p The first hotbed of another imperialist war was created by the Japanese militarists. Japan, one of the victor powers in the First World War, reaped a sizeable proportion of the spoils in the Far East and in the Pacific. The success, gained without an extra effort, moreover, whetted the expansionist ambitions of the country’s ruling elite and fostered the samurai spirit of the Japanese warlords. They dreamed of fresh conquests and of domination over the whole of East Asia and the Pacific.

p The worst ever economic crisis which broke out in the capitalist world at the time exacerbated the contradictions between the imperialist powers. Japanese-American relations were extremely strained. Back in 1918, Lenin, 10 speaking of the Japanese-American imperialist contradictions, pointed out that "the economic development of these countries has produced a vast amount of inflammable material which makes inevitable a desperate clash between them for domination of the Pacific Ocean and the surrounding ter- ritories". ^^2^^

p The U.S. ruling circles attached paramount importance to expanding and consolidating the American "invisible empire”. The U.S. home market could not absorb all the output of American industry which had greatly expanded to fulfil World War I orders. American monopolies were looking for more markets and more room for investment. The Washington system of treaties, concluded after World War I, anchored the American principle of "open doors" and "equal opportunities" in China. Big Business counted on the United States’ economic power enabling it to penetrate the vast Chinese market and capture dominant positions in it. The crisis whetted the appetites of American monopolies.

p Japan’s increasing economic penetration of China and a prospect for American monopolies to be driven out of the Chinese market altogether in the event of China being overrun by Japan were a formidable challenge to the U.S. At the time, however, the United States strove to avoid an armed confrontation with Japan. Late in 1933, a well- informed American journalist Knickerboker pointed out in a conversation with the Press Department Chief of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin that American government sources thought a Japanese-American war inevitable. The U.S. was intensely preparing for that war and building up a powerful naval and air force. Meanwhile, its policy towards Japan was one of peace gestures to gain time. On the other hand, the U.S. government felt sure that Japan would first attack the USSR to capture the Soviet Far East so as to reinforce her rear, and only after that would she start her projected mammoth battle against the U.S. over the Pacific.^^3^^

p Japan’s aggressive ambitions had likewise accentuated the Anglo-Japanese contradictions. British imperialism had penetrated the Far East, and China, in particular, when Japan was still no rival for it to fear. In the East, Britain was in possession of such major military and economic strongpoints as Hong Kong, Singapore, etc. Many big British commercial, industrial and financial companies, with assets 11 adding up to 1,500 million dollars, were ruling the roost in China. Yet by the early 1930s, Japanese imperialists were treading on the heels of British colonialists. Japan had a larger force in the Far East than the British Empire which had its possessions and armed forces scattered in all continents.

p The British foreign service, seeing no chance of success in an open confrontation with Japan, chose to seek an imperialist collusion with her, agreeable to a certain repartition of the spheres of influence in her favour in the Far East.

p True, should Britain have joined forces with other nations, they could have stood up against Japanese expansionism in that zone. The matter came before the League of Nations, too, but the British Government did not find it possible to resort to economic or other sanctions against Japan.^^4^^

p There was, however, full unanimity between the governments of the U.S. and Britain on one point: both would have been pleased most to see Japanese aggression directed against the USSR rather than against China. British conservative quarters believed, the Soviet Ambassador I. M. Maisky wrote on March 10, 1933, that the capture of Manchuria by the Japanese could lead to a war between the USSR and Japan, and that, in their opinion, would have been a "real blessing of history".^^5^^

p Now, with British secret archives of the prewar years available to historians, there is enough incontrovertible evidence on hand to bear out this account of British policy. Two most influential members of the British Government, Neville Chamberlain and John Simon, submitted a memorandum calling for improved relations with Japan, notably, for concluding a non-aggression pact with her. Their principal argument was this: "As regards Russia, anything that makes Japan feel more secure tends to encourage her in an aggressive attitude towards Russia". ^^6^^

p Influential reactionary circles of the United States were also hopeful of a conflict between Japan and the USSR. American imperialism was interested in such a war between the USSR and Japan anyway, because the U.S. craved for both the Soviet Union and Japan to be weakened.

p The ruling circles of Britain and the United States had enough reason to expect an armed clash between Japan and 12 the USSR. On course for aggression ever since 1931, the Japanese imperialists seized Northeast China (Manchuria), setting up a puppet state of Manzhou-Guo. Along with planning for continued aggression against China, the Japanese samurai coveted the Soviet Far East and the Mongolian People’s Republic. Japan had more than once rejected the Soviet proposals for concluding a non-aggression pact between the USSR and Japan.

p Japan’s War Minister, General Araki energetically plumped for attacking the USSR. He told a conference of governors in 1933 that "in the pursuit of her national policy, Japan is bound to confront the Soviet Union" and that it was "necessary for Japan to take possession, by force of arms, of the territory of Primorye (Maritime Territory), Trans-Baikal and Siberia".^^7^^ The British military attache in Tokyo E. A. II. James said the position of the quarters represented by Araki was that "it is necessary to fight Russia sooner rather than later".^^8^^ A Foreign Office Memorandum to the British Government in May 1933 also stated that "the Japanese Army concentrates its whole attention on a future war with Russia".^^9^^ On June 2, Araki and his supporters got the Japanese Emperor, Hirohito, to decide that the Soviet Union was Japan’s "Enemy Number One”,^^10^^ i.e., military preparations had to be made, first of all, for a war against the USSR. The German military attache in the USSR, Hartmann, reported the same news to Berlin, referring to statements by the Japanese military attache in Moscow, Kawabe. He wrote that "the Soviet Union is not desirous of war and is doing its best to avert it,” but the Japanese could start hostilities as early as the spring of 1934. »

p Japan was making intense preparations for a war against the USSR. Manchuria and Korea which she had seized were turned into one vast bridgehead. The strength of the Kwangtung Army stationed in Manchuria was being increased, and military installations, roads, depots, barracks and airfields were being built. Following the seizure of Manchuria and part of North China in 1933, the Japanese Army General Staff specified and particularised its war plan (Plan “Otsu”); it called for 24 out of the 30 projected divisions to bo provided for military operations against the Soviet Union. The opening one was to have seized Maritime Territory to be followed up by a strike at Lake Baikal area. ^^12^^

The Soviet government was well aware of the danger looming across the Far Eastern border of the USSR. Ambassador William Bullitt, reporting to Washington about his conversation with J. V. Stalin arid K. Y. Voroshilov on December 20, 1933, wrote that, in discussing the situation in the Far East, the Soviet leaders voiced most serious apprehension over the possibility of a Japanese attack in the coming spring. ^^13^^ People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov declared on December 29, 1933, that the policy of Japan "is now the darkest storm-cloud on the international political horizon". ^^14^^