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p Peirce views the work of art as a sign. Thus, the performance of a piece of concert music is a sign which conveys and seeks to convey the musical ideas of the composer (I, 5. 475). Peirce argues that we can find the most diverse signs in art, but the sign which he regards essential to art is the iconic sign, or simply icon. There are straightforward statements by Peirce in which he names pictures and sculptures as illustrations of icon (1, 3. 362; 2. 276;

p 2. 281). Perhaps icons are only inherent in the representational arts? In a letter to Lady Welby written in 1904 Peirce refers to musical illustrations in his characterization of icon (2, 391) and else where refers to architecture (1, 2. 281). Thus icon is the universal sign of art. Insofar as it is accorded a special place in art and bearing in mind also that in subsequent semantic aesthetics (in the works of Morris, Langer et al.) the problem of the icon acquires central importance, it would be advisable for us to examine in greater detail Peirce’s characterization of the icon.

p The icon is classed amongst those signs which represent an object thanks to a quality which they themselves possess (1, 2. 247). This quality is similar to a quality of the object: “A sign may serve as a sign simply because it happens to resemble its object" (1, 8. 119). Icon “is of the nature of an appearance, and as such, strictly speaking, exists only in consciousness although for convenience in ordinary parlance and when extreme precision is not called for, we extend the term icon to the outward objects which excite in consciousness the image itself" (1, 4. 447). Consequently, the term “icon” is applied by Peirce both to external things (photos, pictures, sculptures) and to mental images. For example, “any qualisign, like a vision or the sentiment excited by a piece of music considered as representing what a composer intended" is also characterized by him as an “icon”. (2, 391). Admittedly, when talking about mental images Peirce sometimes uses the term “mental icon”, and when talking about such icons as a painted picture the term “material image" (1, 2. 276).

p Icon is a sign which bears a similarity with the designated object. A similarity in what? If we keep in mind Peirce’s argument that pure icon does not represent anything except 174 form (1, 4. 544), we are forced to conclude that it is a similarity of form which constitutes the basis of representation in Peirce’s interpretation. But what does he understand by form?

p It follows from Peirce’s categorization of diagrams, algebraic equations, the logical diagrams which underlie the syntax of any language as forms of icons (1, 2. 22; 2. 282) and from the fact that he also regards mental images as icons, that by form Peirce means not only outer but also inner forms. The latter represents a structure, or system of relationships between elements. Thus, diagrams, largely speaking, represent dual relations (consisting of two elements) between their own elements (1, 2. 277).

p The essence of all phenomena (including logical arguments) consists, according to Peirce, in mathematical form (1, 5. 551). The reproduction of mathematical form underlies any form of representation and partakes of the nature of pure representation. Insofar as Peirce argues that any means of communicating ideas is ultimately based on representation (1, 2. 278), it follows that the application of representation must also underlie communication through art. This means that we will find mathematical form at the basis of art.

p The mathematical form which lies at the basis of representation is, Peirce argues, intimately manifested in logical form, in the arrangement of the representation. The American logician constantly inquired into the logical bases of art. Peirce was familiar with Kant’s statement in the Critique ot Pure Reason about the false hope of reducing the critical evaluation of beauty to the principles of reason and to elevate its rules to the status of a science. Initially Peirce also doubted whether it was possible to establish the logical nature of aesthetics (1, 2. 197) but he was determined to find a connection between aesthetics and logics, arguing that “esthetics and logic seem, at first blush, to belong to different universes (1, 2. 197), but “there is a family likeness between Esthetics, Ethics, and Logic" (1, 2. 156). These views lead Peirce, when he talks about works of art, to regard them often not merely as terms and sentences, but as developed conclusions, logical systems, which right from the beginning contain their 175 premises alongside the rules of deduction and which are subsequently carried over to the deduction of theorems.

p Peirce describes a true poem as “sound argument" (1, 5. 119). A novel is also a form of deduction. The novelist is free to choose his “premises”, but once these have been chosen he must keep strictly to them. If the hero is blind at the beginning of the story he cannot suddenly recover his eyesight in the middle, unless the author provides a special explanation for this “metamorphosis”. Scherherazade, for example, is a fiction, a fancy, but once the author imagined and “made her young, beautiful, and endowed with a gift of spinning stories, it becomes a real fact ... which ... he cannot destroy by pretending that he imagined her to be otherwise" (1, 5. 152).  [175•1  Peirce also sees a logical basis to architecture. We can understand why he should have been concerned by the analogy between mediaeval architecture and the logical theories of that age (1, 4. 27). Painting, according to Peirce, can also be viewed as an analogy with deduction. As an illustration he takes an impressionist seashore piece. Here each quality in a premise is one of the elementary coloured particles of the painting, and all together they are meant to go together to make up the intended quality that belongs to the whole. The resultant quality of parts of the whole, which can be evaluated as a deduction, is brought about by the combination of elementary qualities that belong to the premises (1, 5. 119).  [175•2 

