112

p In the U.S. at the juncture of the 1940s and 1950s the cry went round for scholars to join the CIA. Veterans of R & A OSS responded with enthusiasm: membership in the Gentlemen’s Club, as the CIA was sometimes called, was good for one’s standing. Professors were promised fabulous salaries and personal participation in shaping the most delicate US policy aspects. They were offered jobs in the newly established Office of National Estimates (ONE), the brain of the CIA. People put in charge of the Office in 1950 had worked under OSS cover, and in due course pondered U.S. foreign policy on the eve of and during World War II.

p They had put to good use the few years of academic freedom between their OSS and CIA jobs, and had written several books that were now part of official US historiography. William Langer, together with S. Gleason, had planned writing a four-volume analysis of US foreign policy from 1937 to 1945. But apparently the return to their old occupation in the CIA in 1950 got in the way, and they produced only two volumes in 1952-1954: The Challenge to Isolationism: 1937-1940 and The Undeclared War: 1940- 1941. Those books, the authors believed, reflected the central issues at the time of writing.

p These two volumes by Langer and Gleason have no doubt become an indispensable source—and not only in the United States—for students of the period immediately preceding World War II and of its initial stages. These books are indispensable not because they offer a unique interpretation of those years—essentially, they echo the official version of Washington’s foreign policy aims—but because the over 1,500 page-long volumes are based on facts and documents accessible only to the authors. In the words of A. G. Guerin of France, ’all those closely studying the 113 history of World War II are familiar with the name of William Langer, but few of them realize that he is a CIA man’.^^1^^

p As early as 1946, Generals Marshall and Eisenhower demanded that a 99-volume history of the U.S. army in World War II be written. Eisenhower wanted to assign the task mostly to civilian historians, because the ’gang of retired colonels’ would drag their feet for at least 25 years. The U.S. top brass wanted to have the 99-volume edition without delay, to study the past war for the coming conflict. The armed forces’ archives were opened to the selected historians. Ray Cline, the man who wrote the first volume, was given a chance to study the way US top-level authorities functioned in emergencies. He was not alone. Scholars with theoretical and practical experience flocked to the CIA.

p The government was champing at the bit to dig into the CIA’s intellectual capital and gave money for this purpose freely. Langer and his team were puzzled by the suggestion to recruit 1,000 people for ONE. They replied that in science, quantity did not necessarily mean quality and suggested about 30 staff members. After prolonged argument, the administrators agreed, and throughout its almost two decades of existence the Office never exceeded 100 employees.^^2^^ In the initial stages, when Washington virtually worshipped ONE, Langer’s prestige was unassailable. Apparently, top-level bureaucrats were sure that the Office had a crystal ball that would help scientists find ways of defeating the Soviet Union.

p The crystal ball grew to be the size of an iceberg. Its tip—ONE—rested on 1,000 employees of the intelligence agency and 2,000 more people working in the central reference service—the CIA’s classified data library—and various research units.^^3^^ While Langer had the CIA Director and the National Security Council behind him, he treated all bureaucrats equally, no matter what posts they held, say, in the State Department or in the armed forces. There were reports that he was impatient with them and could well say something like, ’Enough words, General. Now get down to brass tacks.’

p ONE leaders obviously considered themselves an intellectual elite. There were seven of them besides Langer: four historians, Professors Shermen Kent, Ludwell 114 Montague, De Forrest Van Slyck and Ray Sontag; Calvin Hoover, a professor of economics; General Clarence Huebner, former commander of all US forces in Europe; and Maxwell Foster, a lawyer. ONE also used the services of so-called Princeton consultants—George Kennan, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the editor of Foreign Affairs, and Vannevar Bush, an atomic scientist.^^4^^ Those names are known, but thousands upon thousands of U.S. scientists who worked or are still working for the CIA are in no hurry to disclose their Langley connection. While the OSS had been a club of the high-born, the CIA was even more exclusive in its early years, an elite club whose members took pride in their background and university degrees. As Allen Dulles wrote in 1963, ’it is quite true that we have a considerable number of graduates from Eastern colleges. It is also true that in numbers of degrees (many of the CIA personnel have more than one degree) Harvard, Yale, Columbia and Princeton lead the list.’^^5^^ The establishment and operation of ONE puts in its proper perspective the old problem and wild rumours of the CIA infiltrating the academic community. The CIA did not infiltrate science. It was science that helped establish and even shape the CIA. At any rate, the brain of the CIA was built along lines suggested by scholars with a record of covert OSS operations.

p ONE aimed its research at a very wide range of issues, trying to predict future Soviet action, locate weak spots of the U.S.S.R. and submit appropriate recommendations. To this day we know very little about specific ONE—and consequently CIA—recommendations. We can only judge them by their results—U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, to which CIA analysts had inevitably contributed. In the early or golden years of ONE, Langer and his colleagues had direct access to the National Security Council. There is no doubt that CIA analysts wrote either part or all of Psychological Offensive Vis-A-Vis the U.S.S.R. Objectives, Tasks and Themes, a document that is now in President Truman’s library. Dated April 10, 1951, it was declassified in 1976. Its authors stressed the following:

p ’Necessarily implicit throughout these objectives, tasks and themes is the suggestion to the Soviet peoples that an alternative to the present regime can exist. It is not the policy of the U.S. to advocate specific alternatives. Consequently no such suggestion 115 should be made on any specific issue (collectivization, democratic elections, etc.) without special policy guidance. In all our output, however, it should be implicit that the eventual solution lies in a reassertion of the human values which are the heritage of the Russian people, and which Stalinism has repudiated ...’

