p Since Hitler did not consider Germany for the time being to be adequately prepared to attack the USSR, he told Ribbentrop that it was "necessary to stage a new Rapallo episode in German-Russian relations" and that "it will be necessary to pursue a policy of equilibrium and economic cooperation with Moscow for a certain period of time".^^162^^ As Weizsacker wrote later on, they had "begun to woo the Rus- sians". ^^163^^

p That became apparent shortly afterwards from the tone of German press comments. The German papers gradually stopped publishing all references to German plans with regard to the Ukraine just as any of their typical anti-Soviet insinuations. At the New Year’s reception on January 12, 257 Hitler chatted for a few minutes with Soviet Ambassador A. F. Merekalov, something he had never done before on similar occasions. Hitler subsequently confessed that at that very reception he set course towards an accord with the USSR.^^164^^ It was likewise typical of Hitler’s speeches of January 20 and April 28 that they lacked his earlier standard invectives against the Soviet Union. On May 12, 1939, the Soviet Charge d’Affaires in Germany, G. A. Astakhov, reported to Moscow that "the Germans are striving to create the impression of German-Soviet relations becoming or having already become warmer. Dismissing all absurd rumours fabricated here by the Germans or by importune foreign correspondents, one can state for the time being only one thing as a certain fact, and that is a marked change of the tone of the German press in dealing with us... But, while noting these points, we cannot, of course, close our eyes to their outstanding superficiality and to their character that is in no way binding on the Germans. . . The motives which make the Germans change their tone in dealing with us are much too clear to take them seriously enough." ^^165^^

p Representatives of the German government most cautiously broached the question of a possible improvement of German-Soviet relations also in their conversations with Soviet diplomats. So, on May 17, Astakhov conferred with a high-ranking German Foreign Ministry official, an expert on economic affairs, J. Schnurre, on the question of the status of the Soviet trade delegation in Prague. During that conversation Schnurre tried to touch also "the subject of an improvement of Soviet-German relations”. The German representative started making "assurances that Germany has no aggressive designs whatsoever in respect of the USSR" and asked what was to be done to dispel Soviet mistrust. However, Astakhov declared that the Soviet government had no "evidence about any fundamental change of German policy”. He remarked tersely that an improvement of the climate in relations between the two countries depended on the German government.^^168^^

p On May 20, the German Ambassador in Moscow, von Schulenburg, raised with Molotov the question of resuming economic conversations. To that end he proposed a visit by J. Schnurre to Moscow. The Soviet government, however, did not consider it possible, in view of the strained political 258 relations between the USSR and Germany, to conduct negotiations about increasing trade and economic links between the two countries. The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs indicated as much to the German Ambassador He pointed out that economic conversations had begun several times with Germany during the recent period, but invariably proved inconclusive. That was what gave the Soviet government the reason to tell the German side that it had the impression that the German government meant to stage a kind of game instead of businesslike negotiations on trade and economic issues. For this sort of game the People’s Commissar said in his conversation with Schulenburg, Germany should look for another country as a partner, not the USSR which had no intention of joining in such a game.^^167^^ Discouraged by that answer, Schulenburg called on Deputy People’s Commissar Potemkin straightaway and “complained” to him in confusion that he was at a loss about what he should report to his government. But Potemkin could not “comfort” the Ambassador either.^^168^^

p That negative reply, although the Germans were prepared for it, could not but discourage them. The men in Berlin began planning further “moves” in confusion, but, fearful of yet another setback, they did not venture to make them. An outline letter to Schulenburg, prepared by Weizsacker, reflected the apprehension that yet another appeal to the USSR "risked inviting another refusal”. Tn the final text of the letter mailed to Moscow on May 27, Weizsacker pointed out that a further German approach could make Moscow burst into laughter. Therefore Schulenburg was told to exercise "complete restraint" for the time being.^^169^^

p With Hitler’s approval it was decided to undertake a further sounding in Berlin. On May 30 Weizsacker pointed out in his conversation with Astakhov that Germany had taken off the agenda the "Ukrainian question" thereby removing a pretext for a war between the two countries. He said there was a chance of improving Soviet-German relations. "If the Soviet Government wants to talk on this subject,” he continued, "there is such an opportunity. If, however, it means to ’encircle’ Germany together with Britain and France and wants to act against Germany, we will get ready for it." ^^17^^°

p After that conversation Weizsacker put down in his diary 259 that the German government was "making advances" but the Russians were still "showing mistrust”. ^^171^^

