66

p Whatever the champions of American ‘democracy’ may say to the contrary, when World War II broke out the United States had more than enough espionage and counterespionage services of diverse kinds. Washington had always preferred to ‘overdo’ things in this field, disregarding organizational and material costs. The special services knew their place and catered fairly well to current needs. This state of affairs would have evidently taken the country through the war, had the helm been in the hands of a man of less caliber and less inclined to secret politics than Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had an understanding partner in Winston Churchill.

p Both men, though for different reasons, based their policies on a desire to achieve victory over the Axis powers at minimum cost to their countries: Churchill in view of Britain’s limited resources, and Roosevelt by dint of his determination to lead the world into an ’American century’ with minimum losses for the United States. The wiser for the lessons of the October Revolution in Russia, Roosevelt and Churchill knew that a new bloodbath similar to that experienced in World War I—and the technical advance of the tools of war reached in 1939 would have eclipsed it—could lead to radical social changes in their countries. Ultimately, World War II was brought on by the same, capitalist, system.

p After the outbreak of the war, along with increasing the military might of their countries, Churchill in a belligerent Britain and Roosevelt in a non-belligerent United States promoted a rapid build-up of the potential for secret operations. Cryptographers of the Western allies cracked many a secret Axis code. The contents of deciphered 67 German documents were reported to the White House and 10 Downing Street under code-name Ultra. An effective service of misinformation at the highest level was organised to provoke the adversary to actions desirable to Britain and the United States or to thwart his plans.

p The aim of the diverse secret activity conducted as part of the overall strategy of these countries was to weaken and destroy the Axis powers primarily through the agency of others. The British Secret Intelligence Service, whose wartime headquarters were in New York, shared its vast experience in political intrigue with the relevant divisions of the American secret services and helped to put them on their feet. The latter were set up and headed by Roosevelt’s friend, General Donovan, a successful Wall Street lawyer before the war. Insofar as the Soviet Union was the strongest power of the Old World opposing the aggressors, it became the centre of attention for Washington and London, which were out to use its might in their own interests. In the long run, their designs were built on sand, but this in no way reduced the zeal of ’Wild Bill’ Donovan.

p Donovan’s preparatory effort was cut short by Nazi Germany’s sudden attack on the Soviet Union. There was no time to waste, for the Soviet Union’s single combat against the Axis powers called for close study if Washington wished to draw prompt conclusions and to plan its policy. A competent study of the matter contains the following passage: ’The attack on Russia made it politically possible for him (Roosevelt) to declare Bill Donovan his Coordinator of Information’,^^4^^ and this was duly announced in the President’s executive order of July 11, 1941. The vague title of Coordinator (the term OSS appeared on June 13, 1942) was designed to confuse the enemy and at once disarm the large jealous intelligence community angered and dumbfounded by the appearance of a rival. Eight agencies were displeased: the FBI, the G-2, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the customs service of the Department of Commerce, the Treasury Department Intelligence, the immigration and naturalization service of the Department of Labor, and the Federal Communications Commission engaged in radio monitoring.

p What they did not comprehend was that the OSS, formerly subordinated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff but 68 actually to the President, was an organ of strategic intelligence, subversion, and ‘black’ propaganda, while they, organs of tactical intelligence, each operating in its own field, were unaffected. The most important intelligence gathered by them was to be referred to the OSS for analysis. The indignation knew no bounds. For them it was nothing short of sacrilege that civilian professors should from now on deal with military issues. But the President’s power had to be reckoned with. The President’s executive order charged Donovan’s office ’to collect and analyze all information and data’ which may bear upon ’national security’. Ray S. Cline, who started with OSS and ultimately became deputy director of the CIA, wrote 35 years later in his book Secrets, Spies and Scholars (1976):

p ’The sentence that reads: “collect and analyze all information and data" is significant and certainly reflected the spirit of “all source" intelligence that animated Donovan, Allen Welsh Dulles, OSS, and CIA ...

