OF WARFARE METHODS
[introduction.]
The methods of warfare and the war in general are an important indicator of the political and military leadership’s skill in using the combat power of the armed forces for the victory over the enemy. Being ultimately dependent on the level of the state’s military power and the combat power of 365 the armed forces, the methods of warfare are, at the same time, conditioned by a number of other essential factors. One of them—the revolution in military affairs—has already been discussed. Now we shall look into the mechanism underlying the change in the methods of warfare and the main causes and conditions determining the character of those methods now becoming dominant.
Conditions Determining the Development and the Change in Methods of Warfare
p Frederick Engels was the first to evolve the famous formula that expresses the most important law determining the change and development of methods of warfare. “Armament, composition, organisationi tactics and strategy depend above all on the stage reached at the time in production and on communications. It is not the ’free creation of the mind’ of generals of genius that have had a revolutionising effect here, but the invention of better weapons and the change in the human material, the soldiers; at the very most, the part played by generals of genius is limited to adapting methods of fighting to the new weapons and combatants." [365•1
p Let us note that attempts were made at one time to replace Engels’s formula by the formula: “As the mode of production, so the mode of combat.” The argument advanced to justify this change was that methods of warfare depend not only on the development of the productive forces, but also on the character of the economic system, that is, on the people’s relations of production. This is an argument not easily dismissed. Yet without belittling the decisive role of the development and change in the mode of production in world history, Engels’s formula is more accurate, while the proposed formula oversimplifies the question of the development and change of combat methods and is somewhat schematic as well.
p Engels’s formula expresses not the general dependence of the method of warfare on the productive forces and relations of production, but their dependence on the conditions directly determining the armed struggle. After all, the productive forces and the relations of production ultimately determine all aspects of social life without exception. According to Engels the methods of warfare are determined, first, 366 by the weapons at the disposal of the troops and, secondly, the character and the qualities of the mass of the people drawn into the war. Engels noted at the same time that the change in methods of warfare is influenced also by the qualities of men, by national and some other socio-demographic specifics. [366•1
p The productive forces and relations of production naturally influence the methods of warfare, but only through the medium of two important factors—weapons and people. Therefore there is no direct and immediate dependence of the methods of warfare on the nature of the productive forces and relations of production.
p Besides, the formula about the direct dependence of the methods of warfare on the mode of production often gives rise to the totally erroneous view that every mode of production has one, and only one, method of warfare that is characteristic of it.
p The question whether several methods of warfare can correspond to one mode of production is an important one. It is essential to a better understanding of the development of the art of warfare in the past and its prospects in the nuclear missile age.
p The question can be stated as follows: is a bourgeois state, for instance the USA, able to work out a completely new method of warfare, one corresponding to the new weapons, or is it compelled to resort to the methods of warfare used during the Second World War? This question applies also to the socialist state.
p What is the task facing the socialist state? Should it develop and improve the methods of warfare that were used during the Great Patriotic War, or create new ones corresponding fully to the changing conditions?
p The history of wars shows that within a single mode of production, for example, the capitalist, methods of warfare changed repeatedly: some withered away, others changed, still others were created anew. This is only logical, since the modes of production embrace whole historical epochs, while the methods of warfare are indirectly connected with the mode of production in a variety of ways and change 367 comparatively rapidly. Thus, the methods of fighting that were used in the Franco-Prussian war, differed considerably from those used in the Napoleonic wars.
p The methods of warfare include methods for waging battles (tactical scale), operations (operational scale) and methods for waging campaigns and the armed struggle throughout the war (strategic scale). Quickest to change are generally those used to wage battles, and in their wake the methods to wage operations. They may change repeatedly not only within the framework of a mode of production, but even in the course of a big war.
During the Second World War different states used different methods of the armed struggle: nazi Germany applied the Blitzkrieg strategy, Britain and the USA, the strategy of drawing out the war. Yet in all these states there was the same capitalist mode of production.
Influence of Social Revolution on Methods of Warfare
p The deepest changes in the methods and forms of the armed struggle are wrought by social revolutions. This is because social revolutions radically change the aims of wars, the personnel and the morale of armies, and thus evoke far-reaching changes in the military sphere, in the entire military system. These revolutions either evolve new methods of warfare or make a deep imprint on the existing ones.
p We mentioned above the radical changes wrought in military affairs by the French bourgeois revolution at the end of the 18th century. “Just as within the country the revolutionary people of France had then, for the first time, displayed revolutionary energy on a scale it had never shown for centuries, so in the war at the close of the eighteenth century it revealed a similar gigantic revolutionary creativeness when it remodelled its whole system of strategy, broke with all the old rules and traditions of warfare, replaced the old troops with a new people’s revolutionary army, and created new methods of warfare." [367•1
p At the same time there were cases in history when armies evolved by the revolution fought counter-revolutionary armies with the same methods of fighting that were used by the latter. This, for example, happened during the English 368 bourgeois revolution of the mid-17th century, when Cromwell’s army was able to rout the royalist troops because of its higher morale. But this army used the old methods of warfare which did not essentially differ from those used by the royalist troops.
