements is, to a certain degree, conditional, being justified by the available measurements only; future experiments may reveal discrepancies in the results of measurements belonging to different sets, and in this case a single concept will have to be “split” into two or more, that may or may not have the status of physical realities.

p We thus see that the basis of operationalism is emphasis on the uniqueness of the experimental procedures performed by the experimenter, the need for singling out all the physical operations in defining concepts. Continuing this line of reasoning, Bridgman quite logically infers that, strictly speaking, each operation is unique, being implemented by the given single individual at a given time and place. The operations must not be generalised, as there is no method to guarantee the future of such generalisation.

p But if one accepts these theoretical premises, the conclusion is inevitable that not only non-operational but also operational definitions of concepts are in fact impossible. A. C. Benjamin, an American researcher in operationalism, remarks: "Another operation, however similar to the first, must be a different one since it will be distinguished at least by spatial or temporal location. Two measurements of the length of a given object, even if the results are the same, can be distinguished. Now if a concept is always to be defined by an operation, and each operation is a particular, the concept itself takes on the particularity of its mode of definition. Not only will there be a difference between the tapeline length of a field and the triangulation length (even if the measured values are the same), but there will be a difference in meaning between all individual tapeline lengths of the field (again, even though the measured values are the same).”^^24^^ But concepts defined in this way are devoid of any cognitive value at all, for they 43 essentially cease to be concepts, which must, as is well known, capture something that different situations have in common. This taking one of the basic premises of operationalism to its logical end comes into a decisive contradiction with the statement of Bridgman himself that physical operations in terms of which definitions of concepts are given must be repeatable and always realisable. Moreover, Bridgman writes: "Operational definitions, in spite of their precision, are in application without significance unless the situations to which they are applied are sufficiently developed so that at least two methods are known of getting to the terminus.”^^25^^

p It might be assumed that this contradiction in the foundation of the conception could be eliminated by assuming that each concept is synonymous to a set of repeatable operations rather than to one single operation. It is easy to see, however, that introducing a set of operations does not eliminate the main logical difficulty. Any two operations are similar in some points and different in others. Unifying a series of operations in a single set (or a single class) synonymous to the meaning of some concept implies, in the first place the singling out of some general feature or property inherent in all these operations and not definable by an operational mode (operational definitions thus necessarily assume the existence of some characteristics interpreted non-operationally). Then again, the existence of a criterion is assumed which indicates the degree to which the operations must be similar to form a single set (depending on the required degree of similarity, different sets of operations may be specified to which different operationally defined concepts will correspond). Inasmuch as operationalism is in principle incapable of indicating such a criterion, its basic methodological assertion that different concepts correspond to different sets of physical operations proves to be untenable. Indeed, why can we in one case include different operations in a single set, correlating with one and only one concept, while other occasions, different sets of operations (even if they are expressed in identical or similar results) are said to characterise different concepts? Then, if we sometimes refer, for practical convenience, different sets of operations to one concept, why can this reference be regarded merely as a temporal procedure, pragmatically convenient but methodologically unjustifiable?

p A necessary methodological correlate of Bridgman’s position is subjective idealism.

p The Logic of Modern Physics contains, along with subjectivist general philosophical assertions, some statements 44 in the spirit of natural-scientific materialism.^^26^^ In Bridgman’s later works the subjective-idealist position following from operationalism is realised more clearly and implemented quite consistently. In his book The Nature of Physical Theory he defends undisguised solipsism: "It seems to me that as I have stated it, the solipsist position, if indeed this be the solipsist position, is a simple statement of what direct observation gives me, and we have got to adjust our thinking so that it will not seem repugnant.”^^27^^

p In one of his works Bridgman argues that there is no operation to prove that the universe arose more than five minutes ago, "for any of our methods of proof are things that we do nou>".^^28^^

p But the most significant circumstance that has determined the rejection, becoming evident now, of operationalism as a methodology and an epistemology by the wide circles of scientists abroad is not so much the self- contradictory nature of operationalism as the wide gap between the operationalist recommendations and the actual course of the development of science, a gap that became obvious and clearly realised in the 1940s and 1950s. In the 1930s it was sometimes stated that operationalism is something generally accepted in physics,^^^9^^ whereas at present the conviction is widespread that operationalism is very far from understanding the real problems of scientific methodology.

p The fact is that scientists prefer to use the so-called open concepts in the actual practice of scientific cognition, i.e., concepts whose significance relative to an experimental situation is not fully defined (since it is impossible to fully exhaust all these situations beforehand). As for operational definitions, they characterise closed concepts, for they fix the meaning of concepts only for some definite conditions.

p The gist of the matter is that the so-called open concepts, with which science mostly operates, function within the framework of systems of theoretical knowledge. Operations of measuring certain magnitudes have a meaning in these frameworks, characterised by definite premises, ontological assumptions, and modes of specifying a definite aspect of objective reality. In other words, the measurement operations, far from being capable of specifying the meaning of scientific concepts, do not, as a rule, exist in isolation. As for the fundamental question of the standards and norms to which production and evaluation of theoretical knowledge (and knowledge in general) is subordinated, it cannot in principle be solved in an operationalist framework, as has been said above.