p ’The order also invented the phrase “national security" that has lived on to the present, explaining the rationale for much intelligence activity, and serving also as a vague pretext for almost anything a President wanted done.’^^5^^

p By the end of the war more than 30,000 people were working in the OSS. Its brains trust, the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A), was headed by William Langer, a Harvard professor of history. This giant division of the OSS, housed originally in the Library of Congress and still connected with it, Donovan’s biographer Corey Ford writes, eventually became 

p ’the largest collection of eminent educators and scholars ever gathered together in a single government agency. R&A skimmed the cream of the social science departments in all the universities, including specialists in every field of intelligence. Geographers furnished information on foreign terrain and climate for American policy planners; psychologists probed Axis broadcasts for hidden meanings; economists sifted German newspapers in search of figures on Nazi war production; historians provided depth and background to world events. By the war’s end, R&A had enlisted over sixteen hundred social scientists from Washington alone, a national superuniversity unequalled before or since. ... In 1964, McGeorge 69 Bundy wrote in The Dimensions of Diplomacy: “It is a curious fact of academic history that the first great centre of area studies in the United States was not located in any university, but in Washington during the Second World War, in the Office of Strategic Services. In very large measure the area study programs developed in American universities in the years after the war were manned, directed, or stimulated by graduates of the OSS—a remarkable institution, half cops-and-robbers and half faculty meeting. It is still true today, and I hope it always will be, that there is a high measure of interpenetration between universities with area programs and information- gathering agencies of the government of the United States . . . Subsequently this Board of Analysts provided the model for the CIA Board of National Estimates, set up in 1950 by Dr. Langer".’^^6^^

p Though, for understandable reasons, the attention of the OSS was centred on the Axis powers, neither did it disregard an ally, the U.S.S.R. This is recorded in the U.S. specialist literature, albeit in outline only and doubtless with a good dose of misinformation. For instance, when considering the amount of lend-lease deliveries to the U.S.S.R., the U.S. leaders tried to determine the ‘actual’ Soviet needs lest anything should be left over for after the war. The American and British secret services pooled their efforts with regard to both the enemy and the ally, the U.S.S.R., Donovan’s biographer writes:

p ’R&A’s estimate of the strength of the Soviet Union differed from British findings; and Professor Geroid F. Robinson of Columbia, a diligent student of Russian history who later headed the first Russian Institute at Columbia, went to England and spent a week with the British counterpart of R&A, located at Oxford. “You’ve got better men, you’ve got more information, we accept your estimates,” the British conceded. Dr. Langer claims that no other government had anything comparable to R&A. “And that includes the Germans,” he added, “who could have had it if they wanted it—they had the competence.” â€™^^7^^

p A study by Thomas Powers that appeared in 1979 and is, in effect, a history of the CIA, traces OSS concerns with the U.S.S.R. in wartime. Referring to R. Harris Smith’s 70 book, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency (1972) and adding his own observations, Powers notes:

p ’The history of OSS, which is indistinguishable from the secret political history of the war, is marked by a preoccupation with Communism almost as intense as its commitment to victory against Germany. A woman who worked for Dulles in Bern thinks that the focus of his attention— the kind of thing man thinks about as he drifts to sleep at night & wakes up in the morning—was beginning to shift from Germany to Russia as early as Stalingrad. The OSS, including Helms, lived with the Soviet-American rivalry as a fact throughout the war.’^^8^^ This was a cause not only for OSS operatives, of course, but also for the scholars in OSS employ.

p Years of service were given to the OSS by many American scholars of the older generation specializing in social science. Among them were the historians Arthur Schlesinger, Walt W. Rostow, Everett Gleason, and Sherman Kent, the philosopher Herbert Marcuse, the economists Edward S. Mason, Charles Hitch, and Emile Despres, the sinologists John K. Fairbank and Clarence M. Wilbur. Cline wrote: ’He (Donovan) lifted intelligence out of its military rut, where it had little prestige and little dynamism, and made it a career for adventurous, broad-minded civilians. This tradition carried down to CIA, which regularly recruited some of the most able graduates from U.S. universities, to learn the intelligence business from the cadre of OSS veterans who stayed on in public service.’ ^^9^^

p Many of these men of science were attracted by the chance of being on an equal footing (outwardly, of course) with such scions of America’s wealthiest and most influential clans as the Du Fonts, Ryans, Vanderbilts, MelIons, Armours and Bruces. Some Russian emigres—Leo Tolstoy’s grandson Ilya and Prince Serge Obolensky among them—also found their way into the OSS. OSS funds were administered by Junius Morgan, a partner of John Pierpont Morgan. A host of lawyers who worked for the largest American corporations, also worked for OSS. Drew Pearson, the columnist, observed at the time that the OSS consisted mainly of Wall Street bankers. And Donovan was flattered rather than annoyed by this press exposure of what was to have been hidden from the public eye, 71 James Roosevelt, the President’s elder son, was OSS liaison officer with the government.

