IN THE FORMATION OF MAN
p In connection with the matter at hand a number of conclusions can be derived and further Questions posed, touching upon the interrelation of science ana ethics, scientific education and ethical upbringing.
p If each is considered in relation to its object sphere, science and ethics remain mutually indifferent. The sphere of science is the world of things and material relations. That of ethics is the world of man and human relations.
p We recall, however, that according to Marx the world in its entirety, including the whole of nature, must be understood as the world of man, of human activity. Nature apprehends itself in man, and man initiates the remolding of nature. The world of material relations from this point of view is the historical phenomenon of the alienation of man from himself and from nature. Therefore, strictly speaking, science cognizes not the pure world of things, but rather the material forms of activity and the man’s attitude to the world. In other words the object of research for any given science turns out in the final result to be the process of human labour in a definite sphere.
p For its part ethics is broken up into ethics proper and morality. The latter, being adapted to the material relations of actual being, is close to science as the systematized theoretical form of expression of these very relations. The relationship 174 between scientific and ethical consciousness is complex and contradictory. The complexity of its analysis for ordinary common sense is determined by the fact that science functions as the only representative of the "materialized force of knowledge”, permitting man to master the world of external nature, and by the fact that morality, expressing the interests of a definite social group, masquerades these interests as pan-human. This complexity is aggravated by the difficulty of drawing a line of demarcation between ethics and morality, owing to which the ethical consciousness seems to ordinary common sense whole and monolithic. However, this demarcation line stands out in bold relief as soon as an acute conflict situation emerges.
p Since morality is akin to prudent common sense, the temptation arises to "verify harmony with algebra": to scientifically assess the moral action. Given this, from the point of view of common sense, science and morality everything looks respectable. Let us consider, for example, the knotty problem frequently and astutely discussed by Fyodor Dostoyevsky. For the good of mankind is it admissible to sacrifice the life of even one man? From the viewpoint of science, common sense and morality this is not only possible but necessary. Here science and morality differ only in that the former will follow this dictate without unnecessary lamentation.
p But then, suppose it is necessary to “eliminate” one hundred thousand people for the good and use of humanity? Or perhaps a million? Science will answer: of course it is a difficult situation but the reckoning is clear; if it is necessary to sacrifice millions of lives to save billions, we must act accordingly. The moralist will suffer, but when all is said and done, will acquit the scientist who has made such a decision. He will sympathize with the difficult moral pains accompanying this decision and feel the weight of the responsibility before humanity which he bears, etc.
p Now suppose that for the good and the use of humanity it is necessary to conduct medical experiments on human beings? At this point morality is indignant! But, by the way, science can demonstrate to morality that it errs.
p However, from the viewpoint of ethics (and from Dostoyevsky’s position) the problem offers no resolution, because, as we have demonstrated above, man as an individual is a potentially universal and infinite being. In this sphere of the universal and infinite (and it is precisely here that ethics takes shape) the individual is incomparable and immeasurable. He is the 175 equivalent of any other individual, but also of all humanity and the entire universe, remaining (precisely as a result of this) unique and irreplaceable. Therefore the sacrifice can only be made by the individual as a freely made self-sacrifice; no one else may sacrifice him. Thus it is clear why the doctor who conducts dangerous experiments with the diseased evokes aversion while simultaneously the experiment conducted on himself summons forth praise and turns him into a hero.
p The situation is still further complicated by the fact that in the world of the capitalist machine civilization science itself begins to be regarded as a value and as a universal evaluative criterion. The word “scientific” is becoming a synonym for “good” where “unscientific” takes on a “bad” shade of meaning. Hence the conclusion follows that good knowledge is scientific knowledge and therefore that knowledge of man must be restricted to that which is “scientific”. Without a doubt science can and must study man. But it must be taken into account that it will portray him one-sidedly, namely from his material, objective aspect. In fact even human physiology turns out to be conditioned by the subjective, spiritual side of man (firewalking, the inducement of burns, stigmata, and iatrogenic symptoms) to such an extent that this mode of insight turns out to be quite insufficient. Certain aspects of psychic life do not fit (and should not) into the causal-material explanatory mode. From the viewpoint of rational common sense, of science and scientific logic they must be left inexplicable, bordering on the miraculous.
