p Tho Soviet proposals met, however, no support from the British and French governments. Paradoxical though it might seem today, they found them inacceptable. Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Cadogan immediately drew out a memo about the Soviet proposals to submit to the government’s Foreign I’olicy Committee. That document clearly reflected the full extent of the hatred the British ruling top leadership had for the USSR.

p “The Russian proposal,” Catlogan wrote, "is extremely inconvenient.” "We have to balance the advantage of a paper commitment [!] by Russia to join in a war on our side against the disadvantage [!] of associating ourselves openly with Russia”. Cadogan claimed that "the political arguments against .. . accepting the Soviet proposal . . . were irresistible”. However, he pointed out that the "left wing in England" would use its rejection in their struggle against the government. Besides, if Britain turned down the Soviet proposal, "the Soviets might make some ’ nonintervention’ agreement with the German Government".^^46^^

p The debates on the Soviet proposals at the meeting of the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee on April 19 meant, essentially, that Britain had no interest except in the Soviet deliveries of war equipment to Poland and Romania in the event of a German attack against them. Setting out his position, Chamberlain emphasised that there was no need for an Anglo-Franco-Soviet military alliance in order to enable the Soviet Union to help these countries with war equipment. As the Minister for Coordination of Defence, Lord Chatfield, stated at the end of the meeting, "the general view of the committee appeared to be that the political arguments against a military alliance between this country, France and Russia" were "such as to outweigh any military advantages”. The minutes of the meeting stated that "the Committee were not . . . disposed to accept the Soviet proposal".^^47^^

p On April 24, the Chiefs of Staff of the three armed services of Britain produced a document Military Value of Russia. In their class hatred for the USSR, Britain’s military top leadership deliberately distorted the true state of affairs. Having admitted that at the very outset of war, the Soviet Union could mobilise and field 130 divisions on its Western Front, they asserted at the same time that the country’s economy could supply no more of war equipment than to keep in the field only 30 divisions.

p The Chiefs of Staff sought to prove that some countries, because of their "deep-seated hostility to Communism" might deny the right of passage to the Soviet troops through their territory and that "may well nullify the value" of military co-operation witli the USSR. Expressing their doubts regarding the offensive capability of Soviet troops and about the condition of Soviet railways, the 221 Chiefs of Staff arrived at the conclusion that any substantial Russian military support "is out of the question”. The document asserted that the USSR would actually not be in a position to supply war equipment to Poland, Romania and Turkey either.

p At the same time the document pointed out that co- operation between the USSR and Britain would be important in the sense that "Germany would be unable to draw upon Russia’s immense reserves of food and raw materials”. The Chiefs of Staff wrote that the rejection of the Soviet proposal might prompt an agreement between Germany and Russia.^^48^^

p Referring to this conclusion, it is necessary to point out right away that it was so biassed that the Chiefs of Staff themselves, as will yet be shown, had subsequently to dissociate themselves from it, not to speak of the fact that the real potentialities of the USSR demonstrated during the war, completely disproved this inference.

p Reporting on the following day the conclusions of the Chiefs of Staff at a meeting of the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee, Lord Chatfields summed them up as follows: "Russia, although a Great Power for other purposes, was only a Power of medium rank for military purposes.” ^^49^^

p When the Soviet proposals were debated at the British Cabinet meeting on April 26, Lord Halifax objected to a “comprehensive” agreement with the USSR. The British Foreign Secretary’s main argument was that for Britain and France to enter into alliance with the USSR would adversely affect Anglo-German relations, that is, would make impossible any fresh Anglo-German agreement which the British government considered to be its main preoccupation. The Soviet proposal was found inacceptable at that meeting.^^50^^

p Characterising the position taken up by the British government, the Chief of the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office, Laurence Collier, stated that the government did not wish to bind itself with the USSR, but wanted "to enable Germany to expand eastwards at Russian expense".^^51^^

p In the meantime, Chamberlain kept on building his policy with an eye to a Soviet-German conflict. Should Britain have concluded an agreement with the USSR, that 222 would, to a certain extent, dcterr Germany from aggression against it. Therefore, the conclusion of a co-operation agreement with the USSR was al variance with the entire political strategy of the British government.