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p In addition to pure icons Peirce also identifies two other forms of icon: images and metaphors. Images are not only mental images, but also photographs, paintings, etc. The examples adduced by Peirce indicate that he gives the name image to forms of icon which have a similar external, spatial form to that of the object, and can also have merely a common quality (1, 2. 277), such as, for example, colour. Peirce said very little about the metaphor as a variety of the iconic sign. Those forms of icon which display the representative character of a sign, “representing a parallelism in something else, are metaphors" (1, 2. 277). In a formal respect a metaphor is also an expression of similarity, in which a sign of predication is used instead of a sign of similarity, such as, for example, when we say: “This man is a fox" instead of “is like a fox" (1, 7. 590).

p In its pure form icon does not have a physical, or, as Peirce expresses it, “dynamical connection with the object it represents" (1, 2. 299). He is clearly thinking of those cases where the object of representation “may be a pure fiction, as to its existence" (1, 4. 531). For example, a still life is “created” not by the actual objects of inanimate nature, but by the artist. There is a great difference between a plaster-of-Paris mask, in the creation of which the object actually “takes part”, and a sculpture. The mask cannot exist without the existence of the object, whereas the sculpture can.

p Turning away from the question of the real existence of the object of representation Peirce maintains that a pure iconic sign “can convey no positive or factual information; for it affords no assurance that there is any such thing in nature" and only lets the interpreter study what the properties of such an object would be if it did exist (1, 4. 447). However fictitious the object of representation might be, it must, in Peirce’s view, be logically possible. This means that insofar as the object does not exist “the Form of the Icon, which is also its 177 object-must be logically possible" (1, 4. 531). To be logically possible, in Peirce’s interpretation means to have an iconic structure, to be an icon. As far as art is concerned it follows from this that although art also has recourse to images and metaphors, these are of necessity based on pure representation which is by nature logical.

p Peirce realizes that icon (including that in art), like any sign, is not reducible to its material embodiment. For the designation of the latter he introduces the term “hypoicon” (1, 2. 276), leaving the term “icon” to designate its ideal aspect. “So in contemplating a painting, there is a moment when we lose the consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of the real and the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure dream-not any particular existence, and yet not general. At that moment we are contemplating an icon" (1, 3. 362). To see a hypoicon does not necessarily mean to contemplate an icon. We shall discuss below how the icon proper, i.e. the ideal aspect, is interpreted. We should in this statement note the psychological observation of the perception of artistic representation, in which the icon as it were blends with that which is represented and “icons are so completely substituted for their objects as hardly to be distinguished from them" (2, 3. 362).  [177•1 

p In Peirce’s semiotics icon is interconnected with all the other types of sign. Signs themselves Peirce categorizes according to their character as qualisigns, sinsigns and legisigns. These signs constitute his first trichotomy. He characterizes them in the following way. “A Qualisign is a quality which is a sign" (1, 2. 244), for example, “odors are particularly apt to act as signs" (1, 1. 313). In art this role is clearly apportioned to sounds, colours and light. “A Sinsign ... is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign" (1, 2. 245). Any sculpture, statue or play can serve as an example of icon, which is “an actual existent thing or event”. “A Legisign is a law that is a sign. This law is usually established by man. Every 178 conventional sign is a legisign. It is not a single object, but a general type which, it has been agreed, shall be significant" (1, 2. 246). “Every Legisign requires Sinsigns" (1, 2. 246). Peirce calls this sort of concrete application or expression of a legisign in the form of a sinsign a replica. It would appear that among icons in art replicas are those signs which are created in accordance with conventional rules (the depiction of saints in icons, whose differential features-the conventional colours of their garments, the shape of their beards-are strictly regulated in the handbooks of icon-painting). Thus, writes Peirce, “anything whatever, be it quality, existent individual, or law, is an Icon of anything, in so far as it is like that thing and used as a sign of it" (1, 2. 247).

p The iconic sign also enters the second trichotomy, which emerges upon consideration of the sign with reference to its object. In addition to icon the second trichotomy comprises indexes and symbols. An index, for example a weather-vane, has a dynamic link with its object and points to its existence. Like an icon it has a quality in common with the object. But it receives this quality as a result of “actual modification of it by the Object" (1, 2. 248), when the object in its interaction with the sign leaves “traces” in it. If in the process these traces retain a similarity with the original we are confronted with an iconic index, such as, for example, a photograph that “not only excites an image, has an appearance, but, owing to its optical connexion with the object, is evidence that that appearance corresponds to a reality" (1, 4. 4,47). Peirce distinguishes genuine indexes, which have a physical connection with the object, from degenerate indexes, which, though they may lack such a connection, still perform the essential function of indexes: they direct attention to their objects, identify the object and point to its existence “here and now”. Such propositions as “this”, “that”, proper names, pointing with the finger, are all examples of “degenerate” indexes. Peirce argued that it would be hard to find a sign totally void of the property of an index, and that indexes are essential to mutual comprehension.

