p The conference of Britain, France, Germany and Italy was hold in Munich on September 29 and 30. It ended with the alienation of a largo strip of Czechoslovak territory all along the German-Czechoslovak border and its incorporation in the Reich.

p Chamberlain and Daladier arrived in Munich, well prepared to surrender. They did not even try to oppose the demands made by Hitler (technically, those had been presented by Mussolini). On the contrary, Chamberlain and Daladier tried hard to outdo each other in paying compliments about something liko a generosity of that offer. Hitler boasted later on that Czechoslovakia had been offered to him in Munich on a platter by her friends.^^187^^

p The representatives of Czechoslovakia wore told about the outcome of the Munich deal by the Four Powers as something like a verdict not subject to appeal. The first announcement was made by Horace Wilson even before the 188 conference was over. On entering the "waiting room”, where Czechoslovak representatives, summoned to Munich, had spent hours waiting for this verdict in excitement, he decided to make them happy:

p “It is almost over. You will be glad to know that we have reached agreement on practically everything."

p “And what is to be our fate?"

p “It is not as bad as it might have been."

p And Wilson pointed to a strip on the map painted with red ink covering almost half the territory of Czechoslovakia, from the North, West and South, and including almost the whole of the country’s defence line.

p “But this is outrageous! It is cruel and it is criminally stupid!"

p “I am sorry. It is no use arguing." ^^188^^

p That was how Chamberlain and Daladicr struck a deal with the aggressors in Munich, shamelessly letting Czechoslovakia down and helping the fascist aggressors carve her up.

p Naturally, the Four Powers did not have the slightest legal ground for arrogating the right to make any decision on that carve-up. Since the deal was a gross violation of the sovereign rights of the Czechoslovak state and was imposed on Czechoslovakia under threat of force, it was illegal.

p Roosevelt sent a message of congratulation to Chamberlain through his Ambassador in London Kennedy. Although Kennedy had also totally supported the policy of connivance with German aggression, he did realise that it would eventually do its makers no honour. He showed a certain measure of caution, therefore. On receiving the cable, he read it out to Chamberlain at 10 Downing Street, instead of handing it to him. "I had a feeling that cable would haunt Roosevelt some day, so I kept it." ^^189^^

p With the Four-Power talks in Munich over, Chamberlain offered to confer with Hitler eye-lo-eye. Hitler consented. The British Premier attached paramount importance to that chat. For he saw the Munich deal about the carve-up of Czechoslovakia more as a means to achieve his own ends than anything else. His object was an understanding between the British Empire and the Nazi Reich on all problems of interest to both sides so as to turn German aggression from West to East. Britain’s ruling circles hoped that, 189 with Hitler’s pressing demand on the Sudetenland gratified, the situation was most propitious for an effort to take the bull by the horns. ^^190^^

p In the course of that conversation with Hitler, Chamberlain gave a fairly transparent account of his own foreign policy programme. Finding it necessary to demonstrate his negative attitude to the USSR, the British Premier pointed out that Hitler did not have to fear any longer that Czechoslovakia would be used as a springboard for "Russian aggression”. He went on to stress that neither did Hitler have to fear that Britain would pursue a policy of military and economic encirclement of Germany in Southeast Europe. What preoccupied him most was an improvement of Anglo-German relations. And he offered Hitler to sign an Anglo-German declaration of non-aggression in recompense for all that Britain had already done for the German aggressors and promised to do later on.

p Hitler did not balk at it, and the declaration was signed there and then. That was, in point of fact, an agreement between Britain and Germany on non-aggression and consultations. The Nazi Chancellor found it possible somewhat to sugar the pill of the Munich sellout for the British Premier because it was very important for him to strengthen Chamberlain’s hand. "You don’t refuse a thirsty man a glass of lemonade,” Mussolini remarked on the occasion.^^191^^

p By signing the declaration Nazi Germany did not mean to stick to it, however. On the contrary, right there in Munich the Nazis went on discussing with Mussolini the idea of a German-Italian-Japanese alliance to prepare for war against Britain and France. As the conference ended, Ribbentrop declared that Chamberlain "has today signed the death warrant of the British Empire and left it to us to fill in the date".^^192^^

