p The conclusion of treaties of mutual assistance usually brought with it the establishment of close contact between the General Staffs of the countries concerned. That was what France always did. While exchanging notes with the British government on April 1, 1936, reaffirming Britain’s obligation to assist France in the event of a German attack on her, French diplomacy compelled a provision about negotiations to be started forthwith between the General Staffs of the two countries.^^168^^ On military co-operation with the USSR, however, France took a different line.

p Immediately after the signing of the Soviet-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Soviet government, seizing the opportunity offered by Laval’s arrival in Moscow, raised the question of military co-operation. Laval cabled from Moscow on May 16, 1935, that the Soviet government, in view of possible aggression, proposed "considering now the technical arrangements to give the pact its full effect".^^169^^ The Soviet military attache in France informed the French General Staff late in May that the Soviet General Staff was ready for "contacts to be established with the Frencli General Staff". ^^17^^°

p The General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces began planning action with a view to lending military assistance to France in the event of her being attacked by Germany. ^^171^^ In June 1935 the Soviet Ambassador in France Potemkin took the matter up with the French War Minister Jean Fabry. However, as the latter admitted, Laval "did not relish the brutal automatism of a military convention".^^172^^

p The Deputy Chief of the French General Staff, General Loizeau attended a military exercise in the Ukraine in the autumn of 1935 at the invitation of the General Staff of the 77 Red Army. He came to the conclusion that Soviet service’* men had a high morale and great stamina and that the Soviet forces wore capable of holding back enemy forces in the event of a conflict and even in the opening stages of war.^^173^^

p In spite of general Loizeau’s favourable evaluation, the French General Staff looked upon the Soviet-French treaty as a purely diplomatic document without ever considering it right and proper to complement it with a military convention. As the French historian M. Mourin pointed out, the French General Staff proceeded from the following considerations: "If the French forces remained orientated, following the concepts of the government’s general policy, only towards defensive action behind the Maginot Line, military accords with the Soviet Union would be of little use, taking into account the absence of a common frontier between Russia and Germany and the refusal of Poland and Romania, confirmed in September 1935, to accord Soviet troops the right of passage through their territory." ^^174^^

p Instead of taking steps towards an understanding with the Polish and Romanian governments, the French authorities decided to shelve the issue of military co-operation with the USSR. The Chief of the Frencli General Staff, General Gamelin, arranged with the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the methods of French-Russian military co-operation "will not be discussed".^^175^^

p Objectively, France should have been even more interested than the USSR in making the treaty really effective by having it supplemented with agreement on military co- operation, for the Soviet Union had no common border with Germany. So it was more probable for the Soviet-French treaty to come into play when the Nazi Reich attacked France’ (Germany had a common border with her and had invaded! her territory more than once) or any of the weaker European countries with whom France was linked by allied commitments, that is, Czechoslovakia or Poland. Once at war with Germany, in consequence, France would, naturally, be interested in getting assistance from the USSR. But while a German attack on the USSR was impossible without German forces having to pass through the territory of East European countries, it was just as impossible for the Soviet Union to lend effective assistance to France without Soviet forces having to pass through the territory of certain 78 countries of Eastern Europe. Therefore, the question of how the USSR could afford assistance to France did arise several times.

p Early in 1937 the Soviet military attache in France was asked by the French General Staff about the form and amount of aid the USSR could provide in case of a German attack on France or Czechoslovakia. On February 17, 1937, the Soviet Ambassador and the Soviet military attache in Paris communicated the answer from the Soviet General Staff to the Chief of the French General Staff and then to the Prime Minister of France:

p “There can be two versions of Soviet military aid.

p 1. If Poland, which was in alliance with France, and Romania, which was in alliance with France and Czechoslovakia, fulfil their duty and give consent to the passage of Soviet troops through their territory under a decision taken at their own discretion or in compliance with a decision by the Council of the League of Nations, the USSR will have an opportunity of providing its aid and support by all the services...

p 2. Should Poland and Romania object, for unclear reasons, to the USSR affording assistance to France and Czechoslovakia, or should they refuse to permit the transit of Soviet troops through their territory, assistance from the USSR in such a case would inevitably be limited.

p The USSR will be in a position to dispatch its troops by sea into the territory of France and its Air Force units to Czechoslovakia and France.

p The size of this assistance should be stipulated under a special agreement between the states concerned.

p In both cases, the USSR will offer naval assistance.

p The USSR will be able to supply France and Czechoslovakia with petrol, fuel oil, lubricants, manganese, foodstuffs, armaments, engines, tanks, aircraft, etc."

p The Soviet General Staff put the following questions on its part:

p “1. What aid could France afford to the USSR in the event of an attack by Germany?

p In what way should the size of this aid be fixed?

p 2. What arms could France deliver to the USSR?"^^176^^ There was, however, no reply to these counter-questions.

p This document shows that the Soviet government was determined to have the closest possible co-operation with 79 France in resisting possible aggression by Nazi Germany, in particular, the Soviet Union was prepared to conduct negotiations with France lo draw up specific terms for the provision of mutual assistance. Unfortunately, the government of France did not support this initiative in spite of the nation’s vital interests.

p On handing this document, the Soviet government officially raised the "cardinal question" about effective SovietFrench military co-operation as early as 1937, which arose subsequently (in August 1939) during the Soviet- BritishFrench military negotiations in Moscow. Effective Soviet involvement in war against the Nazi aggressors was possible only in case of a positive solution to the issue of Soviet troop transit through the territory of the countries lying between the USSR and Germany.   [79•*  And it was sheer hypocrisy on the part of military representatives of Britain and France to pretend in 1939 that for Soviet military representatives to have raised such a question was something unforeseen which they had no possibility to prepare for in advance.

In the course of the Soviet-French negotiations about the Eastern Pact and the conclusion of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance between the USSR and France, the governments of all the nations concerned carefully analysed all the issues fundamental to curbing the aggressors which cropped up again in 1939 right before the outbreak of war. Of course, it would have been far better for peace in Europe, if the ruling circles of the Western powers had realised in good time, back in the mid-1930s, the full gravity of the danger the aggressors posed to all nations of Europe. In the national interest of their countries, they should have got down to setting up a dependable common front to safeguard peace together witli the Soviet Union instead of working out their insidious plans for a collusion with Germany so as to set her against the USSR. The Soviet Union was determined to do its best to safeguard peace.