p In his article “Possibilities and Prospects of the War of the Holy Alliance Against France in 1852" Frederick Engels wrote that the proletarian revolution would create a special military method, a new method of warfare. At the Eighth Party Congress Lenin called for the mastery not only of modern military equipment but also of modern methods of warfare.
p It should, however, be emphasised that a revolutionary army, even if it uses the existing methods of the armed struggle, uses them much more effectively, for it fights for just aims and has an incomparably higher morale.
p During the Civil War of 1918-1920 the new social nature of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army determined the essentially new methods of warfare applied by it. They were marked by manoeuvrability and resolve, the striving to look for solutions by launching active offensive operations, the extensive application of strike groupings (for example, the offensive of the Southern Group on the Eastern Front, the attacks by the legendary First Mounted Army, etc.).
p Hence, in studying the methods of warfare used by the armies of the socialist countries it is essential to make a concrete analysis—on the basis of historical facts—of what aspects of the methods of the armed struggle are completely new as compared with the art of warfare of the imperialist armies, and what methods they have in common, taking into account the changes made in them by the socialist armies and the greater efficiency resulting therefrom.
p During the Second World War the Soviet Army, the armies of Britain and the USA, and even the army of nazi Germany used many identical methods of warfare on a tactical and operational scale. For example, the methods of breaking through the enemy’s defence, of introducing tank and mechanised formations into the breach and the exploitation of the success were in the main almost identical because identical weapons were used by all those armies. However, the combat actions of the Soviet Army, even 369 when it used methods identical to those used by the armies of the imperialist states, differed in some essential features.
p What are these distinguishing features? They were aptly and vividly stated by Lenin in the following formula: “Marxism differs from all other socialist theories in the remarkable way it combines complete scientific sobriety in the analysis of the objective state of affairs and the objective course of evolution with the most emphatic recognition of the importance of the revolutionary energy, revolutionary creative genius, and revolutionary initiative of the masses—and also, of course, of individuals, groups, organisations and parties that are able to discover and achieve contact with one or another class." [369•1
p If we translate Lenin’s proposition into military language, we can determine the main distinguishing feature of Soviet military art (strategy, operational art and tactics) as the organic combination of a high offensive spirit with an allround evaluation of the situation, the relation of forces and the full supply of the requisite means for combat, The principle to attack the enemy only when one is sure of success, does not exclude, but presupposes the need of taking risks, even big risks, when this is required by the situation.
p The Soviet art of war proceeds from the assumption that a real basis for decisive offensive actions and the achievement of victory over the enemy exists only if the aims and plans for military operations coincide with objective possibilities, reserves are created and skilfully manoeuvred and the material and technical support in battles and operations is well organised.
p This specific feature of Soviet art of war is in full keeping with the dialectico-materialistic world outlook of the Communist Party. It is determined by the lofty aims facing the Soviet people in wars against aggressors, by their invincible morale and unshakeable conviction in victory, and also the advantages of the socialist system in mobilising all resources for the needs of the war. The Communist Party has always advanced and implemented courageous and extensive plans, based on a strict scientific analysis of the concrete historical conditions of social development in every given epoch.
370p It should be noted that two different approaches can often be discerned in the policies of the bourgeois parties and governments, and also in the leadership by them of the armed struggle: an adventurist pursuit of aims which greatly exceed real possibilities and are therefore unattainable, or else an opportunistic refusal to take decisive actions, i.e., the tactics of “minor operations”, a “pinching and scraping”, i.e., delaying tactics and inertness. These different approaches could be clearly seen in the policy and strategy of nazi Germany, the USA and Britain during the Second World War.
p The aims and tasks set to the nazi troops sharply fell out with the resources at Germany’s disposal and with the relation of forces between that country and her opponents. The nazi strategists attempted to overcome these contradictions by mounting sudden attacks and sweeping offensives without sufficient reserves. Having at first scored major successes, the German fascist troops finally suffered complete defeat in the war against the Soviet Union. The adventurism of nazi Germany’s policies led to adventurism in the conduct of the war.
The British and US governments, proceeding from the interests of the monopoly bourgeoisie of their countries, strove to defeat Germany by shifting the main burden of the struggle on the Soviet Union in their desire to weaken that country as much as possible. In the pursuit of this aim the British and US governments did all they could to draw out the war. The policies of Britain and the USA also determined the style of the military operations of their armed forces. These operations were conducted extremely cautiously and slowly. The combat tasks assigned to their troops were far below the possibilities of the USA and Britain.