p Landing amidst professional spies and the scions of America’s leading families, the gentlemen and scholars were found to be far less squeamish than conventionally portrayed. They had no fear of blood and launched into various bloodthirsty plans. The CIA experiments on humans, in behavior control, and in methods of effective interrogation, and many other things of the same order, date back to those OSS times. A long-standing practice of the U.S. special services, quiet elimination of dangerous adversaries, was given a ’scientific grounding’, and in wartime conditions was expected to yield great results.

p An unnamed professor coined the phrase, ’fight terror with terror’ in combating the Axis, adding: ’We have to become monsters to destroy monsters.’ The innovator, described as a ’mumbly professor’, introduced a technique that became a feature of the OSS Research and Analysis branch. Properly handled, it was a fine weapon. It pulled together all the small details about an absent person until you could make him seem to speak and move before your eyes. Heydrich was its first victim.^^10^^ His ‘psychological’ portrait showed that he was dangerous. The OSS and the British Secret Intelligence Service found the Czech patriots who willingly eliminated Heydrich, and laid down their lives in the attempt, with the entire population of the village of Lidice being wiped out in reprisal as the price for Heydrich’s life.

p Donovan’s close associate, the wartime chief of British intelligence, William Stephenson, years later explained the motives for Heydrich’s killing: ’Civilian morale inside Fortress Europe had to be prepared, and our guerilla forces had to be supported by most of the population. There was only one way to mobilize popular support for the secret armies, and that was to stage more dramatic acts of resistance and counterterrorism.’^^11^^

p This fitted perfectly into the Anglo-American strategy of having the chestnuts pulled out of the fire by someone else. But with the exception of Heydrich’s assassination in 1942, no more ’dramatic acts’ of the kind were heard of. Which is probably a fair indication of OSS capability. It was not the intrigues of the U.S. and British special services, but the valiant war effort of the Soviet people that 72 awakened and inspired the Resistance in Europe. Fascism armed to the teeth could be and was destroyed only by superior military force—the Red Army.

p A war of gigantic proportions was in train, but the anonymous OSS scholars with their pathetic yen for tackling problems of global scale, produced a rich assortment of half-baked, neophyte plans.

p Walter Langer, a psychoanalyst by profession, who was brought to the OSS by his brother William, undertook Donovan’s assignment to pull together a ’psychological portrait’ of Hitler. In the opinion of the OSS chief, it was to be of tremendous significance for the fortunes of the war. Declassified and published in the early 1970s under the title, The Mind of Adolf Hitler, it is rather a ’psychological portrait’ of the OSS leadership, and hence the CIA, than of Hitler. The 200 pages about Hitler are enough to turn the stomach of even the psycho-historian. It is really nothing more than a collective excursion into Freud.

p The sources for the research, which was completed in the autumn of 1943, were the already plentiful books on Hitler and interviews with persons who knew him personally and proved to be within roach of the OSS. What had been extracted from publications and oral reports was compared with case histories of mental patients, leading to the conclusion that ’Hitler is probably a neurotic psychopath bordering on schizophrenia. This means that he is not insane in the commonly accepted sense of the term, but a neurotic who lacks adequate inhibitions... It is a kind of “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde”.’

p After thus diagnosing the Fuehrer’s mental state, OSS psychoanalysts ventured a summing up: ’Those who are delegated to conduct the war against Germany. . . will realize that the madness of the Fuehrer has become the madness of a nation, if not of a large part of the (European) continent. They will realize that these are not wholly the actions of a single individual but that a reciprocal relationship exists between the Fuehrer and the people and that the madness of the one stimulates and flows into the other and vice versa. It was not only Hitler, the madman, who created German madness, but German madness that created Hitler. . . From a scientific point of view, therefore, we are forced to consider Hitler, the Fuehrer, not as a personal devil, wicked as his actions and philosophy may be, 73 but as the expression of a state of mind existing in millions of people, not only in Germany, but to a smaller degree in all civilized countries. To remove Hitler may be a necessary first step, but it would not be the cure ... We must ferret out and seek to correct the underlying factors that produced the unwelcome phenomenon. We must discover the psychological streams that nourish this destructive state of mind in order that we may divert them into channels that will permit a further evolution of our form of civilization.’ From the general to the particular—to the personality of Hitler. The doors of the OSS laboratory were flung wide open, revealing the rather shoddy armorarium of Freud.

