OF THE TROOPS’ COMBAT POWER
[introduction.]
p To give a correct evaluation of the fighting efficiency of an army we must have an idea not only of its equipment, but also of its discipline, of its firmness in combat, of its ability and readiness to endure the hardships of war and, especially, of its “... morale, i.e., what can be demanded of it without demoralising it". [350•1
351p By morale we understand the specific manifestation of definite political, moral ideas, sentiments, views, some of which hold a dominant position in people’s consciousness, and lend a definite qualitative characteristic to the spiritual forces of the soldiers. Roughly, the moral factor can be characterised as a state or condition in which there prevail low or high spirits, confidence or confusion, enthusiasm or apathy, etc.
p In some of his letters and telegrams written during the Civil War Lenin emphasised that after the blows delivered by the Red Army a feeling of doom, fear, confusion and apathy was reigning among the interventionist troops. In characterising the morale of the fighting revolutionary masses, he widely used such terms as “passion”, “enthusiasm”, “anger”, “hatred”, “fighting mood”, “elation of the masses”, etc., which aptly emphasised the various shades of the moral factor.
p Speaking of a case of a forced retreat he said that “holding out morally means not allowing oneself to become demoralised and disorganised, keeping a sober view of the situation, preserving vigour and firmness of spirit, even retreating a long way, but not too far, and in such a way as to stop the retreat in time and revert to the offensive". [351•1
p It should be noted fhat many generals and military theoreticians of the past, such as Peter I, Suvorov and Kutuzov, recognised and appreciated the importance of the army’s morale. Napoleon said that as regards their importance the spiritual forces relate to the physical as three to one. Clausewitz maintained that “it is the moral magnitudes that permeate the whole element of war" and that will, being a moral magnitude, is what “sets in motion and leads the whole mass of forces”. He wrote: “...physical phenomena appear almost exclusively as the wooden handle, while the moral ones are the precious metal, the finely sharpened weapon." [351•2
Why does the morale of fighting armies play the decisive role in war? This is mainly because danger is the typical element of war. In other spheres of human activity the aim is to gain some success, and death is due only to some mishap, is accidental and generally rare, but at war death is natural.
352 Any military assignment, every step during an offensive, every day of defensive action, involve the sacrifice of human lives. Therefore, the more death-dealing the weapons, the greater the role played by the morale of the people drawn into combat.p Lenin formulated a proposition that can be considered one of the most important and general laws of war. He said: “In the final analysis, victory in any war depends on the spirit animating the masses that spill their own blood on the field of battle." [352•1 (Author’s emphasis.) This law comes particularly sharply to the fore in wars where one of the sides pursues just, and the other predatory aims. It will assert itself with new force in a. world nuclear war, if one should break out.
p The morale of the army plays a decisive role in the war because, as a material force, it can raise or lower the fighting efficiency of the troops. Only if morale is high can all the hardships of the modern armed struggle be endured and military equipment be used with the greatest efficiency. Low morale damages the fighting qualities of the troops. Thanks to high morale the professional skills of troops transform into genuine mastership, which can be attained only if a creative attitude is displayed, and is impossible where the military duties are fulfilled as a formality. A high morale cements the other elements of the combat power of the troops, multiplies their strength.
A high morale increases the flexibility of the organisation and hardens the will of the troops, strengthens discipline which steadily grows more essential as the technical means of struggle, the methods and forms of warfare become more diversified, and the political aims of the struggle grow more decisive.
Specifics of the Army’s Morale
p As regards its nature the morale of troops is closely linked with the moral- political maturity of the entire population, is a component part of the morale of the population of states (coalitions), and simultaneously expresses the specific features of the army as an organisation whose main aim is to combat the enemy.