p In a society which is dominated by material relations and in which science directly disposes of practical might, ethics, as a rule, is proselytized in the form of morality; in its pan-human form it turns out to be the object of ridicule for its practical helplessness, as a result of which immoral people are often the victors in life. But this victory is at the same time a defeat, the blotting out of that which is human inside, and the process of blotting out is often accomplished quietly and by degrees, unnoticed by the individual himself. Merging with his social role and becoming a pure functionary, he nevertheless continues to regard himself a human. This transformation is sometimes accompanied by the formation of a distinctive duplicity: operating in the external social environment within the confines of prescribed group morality the individual also preserves certain ethical principles strictly for "domestic consumption”. As self-affirmation and for the inner justification of his immoral actions he might think of himself as "living in agreement with a strict moral code, never having caused 176 harm to anyone”. But if this does not work and our individual is plagued with restlessness and an unpleasant aftertaste, then he must make an objective and logical judgement (on the scientific, so to speak, level). In such cases it is always possible to demonstrate, as surely as two times two makes four, that it was necessary to act in such a manner, for it was precisely this sequence of actions which brought the greater benefit, the greater use to society, etc. In this context the personality’s spiritual loss is simply not considered, in fact it cannot even be fixed within the scheme of causal logic (therefore excluding it from the realm of common sense and science as well). It was precisely for this reason that such primitive arithmetic provoked the hatred of Dostoyevsky.
p But matters are complicated by the fact that the world of material relations also belongs to human activity just as does the spiritual culture. Therefore morality, strictly speaking, is no more impersonal than is ethics external to society. Their divergence in conflict situations is simply one of the forms expressing the temporal historical nature of human existence, that is to say, the simultaneous determination of man’s present being by both the past and future. Thus the question: is science moral or immoral—yields no simple answer. Considered on the historical level science functions as the means with which man masters the world of things and turns this world into a moment subordinated to human life activity as such. In other words it serves the "emancipation of man”. At such a level science has a profound ethical sense. Considered, however, on the level of existing social being, it inevitably operates as a factor subordinating man to material goals, turning him into labour power, an object of social manipulation and so forth—crowning the process marking the dehumanisation of human relations. In the same sweep it opposes ethics, turns out to be immoral.
p The relationship of science to the formation of the individual also turns out to be ambiguous. As a form of the development of one of the "essential strengths" of man, it shapes within him a consciousness of truthfulness and of the sovereign might of his thought and relations to the world. Science fosters a dedication to and unswerving pursuit of the truth. In short, it develops certain ethical qualities in the individual. But at the same time this conviction in the sovereign might of thought turns out to be connected with a historically limited form of specifically scientific thought and a scientific stance towards the world as the world of things. The same devotion to science and unswerving pursuit of scientific truth is 177 thereby transformed into the extension of scientific logic and methods to the world of man, of ethical relations. Man begins to be measured with an inadequate (material) yardstick, which ultimately leads to the false, immoral and antihuman conception of the "human machine”.
p At the same time science requires critical, that is to say reflective thought, which is a necessary condition of the possibility of transcendence (an outlet to the boundless and the formation of a new yardstick—that of creativity). Consequently it contributes to the shaping of the personality. However, according to its tendency, the indicated reflection is formally rational. [177•1 It is precisely for this reason that it is incapable of adopting a universal form, to be turned to itself, to become the reflection of a reflection (that is to say, to move into the sphere of the concrete-universal, that of philosophy). The attempt theoretically to consider oneself in a purely material, objectivized form leads to the construction of a hierarchy of metasystems, to “bad” infinity, but not to universality.
p For this reason scientific reflection assumes a critical stance towards any given partial result or assertion, but not towards itself as a whole. This indicates that it cannot be pan-human. Nor can it be adequate in this sense for the individual or for ethics.
