p Getting war equipment abroad was still much of a headache to China. In January 1938, the Chinese government sent an emergency mission to the USSR, Britain and France, led by the Chairman of the Legislative Yuan, Sun Fo, to ask the governments of these countries for aid to China in her struggle against aggression. On his arrival in Moscow, Sun Fo told the Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Stomonyakov, that "in waging their war against the invaders, that is, for their liberation, the Chinese people are drawing their strength from the sympathies and support of the USSR”.^^185^^

p From Moscow Sun Fo proceeded to London and Paris only to return several months later empty-handed. In a conversation with Deputy People’s Commissar Potemkin on May 19, 1938, he admitted that the results of his tour were discouraging and that Britain and France avoided giving any aid to China. "The USSR remains the only country to l)e giving real aid to China," ^^186^^ Sun Fo declared.

p Britain’s position in relation to China could be clearly seen from the memorandum submitted by the Foreign Office to the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee on May 31. China, the memorandum said, "is fighting our own battle in the Far East, for, if Japan wins, our interests there are certainly doomed to extinction. The Japanese Army and other high authorities have left us in no doubt about that. Our immense vested interests in North China and Shanghai will be the first to go and the Japanese Army and Navy set no limits to their appetites on the Continent and in the South Seas. If China can only fight Japan to a stalemate, we and the Americans will then be able to intervene with effective results and safeguard our position for another generation.” ^^187^^

p On the following day, the Chancellor of the Exchequer John Simon flatly declared in the Foreign Policy Committee which was considering the matter, that there could be no question of a British government loan to China. He also expressed some very serious apprehension that assistance to China, even if insignificant, could entail most negative consequences for Anglo-Japanese relations.^^188^^

p China was still getting aid From the Soviet Union alone. Another agreement was signed between the USSR and 139 China in Moscow on July 1, 1938, under which the Soviet Union supplied China with 300 aircraft, 300 guns, 1,500 automatic rifles and 500 machine-guns, 300 lorries and other war equipment.^^189^^

p In a letter to the Soviet government, the President of the Executive Yuan of China Rung Hsiang-hsi expressed "most profound gratitude" for "effective sympathy and genuine friendship”. Kung Hsiang-hsi pointed out that as a result of the "splendid and valuable assistance" in the shape of combat aircraft and other war equipment, China got an opportunity of "wearing out the enemy’s aggressive forces and keeping up a sustained struggle". ^^19^^° The British historian Keith Middlemas pointed out that the USSR, supplying China with munitions once more "appeared as champion of the free world against aggression".^^191^^

p Experienced Soviet military advisers (V. I. Chuikov, P. S. Rybalko, P. F. Batitsky, A. I. Cherepanov, to name just a few) arrived in China to share in making plans for the conduct of war against the Japanese invaders and in training Chinese officers and men. Over 90,000 people had their training under the guidance of Soviet instructors in various educational establishments and units of the Chinese Army. Soviet airmen had volunteered to join the battle against the aggressors in China.^^192^^

p In the summer of 1938, particularly in the face of the determined position taken up by the Soviet Union during the armed conflict at Lake Khasan, the Chinese government was once more pressing hard for a Sino-Soviet alliance to be concluded and for the USSR to enter the war against Japan.^^193^^ However, the Soviet government exercised the necessary caution. While providing China with an increasing amount of war equipment, the Soviet Union did not find it possible to go to war against Japan. The Soviet Ambassador to China, I. G. Luganets-Orelsky emphasised in a conversation with Sun Fo that the Soviet Union, by its military, diplomatic and economic moves, had already prepared extensive ground for the development of Soviet-Chinese relations whereas to have concluded the pact as proposed by China could have had some materially negative conse- quences. ^^194^^

p On September 8, 1938, the Soviet Ambassador had received the following instructions as to the answer to give to the Chinese government: 

p “1. At present the USSR does not consider it expedient to go to war against Japan in isolation from Britain or the United States. . .

p 2. The USSR will go to war against Japan only under Hie following three conditions: a) if Japan attacks the USSR; b) if Britain or the United States join the war against Japan; c) if the League of Nations obliges the Pacific Powers to confront Japan.

p 3. The USSR is prepared, under all circumstances to help China by supplying her with defence facilities under the treaties concluded between China and the USSR.” ^^195^^

p On the same day, Luganets-Orelsky passed this reply to Sun Fo.

The defeat of the Japanese aggressors at Lake Khasan and the Soviet Union’s effective assistance to China clearly demonstrated Iho potentialities of the USSR as well as its determination to Lake the necessary steps towards checking the aggressors.