p In his disputes with the defenders of pure art Belinsky abandons the dialectical viewpoint in favour of the enlightened viewpoint. But we have already seen that in many other cases he remained quite true to dialectical idealism regarding the history of literature and art as a manifestation of the universal law of dialectical development. Let us now examine some of the views expressed by Belinsky in such cases.

p He said that the development of literature and art is closely connected with the development of other aspects of popular consciousness; he pointed to the fact that at different stages of its- 214 development art borrows its ideas from different sources: first from religion, and then from philosophy. This is perfectly correct. The idea that the development of all aspects of popular consciousness takes place solely under the influence of the "economic factor" is usually ascribed to the supporters of dialectical materialism which has replaced the dialectical idealism of Hegel and his followers. It would be hard to find a more mistaken interpretation of their views: they say something quite different. They maintain that literature, art, philosophy, etc., express social psychology, and the nature of social psychology is determined by the properties of the mutual relations that exist between the people who form the given society. These relations depend in the final analysis on the degree of development of the social productive forces. Each important step in the development of these forces leads to a change in people’s social relations, and consequently in social psychology as well. Changes that take place in social psychology are also invariably reflected, more or less strongly, in literature, art, philosophy, etc. But changes in social relations set in motion the most diverse “factors”, and which of these factors influences literature, art, etc., more strongly than the others at any given moment depends on a multitude of secondary and lesser causes which are not directly related to the social economy. As a rule the direct influence of the economy on art and other ideologies is seen extremely rarely. More often than not it is the influence of other “factors”: politics, philosophy and so on. Sometimes the action of one of them becomes more noticeable than the action of the others. Thus, in Germany in the last century criticism, i.e., philosophy, influenced the development of art very strongly. In France during the Restoration literature was strongly influenced by politics. But in France in the late eighteenth century the influence of literature on the development of political oratory is very evident. At that time political orators spoke like Corneille’s characters. So here is tragedy as a factor acting upon politics. And one cannot even begin to list the different combinations in which the various “factors” intertwine in different countries and different periods of social development. The dialectical materialists are perfectly aware of this. But they do not stop at the surface of phenomena and are not content to refer to the interaction of various “factors”. When you say that the influence of the political factor is felt in a certain case, they explain that this means that people’s mutual relations in the social process of production are expressing themselves most clearly through politics; when you point to the philosophical or religious “factor”, they again try to establish the combination of social forces which has caused this factor to predominate in the final analysis. That is all. Belinsky was close to the dialectical materialists in the sense that as an Hegelian he was not content to point to the interaction 215 of the different aspects of social life and social consciousness.

p Among the secondary causes influencing art he included the influence of the geographical environment. Without going into a detailed discussion of this question, we would remark that the geographical environment influences the development of art indirectly, i.e., through social relations which develop on the basis of the productive forces, the development of which always depends to a greater or lesser extent on the geographical environment. The direct influence of this environment on art would not appear to exist to any significant extent. It would seem most natural to assume that the development of landscape painting is closely connected with the geographical environment, whereas in fact this connection is not noticeable, and the history of such painting is determined by a change in social moods which in their turn depend on changes in social relations.

p We shall not examine Belinsky’s aesthetic code here, since we shall be obliged to return to it in our analysis of The Aesthetic Relation of Art to Reality. We shall only say that the question of whether there exist any immutable laws of the beautiful can be solved only on the basis of a careful study of the history of art, and not on the basis of abstract considerations. Already in his article on Derzhavin Belinsky said: "The task of true aesthetics is not to decide what art should be, but what art is. In other words, aesthetics should not discuss art as something presupposed, as a kind of ideal which can be realised only in accordance with its theory; no, it should examine art as a subject which existed for long before it and to the existence of which it owes its own existence.” This is precisely what we mean. But in considering his own aesthetic code Belinsky did not always remember this golden rule. He forgot about it, just as Hegel himself forgot it. If a scholar regards history in general and the history of art in particular as applied logic, it is only natural that he will often have the desire to construct a priori that which should appear only as a conclusion from the facts. Belinsky, like Hegel, succumbed to this temptation at times. This explains why his aesthetic code is narrow.  According to this code one is bound to condemn, for example, French tragedy, and Belinsky really did regard it as ugly.  He thought that “theoreticians” were perfectly right to attack its form and that in following the rule of the three unities^^71^^ Corneille’s powerful genius had yielded to the coercive influence of Richelieu. But can a literary form arise and become established at the caprice of a single person, even if this person was an all-powerful minister? In a different case Belinsky himself would have declared such an opinion to be naive. In fact French tragedy owed its form to a whole number of causes which were rooted in the course of France’s social and literary development. In its time this form represented the triumph of realism over the 216 theatrical emotions of naive mediaeval fantasy. What Belinsky regarded as conventional and unauthentic had in fact emerged as a result of the desire to reduce scenic conventionality and scenic unauthenticity to a minimum. Of course, a great deal that was conventional and unauthentic remained in French tragedy. But since this conventionality was well-defined and known to the public, it did not prevent the public from seeing the truth. It must also be remembered that much that appears conventional and artificial now seemed simple and natural in the seventeenth century. In view of this it would be strange to measure the literary works of that period with the yardstick of our present aesthetic concepts. As a matter of fact Belinsky himself felt that one could quote very many extenuating circumstances in favour of French tragedy. In his article on Boris Godunov. after remarking that Pushkin idealised Pimen very much in his first monologue, lie says: "Consequently, these fine words are a lie, but a lie that is worth the truth: so full of poetry is it, so charmingly does it act upon the intellect and feeling! How much falsehood of this kind was uttered by Corneille and Racine, yet the most enlightened and educated nation in Europe still applauds this (poetic) falsehood! And no wonder: in it, in this falsehood concerning time, place and manners, there lies the truth concerning the human heart, human nature.” For our part we would say that the “falsehood” of Corneille and Racine was the truth not so much concerning the human heart in general, as concerning the heart of the educated French public of the day. But whatever the case may be, there is no doubt that for such “falsehood” sui generis a place must be found in an aesthetic code constructed on a broad historical basis.