p If we accept the approach towards science outlined above, then the position of, say, C.P. Snow, professor at Cambridge University, must be recognized as mistaken. In an article entitled "The Moral Un-Neutrality of Science" he asserts: "There is no need for an extrinsic scientific criticism, because criticism is inherent in the process itself.” Snow has much to say about the duty of the scientist, his moral responsibility and so on, but he overlooks the fact that his evaluation is fully applicable to the serviceman, diplomat or politician (although he endeavours to counterpose the "moral code of the scientist" to the "military code of morality”).
p He would like to deduce the moral qualities which he ascribes to scientists from the intrinsic morality of science as such, in which he sees two moral impulses: the "search for truth" and “knowledge”. "The way in which a scientist tries to find the truth imposes on him a constant moral discipline,” writes Snow. [177•2 However a few pages later he asserts: "I see no evidence that scientific work on weapons of maximum 178 destruction has been in any intellectual respect different from other scientific work. But there is a moral difference.” [178•1 Since scientific methods bear upon the intellectual rather than the moral sphere (and precisely for this reason the absence of a moral framework has not to this date hindered anyone in the development of weapons of maximum destruction), we may regard the preceding assertion by C.P. Snow to be refuted by his latter statement.
p There remains "... a spring of moral action in the scientific activity which is at least as strong as the search for truth. The name of this spring is knowledge”. In the fact that it is "at least as strong" we are soon persuaded, for knowledge "throwsupon scientists a direct and personal responsibility.... For scientists have a moral imperative to say what they know. (Is this a distinctive feature of the scientist?—the Author). It is going to make them unpopular in their own nation-states (does this pertain to divulging military secrets because of moral impulses?—the Author.).” For the “moral” to arise it is necessary that respective knowledge be possessed by the moral individual. That no moral direction is inherent in knowledge as such is clear, since we may imagine numerous situations when "to say" means, from the viewpoint of group morality—to commit treason, that is, to act with the utmost amorality. Even C. P. Snow seems to sense the untenability of his argument, for he finishes the article with the words: "I cannot prove it, but I believe that, simply because scientists cannot escape their own knowledge, they also won’t be able to avoid showing themselves disposed to good.” [178•2
p The problem of science and ethics becomes in our day especially topical, if it is considered in terms of the shaping of the individual. Here the problem emerges as that of the interrelationship of a scientific education and ethical upbringing, subject to the discretion of the educator. Not wishing to intrude into the sphere of competence of the educator, we snail restrict ourselves to a few brief remarks on behalf of philosophy.
p The common type of contemporary school providing a general education evolved in its general features (including its tasks, methods of their realization and didactic principles) in the epoch of the European Enlightenment. The assimilation of scientific knowledge was regarded by the Enlighteners as the decisive factor in the development of the individual and of 179 mankind. This conception was justified for the task of practical mastery of the material world as the causally conditional world was pressing indeed, a task connected with freeing this sphere from the sway of religion, which had blocked off avenues to cognition and activity adequate to this very world. Therefore in school as well ethical education was relegated to an inferior position and became a random factor dependent on the family, the immediate social environment ana religion. During the Enlightenment this was also justified, since both religion and family and kinship traditions still enjoyed immense authority for the bulk of the population in maintaining a definite value system. Family and kinship ties and traditions are much weaker in contemporary society than they were three hundred years ago. The separation of the school from the church and an atheistic education have virtually excluded religion as a factor in upbringing. This is only natural since the value system which could be fostered by religion, the family-kinship and communal traditions bears no correspondence to the contemporary socio-historical situation.
p But in this instance, the type of the enlightenment school which has lived to see our day, marked by the primacy of scientific education over ethical upbriging is also unacceptable. In the course of the last three hundred years science has not only ousted religion from the sphere of knowledge of things, but, as we have seen, has also actively intruded in the sphere of human relations. The “scientification” of the school, for example, in the organization of the pedagogical process has proceeded as far as suggestions to formalize the entire process in algorithms and even to replace the teacher with machines as if the pupils were computers rather than human beings. Such an approach excludes the possibility of personal contact with the educator, which would otherwise make a significant impact on the shaping of the pupil’s ethical consciousness. As far as curriculum is concerned, even those disciplines which judging by their social functions would seem to be intended to foster an aesthetic and ethical awareness (such as literature and history), are now dismembered and analyzed in a so-called “ technological” manner and transformed into a list of dates, events and of the "character traits" of the heroes, spiced up with vulgar sociological maxims. The assimilation of the forms of panhuman culture is replaced by “pumping” with knowledge. As a result the school “drops” (if not completely, at least to a significant measure) from its range of influence an important sphere of the spiritual world of the student—that of the molding of truly human ethical relations.