353p Morale should not be regarded as a clan spirit of professionals or as esprit de corps, as many bourgeois military theoreticians do.
p It is also wrong to regard morale only as a manifestation of moral qualities and convictions; it is more complex and diverse. The main and decisive content of the morale of an army is made up of the aggregate of political and moral ideas, sentiments and feelings shared by the uniformed masses and expressing their attitude towards the genuine interests of the country and the people, towards the socio- political system and the policy of the state, and in time of war, also towards the war aims. An essential aspect of the morale of an army is the attitude towards the enemy, the intensity of the hatred of him, the extent to which the army wishes to fight him and to exert all its powers for victory, as also the depth of the awareness of its military duty and the confidence in its power. All these components of the morale of troops are closely interlinked in dialectical unity. Hence, as regards its essence, morale is the ability of the soldiers to fulfil their military duty to the end. It finds a concrete expression in the maturity and fighting efficiency of the troops.
p The level and strength of the morale of the troops are determined by a number of conditions. The more general and basic of them were discussed in the preceding chapter.
p A specific group is formed by the conditions that affect the morale and are contained in the army itself and in the nature of combat action. They exert a positive or negative influence notably on the psychological components of the morale, on the sentiments of the soldiers, and in definite conditions also on the political attitudes and morale as a whole.
p Military equipment that is superior in quantity and quality to that of the opponent, a high standard of training of army units, excellent mastery by them of modern weapons, their fighting experience exert a particularly great influence on the state of troops. The conviction of the servicemen that their means of combat are superior to those of the enemy lends them additional strength.
p For morale to be high, the decisions adopted by the officers must be rational and purposeful, their organisational activity perfect, especially that connected with troop control, with maintaining co-operation between the services and the arms, ensuring reliable communications and constant and 354 continuous supply of the units with ammunition and other requisite materials. The commanding personnel must be up to the requirements of the war—that is an important factor for strengthening morale.
p The psychological, and in definite conditions also the politico-moral state of the troops, is subject to vacillations, depending on the course and results of military actions. When the troops are winning one victory after another it is much easier to maintain a high morale than it is when they are suffering defeat and are forced to retreat. Offensive operations help to raise the morale of the troops, especially when a powerful offensive or counter-offensive is mounted after a long defence. Attack always affects the psychology of the enemy’s troops for it shows that the attacking side’s will is stronger than their own. The morale of the troops is subjected to a hard test when the opponent uses the element of surprise, launches an offensive unexpectedly, uses a new weapon or new methods of warfare, succeeds in a military ruse, etc.
p “Psychological warfare" exerts an important influence on the morale of the troops. It consists of ideological subversions aimed at undermining the moral and political basis of the army’s combat power, at demoralising the troops, at eroding their faith in their political and military leadership.
p All the above conditions interact. The socio-political system of the state, the ideology dominant in society, the war aims, and the moral quality of the “human material" form the basis of the morale and political maturity of an army. Defeats weaken the will for victory of troops possessing a low morale. In troops with a high morale, defeat evokes a feeling of shame, pain, bitterness; it does not undermine their spirit but strengthens it.
p Troops with a low morale are so sensitive to losses that they frequently become unfit for combat even after suffering slight setbacks. On the other hand, troops with a high morale exhibit the greatest heroism, they are able to hold out to the end, possess a high offensive spirit and maintain strict discipline. Troops realising that they have a social duty to fulfil and whose actions are dictated by their conscience, are able to endure far greater physical and psychological stresses than troops who adopt a formal attitude towards their military duty. Among the latter discipline is based first and foremost 355 on coercion, fear and bribery, which is supplemented by the ideological indoctrination of the soldiers. This lowers their initiative, weakens their will for victory, stops them from using their moral and physical strength to the full.
p Courage, bravery and heroism can be displayed by soldiers on a mass scale, can become a standard of behaviour in combat only if they are linked with noble ideals, with the conviction that the purpose of the army and its war aims correspond to the interests of the people, the genuine interests of their country.
p The psychological features, necessary to transform the recruit into a regular soldier, can be developed only on such a moral-political basis. Every profession, every speciality, exerts a definite effect on the psychology of the people following it. This applies also to the military service, which is associated with definite conditions created by the soldiers’ collective. These conditions are specific because the life and activity of the units and sub-units are strictly regimented, every soldier feels that he is linked with the collective by joint activity, the community of interests, traditions, etc. All this influences the psychology of soldiers. This influence has a telling effect on the psychological make-up of the soldiers because their moral-psychological qualities are not only of professional but also of political importance.