p Belinsky’s view of the role of great people in the history of literature is true today also. Today also one is bound to admit that the great poet is great only in so far as he expresses a great stage in the historical development of society. In judging a great writer, like any other great historical figure, one must iirst and foremost, as Belinsky so splendidly puts it, define at what point of the path he found mankind. To this day many people think that such a view of the role of the individual in history leaves too little place for human individuality. But this opinion is absolutely unfounded. The individual does not cease to be an individual when he is the mouthpiece of the general aspirations of his time. But the following is true: Belinsky’s Hegelian view of the role of great people in the history of art and in the whole history of mankind in general can be properly substantiated only with the help of the theory of historical materialism. Remember what Belinsky says in his article on Wit Works Woe: "Society is always more right and higher than the individual person, and individuality is reality and not illusion only in so far as (it} expresses society.” In what sense should the individual serve to express so- 217 ciety? When Socrates began to preach his philosophy in Athenshe was undoubtedly not expressing the views which were held by the majority of his fellow citizens. So it is not a matter of views. But if not, then of what? And does the majority constitute the“general” which the individual should serve and to which he should subject himself? Belinsky did not answer these questions either in his articles or in his letters. After abandoning the " absolute" viewpoint, he simply declared that for him the individual was above history, above society, above mankind. This is not a philosophical solution of the problem. Hegel regards Socrates as a hero because his philosophy expresses a new step forward in the historical development of Athens. But what is the criterion for judging this step? Since in Hegel history is ultimately only applied logic, the criterion must be sought in the laws of the dialectical development of the absolute idea. This is obscure to say the least. The modern materialists take a quite different view of the matter: as a society’s productive forces develop, the relations between people that exist within it also change. The new social relations do not appear immediately or by themselves on the basis of the new productive forces, however. This adjustment has to be a matter for people, a result of a struggle between the protectors and the innovators. This opens up broad scope for individual initiative. The brilliant social figure foresees the changes that must take place in social relations earlier and more clearly than other people. This outstanding farsightedness makes him contradict the views of his fellow citizens and he may remain in the minority to the end of his days; but this does not prevent him from expressing the general, from representing and pointing to the forthcoming changes in the social structure. This is the general that constitutes his strength and that neither ridicule, insult, ostracism or hemlock can take away from him. In order to evaluate this general the modern materialists turn to the condition of the social productive forces. And these forces are easier to measure than Hegel’s world spirit.

p A great poet is great because he expresses a great step forward in social development. But in expressing this step he does not cease to be an individual.  In his character and in his life there are probably very many features and circumstances that do not bear the slightest relation to his historical activity and do not influence it in the slightest. But his life probably also has features which, without changing the general historical character of this activity, give it an individual touch. These features can and should be revealed by a detailed study of the individual character and personal circumstances of the poet’s life. And it is these features that were studied by the “empirical” criticism against which Belinsky revolted. It is to be condemned only when it believes that the personal features which it is studying explain the general charac- 218 ter of a great man’s activity. But when it quotes them merely in order to explain the individual character of this activity, it is useful and interesting. Unfortunately, in the person of its finest representative, Sainte-Beuve, it made claims that were not justified by this humble role. Belinsky realised this and therefore spoke of the “empiricists” with great irritation.

It is now time for us to pass on to the passages in our critic’s articles on Pushkin that show both his remarkable critical insight and his outstanding ability to draw extreme and quite consistent conclusions from formerly adopted premises.