180p When the problem of shaping the ethical personality arises educators and psychologists often respond in the following manner: draw up a list of ethical (in their view) qualities of the personality, and the question boils down to developing methods with the help of which these qualities can be drummed into the child. In point of fact to cultivate the ethical personality means to foster an individual who is sensitive to the inner conflict between morality and ethics, who is capable of differentiating them, who is capable of making the appropriate decisions and of bearing full and undivided responsibility for them. To this date we know of no means of accomplishing this other than that of personal contact and a mastery of the world of pan-human culture. In this situation, apparently, in the process of imparting scientific knowledge, the attitude must be fostered in the pupil to science as to an instrument, a powerful tool produced by man for the mastery of material reality; but the ability to utilize this tool, though necessary, nevertheless does not make a human being a man.
p We note that the discussion which we have engaged in on the pages of this article represents only one of many possible approaches and makes no claims to being either exhaustive or comprehensive. The problem which we nave touched upon in a general form (the relationship of cause and goal, of materiality and spirituality) has been the centre of discussion for thousands of years—from various angles and in a range of diverse historical modifications. For example, in early Christian theology the problem at hand took the form of the doctrine that man belonged to two societies, the "City of God" and the city of his birth (to cite the Augustinian distinction). In the milieu of the European Middle Ages, tinged with spirituality, it appeared in a multitude of forms, including that of the | contradiction between the scholastics and the mystics or the j church and the secular world. This specific feature of medieval ; culture was observed by the Russian scholar P. Bitsilli: "The > life of the church and that of the world were thought to I proceed on different levels and be subordinated to different types of law. The destinies of the church can be understood only from a ideological standpoint whereas the transformations of the world, viewed in themselves, irrespective of that role which it (the world) fulfills as a receptacle of the Church, are subordinated to causality.” [180•1
p In modern times the problem of the dual nature of man continued to occupy the attention of philosophers, taking 181 various forms. The historicism of West European culture, with its specific development of understanding and perception of time—and moreover its explosive development against the background of the stagnating cultures of the East, may be connected precisely with this form of cleavage in man (both as an individual and as a social subject), a cleavage emerging at some point in antiquity and representing one of the conceivable historical modifications of the subject-object relation.
p In Marx’s theoretical conception in which the world is considered as the world of human object-activity, this cleavage emerges as a historically conditioned division of activity into the general spiritual and material production proper (in the form of the social division of labour); a division to be sublated in the course of historical development. Material production in turn is divided into mental and manual labour with further cleavages engendering the social structure of contemporary society, the phenomenon of alienation, etc.—with all the complex and contradictory collisions marking the contemporary man’s being. We took precisely this conception as our starting point in trying to put forward our ideas and ascertain the place and role of science and morality as socio-historical phenomena.
p This evaluation briefly and schematically outlines one of the possible approaches to the theme. Here we touch upon a knot of problems so complex and broad in scope that a single article cannot provide even a simple exposition not to speak of a theoretical analysis of them. A thorough analysis of these problems requires a colossal effort and cannot be completed in principle, as, incidentally, the analysis of any problem which has adopted a universal categorial form. We are travelling here in a sphere of such logic where each logical step, each rung on the ladder of theoretical knowledge is simultaneously a critical analysis and overcoming of the previous step, the previous rung. This unending process is a form of the existence of truth.