p On June 17, 1939, Schulenburg, coming to Berlin for more instructions, talked it over with Aslakhov in yet more definite terms.^^172^^ Referring to Astakhov’s conversation with Weizsacker, Schulenburg asked why the Soviet government was not reacting to the questions Weizsacker had put. Yet he got no answer to his own question either. The Soviet government did not reply to the approaches of Nazi diplomats, while pressing on for an agreement with Britain and France. Schulenburg had to state in his report about this conversation that Astakhov had once more emphasised Moscow’s distrust in Germany’s policy.^^173^^

p On his return to Moscow, Schulenburg called on the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs on June 29. He assured him that "the German government desires not only to normalise but even improve its relations with the USSR”. Schulenburg stressed that this statement, which he made on behalf of Ribbentrop, had Hitler’s approval. In the course of this conversation he referred, in particular, to the 1926 Soviet-German Treaty of Neutrality. The Soviet People’s Commissar ironically expressed his amazement at the fact that the German government still remembered that treaty; the Soviet government had quite a few doubts on this score. Considering the actual record of experience, the People’s Commissar pointed out, the validity of treaties could well be open to doubt. ^^174^^

p On the following day, the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs cabled an urgent message to Schulenburg to tell him that "in the political field enough has been said until further instructions and that for the moment the talks should not be taken up again by us".^^175^^ For a whole month the Germans no longer ventured to approach the Soviet government on these matters.

p The soundings were resumed late in July when Britain’s consent to start military conversations with the USSR became known in Berlin. On July 24 J. Schnurre, with reference to Ribbentrop, told G. A. Astakhov "about the need to improve political relations between the USSR and Germany”. He expressed his disappointment over the fact that "the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs left unanswered all German overtures with the view of talking this subject over".^^176^^ In a subsequent conversation with 260 Astakhov on July 26, Schnurre repeated these remarks.^^177^^

p On August 3, 1939, G. A. Astakhov was invited to see Ribbentrop. The German Minister declared that there were no unresolvable issues between the USSR and Germany "all over the land from the Black Sea to the Baltic. Agreement on all of these issues can be achieved if the Soviet government shares these underlying principles”. In an effort to put up some pressure, Ribbentrop did not conceal that Germany was conducting secret negotiations with Britain and France. At the same time Ribbentrop resorted once more to unequivocal threats. "If you have different prospects”, he said, "if, for instance, yon consider that the best way to adjust relations with us is by inviting Anglo-French Missions to Moscow, that is, of course, up to you. As far as we are concerned, we do not pay any attention to all the hue and cry against us from the camp of so-called West European democracies. We are strong enough to look at their threats with contempt and derision. We are sure of our strength; there is no war which we could not win." ^^178^^

p On the same day, German Ambassador Schulenburg put the same questions to Molotov. After pointing out that normalisation of Soviet-German relations would meet the desire of the Soviet government, the People’s Commissar declared straight away that it was not through the Soviet government’s fault that these relations had deteriorated, and pinpointed the Anti-Comintern Pact as the root cause behind bad German-Soviet relations. The People’s Commissar went on to cite examples of anti-Soviet foreign policy of the Third Reich; support for, and encouragement of Japanese aggression against the USSR and the Munich Agreement. How could all that be reconciled with the Ambassador’s assurances that Germany had no hostile designs against the USSR? He then made it clear that the Soviet government did not trust the peaceful assurances of the Nazis regarding Poland. A peaceful settlement of the Polish question, he said, depends, above all, on the German side.^^179^^

p Schulenburg’s conclusions from that conversation were disappointing once again. In his dispatch to Berlin on August 4, he stated that the Soviet government "was determined to conclude an agreement with Britain and France." ^^18^^° Three days later Schulenburg wrote that in Moscow "at every word and at every step one can sense the great 261 distrust towards us. That this is so, we have known for a long time.” The unfortunate part of it is that the mistrust is very easily kindled, "and can only be allayed slowly and with difficulty.” ^^181^^

p Weizsacker stated on August B that the Germans were making increasingly hard efforts to reach an agreement, but Moscow left those feelers unheeded. ^^182^^

p There is enough documentary evidence to indicate that the Soviet government saw through the insidious designs of the Nazis. For instance, on August 8, 1939, G. A. Astakhov reported to Moscow that Nazi chiefs were not, naturally, going "to respect appropriate eventual commitments in earnest and for a long time. I think only that in the foreseeable future, they find possible a certain measure of agreement. . . As to the way things may shape up in the future, everything would depend, of course, not on these commitments, but on a new environment that would be created.” G. A. Astakhov pointed out that the Germans were "obviously worried by our conversations with Anglo-French military men, and they are not stinting any arguments and promises of the largest possible order so as to forestall an eventual military agreement. For this sake, they are not prepared, as far as I can see, to make such declarations and gestures as could have seemed ruled out altogether several years back".^^183^^

