p Meanwhile, British public opinion was increasingly worried. There was a heated foreign policy debate in the British House of Commons on May 19. Chamberlain’s line came under scathing criticism from Lloyd George, Churchill, Attlee and some other MPs who called for the AngloFranco-Soviet agreement to be concluded at the earliest opportunity. Urging Britain’s acceptance of the Soviet proposal, Churchill stressed that there could be no effective Eastern Front without the Soviet Union and without the effective Eastern Front, there could be no hope of defending Britain’s interests in the West. If the Chamberlain government, he warned, "having thrown away Czechoslovakia with all that Czechoslovakia meant in military power, having committed us, without examination of the technical aspects, to the defence of Poland and Romania, now reject and cast away the indispensable aid of Russia,” it would so lead Britain "in the worst of all wars".^^62^^

p Anglo-French diplomacy was quite disturbed by the news reaching the press on May 21, 1939, about a German trade delegation going to Moscow (the German government had, indeed, suggested sending a trade delegation to Moscow on May 20, but the Soviet government turned down the offer).

p The signing of a German-Italian treaty of alliance “(The Steel Pact”) on May 22, 1939, was a telling blow to Britain and France. The British and French governments indeed had something to worry about. On the following day, 225 May 23, Hitler called a conference of the Wehrmacht top chiefs to order effective preparations for war. He declared that "further successes can no longer be won without bloodshed”. It was clear from Hitler’s pronouncements that he was girding himself for war against Britain and France, but, to make sure of his starting position, considered it necessary "to attack Poland at the first suitable opportuni- ty". ^^63^^

p The Chamberlain government eventually had, against its will, to give its consent to the conclusion of an AngloFranco-Soviet agreement (which, unfortunately, was no more than a smokescreen, as the subsequent course of events showed). At the British Cabinet meeting on May 24, Lord Halifax admitted that a breakdown of the talks Britain and France were conducting with the USSR could enduce Hitler to go to war and, therefore, he finally expressed himself in favour of accepting the Soviet proposal to conclude an Anglo-Franco-Soviet agreement. It was decided, however, there and then to hedge it in with a whole series of reservations which were to reduce the importance of the treaty virtually to naught. Chamberlain, having stressed that he had a keen sense of prejudice against anything that looked like an alliance with the USSR suggested linking the treaty with Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. This article, he said, would possibly be modified subsequently, so a reference to it made the treaty look provisional. He also objected to the treaty being concluded for a term of more than five years (although it was mentioned at the meeting that the German-Italian alliance had been signed for a term of 10 years). As for Halifax, he considered it necessary for the treaty also to stipulate that the contracting parties should first consult together before taking military action.^^64^^ That gave Britain an opportunity to evade her treaty obligations under a " plausible" pretext.

p Channon put down in his Diaries on the same day that the government had showed itself to be sly enough to link the treaty with the League of Nations thus rendering its new obligation quite meaningless, in point of fact. The projected agreement "is so flimsy, so unrealistic and so impractical that it will only make the Nazis poke fun at us”.^^65^^

p On May 27, British Ambassador, Seeds and French 226 Charge d’Affaires, Payart advised Molotov who was appointed People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs early in May, of "the consent" of their governments to accept the Soviet proposal for concluding the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance, but hedged it in with the reservations just mentioned. The Soviet government realised perfectly well that those reservations reduced the treaty to a mere scrap of paper and said so in no uncertain terms to the British and French diplomats.^^66^^ From then on the French government put forward no more proposals of its own at the talks, but limited itself to backing up Britain’s position. There was hectic controversy in France about whether or not the treaty with the USSR should be concluded. Foreign Minister Bonnet was the most persevering opponent of the treaty, and the British policy of stalling the conclusion of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance in defence against aggression suited him perfectly well.

p To hasten the negotiations and remedy the defects of the Anglo-French proposals the Soviet government passed a draft treaty of mutual assistance to the governments of Britain and France on June 2. It provided for immediate and all-round effective mutual assistance of the Three Powers in case of an attack on any one of them, and for them to render assistance to Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Poland, Finland and the Baltic states. The treaty of mutual assistance was to have come into effect simultaneously with a military convention.^^67^^

p The Soviet draft was examined at the meetings of the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee on June 5 and 9. The essential meaning of the debate was that Britain should avoid assuming any particular commitments, including assistance to the Baltic states.^^68^^

p Back on June 10, the Soviet Ambassador in London was instructed to tell Halifax that it would be impossible for the negotiations between the USSR, Britain and France to be carried through without finding a fair solution to the question of guarantees for the Baltic states.^^69^^ As Maisky reported to Moscow, Halifax, in a conversation with him on the subject, had to admit the "validity of our desire to have the guarantees of the Three Powers against direct or indirect aggression in respect of Latvia, Estonia and Fin- land". ^^70^^

p That did not mean, however, that the British government was ready to meet the Soviet Union half-way on the subject. On the contrary, it proceeded from the assumption that German aggression against the Baltic states and Soviet resistance to it were one of what it considered to be perfectly suitable versions of the outbreak of an armed conflict between the Soviet Union and the Nazi Reich. Seeds noted in his cable to Halifax that the British proposals did not envisage an unreserved guarantee for the Baltic countries and that the appropriate point of these proposals contained "a loophole through which Great Britain and France might evade their obligations to assist the Soviet Union".^^71^^

p The British and French governments would still not agree either to the simultaneous signing of political and military agreements.

p Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Andrei Zhdanov had every reason to state in a Pravda article that the British and French governments did not want any equal treaty with the USSR and that they were dragging out the talks and saddling them with all kinds of artificial difficulties with regard to such matters which, given the good will and earnest intentions of Britain and France, could have been resolved without delay and hindrance. "It seems to me,” Zhdanov stressed, "that what the British and the French want is not a real treaty acceptable to the USSR, but only talk about a treaty in order, by playing up the alleged Soviet intractability in front of the public opinion of their respective countries, to make it easier for themselves to strike a deal with the aggressors."^^72^^ That was strong, yet fair, as the facts showed, criticism of the British and French governments and a perfectly justified qualification of their respective positions.

p On July 1, Britain and France finally gave their consent to the Three-Power guarantees being extended to the Baltic countries. They proposed, however, that the nations receiving such guarantees should be listed not in the treaty itself but in a protocol which was not subject to publication. In their opinion, the list of the countries concerned should include Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Greece, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Switzerland.^^73^^

At the same time, while the Anglo-French guarantees for 228 Poland and Romania covered both the contingency of direct and indirect aggression, Britain and France agreed to assist the Baltic countries only in the event of a direct armed attack against any of them. In case of indirect aggression, all they still agreed to was to consult together, which meant reserving an opportunity to evade affording assistance. Besides, in an effort to create more difficulties at the talks, the British and French ruling circles had now started an endless debate about the definition of "indirect aggression".