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[introduction.]

The armed forces’ combat power and, hence, the military potential of states (coalitions) have acquired a new form notably because of the radical changes in the material and technical basis of military affairs, which directly reflects the level and the character of the development of the productive forces, science and technology.

Evolution of the Army’s Technical Equipment

p History shows that the ability of troops successfully to wage combat, to inflict blows and repel attacks, to take actions to force the enemy to capitulate or to destroy him, depends, first and foremost, on the military equipment, on weapons. The more perfect they are and the more efficiently they are used, the sooner and the fuller can the aims of combat actions be achieved.

p The simple methods and forms of combat corresponded to 339 the negligible destructive power of the side-arms and primitive mechanisms used in combat at the dawn of history. The battle was generally a single combat while changes in its course and in the supremacy over the opponent were attained either by a simple numerical superiority of troops, or by better preparations and equipment (armour), or else by better organisation and skill in operations on the field of battle.

p Although the development of firearms was a revolutionary leap in the development of military affairs, the means of combat changed but little initially, even when smooth-bore weapons (guns, cannon) were applied. The sole difference was that cannon, and later also small-arms fire were used in attacks. The battle formation remained in the main the same as before—monolithic, linear. However, even in these conditions the more far-sighted and skilled generals were able correctly to assess the possibilities of the new weapons and to evolve new combat methods. These qualities distinguished, for example, the generalship of Peter I, Rumyantsev and especially Suvorov.

p Only the great improvement of firearms (the accuracy of fire, range and rate of fire) to such an extent that a trained rifleman could hit his target at a considerable distance changed the combat methods and made war increasingly a firing competition.

p The advent of rifled firearms led to a sharp increase in the importance of rifle and artillery fire and to a corresponding decrease in the importance of side-arms. This was typical already of the combat actions in the wars at the turn of the century, especially the Austro-Prussian (1866), FrancoPrussian (1870-71), Russo-Turkish (1877-78), Anglo-Boer (1899-1902) and Russo-Japanese (1904-05) wars. Columns vanished from the battlefields and combat was waged mainly by lines of riflemen, whose advance was supported by artillery fire.

p The use of natural cover to take shelter from the fire, later the digging in on the battlefield, the extensive use of field fortifications, the development of artillery, later of machineguns, increased the importance of concentrated fire in the destruction of enemy forces.

p The sharp increase in the application of concentrated small-arms and gun fire in combination with the extensive 340 use of field fortifications in the First World War resulted in the adoption by the warring armies of positional forms of combat. Losses from fire were exceedingly heavy. The art of war reached a deadlock. The old combat methods proved ineffective, new ones could not be created overnight.

p New methods of offence and mobile means—aircraft and notably tanks—offered a way out from the deadlock. Aircraft and tanks were fully developed during the Second World War. At the same time artillery and automatic weapons found wider application. Artillery fire and aerial bombing became the main means of destroying the enemy. The application of air force and airborne landing troops together with mechanised and motorised troops considerably extended the field of battle, drew the areas in the rear into the sphere of operations, boosted the role of space and further heightened the importance of the time factor. Combat actions developed at an unprecedented rate.

p In the course of the Second World War the trend to raise the combat power of the main means of destruction came clearly to the fore—it involved the growth of the calibres of the artillery, and increase in the rate, range and accuracy of gun fire, in the power of shells and aerial bombs. At the same time there was a drop in losses from the fire of individual weapons, especially at great distances, although small arms became mainly automatic.

p After the end of the Second World War, however, the dominant trend was to create thermonuclear weapons and also suitable delivery and control means.

p The age-old content of armed struggle—the clash of the belligerents’ armed forces—was supplemented by direct and exceedingly effective action against the enemy’s rear. This is an objective reality, that is, one independent of people’s theoretical views or wishes.

p Modern combat means have an enormous destructive power and owing to rockets also an unprecedented range and accuracy. There is no spot on the globe now that is not accessible to ballistic missiles.

p The rapid development of missile equipment has changed the former significance of such combat means as piloted aircraft, cannon artillery, and big surf ace ships. This alters the correlation of the services, the share of the different arms of 341 the services, their role in combat, operations and the war as a whole.

In a world thermonuclear war the whole planet can become a battlefield, and all its aerial space can become the theatre of operations. Combat actions will be conducted not only at the front, but will extend simultaneously to vast areas on the ground and in the oceans, depriving the old concepts “front” and “rear” of their conventional meaning. Blows will be delivered not only against troops, but against the entire territory of the enemy, in order to disorganise and destroy his industry, transport, communications, towns and population.