p Lumped together were Hitler’s Messianic inclinations and his tears over a dead canary, the mechanism of influencing the crowd and the people as a whole, which the Fuehrer saw as a woman, entering into a sexually- determined contact with it from the speaker’s platform. Hence, in the opinion of OSS experts, the paralyzing effectiveness of Hitler’s speeches. There was also, of course, a richly documented history of his sex life, starting with early observations of the parents of three-year-old Adolf. Brushing aside the commonly-held view of the Fuehrer’s homosexual inclinations, the psychoanalysts described, with relish and a wealth of detail, how Hitler satisfied his sexual desires, prostrating himself naked at a woman’s feet, imploring her to beat him, and hysterically insisting that she urinate and defecate on him, and so on. This clinical case of typical masochism had such a staggering effect on his uninitiated partners that two of them committed suicide, while Eva Braun’s consent to grant the Fuehrer’s extravagant requests had cost her considerable effort plus two attempts at suicide.

p Good heavens, why all this nastiness, and why the laudatory and loathsome afterword to the report written by Robert Waite in the early seventies confirming these conclusions on the basis of postwar investigations. Yes, Hitler ’was reputed to have taken great pleasure in having young ladies defecate on his head’. And why make the reader climb up Hitler’s genealogical tree to satisfy himself that his grandfather was a Jew? What bearing did this have on the horrible war, and in what way did the elucidation of these circumstances help Washington? As Walter 74 Langer, who had been in charge of the research project, explained in the introduction to his book in 1972, ’If such a study of Hitler had been made years earlier, under less tension, and with more opportunity to gather first-hand information, there might not have been a Munich. .. and one of President Diem might have avoided our deep involvement in Vietnam. Studies of this type cannot solve our international problems. They might, however, help to avoid some of the serious blunders we seemed to have made because we were ignorant of the psychological factors involved and the nature of the leaders with whom we were negotiating.’

p According to Langer, it was a brilliant piece of impartial research. Quite true, at least in the case of Hitler’s strange ways. But on the whole, the analysis of Hitler’s personality shows the high sense of discipline that prevailed in the OSS: it supplied those at the top, in the White House, only that which flattered the recipients. It says in the study, for example, that ’there is evidence that the only person in the world at the present time who might challenge Hitler in the role of leader is Roosevelt. Informants are agreed that he fears neither Churchill nor Stalin. He feels that they are sufficiently like himself so that he can understand their psychology and defeat them at the game. Roosevelt, however, seems to be an enigma to him. How a man can lead a nation of 130,000,000 people and keep them in line without a great deal of name-calling, shouting, abusing, and threatening is a mystery to him. He is unable to understand how a man can be the leader of a large group and still act like a gentleman. The result is that he secretly admires Roosevelt to a considerable degree, regardless of what he publicly says about him. Underneath he probably fears him inasmuch as he is unable to predict his actions.’^^12^^

p Since Langer and his learned colleagues wrote off what the Fuehrer publicly said about the U.S. President and turned instead to what the Fuehrer had thought ‘secretly’ about him, Hitler’s Secret Conversations, which is a book of verbatim reports on his pronouncements among intimates, published in 1953 in London, is surely acceptable for ascertaining precisely what Hitler had thought. Well, then, let’s look into it. Hitler’s appraisal of Roosevelt was: ‘There’s no doubt about it, he’s a sick brain.’ Hitler said to 75 his retainers: ’Neither of the two Anglo-Saxons is any better than the other ... Churchill and Roosevelt, what impostors! ... Roosevelt, who both in his handling of political issues and in his general attitude, behaves like a tortuous pettifogging Jew . . . Churchill as the undisciplined swine who is drunk eight hours of every twenty-four.’ About Stalin, on the other hand, Hitler said he ’must command our unconditional respect. In his own way he is a hell of a fellow’.^^13^^ At the height of the war, after familiarizing himself with the estimate of the U.S.S.R. prepared by the office of Walter Schellenberg, Ribbentrop told the latter that he was very familiar with his special reports on Russia, ’and he had given the full situation much thought. He had then gone to the Fuehrer and told him frankly that their biggest and most dangerous enemy was the Soviet Union and that Stalin had as much military ability and statesmanship as Churchill and Roosevelt put together. . . The Fuehrer shared this view and even mused out loud that Stalin was the only one he could find the necessary respect for.’ ^^14^^