p The point here was to help restore capitalism in the U.S.S.R. Of course, the central objective of U.S. psychological warfare was based on a distorted image of the Soviet Union in the United States: the document called for efforts aimed at ’widening the schism which exists between the Soviet Peoples and their rulers ...’

p This was followed by recommendations prepared by the unholy alliance of spies and scholars. The means suggested was brazen slander of the Soviet social and state system. The only restriction to be observed was the following:

p ‘Caution: This is the task most easily implemented. Do not overdo it. The purpose is to stimulate a consciousness of tyranny among those who might become inured to it or not know what goes on beyond their own personal horizon.’

p Slander was indeed easy for professional slanderers, but the interesting thing here was the logic of the recommendations. People lived and worked under a people’s government, but CIA scholars wanted them to think they lived under a tyranny, to believe what they were told by the sworn enemies of the Soviet system instead of what they themselves saw and knew. If American propaganda is based on such assumptions, as it was in this case, then it explains why Washington’s enormous appropriations for this purpose go down the drain. Only deranged minds can believe the nonsense of the ’molecular revolution’ type peddled by NTS. But the CIA’s ‘scholarly’ approach to psychological warfare was no better.

p The recommendations insisted on the following ways to fight socialist ideas:

p ‘Task 1.

p ’1. To uncover and develop the spiritual values and the moral and ethical concepts of the Soviet peoples, especially of Russia, and to establish the identity of these values with those of the free world.

116

p ‘Suggested Themes:

p ’(a) Truth, mercy, pity, charity, love of family, hospitality, are some of the basic values which have always been dear to the Soviet peoples and which are derived from their spiritual life. They are held in common with the people of the free world, but in contempt by the Soviet rulers.

p ’(b) Historically the contribution of the Russian people to the free world in the various fields of creative thought—i.e., ethics, arts and the sciences—has always been recognized and respected. ’ (c) A review of classical Russian literature and political and ethical philosophy shows that Russia shared and was influenced by the creative social and cultural forces that have shaped the West. The political and ethical ideals of the Russian peoples are at bottom similar to those of the West, since they spring from common spiritual roots; they are thwarted in the communist state, but they are not dead. *

p ‘* Treatment note: We should avoid talking of Western influence overmuch, and avoid any suggestion of being patronizing.

p ‘(d) The Russian family is founded on love, trust, mutual assistance, and respect for the rights of others. These values are held in common with the free world,

p ‘(e) The things for which the Soviet peoples believed the revolution was fought: peace, freedom, and a decent life for all, are basic concepts held in common with the free world. These concepts motivate and are being advanced in the progressive daily and political life of the free world.

p ’(f) To assure the Russian people that the free world has no designs against them nor their country and that it seeks only their freedom and prosperity in a friendly, cooperative world.’

p The ’free world’, and U.S. leaders in particular, was actually getting ready to shower the Soviet Union with atomic bombs, launch bacteriological warfare, and generally exterminate Russians by any means available. Meanwhile, U.S. propaganda used flattery to lull them into a false sense of security. This approach, with minor variations to suit new circumstances, is used against the U.S.S.R. to this day.

117

p ’Suggested themes’ for talks about the United States were equally revealing. They were to disguise the actual U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. I must apologize for the long quotations, but the following one is a good indicator of the moral and intellectual standards of the psychological warfare strategists:

p ’(a) The U.S. is peace-loving and honors the sovereignty and integrity of peoples and nations, ’(b) Americans distinguish between the Soviet peoples and their government.

p ’(c) The United States never has been at war with Russia.

p ’(d) The U.S. helped the Soviet peoples in World War II even before the U.S. was at war with Germany.

p ’(e) The U.S. continued to help the peoples of the U.S.S.R. even after the end of hostilities of World War II. (Helped also after the Revolution: Hoover Commission)

p ’(f) Americans have contributed their knowledge and experience to the building of industry there,

p ‘(g) The love of technology and gadgetry, science and mechanics applied to daily life, is shared by the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

p ’(h) Our countries are big and we share a tendency to plan big.

p ’(i) We share the spirit of pioneers,

p ’(j) There are many thousands of persons of Russian or Ukrainian descent in the United States who have had an important influence on the development of American life.

p ’(k) Russian and Ukrainian folk music and the music of their composers (including the Soviet) are very frequently performed in the U.S. Many of our outstanding performing artists are of Russian extraction.

p ’(l) The novels and stories of Russian authors are very popular in the United States (the free world). Courses in Russian literature figure in the curricula of all our major universities. *

p ‘* New biographies of Russian writers and studies of Russian literature should be reviewed, even if they appear to have political content,

p ’(m) The people of the U.S. and the free world are 118 well aware of the courage, energy and aspirations of the Soviet peoples; many Americans have publicly praised these qualities.

p ’(n) The U.S. helps all peoples when it can, whether or not they agree with American policy ...

p ’(o) Theatrical aspirants in America still study the Stanislawsky method and no attempt is made to disguise its Russian origin.

p ’(p) The U.S. government and many private institutions and individuals have sought to establish cultural, scientific, and technical exchange with the Soviet Union ...

p ’(q) Evidence of nature of America (the free world) and of the basic drives and ideals we hold in common with the peoples of the U.S.S.R. is provided in the American and other Western literature still available in the Soviet Union: Steinbeck, Upton Sinclair, Mark Twain, Jack London, Dickens, etc. Although some of the works are “social protest" literature, they demonstrate the operation of the democratic faith in social process ...’^^6^^

Such are the tools used for deception and subversion. That working paper was submitted to the President of the United States as part of the psychological warfare arsenal. The recommendations it contained were used by the mercenaries the CIA hired to staff subversive radio stations beamed to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Two of them—Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe—are foremost among the CIA subsidiaries.