All the above factors determine the level of the army’s morale neither spontaneously nor automatically. They only create possibilities, favourable or otherwise, for maintaining this spirit on the necessary level. How successfully these favourable possibilities are realised and unfavourable ones overcome in the armies of the socialist countries depends on the activity of the commanding personnel, the political bodies, the Party and Komsomol organisations. In this Partypolitical work has a particularly important role to play.
Specific Features of the Influence Exerted by the Combat Situation on the Morale of Troops
p To ensure a high morale in the army in a modern war, should it be unleashed by the imperialists, it is essential to take into account aiso the new circumstances that make far greater demands on the morale of the troops. They evolve from the nature of nuclear war, from the qualitatively new character of military actions as regards their military-technical and political aspects.
356p The troops must be fully prepared morally even before the outbreak of the war. The aggressors stake on a sudden attack on the USSR, on “pre-emptive” nuclear strikes at Soviet political centres, industrial areas and transport junctures, at key military objectives. This makes it necessary for the troops to be constantly ready for combat already in peacetime, to give maximum attention to preparing the soldiers in moralpsychological respects. When the war begins there will be no time for a gradual preparation, for the transition from peacetime to war conditions. The logic of modern war is such that a soldier must be ready to face its trials in advance. In all past wars the final moral tempering, “the baptism of fire”, was achieved in the course of operations. Now one cannot rely on that even if the war should begin with conventional weapons. Even then the troops will have to conduct intense, fluid operations and to be constantly ready to use nuclear weapons and to defend themselves against them. The transition from one kind of combat action to the other, from conventional to nuclear weapons, will require enormous moral staunchness.
p The picture of combat in a nuclear war will have an enormous moral-psychological effect on the belligerents. They will witness huge losses among the population and the troops, heavy damage, will experience the destructive effects of light and sound waves, of rapid changes in pressure, may find themselves in areas flooded because of the destruction of dams, etc. All this will inevitably be a mental shock and can inflict a heavy moral blow, one particularly difficult to bear in the first minutes and hours of the war. It is not to be discounted that the instinct of self-preservation, the fear of death, will at that moment take hold of some of the soldiers. Fear evokes a state of depression and panic among people who are not morally tempered. The manifestation of a weakness of the spirit by some people is no less dangerous than are elemental forces. The loss by some soldiers of control over their feelings is intolerable, even if such cases should be few, for negative psychological reactions are extremely infectious. A person who is unable to control himself is unable to control mechanisms efficiently and makes mistakes in handling equipment. The damage that may be caused by a mistake in modern war is difficult to overestimate.
p Increased demands upon the moral qualities of the soldiers 357 are posed by the extreme fierceness of the armed struggle, by the high mobility of combat operations, the absence of continuous front-lines and the necessity to pass through extensive zones of radioactive contamination, destruction, fires, floods, etc.
p The sharp increase in the danger of possible accidents in combat, which will take place at night or in conditions of poor illumination, in smoke or dust clouds, will inevitably give rise to a feeling of uncertainty. This always has an extremely depressing effect and erodes people’s morale.
p Alarm and uncertainty can also be aggravated by the constant danger from invisible radioactive, bacteriological and chemical weapons. One must also be prepared for the possible application by the enemy of fundamentally new kinds of weapons. In past wars it was found that the sudden employment of a new weapon can have an extremely negative effect on troops not prepared for it. It is impossible to make provisions against the psychological damage from suddenness which in definite conditions may exceed the material damage caused by the new weapon. The scientific and technological revolution may produce new weapons so unexpectedly that the effects from their use are difficult to foresee with any degree of accuracy.
p The higher demands upon morale are due also to another feature of modern war—a large part of the servicemen will not see the enemy, he will remain invisible. Many soldiers will regard the enemy as something “abstract”. However, despite the remoteness of the enemy, despite thousands of kilometres, his death-dealing breath will be felt everywhere. This aggravates moral stresses. It is therefore essential to find some sort of a “moral safety valve" for the servicemen. Alarming, oppressive thoughts can be suppressed by active preparations for combat, the checking of the equipment, weapons, etc.
p The striving to improve the protection of the troops and to increase their mobility finds expression in the trend to give the troops the protection of armour, to build deep underground shelters, etc. However, this may intensify the feeling of partial isolation, especially because in modern war the action of individual units and sub-units in isolation from the headquarters, from the main forces, without sufficient information, will probably be the rule rather than the exception.
