p Peirce calls an “aesthetic quality" (1, 1. 591) aesthetic goodness, which in modern day terms is designated “value”. Consequently, Peirce connects the use of signs in art with the concept of value. This position is also taken by many of the subsequent conceptions of the semiotic theory of art.

p Most frequently the American philosopher recognizes as aesthetic goodness that quality of an object which is capable of evoking admiration by itself (1, 5. 594; 1. 191). This quality can be shared by King Lear and an elegant mathematical proof. Aesthetic goodness is universal, there for all to perceive. In his analysis of which term best designates this 182 value, Peirce decides in favour of the Greek KO^OC, (I, 2. 199). Peirce’s understanding of “kalos” is extremely close to the antique conception of beauty as “kalos”. Just like the Greeks he takes music as his starting point for many of his theories and extends his conclusions to all forms of art. He sees the basis for this generalization in mathematics, and looks for similarities between the artist and the mathematician.

p Aesthetic value, interpreted as kalos, is harmony, unity, the integration of the parts of the whole in the work of art. The aesthetic object has a multitude of parts, which act as a totality (1, 5. 132). Harmony is created by a system of relations. Thus, Peirce sees the aesthetic value of a musical work as a pattern of sound sequences (1, 5. 396).

p We stated above that, according to Peirce, mathematical form lies at the basis of representation as applied in art. Now we have to reinterpret this view, and state that mathematical form lies at the basis of aesthetic quality. Peirce’s commentators emphasize that he did not approximate beauty to mathematical form, regarding the latter as merely a necessary condition of beauty. Peirce lays stress on quality as a whole, and not on its parts in their analytically interpreted relations. This interpretation of Peirce’s views is supported by a number of Peirce’s own statements. In one of these he expresses the important notion that although anything good (i.e. including aesthetic) can also be seen from a quantitative point of view, that is from the standpoint of the degree of this value, not one normative science-one of which Peirce considers aesthetics to be, as we shall elaborate below-deals only with quantity (1, 5. 127). “As for esthetics,” writes Peirce, “in that field the qualitative differences appear to be so prominent that, abstracted from them, it is impossible to say that there is any appearance which is not esthetically good" (1, 5. 127).

Since Peirce was concerned to find the logical bases of art, he was faced with the question of the correspondence of beauty and truth, and in this connection with the confrontation between the work of the artist and that of the scientist. The American philosopher argues that the question of truth and falsity is applicable to representation in art (1, 8. 183). “I hear you say: ‘All that is not fact; it is poetry.’ Nonsense! 183 Bad poetry is false, I grant; but nothing is truer than true poetry. And let me tell the scientific men that the artists are much finer and more accurate observers than they are, except of the special minutae that the scientific man is looking for" (1, 1. 315). We should note that Peirce does not provide a clear answer to the question of how “truth” should be understood with reference to art. There are statements in his writings in which he approximates truth and beauty, but does not identify them. “The work of the poet or novelist is not so utterly different from that of the scientific man. The artist introduces a fiction; but it is not an arbitrary one; it exhibits affinities to which the mind accords a certain approval in pronouncing them beautiful, which if it is not exactly the same as saying that the synthesis is true, is something of the same general kind" (1, 1. 383). There are other statements, however, from which we can conclude that Peirce rejected the possibility of applying the category of truth to art, at any rate not in the sense in which it is applicable to science. For example, he holds that the scientific imagination deals with explanations and laws, while in art we have to deal with an imagination which lacks scientific value (1, 1. 48). A hypothesis created by a poet of genius may be great but its creation cannot be classed as scientific since it produces nothing either true or false and therefore is not knowledge (1, 4. 238). Since the resolution of the question of truth in art depends on whether we ask the question of truth or falsity with respect to the feelings, or emotions, and on how the question is asked, we shall have occasion to return to it in the following section when we discuss Peirce’s views on the “emotional interpretant".