p The present-day historians of the American special services are doubtless perfectly aware of this, yet attach no importance to it, and insist that Hitler’s wartime ’ psychological portrait’ had been impeccable. More, the Langer & Co. ‘portrait’ is taken as a model for similar studies, past and present, done by the CIA. R. Cline, for example, has no second thoughts about backing it with his professional weight of a former high-ranking CIA officer and, what is more, with the weight of his sideline profession of historian (he was the author of one of the important volumes of the 99-volume history of the U.S. Army during World War II—Washington Command Post). He does not hesitate to testify that ’Walter Langer . . . supervised the publication of an extraordinary insightful personality profile of Adolf Hitler, published as a book many years later, which pointed the way to similar sketches of foreign leaders by CIA’s psychiatric staff.’^^15^^

p Could eminent historians—like Carl L. Becker and Charles A. Beard among the American ones—have foreseen what use would bo made of their relativist method by the gentlemen and scholars in the employ of the U.S. special services. Harry Rositzke was in positive raptures in 1977 that the CIA produced ’profiles on key political 76 figures in the tradition of Professor William Langer’s published OSS profile on Hitler.’^^16^^ So it’s already a ‘tradition’.

p Evidently the range of persons whose ‘profiles’ are drawn is not limited to major leaders. More likely still, the CIA has adopted the practice of portraying those—- Americans included—who are found to be ‘dangerous’ to the existing system. It appears that the kind of investigation provided for by the law is replaced with the arbitrary compilation by anonymous specialists of a secret ’psychological portrait’ whereby conclusions may be drawn with regard to its ‘subject’, and thus, too, beyond the limits established by the law. Operational efficiency is the keynote: instead of a long investigative record, a thin file with a ’ psychological portrait’ as the basis for extrajudicial persecution. But, of course, that is not the kind of thing the CIA shouts about from the rooftops. Yet in 1971-1973 a certain ’psychological portrait’ caused a scandal that could not be hushed up.

p In June 1971 The New York Times began publishing excerpts from a 47-volume secret history of U.S. policy in Vietnam. It had been compiled in 1967-1968 on orders from Defence Secretary Robert McNamara who, anticipating the defeat of the U.S.A., had commissioned a panel of experts to give an exposition of the reasons for this. The 36 authors of the report, which the press came to call the Pentagon Papers, but which was officially entitled History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy, were aware, as was pointed out in the introduction, that what they had produced was ’not a complete ... history’.^^17^^ But even the facts disclosed in it were enough to prove that the United States had been the instigator of that aggressive war. When opinions were aired on this score in the White House, Defence Secretary Mel Laird felt that over 95 per cent of the material could be declassified. ’But,’ Richard Nixon recalls, ’we were all still worried about whatever percent—even if it were only 1 percent—that should not be.’^^18^^ The Administration reacted with alacrity, but was unable to stop further publication. The then Governor of Georgia Jimmy Carter called on a Senator to urge ’the enactment of Federal legislation that would make news organizations criminally liable’.^^19^^

p A public scandal erupted, in which the government’s hands were tied, for the Vietnam war had by then caused 77 deep rifts in the ruling class. Though, to be sure, the publication of the Pentagon Papers did not, and indeed could not, alter anything in U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. This is attested, too, by R. Sigford, author of an unpublished dissertation on the Vietnam War, preserved in the Lyndon B. Johnson library. ’But after all was said and done,’ he wrote, ’the Pentagon study had little if any effect on the Vietnam War.’^^20^^

p The culprit responsible for the leaking of the secret papers, Daniel Ellsberg, who had been in Vietnam in 1964- 1966 in the capacity of a Pentagon expert, and had gone there a ‘hawk’ and returned a ‘dove’, had immaculate credentials: he had been connected with the CIA.

p According to Fletcher Prouty, former chief liaison officer between the Department of Defense and the CIA, the purpose of leaking the Pentagon Papers was ’to make certain that the role of the CIA always appeared in a most laudable and commendable manner’. ^^21^^ The Administration, it seems, had not heeded its recommendations, and this was the sad result.

p Ellsberg’s intervention was welcomed by Richard Nixon’s powerful opponents. He was to be prosecuted, but the case collapsed. He basked in glory. His name was featured in frontpage headlines. Ellsberg was invulnerable, he was being swept along by the powerful current carrying the country towards Watergate.