358p In modern combat ultimate victory will possibly be won by small, courageous teams. Hence, the soldiers must be able to carry out any combat task, be able rapidly to advance over vast distances, fight without contact with their neighbours, remain cool and level-headed in any situation no matter how complex, display courageous initiative, take daring risks and deliver steadily intensifying blows to the enemy. Naturally, such actions can be taken only by troops possessing an invincible will-power.
p Huge, irreplaceable losses are a typical feature of nuclearmissile war. The outcome of battles will depend first and foremost on the losses the troops will be able to sustain without losing their fighting spirit, on their courage and the will to carry on the struggle.
p In addition to the measures taken to lower the vulnerability of the troops to weapons of mass destruction it is important to foresee the psychological and moral consequences the application of such weapons may entail. This causes grave concern to the bourgeois military leaders.
p In nuclear war military discipline, its moral basis, will be all-important. No army can exist without strict discipline, but when modern combat means are applied, it must be even firmer.
p How to maintain a high morale after the initial nuclear strikes and during further combat operations is a problem of extreme complexity. The troops must be ready to advance, to break the enemy’s resistance, remembering that he too has suffered heavy losses. This readiness must not be impaired by the heavy losses sustained from the nuclear strikes of the enemy, it must remain firm even if only separate composite groups or detachments survive of the former sub-units, units and formations.
p To be able to endure a “moral blow" of unheard-of strength, it is necessary for every soldier on every sector or every post to direct all his strength, thoughts, will and feelings to the task on hand, to concentrate all the time on the carrying out of his tasks, of his duty, not to allow even a moment of slackness. When one has concentrated one’s will and directed it at the faultless operation of the weapons, equipment, various apparatuses and mechanisms, the feeling of terror evaporates and its place is taken by the excitement of combat, by a moral upsurge, an offensive spirit.
359p In the most difficult moments, especially those immediately following a nuclear strike, it is extremely necessary to provide an external stimulus: the personal example and firm command of an officer, the confident word of a political worker, a Communist. The role of the commanders and political workers of all ranks will be decisive in maintaining and reinforcing the morale of the troops.
The purposeful activity of all soldiers (based on communist ideas and high military mastership) and the active influence exerted on their consciousness and psychology by the commanders and political workers will maintain their morale on a high level and help them to fight and win.
Moral-Psychological Training of Troops on a Scientific Basis
p The obvious moral superiority of the socialist over the imperialist armies is due to causes of a socio-economic and ideological nature. But, the strength of the morale is determined also by the actions of the military leadership, the combat readiness and political maturity, the education of the soldiers and the entire way of army life.
p For morale to be given a definite structure, an influence must be exerted on all its elements, one that takes into account their specific features and the fact that they are interdependent. The “moral” and “psychological” training of the troops cannot be separated. Such training must be a “ moral-psychological" one, one that through the moulding of a communist world outlook, a remoulding of man’s psychology, forms the essential moral and combat qualities, educates patriotism and internationalism, prepares the soldier-citizen for the trials of modern war.
p The essence of the moral-psychological training consists in the purposeful formation of moral-psychological firmness in the servicemen, of the constant readiness to endure the grimmest trials of modern war and to vanquish the enemy. This is achieved by the entire system of political education and combat training, by moral and military education.
p Lenin’s propositions and views on the problem of preparing man for war can be formulated and expressed as definite principles of the moral-political and psychological training of the troops in modern conditions.
p The first of these principles is the systematic work to educate communist consciousness and convictions in the Soviet soldiers. It is influenced by a variety of factors. First of all, 360 this is the influence of the social environment, of circumstances, the real living conditions that mould the personality. In the broadest sense this could be called the influence of the Soviet way of life, which has a number of specific features as applying to the army. A major role belongs also to the organisation of a harmonious system of instruction and education. Finally, an important factor is man’s ability for self-education, self-instruction, the ability to approach selectively the influences to which he is subjected. When all these factors act in the same direction in a co-ordinated way, the formation in the soldier of a communist personality will obviously succeed.
