p Once it had become finally clear from Hitler’s statements in March 1935 that Germany and Poland were opposed to the draft Eastern Pact, the Soviet government brought up on March 29, the question of concluding a trilateral SovietFrench-Czechoslovak treaty of mutual assistance.^^149^^ Paris, however, favoured the conclusion of bilateral Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak treaties.

p The difference between these proposals was essentially that the French one urged that France and the USSR should assume separate commitments in front of Czechoslovakia, while the Soviet proposal called for a joint commitment of the two powers. Such a joint guarantee by the two major powers of Europe would have been more substantial for Czechoslovakia. Another thing a trilateral treaty would mean for Czechoslovakia was that she was not obliged to afford assistance to the USSR single-handed, unless such assistance was provided by France. Czechoslovakia thought it impossible to conclude a treaty of mutual assistance with the USSR without such a reservation. A similar consideration was of no lesser significance for the USSR because it was also anxious to avoid being bound by a treaty obligation regarding assistance to Czechoslovakia without any guarantee that France would come to her aid.

p However, the French government did not want to commit itself to concert its position regarding assistance to Czechoslovakia with the Soviet Union. It sought to retain full freedom of action in deciding whether or not to afford assistance to Czechoslovakia.

p The Soviet government still considered it most reasonable to conclude the Eastern Pact in one form or another. On April 2, 1935, the Soviet People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs informed its Ambassador in France that the Soviet position "is to have a pact of mutual assistance in the East with Germany and Poland as parties to it and, should Germany refuse to participate, with, at least Poland and, in case of Poland’s disagreement, with France, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic countries as parties to it.. . As to Laval’s new proposal about a bilateral pact of mutual assistance, it is not clear to us what we can gain from it so that was yet to be cleared up.”^^150^^

p The Soviet Union still could not fail to attach major importance to the Eastern Pact safeguarding the Baltic states as well from German aggression. On this subject, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs indicated that "the occupation of those countries by Germany would be the start of her attack on the USSR”. Therefore, France must lend assistance to the Soviet Union as soon as the German Armed Forces crossed their Eastern border. Should the Baltic countries be left without the guarantees of France and other parties to the Eastern Pact, and should the Soviet Union want to come "to the aid of those countries”, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs stated, "we would be deprived of French assistance as well in the course of further hostilities and with Germany developing her offensive against our borders, because we would have been the first to go to war against Germany to defend the Baltic countries. We would, evidently, have to confront France and Britain in a major dispute on this account".^^151^^

p On April 6, the Soviet Ambassador in Paris, V. P. Potemkin, made an appropriate statement to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. However, the French government did not support the Soviet proposal for concluding the Eastern Pact without Germany and Poland. Besides, Laval told the Soviet Ambassador that Franco had never agreed to guarantee aid to the Baltic states. Therefore, the only option was to conclude bilateral agreements. On April 9, the French government officially announced that France was willing to conclude a treaty of mutual assistance with the USSR.^^152^^

p In view of the worsening international situation and impossibility of a larger agreement, the Soviet government decided to sign a bilateral Soviet-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance. On April 10, the Soviet Ambassador in France Potemkin received appropriate instructions from Moscow. These called, in particular, for including a provision about the USSR and France affording immediate assistance to one another in case of aggression, without waiting for any decision by the Council of the League of Nations.^^153^^

p In mid-April 1935 Litvinov and Laval held negotiations in Geneva to draft Hie treaty. But these negotiations showed that Laval could not be relied upon. His ambition to come to terms with the Nazis was only too obvious. Litvinov pointed out that Laval would be glad to see the 72 Soviet-French pact "wrecked without him being personally reproached for it”. "But Laval himself would not want to stop the negotiations and renounce the pact unless the outlines of a collusion with Germany emerged. The best thing for Laval to do was to drag out the negotiations in the hope that Germany would make some attractive offer to France with assistance from Britain."

p Litvinov found from his discussions with Laval that "one should not pin any serious hopes on the pact in the sense of real military aid in the event of war. Our security will still remain the exclusive concern of the Red Army. The pact has predominantly political significance for us, reducing the chances of war both from Germany and from Poland and Japan." ^^154^^

p The Treaty of Mutual Assistance between the USSR and France was signed on May 2, 1935. The preamble pointed out that the treaty had the aim of strengthening peace in Europe and that the two nations would work for an appropriate European agreement. They undertook to consult one another in the event of a danger of aggression against the USSR or France, and to lend one another immediate assistance in the event of an attack by any European state. The protocol to the treaty made it clear that the contracting parties were imder obligation to afford assistance to one another subsequent to an appropriate recommendation from the Council of the League of Nations; if the Council still did not produce any recommendation, the obligation regarding assistance would nevertheless be fulfilled. The treaty was concluded for a term of five years. Both governments declared in the protocol that they considered it desirable to conclude a regional agreement containing the terms of mutual assistance to replace the Soviet-French treaty.^^155^^

p The government of Czechoslovakia declared its desire to conclude a similar treaty with the USSR. The Treaty of Mutual Assistance between the USSR and Czechoslovakia was signed on May 16, 1935. It had a reservation, included upon the initiative of the Czechoslovak government, to the effect that the obligations of the USSR and Czechoslovakia to provide assistance to one another would remain valid only in case of assistance from France as well to the USSR and Czechoslovakia in the event of aggression.^^156^^