p In May 1973 it became known that following the publication of the Pentagon Papers, the CIA had been instructed to settle scores with Ellsberg. But by no means for turning from ‘hawk’ into ‘dove’. As reported by V. Lasky in his book, It Didn’t Start with Watergate (1977), Henry Kissinger, who was personally acquainted with the muchlauded truth-seeker, had reported to the President that Ellsberg had

p ’knowledge of very critical defence secrets of current validity, such as nuclear deterrent targeting’. In the mid-sixties Ellsberg had, in fact, worked for Defense Secretary McNamara on nuclear targeting plans. ’These closely held nuclear secrets,’ Lasky says, ’were contained in a highly classified document—the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP). Kissinger informed Nixon that a leak of SIOP would be devastating to national security. SIOP spelled out the 78 timing and attack patterns of American nuclear bombs in case of war; it contained specific targeting information for every military objective behind the Iron and Bamboo curtains, including the number and power of nuclear warheads programmed for each target.’

p Though there was no indication that Ellsberg intended to make any revelations concerning SIOP, the President’s orders were more than emphatic: ’I don’t give a damn how it is done, do whatever has to be done to stop these leaks and prevent further unauthorised disclosures; I don’t want to be told why it can’t be done.’^^22^^

p The CIA mounted an operation code-named Odessa to put together a ’psychiatric profile’ of Ellsberg. Agents with special equipment broke into the offices of the family doctors to pick up information. By November 1971 the ‘profile’ was ready.

p The man in charge of the operation, G. Gordon Liddy, reminded presidential aides: ’The only overt program should be that involving criminal prosecution under the appropriate federal statutes. The remaining malefactors should be identified and dealt with no less severely, but by alternative means (italics added).’^^23^^ As a result of a concatenation of circumstances, and most likely because of pressures exerted by quarters that wanted to get rid of Nixon, the operation was brought to the light of day. The curtain on Watergate was rising.

p Former CIA Director William Colby writes in his memoirs:

p ’In early May of 1973 I read in a newspaper the story that would radically shake up my life, and that of the CIA. It was the story that reported that, during Daniel Ellsberg’s trial for disclosing the Pentagon Papers, it had been revealed that the office of his psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis J. Fielding, had been broken into by Howard Hunt, using CIA equipment, in search of material that would then be turned to CIA and from which CIA would prepare a “psychiatric profile" on Ellsberg for the White House. This was a shocker and I couldn’t understand how I had never heard of it before, when I was supposed to have been in charge of assembling all the CIA material relevant to Watergate.’^^24^^

79

p Colby’s memoirs belong to writings that come under the head of limited credibility. But in the given case he might well have been taken aback. As were those in the White House who had ordered operation Odessa. They probably had only a dim idea of how the CIA worked, and could not imagine that so experienced an outfit would leave its tracks uncovered. On March 17, 1973, the following exchange took place between Nixon and his loyal aide, John Dean:

p ’Dean: ...Hunt and Liddy both. They -these fellows had to be some idiots as we’ve learned after the fact. They went out and went into Dr. Ellsberg’s doctor’s office and they had, they were geared up with all this CIA equipment—cameras and the like. Well they turned the stuff back in to the CIA at some point in time and left film in the camera. CIA has not put this together, and they don’t know what it all means right now.

p ’President: What in the world—what in the name of God ...

p ’Dean: They were trying to—this was a part of an operation that—in connection with the Pentagon papers. They were—the whole thing—they wanted to get Ellsberg’s psychiatric records for some reason. I don’t know . . .

p ’President: (Expletive deleted)... ’Dean: There are all the materials relating to Hunt. In there are these pictures which the CIA developed and they’ve got Gordon Liddy standing proud as punch outside the doctor’s office with his name on it. And (unintelligible) this material it’s not going to take very long for an investigator to go back and say, well, why would this—somebody be at the doctor’s office and they’d find out that there was a breakin at the doctor’s office and then you’d find Liddy on the staff and then you’d start working it back ...’^^25^^

p The two had foreseen exactly what would happen. The break-in at the doctor’s office figured prominently in what came to be known as the Watergate affair. The guilty parties went to prison. Nixon in his memoirs calls it a tragedy, for after all ’Daniel Ellsberg went free’. ^^26^^

But we are not concerned with Watergate. We referred to it only to show the kind of dirty tricks the CIA engaged in.