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p Most participants at the 1954 symposium on the Present State of" Operationalism^^30^^ came to the conclusion that "if the rule of operationalist caution is strictly and consistently applied, physics must reduce to a mere record of isolated data".^^31^^

p The question naturally, arises, if operationalism as an epistemology and general methodology of science must be rejected, does that mean that the technique of operationalist analysis has absolutely no rational content?

p We have noted already that, although most concepts of science cannot be defined in terms which fix the results of measurement (and it is in this sense that operational definitions are understood in strict operationalism), these definitions still have a certain significance. They are used when a general non-operational definition indicating the specific properties and relations of the concept defined has not yet been worked out. "We may not be able to give a general answer to such questions as ’What is length?’, What is causality?’, ’What is simultaneity?’, etc. But.as long as we can, in most concrete cases, determine length and simultaneity through measuring operations, as long as we can determine the position of the body at a time t from its position at t, and the momentum lent to it, we dan say that the words ‘length’, ‘simultaneity’, and ‘causality’ have quite a definite unambiguous meaning,"^^32^^ writes D. P. Gorsky.

p An "operational definition" is not a definition in the proper sense of the word but a formulation of the empirical conditions of application of a theoretical concept, one and the same theoretical concept amenable to several empirical interpretations through different "operational definitions”.

p Evaluating the significance of operationalism for the methodology of science in general, we conclude that Bridgman’s emphasis (following Einstein) on linking up theoretical constructs with experimental operations was not without a foundation, although the nature of this link was given a fundamentally erroneous interpretation in operationalism.

p “Bridgman’s operationalism”, [remarks V. S. Shvyrev], "reflected in a distorted form the indubitable fact of the methodology of natural science that the establishment of the meaning of ... theoretical concepts ... implies fixing certain empirical dependences between experimentally reproduced situations and the consequences, also empirically fixed, of these operations.”^^33^^

p As we see, the significance of the technique of operational analysis is not very great. This technique may only be fruitfully used if the meaning of the measurement 46 operations and the nature of their reference to some scientific concept are already given, that is to say, if there already exist certain systems of knowledge characterising the state of affairs in the objective world independent of the subject and his operations. Any elementary measurement operation already presupposes the singling out of the objective magnitude or parameter which is to be measured, as well as “incorporation” of the results obtained into the system of relations between the mathematical objects (the result of measurement being expressed in mathematical form). As for the norms of obtaining and evaluating the systems of the very knowledge correlated with objects, this question is insoluble from the positions of operationalism as an epistemological and methodological conception. In other words, one cannot arrive at an understanding of the nature of knowledge and the character of the cognitive relation within the framework of this conception.

p We have endeavoured to show that the naturalistic interpretation of the cognitive relation between subject and object as a kind of interaction between two natural systems, leaves a number of fundamental epistemological problems unsolved, regardless of the share of activity ascribed to each of the poles of interaction. Here belong questions of the interpretation of the nature and character of the norms of acquiring and evaluating knowledge, and those of the place and role in the cognitive process of such a specific structure as consciousness.

p Starting out from metaphysical materialism, the adherents of the naturalist model of cognition are compelled to make inevitable concessions to subjectivism, siding, in some cases, entirely with subjective idealism and giving up the materialist theory of reflection.

p Let us once again note that revealing the untenability of the epistemological conceptions formulated by the supporters of the naturalist interpretation of cognition, in no way signifies ignoring the real facts that are given a false interpretation in these conceptions (some of them were discovered by the upholders of the conceptions criticised here).

p Indeed, man as the cognizing subject has a body liable to the action of mechanical, physical, chemical, and biological laws. This and other factors have a definite bearing on the mechanisms of implementing cognition. The whole point is, however, that man’s characteristic as a subject acting and cognizing in a specifically human manner cannot be understood from the natural specific features of man’s body. It proves impossible to interpret the fundamental 47 and most essential traits of the cognitive relation within the mode of presentation of the subject-object problem discussed in this chapter.

It is all evidently a question of philosophical and scientific theoretical interpretation of the facts described and of evaluation of their significance for epistemological research.