p Let us point to a few of the contradictions to which the argument presented in this article leads and which must, in our opinion, testify to its vitality, responsiveness to change and receptiveness to transcendence. We speak of the cultural and historical subject, of that which we call the "field of culture" unfolded in time. But the historical subject is a paradoxical entity and, in a demonstrative-logical framework quite unimaginable for he must change, remaining just the same. If we attribute to him only change, then we have no basis to believe that temporally sequential states in fact represent phenomena 182 of one and the same subject. Times become "out of joint”, history disappears: there remain discrete states without time as temporal change. If we assume that our subject is not changing, remains the same, then there is no time, there is only eternity and once again no history. The first of these possibilities is embodied in the theory of discrete, hermetically sealed cultures (civilizations). The second is exemplified by mythological thought patterns. The Christian eschatological consciousness realizes both conceptions in a twofold manner. First, in the image of Christ, who, being both God and man, belongs at one and the same time both to eternity and to time. As a man he is causally determined by external necessity and perishes on the cross. As God he is free, that is to say, determined by the goals immanent to him, and emerges before man as an envoy of the future, of the very goal which, in Christian terms, mankind must implement through its history. The image of Christ is consequently the first (as far as we know) theoretical model of the historical subject (hence, of man as creator and reformer and as ethical creature). So we observe the formation in Christianity of a notion of universal history and of man as the representative of mankind as a whole. Secondly, the Christian consciousness actualizes this notion in the idea of the discrete—in relation to time—being of the world. Indeed universal history, according to Christianity, is only a limited moment of being and its boundaries are strictly and precisely defined: the commitment of the primal sin (and this sin bears directly upon our theme, since it consists in the cognition of good and evit\), sets in motion the historical clock, the Last Judgement stops it. Before and after history there is only eternity.
p Certain scholars attempt to portray Marx’s understanding of communism as eschatological, viz., as an absolute goal the realization of which signifies the end of history. [182•1 To us such views seem quite unfounded. Both the direct statements of Marx and the entire thrust of his theoretical construction demonstrates that communism in Marx’s understanding is man’s transcending beyond the boundaries of limited sociality, placing man in dependence upon external expediency, making him unfree, partial. That is why communism is characterized by Marx either through negation (the absence of the social division of labour, of classes, the state, etc.) or through the 183 parameters of the infinite (freedom, the universal development of the essential forces of man, universal intercourse, etc). We observe that Marx’s negative observations pertain to the socium, and positive-infinite—to man.
p Thus, that which we might call the present or actual sensuous being of the historical subject is determined in two opposite ways: from the past to the present (causal determination) and from the future to the present (goal determination). The former is expressed in the dependence of the subject upon the external world (necessity), the latter—in the dependence of the world upon the activity of the goal-positing subject (freedom). The degree of dominance neld by the second way over the first could most probably be taken as a criterion, thereby a definition of historical progress (of course, not the sole criterion).
p This twofold determination has not been grasped by contemporary scientific thought, which regards as explanation only the discovery of cause and therefore repeatedly inquires: "Where, then, is the cause of the goal?" This question can be answered only in one manner: "Trie same place as you’ll find the goal of the cause,” that is to say, in nature, in the universe. In pointing to the cause for a given goal we are committing, perhaps unwittingly, an act of reduction; we reduce time to space (“geometrize” time), man to matter (“the human machine" or "labour power”), freedom to necessity (“freedom is cognized necessity”), process to structure (system analysis applied to history), history to sociology and ethics to morality. At the historical level this indicates that we, in explaining the past, investigate the causes and motives underlying processes and actions, that is to say, man within the sphere of causal logic. But as soon as we try to extrapolate this mode of explanation into the future, we arrive at one or another form of fatalism. For the notions of “freedom” and “subject” there is no place in such a conception; hence there is no room for the concept of history. One is compelled to state that there exists a fundamental distinction between the future (the logic of aim) and the past (the logic of cause). The world of things does not know such a distinction, therefore extrapolation “works” perfectly there (in the form of scientific prediction), but it does not know real time either (time is “geometrized”). Science presents a picture not of nature as such but rather of its ’material projection”, a view of nature through the prism of the logic of things and material relations.
