p The British government considered that by having strengthened its bond with Poland and with some other states of Eastern Europe and having entered into negotiations with the USSR, it had sufficiently consolidated its position, and the time had now come for it once again to try and reach an amicable agreement with the Nazi Reich. The Polish Ambassador in London, E. Raczynski, wrote on June 8, 1939, after conferring witli Chamberlain, that "the Premier means trying to reach agreement with Germany already from positions of ’strength rather than weakness’. He 233 would consider it disastrous to slam the door leading to agreement with Germany".^^85^^

p Back on May 3, Neville Chamberlain suggested at a Cabinet meeting that it was desirable to resume AngloGerman economic negotiations which had been suspended following Germany’s take-over of Czechoslovakia. He went on to express his conviction that "Herr Hitler’s heart was in Eastern Europe”. Halifax, like Chamberlain, took the line that the only thing that Hitler was going to demand from Britain was a "free hand in Eastern Europe”. In that context, Halifax suggested that the British government might avoid fulfilling its guaranteed commitments in respect of Poland. He pointed out that the guarantees would stand only if "Polish independence was clearly threatened”, which gave Britain some right to exercise her own judgement on assistance to Poland. Chamberlain went along with Halifax in this issue.^^86^^

p British politician H. Nicolson recorded in his memoirs a very characteristic dialogue between two Tories—members of the British Parliament—on that subject:

p “I suppose we shall be able to get out of this beastly guarantee business?"

p “Oh, of course. Thank God, we have Neville."^^87^^

p The idea now was for co-operation of Britain and France with Nazi Germany to be established at the expense of Poland. The U.S. Charge d’Affaires in France wrote to the State Department on June 24, 1939, that he had the impression that "a second Munich, this time at the expense of Poland, may be in the making”. "The influences”, he wrote, "which wore at work in France and England in last September are coming to life again."^^88^^

p The attempts of the British ruling elements to come to terms with the Nazis were intensified particularly in the second half of July of 1939.

p London decided to take advantage of the visit of Helmuth Wohlthat, a high-ranking official of the department headed by Goring, that was in charge of the four-year plan to prepare Germany’s economy for war. Discussions between Chamberlain’s closest adviser Horace Wilson and Wohlthat about Anglo-German co-operation took place on July 18 and 21, 1921. Wilson set out the foreign policy plans of Britain’s ruling top leadership. He stressed the particular importance of preventing "an armed clash which might 234 develop far beyond . . . Eastern Europe, into a new fundamental struggle between the groups led by Britain and Germany".

p That was an unequivocal indication that Britain would not object to German aggression in Eastern Europe provided Germany gave assurances that she would not encroach on the interests of the British Empire.

p Wilson then proposed a "programme for German-British co-operation" which he had previously formulated in a special memorandum and had it approved by Chamberlain. The Programme provided for:

p “a joint Anglo-German declaration not to use aggression; mutual declarations of non-interference by Germany in respect of the British Commonwealth of Nations and by Great Britain in respect of Greater Germany; the Colonial and/or Mandates question; a German-British declaration on a fundamental revision of the relevant provisions of the Versailles Treaty". ^^89^^

p R. Hudson declared, in a conversation with Wohlthat, that London regarded East Europe as a "natural economic sphere of Germany" and that "there were much wider possibilities”. In that context, he mentioned Russia, China and the various colonial dependencies of European powers.^^90^^

p On August 3, Wilson disclosed the British plans also to the German Ambassador in London. Dirksen wrote to Berlin afterward that the British government’s expectation as Wilson put it, was that "an Anglo-German agreement . . . would completely absolve the British Government from the commitments to which it was now pledged by the guarantees to Poland, Turkey, etc. . ."^^91^^

p Many of the British government’s 1939 documents have been declassified, but it has been decided in London to keep secret until the Year 2000 and even 2039 some of the most important ones regarding British policy on Germany. Evidently, there is something in them thai has to be withheld from the public.

p Georges Bonnet, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, was still a committed advocate of an accommodation with Germany. He told the German Ambassador in Paris, J. Welczeck that "in spite of everything,” France "held fast to the idea of bringing back co-operalion with Germany, to grow closer as time went on" and that lie would never deviate from the main lines of his policy.^^92^^

p U.S. diplomatic representatives in the capitals of many European countries supported such plans wholly and entirely. The U. S. Ambassador in London, Joseph Kennedy, believed thai Ihe Poles should be left to themselves to make them accept an accommodation with Hitler which would "enable the Nazis lo pursue Iheir objectives in the East”, leading to an armed conflict between the USSR and Germany "to the great benefit of the whole Western world".^^93^^ The U.S. Ambassador in Berlin, Hugh Wilson, also found it Ihe besl way oul if Germany ventured to "attack Russia, with the tacit consent" of the Western powers, "even with their approval".^^94^^

Britain’s and France’s policy on Poland changed considerably since the spring of 1939 when they had given her their guarantees in the belief that a German occupation of Poland would have substantially weakened their own positions. Now they pinned virtually all their hopes on a deal with the Nazi Reich in the expectation that, with Poland smashed, the German forces would keep advancing oastward, that is, against the USSR, rather than turn westward, that is, against them. So, the U.S. Charge d’Affaires in Paris wrote on June 24 thai influenlial sources Ihere considered lhat in the long run "France should abandon Central and Eastern Europe to Germany, trusling lhat eventually Germany will come into conflict with the Soviel Union.” ^