p Even Western students and political journalists have had to recognise the extreme complexity of the Soviet Union’s position in view of the reluctance of the Western powers to co-operate with it in the defence of peace in Europe. Here is, for instance, an excerpt from a book by British historian L. Mosley about the opening stages of the Second World War. Speaking of the natural rise of suspicion in the USSR regarding the motives behind Britain’s and France’s policies, he wrote that the Soviet leaders realised that they "could trust neither side. They feared that at any moment the procrastinating representatives of the democracies and the tempting talkers in Berlin would reveal themselves as tricksters and turn to each other once again as they had at Munich, leaving the Russians more isolated than ever. It was a time for caution." ^^184^^

p Without ever reacting to the advances by German diplomats, the Soviet government persistently strove for the success of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations. But in the 262 middle of August it became perfectly obvious to the Soviet government that it was altogether impossible to come to terms with the governments of Britain and France about the conclusion of an effective treaty of mutual assistance.

p So there was a kind of vicious circle: Britain and France wanted an accommodation with Germany, but she balked at it; German strove to get a treaty of non-aggression signed with the USSR, but the Soviet government turned down the German offers; the USSR was seeking a treaty of mutual assistance with Britain and France, but they shied away from it.

p Incontestable evidence that Britain and France did not want to co-operate with the Soviet Union was provided by the British government’s documents about Anglo- Franco-Soviet conversations which have recently been declassified (although not in their totality) and made available to researchers. None of the pronouncements of Chamberlain, Halifax and any other British Ministers at Cabinet meetings or in the Foreign Policy Committee, nor the memoranda submitted for their consideration contained any statements or documents to attest to a desire to conclude an effective treaty with the USSR about mutual assistance in opposing Nazi aggression. On the contrary, as shown earlier on, these documents prove beyond dispute that the British ruling quarters pursued entirely different objectives in the conversations with the USSR.

p Right until mid-August, 1939, that is, so long as the slightest hope remained for the conclusion of an AngloFranco-Soviet agreement, the Soviet government left all German approaches unanswered. Yet because of the breakdown of the Three-Power talks, it was no longer possible to ignore the German overtures.

p Since the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks were clearly inconclusive, the Soviet government faced, in point of fact, the following alternative:

p either to watch passively how Germany was overrunning or otherwise bringing into submission all the East European countries bordering on the USSR, occupying advantageous strategic vantage grounds for a subsequent attack on the USSR, and that at a time when any armed conflict breaking out near Soviet frontiers could erupt into fullscale hostilities; 

p or, taking advantage of Germany’s indisposition to go to 263 war against the USSR at the time, to do everything possible under the circumstances for limiting the spread of German aggression so as to safeguard to the utmost the interests of the USSR as well as those of other nations and peoples of Eastern Europe, and to avert the possibility of spontaneous unpremeditated hostilities between Germany and the USSR.

p Meanwhile, German diplomacy grew increasingly active.

p On August 14, 1939 Schulenburg got instructions from Ribbentrop to call on the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs on an urgent mission to make a statement that Britain and France were trying again to drive the Soviet Union into war against Germany. In 1914 this policy had serious consequences for Russia. It is the compelling interest of both countries to avoid for all future time the destruction of Germany and Russia in the interests of Western powers. By drawing such a prospect of Germany’s war against the USSR, the German government expressed its willingness to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. On the following day, the German Ambassador read out this statement to Molotov. Reporting to Berlin about it, Schulenburg pointed out that although the People’s Commissar had welcomed Germany’s intention to improve relations with the USSR, he still gave no straight reply to the questions asked, including the one about a possible arrival of Ribbentrop in Moscow.^^185^^

p Berlin grew manifestly impatient. On August 17 Schulenburg called on the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs once again to confirm that Germany was prepared to conclude a non-aggression pact and ready to guarantee the Baltic States jointly with the USSR, also the German government promised to exercise influence on Japan for normalising Japanese-Soviet relations. Schulenburg reported that Germany’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop was prepared to come to Moscow on August 18 or on any subsequent day.^^186^^ Hitler declared that he was prepared to come to Moscow personally if need be.^^187^^

p The reply given to the German Ambassador was that Soviet-German relations should be improved through a series of practical steps, while the coming of the German Minister was impossible without preliminary thorough arrangements. Moreover, the People’s Commissar again referred to Germany’s anti-Soviet foreign policy down the years.^^188^^

On instructions from Ribbentrop, Schulenburg, conferring witb Molotov on August 19, once more insisted on the immediate visit by the German Minister to Moscow, only to be refused once again. ^^189^^