p What preoccupied the ruling circles of Britain and France most about the Munich deal was to make it as antiSoviet as possible. This can be seen quite well from the earlier references to the British Cabinet debates on the major foreign policy issues. As much can be seen from some of the diplomatic documents of the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and other countries at the time. On October 4, 1938, the French Ambassador in Moscow, Coulondre, pointed out that the Munich agreement "is particularly menacing to the Soviet Union".^^193^^ Lord Lothian, appointed as 190 British Ambassador to the United States shortly afterwards, said that because of Munich the political circles of London believed thai Hitler, with Czechoslovakia captured, would inarch on the Ukraine. Everybody was waiting for that to happen, he emphasised.^^194^^

p The anti-Soviet lining of the Four-Power Munich deal has not been passed over by some Western historians either. British historian Wheeler-Bennett pointed out that at the time of Munich in the ruling circles of Britain "there was a secret hope that if the tide of German expansion could be turned eastward, it would dissipate its force on the steppes of Russia in a struggle which would exhaust both combatants".^^195^^

p The same was evidenced by a well-known American columnist Walter Lippmann. He wrote that Britain’s Munich policy was rooted "in a last vain hope that Germany and Russia would fight and exhaust one another".^^196^^

p West German historian B. Celovsky admitted that throughout the pre-Munich period the Soviet government had tried to compel a change in the "appeasement policy" so as to create a united front against the aggressors. "Chamberlain and Bonnett did all they could to keep the Soviet Union out. For ideological reasons and for considerations prompted by power politics they were against cooperation with the Soviets”. It was not "the principles of democracy and law, but anti-Bolshevism that the governments of France and Great Britain guided themselves by in their foreign policies."^^197^^ Even Lord Halifax’s biographer Birkenhead had to admit that it was extremely important to deal with the Soviet Union openly as an ally, and "it must be counted a glaring error that more realistic efforts were not made to secure this end".^^198^^

p The Soviet Union clearly saw the danger arising from the Munich deal of the four imperialist powers. The Soviet press pointed out that within a short space of time Ethiopia, Spain, China, Austria and Czechoslovakia had fallen victim to fascist invaders. Along with denouncing tho aggressors’ action, the press criticised the policy of abetting aggression, which was pursued in London and Paris, and which led to the Munich deal to carve up Czechoslovakia. "The surrender of the so-called democratic countries to the aggressor”, Izvestia wrote, "having ostensibly put off the outbreak of war, is actually bringing it nearer.” ^^199^^

p In summing up the latest course of events, the Soviet head of government V. M. Moiotov slated in his report on November 6 that "German imperialism has sliced off more of Czechoslovakia than it could itself have counted on. Some of the spoils went to Poland, as the ally of German fascism in the carve-up of Czechoslovakia.” Only the Soviet Union, he said, has demonstrated its loyalty to the treaties and international commitments it had entered into, and its willingness to oppose aggression. "Only the Soviet Union, the socialist country, has unshakably stood and does stand for lighting fascist aggression and for defending peace, freedom and independence of the peoples from fascist attack." ^^20^^°

p The Munich deal fundamentally changed the situation in Central Europe. Having captured Austria and then some of Czechoslovakia, Hitler Germany substantially strengthened her positions.

p Czechoslovakia was sacrificed to the Nazis in Munich. She was forced into accepting an illegal decision whereby she lost much of her territory including economically most important areas, and a considerable proportion of her population. Because of the mixed population of the regions annexed to Germany, 1,161,610 Czechs and Slovaks found themselves under the rule of the Nazi Reich.^^201^^ The newlydrawn frontiers cut and disrupted the country’s major transport arteries. Czechoslovakia was deprived of her natural borders and frontier fortifications and found herself utterly defenceless in the face of the fascist aggressor.^^202^^ Half a year later all this was exploited by the Nazi Reich for the complete liquidation of the Czechoslovak state.

p The strategic and political positions of France and Britain also turned out to be greatly weakened because of the Munich deal. The Anglo-French hegemony in Europe, which rested on the Treaty of Versailles, was finally done away with. And so was, in point of fact, the system of military alliances France had concluded with other nations of Europe. Tho League of Nations was buried. The SovietFrench Treaty of Mutual Assistance in action against aggression as a means to ensure peace and security in Europe was virtually invalidated. Nazi Germany got the best opportunities for continued expansionism, and, for aggression against Britain and France in particular. French Ambassador in Warsaw Leon Noel admitted iu his recollections that "the Munich accords and the betrayal of 192 Czechoslovakia arising therefrom represent one of the most pitiful, shameful and humiliating episodes of the policy conducted in the name of France during the period between the two world wars, which led to the most destructive catastrophe in our history.” ^^203^^

The Munich deal brought nearer the outbreak of the Second World War.