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_p Let us proceed further. Yurkevich argued that materialism could not provide a firm foundation for a truly progressive world outlook. The same is repeated by Mr. Volynsky in his attempts to demonstrate the advantages of idealism from the viewpoint of practical reason. But, not possessing either an "original philosophical talent" or even the simple ability to understand other 153 people’s ideas properly, our author fails in his intention in this case also. Thus, for example, Belinsky reproached Hegel for the fact that "for him the subject is not an aim in itself, but a means for the instantaneous expression of the general, while this general is a Moloch for him, because, after parading it, it casts it off like a pair of old trousers".

p Mr. Volynsky objects:

_p “The dependence of the subject on the world all-uniting spirit is the true strength of this system which determined (!?) the supreme law, meaning and order in the process of life. It is precisely in this point that Hegel’s teaching rises above ordinary knowledge (ah! precisely in this, we will make a note of that), by fusing science with religion and giving a firm answer to the noblest needs of the human soul" (p. 101).

Tell us, reader, if this is a “firm” answer and, in general,

...is it an answer at all!

p Belinsky says that all Hegel’s discussions of morality are nonsense, "because in the objective realm of thought there is no morality”. It is not hard to prove that this “because” is unfounded. Yet Mr. Volynsky does not try to prove anything, but merely rolls his eyes, as is his wont, and gives full rein to his “pathos”.

_p “If, in order to save mankind from immorality, the childish inventions of dilettante subjectivism are required, there can be no doubt that mankind could be saved only by the efforts of purely Russian philosophy (about which Belinsky never dreamed). A philosophy that conceives the world principle, that makes man the organ of the embodiment of objective forces, a philosophy that contemplates beauty and truth in the movement of universal reason, such a philosophy is bound to destroy mankind. Salvation is only within!" (p. 102).

p Yes, Mr. Volynsky is fervent, unusually fervent!

p And here is another tirade, not only with a "tumult of emotions" but even with a certain philosophical cunning, as it were.

p “The progressive force of idealism lies in its clear understanding of the struggle which is constantly taking place between man’s higher and lower principles. To see the whole of nature in the light of consciousness, to subject the mechanical movement of natural forces to a supreme, spiritual principle, to advance free human will as a key factor in the reconstruction of the crude forms of historical existence, this is the task of idealism if it is addressed not only to the theoretical, but also to the practical interests of mankind. The eternal contrasts between the idea and the fact, between sensual experience and the demands of reason, this is the means for real humane and moral agitation. Only in inexperienced hands can idealism, which is progressive by its very nature, ^^4^^>irn into an instrument of retrograde influence" (p. 8(>).

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p Mr. Volynsky would have done well to acquire the habit of rereading in the "light of consciousness" albeit those lines in which a tumult of emotions takes place apropos of important philosophical matters. This habit would have saved him from a lot of nonsense.

p The progressive power of dialectical idealism did not lie at all in its clear understanding, invented by Mr. Volynsky, of the struggle taking place between man’s higher and lower principles.

p Catholic priests, the Jesuits in particular, always engaged in this struggle far more and, of course, understood it more clearly than the great idealists, in whom there was so much of the bright pagan spirit of Ancient Greece, at least in the finest periods of their life The progressive power of dialectical idealism lay in the fact that it examined phenomena in the process of their development, their emergence and their destruction. It is enough to assimilate the viewpoint of development fully in order to lose all possibility of being a true conservative.  And as long as the human race is in the ascending section of the curve of its historical movement, anyone who has assimilated this viewpoint of development is sure to be progressive, if he does not wish to strike a bargain with his conscience and does not lose essentially the quite elementary ability to draw correct conclusions from premises which he himself has accepted. But in order to be able to adhere firmly to the viewpoint in question, one does not have to be an idealist. The new dialectical materialism adheres to it at least as firmly .as the idealism of the first half of the nineteenth century.

p To see the whole of nature in the light of consciousness, to subject mechanical movement to a supreme spiritual principle.... This would be splendid, of course, but unfortunately Mr. Volynsky does not explain exactly how idealism has solved this “task” and in what way the solution provided by idealism differs from that offered by modern natural science and modern technology, which, as we know, are quite successfully subjecting the powers of nature (Mr. Volynsky’s "natural forces”) to human reason, i.e., if you wish to express yourself in high-flown language, to the higher spiritual principle. Or perhaps Mr. Volynsky manages to see nature in the light of consciousness in some other way? Perhaps seeing nature in this light means simply declaring matter to be "the other being of the spirit" and constructing a Naturphilosophie in keeping with this basic proposition. But such a “task” belongs to the sphere of theoretical reason, while Mr. Volynsky and I are at the present moment concerning ourselves with idealism that is addressed "not only to the theoretical, but also to the practical interests of mankind”. So how are we to interpret our thinker?

p Ah, Mr. Volynsky is fervent, unusually fervent! One can understand the first two words of what he says, and then nothing more!