p Still, what goal does in fact “project” human history and man as a historical subject? In philosophy the answer was 184 found long ago: man as goal in itself, as universal being. In such an instance the entire history may be regarded as the formation of man, as continuing anthropogenesis. The point of origin must be considered the emergence of reflection; that is to say, the ability to make of oneself an object (and consequently a goal), to detach oneself from one’s own life activity (ana hence to make this life activity the means to an end). The ability to reflect signifies the possibility of standing outside oneself, viz., transcending the boundaries of the self, which in fact is the definition of infinity, universality and of a being living in time (the equivalent—in the future), and perhaps even the definition of time itself.
p This “projecting” of man lives in him, and is carried out in the concrete-historical, transient images of various cultures. Giving expression and accomplishing these images man is not absorbed by this concreteness, and cannot in this act of accomplishment express himself exhaustively, completely, for in each instance he divorces himself from his embodiment and transcends—remaining through all changes himself to an equal measure—i.e., unfulfilled, potential universality.
p This tantalizing feature ot man compels him throughout the history to search out for the eternal in all cultural manifestations and try to detach it from the “transient”—from historically conditioned forms. The images of the eternal cosmos, eternal gods, eternal substance and eternal matter are nothing but an attempt to explain the “many” through the “one”, the temporal through the eternal. The persistence of the idea of trie transcendent and of truth as process demonstrates that this search is necessary, but at the same time cannot be brought to completion. The very existence of this enquiry reveals to us man as a being “projected” by his own future (not extrinsically but intrinsically, not of necessity, but freely). One of the forms of this projectivity, or as was commonly said, of "man’s mission”, turns out to be, as we have tried to demonstrate, ethics.
p Without an analysis of this determinacy the understanding of history as the becoming of man, as continuing anthropogenesis is impossible. This means one cannot understand the origins of man, that is, his past, without analyzing his future, in particular, such forms of determinacy by and of the future as ethics. Incidentally our argument permits an unambiguous resolution of the question so hotly debated in contemporary science: is man homo habilis or is he an animal? [184•1 185 The fact that homo habilis possesses the aptitude for instrumental action demonstrates that despite his pithecoid morphology he already detaches himself from his life activity, i. e., reflects and is capable of transcendence. But this indicates that he is already a man, for in him is already “projected” all of subsequent genuinely human development: all of history, culture, ethics, etc. Incidentally, the morphology of the homo sapiens species is also projected. All of his subsequent development is not of a biological type, nor is it determined by biological laws. Thus even anthropogenesis is regarded only as the establishment of the biological species homo sapiens, even here it is necessary to formulate a thesis which is paradoxical from the viewpoint of modern anthropology: the emergence of the biological species homo sapiens is not a biological process. In this context our image and understanding of anthropogenesis turns out to be substantially different from that accepted in modern science.
p The way in which we in this article have presented the formation of individual ethics meets with yet another series of contradictions and paradoxes. We posited the spatial-temporal existence of the individual as the development of his life simultaneously on two levels—the social (spatial unfolding) and the cultural-historical (temporal unfolding). A concrete analysis of cultural-historical determination of the individual implies that the given historical culture be taken as a qualitatively unique whole. But the representation of culture through definitions characterizing it as a whole, links the historical origins of this culture with its end, and it takes shape before us as a structure and not as a process, that is to say, once again in the "spatial unfolding”, as one both confined and limited (in general any definition is a limitation). Ethics, which bears pan-numan and absolute content, turns out to be beyond the scope of our investigation, and remains elusive. Time is in this context ousted to the sphere of transition from one culture to the next, i.e., to the immeasurable, the transcendent.
p But then the effort can be made to approach the analysis of concrete-historical culture from the other side, namely to define it as a whole through its “future-past”, viz., to ascertain from what and how it emerges and into what it is being transformed. With such an approach culture appears as the struggle between the past and the future and its own essence appears as a contradiction in substance. Culture in this instance bears within itself universality in the form of the possibility of transcending its own limits. Then the opportunity arises of 186 understanding it as a unique phenomenon and as the embodiment of universal human history, and hence, as panhuman ethical content in the forms of the ethical consciousness set forth by the given culture. But even this is not quite so simple, since the very understanding of the universal also changes and for an elucidation of the meaning of history it is necessary to understand what “projects” man per se. It remains to define man through his “future-past” since, as we have made clear, no universal structural definitions are applicable in this instance and since the essence of man lies in transcendence. Once again we have arrived at an understanding of history as a problem of anthropogenesis—an unending problem, requiring simultaneous theoretical movement both in the past and in the future, both in the forms of causal logic (in particular, scientific) and of goal logic which itself is still a problem.
