p On August 20, 1939, Hitler addressed a message to Stalin to say that a "crisis may arise any day" and it might involve the Soviet Union unless it agreed to sign a non- aggression treaty with Germany. "1 therefore again propose”, the message said, "that you receive my Foreign Minister on Tuesday, August 22, but, at the latest on Wednesday, August 23. The Reich Foreign Minister has the fullest powers to draw up and sign the non-aggression pact." ^^19^^°

p It was impossible to decline the German overtures any longer. For it was necessary to forestall the outbreak of war across the Soviet Western border, when Soviet forces in the Far East were already engaged in fierce fighting against the Japanese aggressors in the area of the Khalkin-Gol River, that is there was a serious danger of war breaking out in the West and in the East at once, witb the USSR having to fight it without any allies. In no way overestimating the value of the treaties signed with Germany, the Soviet government still found it necessary to accept the German offer this time.

p It was in the evening of August 21, following the inconclusive last session of the conversations between the British, French and Soviet military missions, that the Soviet government finally agreed to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs coming to Moscow on August 23.

p But that did not mean that the Soviet government had given up all further attempts to get an agreement concluded with Britain and France. On the following morning, foreign news agency reporters in Moscow were told that Ribbentrop’s arrival for the conclusion of the non-aggression pact was not inconsistent with the continuation of negotiations between the British, French and Soviet military delegations with a view to organising resistance to aggression. On the contrary, the conclusion of the non-aggression pact was quite compatible with the conclusion of a triple alliance between France, Britain and the USSR, These acts 265 did not cancel each other out at all. The Anglo-Franco- Soviet pact, supplemented with a military agreement, had the aim of checking Germany, if she persisted in her aggressive designs. For the USSR and Germany to have concluded a non-aggression pact would have meant reducing the tension between the two countries. ^^191^^

p Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow on August 23 to sign the non-aggression pact.

p One cannot help noting in this context a difference of principle between the approach of the governments of Britain and France, on the one hand, and that of Germany, on the other, to negotiations with the USSR. The German government unequivocally declared through its Ambassador in Moscow that it wished to conclude a non-aggression treaty with the USSR. The German head of government addressed a special message to Stalin on this matter. There was the German Foreign Minister in Moscow. These facts could not but point to Germany’s true desire to conclude a treaty with the USSR without any delay. But all that was in sharp contrast to the attitude of London and Paris to the negotiations with the Soviet Union. While the Soviet government had spent months on end for inconclusive negotiations with Britain and France, it took but one day to draw up the text of the Soviet-German Treaty of NonAggression and sign it.

p The Treaty, signed in the small hours of August 24, contained the commitments of non-aggression (Article I) and a statement on refusing assistance to a power attacking one of the contracting parties (Article II). Both parties undertook to inform one another on matters involving their common interests (Article III) and to stay out of any group of powers, directly or indirectly spearheaded against the other party. The Treaty was concluded for a term of 10 years.

p The Soviet government’s decision to conclude this treaty was an enforced, but the only right one, too, under the circumstances of the day because there had been no chance of ever creating an Anglo-Franco-Soviet coalition.

p Conferring with the French Ambassador on August 23, 1939, Molotov emphasised that the Soviet government had decided to conclude the treaty with Germany only after it had definitely found that it could achieve nothing positive through the Anglo-Franco-Soviet conversations.^^192^^

p In an interview for Izvestia, People’s Commissar for Defence Voroshilov also pointed out that the USSR had concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany because the "military conversations with France and Britain have reached a deadlock because of insurmountable differences." ^^193^^

p Even tho French military attache in the USSR, Palasse admitted that throughout the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks, the Soviet government showed its sincere interest in the conclusion of the Three-Power agreement and that to sign a treaty with Germany was the only right step for it to take under the circumstances. Writing on August 27 about the position of the Soviet government, he said: "1 still believe that, fearful of the excessive strengthening of Germany, it would have preferred an agreement with France and with Britain, should it have proved possible at all.” ^^194^^

p The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars and Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, declared at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR a few days later that since the negotiations with Britain and France showed there was no grovind for expecting to conclude a mutual assistance pact with them, the Soviet government could not fail to consider other ways of removing the danger of war between Germany and the USSR. "Our duty”, he stressed, "is to think of the interests of the Soviet people and of the interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The more so since we are firmly convinced that the interests of the USSR coincide with the basic interests of the people of other countries." ^^195^^

p The German government, while concluding the treaty of non-aggression with the USSR, pledged itself not to encroach on Soviet land. At the same time, it was to relinquish its plans of alienation of the Soviet Ukraine and to create a vassal "Ukrainian state" as, equally, the plans for its domination of the Baltic states including the idea of turning them into a springboard from which to attack the USSR.

p By signing the non-aggression pact with Germany, the Soviet government contributed towards peace-keeping in the Far Eastern border areas of the USSR. The conclusion of the treaty caused confusion among the governing quarters of Japan which counted on Germany as their main ally in a war against the USSR. "The news of the conclusion of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and 267 Germany has produced a staggering impression over there, causing obvious disarray, particularly among the militarists and the fascist camp”,^^196^^ said a message from the Soviet Embassy in Japan. The Hiranuma government, which was building its policy on anti-Soviet collaboration with Germany fell. Japan had to reconsider her plans and to refrain from invading the Soviet Far East for a while.

p Japan found her position weakened in respect of China as well. On August 26, 1939, the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow, Yang Chieh said in a conversation with S. A. Lozovsky, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, that he welcomed the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact of non-aggression because that treaty "will, no doubt, be a blow to Japan.” ^^197^^

p The Soviet Government did, naturally, realise that it was impossible to rely on the non-aggression pact with Germany providing safety from aggression. It was clear that as soon as Nazis found themselves strong enough to do so, they would bring all their forces into action against the USSR.^^198^^

When the Soviet-German non-aggression pact came up for ratification in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, it was stressed that it "cannot blunt our vigilance".^^199^^