_p The “task” of idealism is also to advance human will as a key 155 factor in the reconstruction of the crude forms of historical existence.

p Splendid. But let us take a look at the matter in "the light of consciousness".

p According to the teaching of the great idealists of the first half of the present century, the historical development of mankind is by no means the product of people’s free will. Quite the reverse. History is leading mankind to freedom, but the task of philosophy is to understand this movement as necessary.  Naturally, neither people in general, nor the great historical figures in particular, lack will; but their will in each of its apparently quite free selfdeterminations is totally subject to necessity.  Moreover, people never see their actions in the whole fullness of their future consequences. Therefore historical movement takes place to a very large extent quite independently of human consciousness and human will. This is how the matter appeared to Schelling and Hegel when they examined it from the theoretical point of view. In turning to practical questions, they were bound, of course, to look at it from a different aspect.

p In its self-determination the will is subjected to necessity. But no matter how necessary each of its determinations may be {i.e., no matter how illusory our inner freedom is), the human will, once determined, becomes a source of action and, consequently, also a cause of social phenomena. Man is not conscious of the process by which his will is determined; but he is more or less clearly aware of the results of this process, i.e.. he knows that at a given moment he wants to act in one way and not in another. When we are seeking to achieve any practical aim, when we are striving, for example, to abolish this or that outdated social institution, we seek to act in such a way that the will of the people around us is in keeping with our wishes. We seek to persuade them, argue with them and appeal to their emotions. This influence of ours upon them is bound to be one of the conditions that determine their will. The process of its determination will be a necessary process in this case, as always; but in the heat of our campaign we will forget about this completely. Our attention will be concentrated not on the fact that people’s will is an effect, but on the fact that it can be a cause, i.e., in the case in question it can produce the changes in social life that we desire. Thus, in practice we shall regard human will as if it were free. To act otherwise is quite impossible because of the very nature of the phenomenon known as the self-determination of the human will.

p The dialectical idealists knew this perfectly well. Therefore, in examining will as an effect in theory, they saw it as a cause in practice, i.e., recognised its freedom, as it were. But this still does not prove their progressive aspirations at all, just as it does not constitute a distinctive feature of either dialectical 156 idealism in particular, or idealism in general. In their practical philosophy the materialists (with the possible exception of Jacques le fataliste^^45^^) have never expressed a different view of human will. Let Mr. Volynsky recall Diderot at least. Our present-day dialectical materialists remember very well that in practice the human will is a key factor in the reconstruction of the crude forms of historical existence. Why then does Mr. Volynsky imagine that this "key factor" is known only to idealists? Probably because the distinctive features of idealism are a closed book to Mr. Volynsky.

p To our mind there was yet another cause here, however. Over the last few decades there has been a great deal of discussion in our country on the subject that the human will is a key factor of social progress. This indisputable truth, which can be understood by everyone, even if they have not received a seminary education, was declared to be a great discovery, it was carefully dissolved in the water of allegedly scientific ... verbosity, it was chewed and rechewed, it was propped up with various “laws”, surrounded with “formulae”, and embellished with “amendments” and "amendments to amendments". Thanks to all the fuss about it there suddenly appeared in our country a multitude of "our revered sociologists”, whose profundity is recognised by all rightthinking Russians, and whose fame, I fear, will travel beyond the borders of their native land. The fame of "our revered sociologists" gave Mr. Volynsky no sleep, just as the fame of Miltiades gave Themistocles no rest. But he did not want to follow the beaten track. He saw clearly that in spite of all his efforts and grimaces he would not be able to excel his predecessors in the fruitful activity of inventing “laws”, “formulae” and " amendments”. So he decided to embark upon a new path. Having noticed that "our revered sociologists" were extremely weak in the matter of philosophy, he declared himself to be an idealist and proceeded as a warning to refer constantly (and invariably to no effect) now to Schopenhauer, now to Hegel, Schelling or Fichte. And since idealism has had conservative tendencies attributed to it in our country, Mr. Volynsky began at every convenient and inconvenient opportunity, sometimes in the language of a schoolgirl whohas read too much Marlinsky, sometimes in the language of a bursak^^46^^ confused by some poorly digested "wisdom of books" and, finally, partly in the language of Uteshitelny to assure his readers that he, Mr. Volynsky, the idealist, was no less progressive than "our revered sociologists”, but, being more profound and cleverer, he could at any given moment mobilise for the defence of progress a whole army of the most terrifying philosophers, whereas they, "our revered sociologists”, knew only “formulae” and “amendments”. And so that the reader should not have the slightest doubt as to his progressive intentions, Mr. Volynsky 157 advanced free will as a key factor, and so on. Thus it emerged that, by parting company with "our revered sociologists" and putting himself under the intellectual guidance of Mr. Volynsky, the reader would have retained fully the "key factor" long dear to his heart, and at the same time acquired a whole mass of philosophical wisdom. Anything more profitable than such an exchange one cannot imagine.

Mr. Volynsky wishes to convince his readers that his views constitute a total rejection of all the many philosophical sins of which, it must be admitted, Russian thought has been guilty in the period from the twenties up to the present day. In fact, however, his views are the raising of these sins to the second, if not the fourth power. His theoretical philosophy amounts to totally meaningless phrases; his practical philosophy is nothing but a very poor parody of our "subjective sociology".