The Changes and Upheavals in Methods of Fighting— a Result of the Progress of Military Equipment
p Military equipment, particularly weapons play a special role in the changes and large-scale upheavals in methods of warfare.
p The invention of a new weapon or a considerable improvement of an existing one leads not only to the gradual change of the art of warfare, but is able, under certain conditions, to bring about a major upheaval in tactics and even in strategy, to give birth to entirely new methods of warfare. What conditions are these? How do military equipment 371 and weapons bring about radical changes in the methods of the armed struggle?
p The invention of new military equipment does not yet result in a change in the methods of warfare. Only the mass production of the new weapons and their massive employment in combat can bring about a revolution in the art of war. This is, in fact, a manifestation of the well-known law of dialectics—the transition of quantity into quality. It should be noted in this connection that not every accumulation of weapons, but only the accumulation of a definite, highly effective weapon, can bring about a radical change in the methods of the armed struggle.
p For a given state to launch the mass production of a weapon able to revolutionise the art of war, it must have a well developed and mobile industry. But even that is not enough. It is also necessary that industry should receive orders from the army for the production of the new weapon well in advance. To do this the political and military leadership must realise the value of that weapon and the effects of its employment in good time.
p If the new weapon is employed only on a limited scale it cannot change the methods of fighting radically. This is illustrated, for example, by machine-guns, which were first used on a limited scale during the Anglo-Boer war of 1899- 1902 and later in the Russo-Japanese war. At the beginning of the war the Russian army had 8 machine-guns, towards its end—374. They were far too few to influence the course of the war and military art.
p A different situation arose during the First World War. Hundreds of thousands of machine-guns were put out by the industries of the belligerent countries. Alongside with the use of quick-firing weapons and the system of trenches protected by barbed wire, the machine-gun was instrumental in effecting the change from manoeuvring to positional methods of warfare, especially on the Western front.
p The introduction of tanks took a somewhat similar course. Their appearance on the battlefields of the First World War did not substantially change the methods of warfare. This was because, first, tanks were relatively few, and second, they were extremely imperfect: were slow and their range was limited. Moreover, the troops had not yet fully adapted their tactics to the new weapon.
372p In the period between the two world wars tanks were greatly improved and the industries of the major countries started putting them out in growing numbers. During the Second World War their production skyrocketed. Between 1914 and 1918 all the warring states produced less than 10,000 tanks, while during the Second World War Germany produced over 65,000, the USA over 85,000 and Britain over 25,000 tanks.
p The improvement of tanks, the expansion of their production, and their mass employment in combat were the material basis that gave birth to new methods of fighting during the Second World War. As distinct from the First World War, tanks were no longer used only as a weapon for the close support of infantry during a breakthrough of the enemy lines, but became an independent strike force able, in co-operation with aircraft, to exploit this breakthrough in order to achieve major operational and strategic aims, to carry out long raids into the enemy rear, to cut his communications and to surround his troops.
p During the First World War tanks had not yet become an independent arm of the service and their use was entirely subordinated to tactical tasks, whereas during the Second World War a reverse process unfolded—the tactics of infantry, artillery and the other old arms of the service were beginning to adapt themselves to the new weapon so as to secure the most effective use of armour.
p All this is an expression of an important law governing the development of military art and revealing the mechanism of the changes in the methods of warfare:
p first, new weapons do not immediately push the old to the background, but for some time coexist with them;
p second, new weapons are generally first adapted to the old weapons and to the tactics corresponding to those old weapons;
p third, new weapons acquire independent and major importance only after they have been sufficiently improved and produced in large enough numbers;
p finally, the old weapons are increasingly subordinated to the characteristics of new weapons and the new methods of warfare corresponding to them.
p The history of military art, especially in the 20th century, when military equipment develops extraordinarily rapidly, shows that a new weapon emerging in the course of the war 373 is not used to the full during that war. It is fully applied and changes the methods of warfare only in the next war. This is explained by the fact that the duration of wars is generally shorter than the time needed to organise the mass production of the weapon, to utilise its tactical and technical qualities in combat conditions to the full, to change tactics and strategy, and also to reorganise the troops in accordance with it. This was the case with the machine-gun, which had such an impact on military art only during the First World War.
p Tanks and aircraft were used during the First World War, but wrought a revolution in the methods of the armed struggle only during the Second World War. In that war new military equipment was used, such as jet-propelled aircraft and unpiloted planes, and even atom bombs. But, this new equipment did not substantially change methods of warfare (with the exception of radar).
p In modern conditions the re-equipment on a large scale of the army and navy with qualitatively new weapons, new military equipment, has brought about a radical change in the forms and methods of warfare. It will be only logical to expect that in future too military equipment, new weapons, will create corresponding new forms and methods of warfare.