p Although the widest sections of French public opinion were profoundly concerned over the course of events, the French government also did not show any real intention either to seek co-operation with the USSR. Following a conversation with the French Minister for Colonies, G. Mandel, Soviet Ambassador Surits reported from Paris on April 24 that the text of the Soviet proposal had not yet been brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet members. None of the ministers, except Bonnet and Daladier, had yet seen the draft. Two days later, Surits wrote that, apparently, all talks about “co-operation” with llie USSR would "end in a common bluff" since Bonnet and Chamberlain had never desired such co-operation in real earnest.^^52^^

p Meanwhile the international situation was fast deteriorating. On April 28, Hitler announced the termination of the 1934 Polish-German declaration of non-aggression as well as the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935. Maisky reported to Moscow in those days that there was strong anti-German feeling in Britain and that everybody was coming to recognise the need for resistance to aggression. "Hence, vast popularity of the idea of an alliance with the USSR among the masses. Each mention of such an alliance at political meetings and rallies up and down the nation is cheered to the echo.” ^^53^^

p Nevertheless, the British government still believed that the only fact of Britain, France and the USSR conducting any negotiations was enough to exercise certain pressure on Hitler to make him accept an Anglo-German agreement. A reply to the Soviet proposal was discussed at a British Cabinet meeting on May 3. While expressing the hope that a way would still be found to come to terms with Hitler by leaving his hands free in the Fast, Halifax and other members of the government suggested that there should be no change in British policy. There was only some apprehension lest the Soviet government should be forced to agree to normalising its relations with Germany, because of the position held by Britain. True, that was found hardly probable but, nevertheless, to prevent Soviet-German relations from being normalised, it was found expedient "to keep 223 negotiations continuing for some further period".^^54^^ Channon pointed out in his Diaries on the same day that Russia was to be snubbed, or rather let down lightly.^^55^^

p On May 8, the British Government once more turned to the USSR with the “offer” that the Soviet Government should unilaterally commit itself to providing assistance to Britain and France if they, in fulfilment of their commitments to some East European countries, found themselves involved in war.^^56^^ The Soviet Union, naturally, did not find it possible to assume such a unilateral obligation.

p The question of relations with the USSR was once more brought up for a discussion at a meeting of the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee on May 16. The Chiefs of Staff submitted a new document. It now stated that an agreement of mutual assistance between Britain, France and the Soviet Union would offer "certain advantages. It would present a solid front of formidable proportions against aggression”. On the contrary, if such an agreement was not concluded, that would be "a diplomatic defeat which would have serious military repercussions”. If, rejecting an alliance with Russia, Britain were to prompt her to enter into an agreement with Germany, "we should have made a mistake of vital and far-reaching importance".^^51^^

p In the face of a manifestly growing threat of German aggression and, in particular of the intention, announced by Germany and Italy on May 7, to conclude a military alliance between themselves, the British Chiefs of Staff tended to adopt a more sober stand. Chamberlain, however, was still adamantly opposed to Britain assuming any obligations with respect to the USSR. He declared that, apart from the military and strategical considerations with which the Chiefs of Staff were concerned, there were political considerations, and they prompted "a different attitude”. He was supported by Halifax who repeated the old theory that the political arguments against a treaty with the USSR were more important than the military considerations in favour of it.^^58^^

In a conversation with his assistant Oliver Harvey, Halifax pointed out in those days that Chamberlain never wanted a full triple alliance by any means. Strang noted, in his turn, that the Prime Minister and his closest adviser Horace Wilson guided themselves by the principle that 224 following the conclusion of a treaty with the USSR, it would be impossible to continue with the policy of appeasement, Llial is, to reach an accommodation with Germany. "All at No. 10 are anti-Soviet,” Strang said.^^59^^ That was confirmed by an entry of Alexander Cadogan in his Diaries: "The Prime Minister says he will resign rather than sign alliance with Soviets." ^^60^^ One of the partisans of the Anglo- German accommodation, Henry Channon, pointed out that Chamberlain and Halifax were decidedly opposed to an Anglo-Russian alliance. They were reluctant to embrace the Russian bear; it has now been decided "to hold out a hand and accept its paw gingerly. No more. The worst of both worlds".^^61^^