p Another important principle in the moral-political and psychological training of the troops is the unity of the ideological and psychological influence on man’s consciousness in the course of training and combat activity.
p The strengthening of the ideological impact, of the Party’s influence on the ranks can accomplish a major “psychological shift" in the necessary direction. The spiritual state of the masses and the army should be considered in the entire wealth of its shades, both ideological and psychological.
p Relying on Lenin’s heritage, as applying to the problem of the moral-political and psychological training of the troops, we can formulate one more principle. It expresses the objective need to use to the maximum the achievements of science in the process of preparing the “human material" for war.
p The present level of the development of science and technology makes it possible to give people a more adequate idea of what may happen in modern war. This can be achieved in particular with the help of a special set of physical models of combat in a nuclear missile war. They can consist of technical devices such as special chambers, simulators, three-dimensional zones, etc. Each of these devices can create (with a maximum degree of accuracy) the illusion of real combat, of its dangers, rapid changes of situations, uncertainty, and can also help the soldiers simultaneously to experience (within reasonable limits) increases in temperature, noise, light flashes, etc. With the help of such devices the moral-psychological combat readiness of the soldiers can be tested, and repetitions of such treatment can help to work 361 out and strengthen this readiness. It is advisable to have many models, so that they become increasingly complicated and make the testee gradually approach real conditions as closely as possible. The most complex models can have a series of different programmes. The degree of similarity between the model and real conditions is determined by the designer’s intention and the technical possibilities of realising that intention. Such models should be designed jointly by engineers, psychologists, physicians, military experts, etc. The use of such models should be regarded as a specific form of practice, as a definite criterion for verifying theories which formerly were tested only by war.
p It is essential to teach the soldiers to control their behaviour, to mould in them a constant internal readiness for active combat operations, for mass heroism.
p We cannot agree with the assertion that in the war of “machines and robots" there will be no place for heroism. “Modern technology has destroyed this concept,” some US sociologists aver. This is not true. The point is that in modern conditions the concepts “heroism” and “exploit” are filled with a new content. Heroism and exploit are not only a bright manifestation of the finest qualities, of the intentions of one outstanding person. Heroism in modern war will be manifested ever more fully in the unity of the individual and the collective. This will be the heroism of crews, groups, units and at times it will assume the form of arduous and accurate work with machines, mechanisms and apparatuses in the most difficult combat conditions, often requiring selfsacrifice, the fulfilment of tasks at the cost of one’s life. We see elements of this heroism already today in the performance by men of combat duty, in the maintenance of constant combat readiness, which requires the straining to the utmost of all their intellectual, physical and moral powers.
p Modern war demands a keen and flexible reasoning by all soldiers from privates to generals, the ability to assimilate diverse information immediately. A creative frame of mind is a factor of great importance, it enables the soldier to evaluate what is happening in a flash, to foresee what may happen and to adopt suitable decisions. A conservative mind, one unable to create, is generally quickly paralysed by great moral-psychological stresses.
362p Modern war makes it necessary to educate a soldier ready for action, resolute to the point of daring. The level of a person’s resolve is most vividly manifested in complicated critical situations. It is essential for him to keep a cool head and to act decisively at such times.
p First-rank importance is attached to working out a moralpsychological staunchness and endurance, that is, the ability to endure extreme physical and psychological stresses and shocks without losing the will for struggle and victory. Physical endurance is directly dependent on moral- psychological endurance.
p Modern military equipment and weapons and the character of the nuclear-missile war call for a combination of discipline and self-discipline, for man must be able to control himself even better than he controls mechanisms and devices. Modern combat requires an excellently and smoothly functioning military collective that includes a large number of officers and men of diverse specialities. Therefore, the morale that welds the officers and men in a single military collective is crucial in modern conditions. This does not belittle, but heightens the role of the individual, the “cell” of the single whole.