p In discussing the mechanism of the change in the methods and forms of the armed struggle, we have to mention several other features. The choice of the combat method, the form of the armed struggle depends greatly on the balance of power immediately before the outbreak of hostilities and also during them. Experience shows that a considerable superiority in strength over the enemy makes it possible to choose and implement definite methods, generally offensive ones, while an insufficiency of strength makes it necessary to resort to different methods, generally defensive ones. A change in the relation of forces during the war leads to a change in the methods and forms of the armed struggle. The methods by which the troops and weapons are used in action depend also on the geographical environment at the theatres of operation. The geographical environment (climate, topography, weather, hydrology of the sea, conditions of the atmosphere and space, season, time of the day, etc.) always influences the operational-tactical and strategic actions of the troops.
The development of weapons and military equipment has 374 created conditions in which the geographical environment can become a method of warfare. For example, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction can result in radioactive, chemical or biological contamination of huge areas on land, sea and in the air; nuclear missile weapons can change the course of military operations, interfere with the propagation of electromagnetic waves in the atmosphere, ionosphere and space and affect communications and the control on the battlefield.
The Role of Military Theory in Working Out the Forms and Methods of Armed Struggle
p In modern conditions the elaboration of new combat methods or major changes in them do not proceed spon taneously. This is characteristic of the present stage in the development of military affairs. In modern wars a spontaneous adjustment of the methods of warfare to the variety of complex equipment is possible only with respect to the tactics of sub-units, and even then only in rare cases. New methods of fighting can be evolved only scientifically by military-theoretical thought, which must rely on the comprehensive practical experience of the troops and generalise that experience. This applies to the methods for the use in combat of all military equipment and all modern services and arms.
p Military theory plays a major role owing to the specific relation between it and military practice—the source of its development and the criterion of its truth. The theories being advanced and worked out by military science can be properly tested only in the course of a big war against a strong opponent. But, such wars are rare, while military equipment develops comparatively rapidly in the periods between them. Therefore peacetime exercises are of great importance to the development of military theory.
p The employment of new equipment in small wars gives an insufficient, one-sided, and often erroneous idea of its importance in a future big war. Yet, it would be dangerous for military science to disregard such experience. Military science naturally takes this experience into account and develops it with a view to its application in big wars. Therefore, the prevision of the character of the new war, based on the theoretical understanding of the trends underlying the changes in social conditions and military equipment, is extremely difficult, but it is vitally important.
375p For a long historical period military theory confined itself to generalising past experience. This, almost complete, disregard of the future did not have too great an effect on social and specifically military functions, since military affairs developed slowly, the technical basis and other material conditions pertaining to warfare changed gradually, and the generalised experience of past wars could therefore be used for a long time.
p It will be remembered that during the feudal period generals found it useful to study the description of campaigns and wars of the remote past and made practical use of the experience of Epaminondas, Alexander the Great, Caesar, Hannibal and other great soldiers of the slave-owning times.
p The generals and theoreticians of the capitalist epoch also relied partly on that experience, combining it with an analysis of the methods of such generals of the feudal-absolutist period as Turenne, Eugene of Savoy, Gustavus Adolphus, Peter I, Frederick II, Rumyantsev, Suvorov. The generalised experience of the wars of the epoch of the French bourgeois revolution and the Napoleonic wars formed the basis of bourgeois military theory and played a definite role in several wars of the 19th century waged by Prussia, Russia and other states.
p However, bourgeois military theory was on the brink of bankruptcy when the objective conditions changed the means and methods of warfare so much that the generalised experience of the past and the adherence to classical patterns became inadequate. A scientific analysis of the new conditions was required as also the ability to foresee the development brought on by the rapidly changing situation in the armed struggle. For the first time this came clearly to the fore during the First World War, at the outbreak of which military science in all countries without exception was still in the grip of backward ideas and therefore unable opportunely to appraise the specific features of that war. The same can be said of French military doctrine in the period of the preparations for the Second World War.
In the past major mistakes made by military thought in the appraisal of the future war could generally be rectified during that war, now, however, entirely different conditions prevail. There may not be time in the course of a dynamic and highly destructive war to rectify mistakes made before 376 the war. Therefore, even in peacetime military science works out the most effective methods of employing super-powerful and superlong-range weapons, and also conventional ones. By studying and generalising the experience of local wars, the directions and basic trends in the development of military equipment and weapons, and also by taking into account essential socio-political changes, military science forecasts the character oif actions in the future war, the specific forms and methods of the armed struggle without, as well as with the use of nuclear missile weapons. The degree to which the changes in the forms and methods of warfare and the conduct of the war as a whole are based on science is therefore an important indicator of the level of the military power of states (coalitions).