p The British government persisted in its earlier course of action, witness Neville Chamberlain’s utterances at a meeting of the government’s Foreign Policy Committee on March 15. "The Prime Minister”, said the minutes of the meeting, "did not think that anything that had happened should cause the Government to alter their present policy, on the contrary, recent events had confirmed him in his opinion that that policy was a right one and he only regretted that it had not been adopted earlier."^^59^^ This opinion was shared by Lord Halifax. He declared in a conversation with Czechoslovak Minister in London Jan Masaryk that he did not want to give up altogether the hope that an accommodation with Germany could still be found some day.^^60^^

p On March 18, Foreign Office presented for the considcration by the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee a thoroughly elaborated Memorandum on the Czechoslovak question, pointing out that the British government had to choose between three options:

p 1. Conclusion of a "grand alliance" with the participation of France and other countries against aggression (as proposed by Winston Churchill in the House of Commons on March 14).

p 2. Commitment to afford assistance to France in the event of her honouring her contractual obligations witli regard to Czechoslovakia.

p 3. No new commitments to France.^^61^^

p On the same day, the question was carefully examined at a meeting of the government’s Foreign Policy Committee. The tune was called by Chamberlain, Halifax and the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, Thomas Inskip, who came out against the first two possible options for British policy.

p Foreign Secretary Halifax intimated in his statement that there should be no obstacles in the way of an accommodation with Germany. "The more closely we associated ourselves with France and Russia”, he maintained, "the more difficult would it be to make any real settlement with Germany.” At the end of the meeting, Halifax, summing it up, stated the general view that Britain must decline to undertake any fresh commitment, and must try and persuade the Czechs and the French that "the best course would be for Czechoslovakia to make the best terms she could with Ger- many". ^^62^^

p The decisions taken at that meeting were put at the root of the entire subsequent activity of the British foreign service. It saw its main task in preventing France from affording assistance to Czechoslovakia, which could have got Britain involved in a war against the Third Reich. And that would have meant the failure of Chamberlain’s entire foreign policy line directed towards achieving agreement with Germany. It was the "solution of the Sudeten problem”, that is, the incorporation of the Sudetenland in Germany by "peaceful means" that the British government considered to be the major precondition for such an accommodation under the circumstances of the day. That was the course that was "crowned with success" in Munich.

p In a note of March 22, 1938, to the French government Britain announced that she did not find it possible to assume any fresh commitments in Europe and that France could not count on Britain’s assistance in the event of her going to war to lend a helping hand to Czechoslovakia.^^63^^

p It was still believed necessary in London to draw Berlin’s attention to the possibility of Britain being embroiled in war contrary to her own will, should Germany resort to acts of outright armed aggression to expand into Central Europe. Speaking in the House of Commons on March 24, Neville Chamberlain made an official statement to the effect that Britain did not propose to assume any further commitments in Europe. But should a war break out, he said, "it would be well within the bounds of probability that other countries, besides those which were parties to the original dispute, would almost immediately be involved. This is especially true in the case of two countries like Great Britain and France, with long associations of friendship, with interests closely interwoven. .."^^64^^ The Chamberlain government was, therefore, “persuading” Berlin to refrain from launching an armed conflict by virtually assuring Nazi Germany that she would be able to achieve her ends by other means.

p This position of the British ruling establishment rested on the hope that having carried out their aggressive plans against Czechoslovakia, German aggressors would keep moving east. By building their policies on such false hopes, the British reactionaries left the vital interests of the British people exposed to a mortal danger because the Nazis were planning to go to war against Britain first and against the USSR afterwards. That is why it was Britain, above all, that would be assuring her own security in the event of cooperation with the USSR. That short-sighted approach of British politicians was particularly evident from Ribbentrop’s directive of April 19, 1938, to the State Secretary at the German Foreign Ministry: "Russia should be officially called enemy, but in reality everything must be directed against England." ^^65^^

p The Soviet proposal of March 17 for urgent steps to be taken to resist aggression was not so much as mentioned at any of the meeting of the British government and its Foreign Policy Committee in those days. The negative attitude to it had been shaped in advance by the general foreign 160 policy course of Britain’s ruling establishment. However, since the Soviet proposal had fetched widespread response from many nations, Chamberlain found himself constrained to touch on it in his foreign policy speech in Parliament on March 24. He expressed his displeasure with the fact that the object of this proposal was "to negotiate such mutual undertakings in advance lo resist aggression" and declared it to be unacceptable to the British government.^^66^^

p Neither did France support the Soviet proposal of March 17, although the AnschluB represented an outright danger to her ally, Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak question was examined at a meeting of the Permanent Committee of National Defence under the chairmanship of Edouard Daladier on March 15. It was the defeatist standpoint that prevailed in the debate. Ualadier asserted that France was not in a position to lend Czechoslovakia "any immediate assistance”; she can only pin down German forces on the Franco- German border by a mobilisation. Members of the Committee took up a negative stand on the question of possible co- operation with the USSR in affording assistance to Czechoslovakia. The conclusion reached at the end of the meeting was that France "cannot impede action against Czechoslovakia”. French statesmen refusing to co-operate with the Soviet Union were actually leaving their ally, Czechoslovakia, at the mercy of Nazi Germany.^^67^^

p In a letter of April 4, to the Soviet embassy in Paris, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, describing the policy of France, pointed out that in spite of the extreme tension of the international situation, the French government was not changing anything about its position of indecision, inactivity and credulity in the face of the events creating a direct danger to general peace and outright menace to France proper. Neither the annexation of Austria by Germany, nor the critical situation of Czechoslovakia, or the Polish ultimatum to Lithuania, or the appearance of German and Italian troops on the border between Spain and France, nor, ultimately, the arrogant pronouncements of Mussolini who was threatening war against Europe, "could wake the French up, make them change their mind and do something at least for their own self-defence".^^68^^

p The position of the United States was likewise of essential importance under the circumstances of the day. The U.S. Government left the Soviet proposal of March 17 161 unanswered. U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, retracing the background to this issue in his Memoirs, wrote that in view of the fact that the American response, "under the limitations of our policy against entanglements, must be negative and might therefore discourage Russia”, it was found that the best course would be to send no answer at all.^^69^^ In a directive letter to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, commenting on the U.S. stand, said: "Roosevelt and Hull keep treating the world to their homilies while doing nothing for the sake of peace. Seen against the background of the Neutrality Act still in force and unlimited arms supplies to Japan, the afore-said homilies look revolt- ing."^^70^^

It was hoped in Washington that the Nazi Reich, engaged in its aggression against the East, would not represent any particular danger to the United States. American historians Langer and Gleason pointed out that Roosevelt was "not particularly bothered" by the AnschluB. "lie was convinced that Hitler would embark on his Eastern venture."^^71^^