p Military discipline and its highest expression—self- discipline—are indicative of the moral strength of the troops. A strengthening of the ideological conviction of the soldiers makes them fulfil their tasks not only because of orders and coercion, but also because their reason and feelings command them to do so, that is, because they are self-disciplined. The deeper a soldier realises their necessity, the more willingly does he carry out the demands of the service. Self-discipline makes it possible to control one’s feelings, to master them and to suppress momentary attacks of weakness.
p Such qualities as self-control, self-sufficiency and insistence are also vital to the soldier in modern war. The absence of even one of these qualities makes the soldier inadequate in fighting efficiency and morale.
p The best ways of working out a high morale are intense combat training, long naval cruises, flights in difficult conditions, forced marches, the launching of missiles. Training and exercises make it possible to resolve a dual task—to work out and develop the necessary qualities and also to reveal the weak points of every soldier: tardiness, timidity, 363 excessive impressiveness, lack of self-control, etc., and by rationally choosing individual tasks and exercises to help the men get rid of them. If such qualities are “discovered” in combat, it will be much more difficult to remedy them.
p It is expedient in the process of moral tempering to create situations entailing an element of risk (but of a risk controlled by the commander). The outstanding Soviet educator A. Makarenko was right in saying that “one cannot educate braveness in a person if he is not placed in conditions in which he can display his courage". [363•1
p When dangerous situations emerge sufficiently frequently stable reactions are worked out in the soldier’s mind; the soldier reacts more and more calmly to unexpected complicated situations, copes with them calmly, gets used to the feeling of danger as a necessary and unavoidable element of military life.
p Naturally it is impossible to simulate accurately the conditions of modern combat, but attempts should be made to approach them as closely as possible. A skilful simulation of a combat is no less important today than it was before. It is advisable to use such methods as the “running over" by tanks, the firing over the heads of one’s troops, the showing of educational and documentary films giving a life-like imitating modern battles, the action of modern weapons and their destructive factors, because then they will not come fully unexpectedly when encountered in real combat.
p We must not confine ourselves only to the existing programmes of combat training in the moral-psychological preparation of the troops. There must be exercises of a special nature to train the will, self-control, and psychological firmness of the soldiers of all arms, taking into account the specifics of their service. The systematic training on simulators, the working out of the ability of “self-mobilisation”, the creation of a sound “moral atmosphere" in the collective, crew or sub-unit will promote the moulding of the necessary morale and fighting qualities.
p In view of the nature and specific demands of modern warfare it is advisable to improve the system now used for the professional selection of soldiers for some specialities charged 364 with special responsibilities in conditions when time is extremely limited and tasks have to be fulfilled under great emotional stress. More importance should be attached in selection to the physical and psychological traits of the individual, to his professional inclinations, character, temperament, the speed of his reactions, his attention, his ability to pull himself together and other qualities.
p A harmonious system of military-professional selection is the more essential now since a speciality has to be acquired in a very short time and in tense conditions. Such a selection makes it possible to form the special sub-units of people who are able to handle modern equipment with the greatest efficiency.
p The above mentioned trends naturally do not exhaust all the forms of work aimed at strengthening the morale and at hardening the spiritual qualities of the troops. The task of maintaining constant combat readiness—the central problem in the activity of the Armed Forces of the socialist countries in peacetime conditions—demands maximum harmony in the development of the technical and spiritual aspects of combat readiness.
p Thus, morale, transforming in the course of military actions into a material force, is the decisive factor. But this proposition should not be understood one-sidedly and in an over-simplified way. The morale of the army, no matter how high, is not the only factor securing victory. An important role is played also by material-technical factors.
Hence, victory in modern war is determined by all the elements of the combat power taken together, in aggregate and, what is most important, by the ability and skill of the political and military leadership to use all these elements to the greatest effect.
Notes
[350•1] K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Correspondence, Moscow, 1966, p. 184.
[351•1] V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 116.
[351•2] Karl Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, Dresden, 1885, S. 124, 125.
[352•1] V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 137.
[363•1] A. S. Makarenko, Sobraniye sochinenii v 7 tomakh (Selected Works, in seven volumes), Moscow, 1958, Vol. V, p. 424.