p The argument we have presented concerning the succession of ethics through the "field of culture" permits us, as we have sought to demonstrate, to clarify certain relations between ethics and science as a historical phenomenon. The question becomes much more complex when we touch upon the formation of the ethical consciousness of a separate individual. Here we encounter instances revealing the insufficiency and one-sidedness of this argument.
p One instance is the full ethical transformation of the individual, an upheaval of sorts leading him to a high ethical position. In this context we know of instances when such a transformation takes place in circumstances virtually excluding the mastery by the given individual of the substance of culture.
p Research in psychology and education provides us with examples of mature ethical consciousness in children aged 7-9 who, naturally, have not had the time to assimilate culture to the degree permitting us to consider this assimilation the source of the evolution of their ethical consciousness.
p Sometimes the image of a person encountered by the individual in his life serves over a stretch of years as the ethical criterion for this individual’s actions. The assessment of the action in this context takes on the form of a question: "What would X say about this?" or "How would X act in this situation?”
p This example, to all appearances, marks the path to an understanding of the earlier ones: there took place an encounter with a personality, with a man in whom personal qualities were pronounced. If we recall that the personality (as a transcending entity) is boundless, it becomes clear that 187 contact with a personality can lead one beyond the boundaries of limited sociality and hence, on an ethical level, offer the individual the opportunity of appraising the restricted nature of existing morality. This in turn leads to the development of that inner conflict which we have attempted to portray as forming the individual’s ethical consciousness. Moreover, as a result of this boundlessness, contact even with one isolated individual may exert more influence on the individual and in his eyes be more important than his social and quotidian environment.
p This personality (this X) may turn out to be one’s school teacher, school- or play-mate and so forth, perhaps even an incidental acquaintance. Apparently of great import in this context is the role played by extreme situations when a sole instance either experienced through or witnessed by the individual can bring him to an ethical turnabout.
p We can thus state that the formation of the individual’s ethics is not of necessity directly connected with his assimilation of forms of culture. Ethics (just as in the opposite case—- immorality) is infectious and the “infection” can take place through personal contact between individuals (their social intercourse is responsible for morality). The historical forms of culture and social relations in this instance determine the objective conditions and opportunities for personal contact and, apparently, the susceptibility of the individual to this “infection”.
p The Christian church was a social institution controlling education for hundreds of years because, in particular, it organized each individual’s encounter and contact with an ethical ideal and image presented in the personality of Christ. We call attention to the fact that this ideal is simultaneously a “model” of the historical subject and an image of culture. As such it is not confined within the framework of the church, which bears all the limitations and flaws of a social institution. The Reformation tried to resolve this among other contradictions, although the attempt was unsuccessful.
In conclusion we observe that forms of culture and direct personal contact do not apparently exhaust all modes of the ‘projection” of man by his “future-past”. Indeed even the historical development itself of these forms is in turn “projected” in man, i.e., human history is projected within man. We still know very little of the means by which this is carried out (this, too, is a problem of anthropogenesis). Thus, the theme which we have touched upon remains open for further inquiry.
Notes
[177•1] "Thought generating solely finite definitions and moving in them is called reason" (G.W.F. Hegel, Samtliche Werke, Bd. V, Leipzig, 1930, S. 58).
[177•2] C. P. Snow, Public Affairs, London, 1971, p. 192.
[178•1] C. P. Snow, Public Affairs, p. 195.
[178•2] /6«i,pp. 197-98.
[180•1] P. Bitsilli, Aspects of Medieval Culture, Moscow, 1919, p. 133 (in Russian).
[182•1] See Robert C. Tucker, "Marx and the End of History" (Paper presented to the international symposium at Triers, 1968, dedicated to the 150th Anniversary of the Birth of Karl Marx).
[184•1] See the discussion in the journal Priroda Nos. 1, 2, 1973 (in Russian).