p Even after the signing of the Soviet-German Treaty of Non-Aggression, the Soviet government was still interested in co-operating with Britain and France. As the French Ambassador, Naggiar communicated to the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, L. Steinhardt on August 23, Molotov had told him that "the non-aggression pact with Germany is not inconsistent with an alliance of mutual assistance between Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union”. The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars noted, however, the difficulties arising from Poland’s refusal to accept Soviet aid. ^^20^^° Molotov also emphasised that the SovietFrench Treaty remained in force as it stood.^^201^^

p The French military attache in Moscow, Palasse, cabled to Paris on the same day: "I still consider that for the USSR to have settled the matter by concluding an 268 agreement with Germany was nothing but the best of the two evils, and, perhaps, a means of exercising pressure with a view to bringing about a sound and integrally well-welded coalition as soon as possible which, as it has always seemed to me, is an object of the Soviet leaders’ desire."^^202^^ On August 24, the Foreign Office informed the British embassy in Washington about Molotov’s satement that " negotiations with France and Britain could be continued somewhat later, say in a week".^^203^^

p However, the British and French military missions were ordered back to London and Paris. When they paid a courtesy call on Voroshilov on August 25, the latter told them: "Unfortunately, we have not succeeded in coming to agreement this time. But let us hope that on another occasion our work will be more successful." ^^204^^

p The matter came up again during the conversation the Soviet Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, S. A. Lozovsky, had with Yang Chieh, the Chinese Ambassador, on August 26. Replying to the Ambassador’s question as to whether the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations would continue, the Deputy People’s Commissar declared that "negotiations with Britain and France went on for five months, and the departure of the delegation is but an episode in these talks. Delegations come and go, but the issue of the battle for peace remains. This departure is not due in any way to the conclusion of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany, but to a lack of agreement on a number of issues. Should Britain and France accept the proposals of the Soviet government, the possibility of a treaty being concluded with them cannot be ruled out.. . At the present time, the negotiations are being suspended, but their resumption depends on Britain and France".^^205^^

p What was to be done further on was an issue that came up for debate at a Frencli government meeting on August 24. Daladier expressed the view that negotiations with the Russians should be resumed. On the following day, one of his assistants, R. Genebrier suggested that a former French Air Minister Pierre Cot (who had consistently advocated co-operation with the USSR ever since 1933) should be sent to Moscow, in the hope that he could bring off the process of concluding an agreement. Doumenc also suggested that it was still possible to conclude an alliance 269 with the USSR. Yet no positive decisions on the matter were taken by the French government.^^206^^

p The Chamberlain government made feverish attempts in those days, however, to secure a last-minute agreement with the rulers of the Nazi Reich, having lost all interest in the negotiations witli the Soviet Union. So the events in the closing week of August of 1939 finally confirmed that what London and Paris sought was not an agreement with the USSR, but yet another imperialist collusion with the Nazi Reich.

The course of events made it quite clear how far-sighted and correct the Soviet government’s policy was. Just as it feared, Britain and Prance did not offer the slightest aid to Poland after she had been attacked by the Nazi Reich. As long as there was a war going on in the Fast of Europe, the French forces were sitting it out behind the Maginot Line. That was the beginning of what came to be called the "phoney war”. Had the USSR imprudently assumed any unilateral commitments at the time of the Anglo- Franco-Soviet talks while the British and French governments dodged all concrete obligations regarding active opposition to the aggressor in the West with fairly large forces, the Soviet Union could have found itself in a state of war with Germany without any true allies.