p According to Peirce, indexes are apparently also necessary in art, in the process of interpreting icons. All those 179 components of an icon which enable the viewer to identify its time, social background, etc., as well as legends (inscriptions on icons, credits in films, etc.), without which the pure picture only says “something is like this”, are all probably indexes. The picture’s true meaning is conveyed by its inscription (1, 8. 183).

p Peirce expressed a profound thought, which given the level of psychology in his day he was unable to develop, that not only a photograph but also, say, a portrait painted from life is not pure representation in the sense that the latter should not have a physical connection with the designated object and is not created as a result of the influence of the object itself. Although there is no direct influence from the original in this case there is, argues Peirce, indirect influence, mediated by the artist. A portrait is an effect, caused by the original’s appearance (1, 2. 92). Only at its modern stage has psychology attempted to take the original itself as the explanation for the man-mediated determination of representation.

p Peirce does not regard representation as “pure” representation for the additional reason that it also includes conventional references. But conventional references characterize symbols which, according to Peirce, must also find their place in art. The symbol is a sign which “fulfills its function regardless of any similarity or analogy with its object and equally regardless of any tactual connection therewith" (1, 5. 73). The symbol “is connected with its object by a convention that it shall be so understood, or else by a natural instinct or intellectual act which takes it as a representative of its object" (1, 2. 308). Once it comes into being the symbol performs its function as if submitting to some law or rule. At the psychological level this means that symbols “denote the objects that they do by virtue only of there being a habit that associates their signification with them" (1, 4. 544). Peirce believes that “any material image, as a painting, is largely conventional in its mode of representation" (1, 2. 276), that “every picture (however conventional its method) is essentially a representation" (1, 2. 279). Peirce’s writings contain statements of the type “the most perfect of signs are those in which the iconic, indicative, and symbolic characters are blended as equally as 180 possible" (1, 4. 448). Theodore Schulz maintains that according to Peirce the work of art is also a perfect sign when it possesses the indicated quality. Max Dense argues to the contrary, that for Peirce the symbol is the highest step of free creation (the highest “semioticity”), while the index and the “icon” occupy a lower step (“degeneration”). We should note that both Peirce’s approach and his interpretation by Schulz and Dense suffer from an abstract approach. The practice of using signs in science and art indicate that, depending on the purpose to which they are used, and genres, etc., “perfect” signs are those with a different proportion of iconic, indicative and symbolic characters. Dense’s interpretation contains in addition the tendency to exalt modernist art, its conventional, arbitrary character.

p Peirce’s classification of signs also presupposes a third trichotomy in which signs are divided, according to their relation to the interpretant and the way in which they are interpreted, into terms, propositions and arguments (1, 2. 95). “A term is simply a class-name or proper-name" (1, 8. 337). A term cannot be described as true or false. A proposition refers to something which has real existence, i.e. it is an index and is either true or false (1, 2. 310). In Peirce’s view pure icon can only be a term and cannot be said to be true or false. Dut we have already quoted statements by the philosopher from which it is clear that icons in art as a rule function together with indexes and symbols and can be regarded as propositions and arguments. Thus the portrait of a man which bears that man’s name can be qualified as a proposition (1, 2. 320) and in this instance we can talk about its truth or falsity.

p The distinguishing property of the iconic sign consists in the fact that “by the direct observation of it other truths concerning its object can be discovered than those which suffice to determine its construction" (I, 2. 279). Studying an iconic sign in terms of its cognitive results is tantamount to studying its object. “It is true to say,” writes Yuri Melvil in this connection, “that the sign (in the form of an explicit schema) functions for Peirce as a sort of model, the study of which reveals the properties of its archetype" (14, 187). When he talked of icon as a means of discovering new truths Peirce 181 undoubtedly had in mind representation as applied in science (mathematics, logic), however we can justifiably also apply his views to representation in art, since this form of representation was also seen by Peirce to have a logical nature and mathematical basis. Peirce’s theories of representation and its place in art undoubtedly contain an implicit view of the modelling nature of art.

Since icons are applied not only in art we also encounter the question of the specific features of artistic representation. Peirce sees these specifics in the expressiveness of signs. Signs may possess a moral goodness-veracity (1, 5. 137), and a logical goodness-truth (1, 5. 142). Dut there is “a special variety of esthetic goodness that may belong to a representamen, namely, expressiveness" (1, 5. 137). Expressiveness can and should be possessed by all varieties of signs: terms, propositions and arguments (1, 5. 140). Let us now see how signs acquire this property. Peirce elucidates this with respect to icon: since it reproduces the qualities of an object, including its aesthetic qualities, an emotion arises similar to that evoked by the object itself (1, 5. 308). In those cases where the designated object is fictitious and “coincides” with the form of the icon itself the latter must also be aesthetically expressive. Thus, in all cases expressiveness of icon is due to the aesthetic properties of the designated object, which are reproduced in the icon. Now let us take a look at these properties.