p The conclusion of the treaties of mutual assistance witb France and Czechoslovakia was a result of the Soviet 73 Union’s vigorous and consistent struggle for peace and against aggression. The Soviet-French and the Soviet- Czechoslovak treaties of mutual assistance could have become a major factor for peace and security in Europe. What was required, however, for that to be so, was for all the parties to the treaties to fulfil the commitments they had assumed in good faith. These treaties could also have been the nucleus for other European nations threatened by Nazi aggression to rally round the USSR, France and Czechoslovakia. But the French government, under Laval, never thought of earnest co-operation with the USSR. Laval’s major preoccupation was to reach an accommodation with Germany. Being unable to avoid signing the treaty with the Soviet Union, since that was demanded by the largest sections of the French people, Laval saw it as, above all, a means of making Germany enter into an amicable agreement with France. Laval said he was signing the pact with the USSR to have more trump cards in playing for agreement with Berlin.^^157^^ At the same time Laval feared lest the USSR, knowing about the intention of British and French reactionary elements to arrive at an understanding with the Nazi Reich, should find it necessary to work for normalising relations with Germany. The desire to prevent the revival of " Rapallo" was one of the major reasons why Laval did not venture to break off negotiations with the USSR and agreed to sign the treaty.^^158^^

p Laval affirmed on various occasions that he did not propose to turn the Pact with the USSR into an effective agreement, that is, supplement it with a military convention. For instance, he assured German diplomats that he had no thought of developing the pact with the USSR "into a closer alliance".^^159^^ During his meeting with Goring in the latter half of May of 1935, Laval assured him that he was doing everything to lessen the significance of the treaty with the USSR. ^^16^^°

p Although the position of Czechoslovakia was particularly precarious, her ruling circles attached but limited importance to the treaty. In a letter of information to the Czechoslovak ministers abroad, E. Bones, explaining his government’s position regarding the treaty with the Soviet Union, wrote that should Russia be once more kept out of European affairs as she had been at the 1922 Genoa Conference, that could again automatically entail a German-Russian 74 rapprochement. So it was necessary that co-operation with Russia should be maintained and that she should not be kept out.^^161^^ The day before treaty was signed, Benes argued with the British Minister in Prague that the treaty changed nothing about the situation in Europe, but would keep Germany and Russia away from each other.^^162^^

p The approach to the Eastern Pact after the conclusion of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty and the Soviet-French treaty had to be different. The Soviet government considered that a multilateral treaty of a more limited substance, with Germany acceding to it, would have a certain sense as a complement to those treaties. On May 16, 1935, the governments of the USSR and France put forward their proposal for concluding the Eastern Pact containing obligations about nonaggression, consultations and refusal of aid to the aggressor. The Soviet government told the government of France that it considered it desirable for the treaty to be signed by the USSR, France, Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic countries that would wish to joint it.^^163^^

p The French government transmitted a memorandum to the government of Germany proposing that the Eastern Pact should be concluded on the foregoing terms.^^164^^

p However, Laval once more showed himself as cunning as he was shortly afterwards. On June 25, 1935, the French Ambassador in Berlin Francois-Poncet, meeting the Secretary of State at the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, von Billow, told him that in the event of an Eastern Pact being signed, even without the provision for mutual assistance, the Soviet-French treaty "would become invalid".^^165^^ During his conversation with the German Ambassador in Paris von Koster on July 27, Laval said he attached major importance to a Franco-German understanding and was prepared to make certain concessions to bring it about. He emphasised the identity of views of the two countries on the struggle against Bolshevism. Pointing out that the FrancoSoviet treaty had been concluded for a short term of five years, Laval stressed that this alone showed that France was not desirous of binding herself up with the USSR for too long. He declared that should Germany agree to co- operate and undertake, by concluding a multilateral pact, to refrain from attacking any of its signatories, France "would hand her paper back to Russia”,^^166^^ that is, would abrogate her treaty with the USSR.

p That is to say that right after the signing of the SovietFrench treaty, the French foreign service entered into negotiations with the Nazis which meant, to all intents and purposes, that in the event of agreement with Germany, France was prepared to betray her ally and renounce the treaty she had just concluded with the USSR.

p However, the German government decided to reject the Eastern Pact in its new form as well. It self-righteously declared that because of the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance, its earlier statements on the matter were null and void.

p It was, beyond dispute, Hitler Germany that played the leading role in thwarting the plans for concluding the Eastern Pact. Not only did she refuse to be a party to it, but exerted pressure on other possible parties to the pact as well. And yet, should the governments of all other nations, projected as parties to the pact, have really shown themselves far-sighted enough and concerned about the security of their respective countries, they ought to have signed the Pact even without Germany in it. Much of the blame for the breakdown of the negotiations about the Eastern Pact lay, therefore, with the ruling circles of bourgeois-landlord Poland.

p A large measure of responsibility for wrecking the conclusion of the Eastern Pact rested, besides, with the government of Britain whose policy hampered the effort to strengthen the security of Europe. Even the Polish diplomatic service referred to the "double-dealing of England" which, while paying lip-service to the idea of the Eastern Pact was, in reality, wholly appreciative of Poland’s negative stand.^^167^^

p Although the Soviet-French treaty had been signed, Laval, who became the French head of government in June 1935 (along with retaining his post of Minister for Foreign Affairs), was deliberately sabotaging it.

p Under the French Constitution, the treaty could have been endorsed and put into effect by the President of France without delay, but Laval had it referred to parliament notorious for its unwieldly multitier procedure. As long as Laval remained head of government, the Treaty of Mutual Assistance between the USSR and France never came into effect.

The matter was taken off the ground only after a new 76 government (led by right-wing radical Albert Sarraut) was formed in France in January 1936, and the situation in Western Europe was once more strained because of the Nazi preparations for moving German forces into the demilitarised Rhineland. On February 27, 1936, the Chamber of Deputies of the French Parliament finally ratified the treaty by 353 votes to 164. The treaty came into effect on March 27, 1936.