Fire and Mobility— the Main Elements of the Combat Power of Troops in Technical Respects

p The development of fire weapons naturally raised the role of fire in combat, and advanced the art of war. The role of fire has become particularly great in modern conditions.

p Its power was formerly used in operations of a tactical and operational scale. Even in the past war the mass fire of all weapons served mainly as a sword of fire, as it were, in the offensive, and as a shield in defence. It helped consistently to destroy the enemy’s manpower and equipment on a comparatively narrow sector. The zone of destruction by fire, limited by the comparatively small range of the weapons, moved deeper into the enemy positions as the attacker’s battle formations advanced. As heretofore, attacks were prepared by fire, which also supported offensives mounted by armoured troops and infantry. This preparation and support were supplemented by the fire delivered by long-range artillery and particularly air force. But the strikes at the enemy’s rear were limited by the comparatively small range of bomber aircraft.

p In modern war fire has become the main element in the blows delivered at the opponent. Fire in the form of nuclear explosions has become a strategic factor that substantially influences the course and outcome of the war as a whole, not to mention individual operations and battles. Nuclear charges are able to destroy the battle formations, near and remote reserves of the opponent, military objectives spreading over vast areas in the enemy’s rear. A few such charges, equivalent to millions of tons of TNT, can paralyse an entire 342 country. Therefore, in the presence of nuclear weapons and means for their almost immediate delivery on target, the fire possibilities of troops have become the basis of their combat power.

p Major operational aims and strategic results are likely to be achieved mainly through simultaneous nuclear strikes at the whole depth of the enemy’s disposition, at all the key objectives in his rear.

p It could be said that formerly military actions proceeded gradually “from bottom to top”; now, however, they can proceed simultaneously and depend on the results of the strikes made “from the top to the bottom" (by “top” we mean direct fire strikes of strategic importance).

p From strategy to tactics, fire generally constitutes the main content of combat actions and is the most effective means of resolving their main tasks. At the same time in modern warfare the mobility of troops has, alongside fire power, become a factor of prime importance. Mobility can be tactical, operational and strategic.

p Mobility, when it has to do with the movement of battle formations on the battlefield, is called tactical. Operational mobility is the ability of the mass of the troops to move during combat operations, as well as during periods between actions, from one field of battle to another. Thus, operational mobility is determined not by the rate of the movement of battle formations, but mainly by the ability of troops to carry out marches and wage combat actions without losing their fighting efficiency. The latter depends not only on the endurance of the soldiers and their physique but also on their supply with foodstuffs and materiel. Heavy horse-drawn trains, supplying the troops with the requisite means of sustenance and means of combat, generally limited the operational mobility of armies before mechanised means of transport were evolved. In those days operational mobility actually coincided with strategic mobility, i.e., the ability of large masses of soldiers to move on the theatre of operation.

p The emergence and development of mechanical transport means (first of railway, then of automobile transport) increased the strategic mobility of armies. The latter entered at first into sharp contradiction with the operational and tactical mobility that had remained on the former level. This can be 343 seen from the experience of the First World War. Operations that^were carried out slowly, by the method o’f consecutively “eroding” enemy defences, inevitably petered out because the attacker’s power was rapidly exhausted, while that of the defender grew quickly because he could bring up reserves by rail and partly by motor transport.

p The situation changed only when the armed forces were motorised and mechanised. Motor power made the troops extremely mobile. Armies were supplied with large numbers of tanks and motor vehicles. Aircraft also became a major factor adding to mobility, and its extensive use made it necessary to abandon the traditional views on time and space in combat actions.

p Since it has now become possible to bring on destruction by fire simultaneously over wide areas and at great depth, the mobility of the troops has become even more important. It determines their ability rapidly to take advantage of the results of nuclear strikes, in order to rout the enemy and to seize the territory on which his forces are disposed. This is promoted by the ever more extensive use of such means of transport as aircraft, helicopters, tanks, armoured carriers, cross-country vehicles, etc.

p Formerly the superiority in the mobility of troops was expressed only by their ability quicker to concentrate on the battlefields, to create more powerful and more compact groupings, and to secure the support of a sufficient number of artillery pieces. Later mobility became associated with the rapidity with which success could be exploited, the effectiveness with which the retreating enemy could be pursued and the lead could be gained in reaching definite objectives. Speed is also important when reserves are moved to the front from the rear, and when troops are regrouped.

p The great mobility of the troops (made up of arms of the services in a proper combination equipped with powerful combat means) brought about by the revolution in the military field, enables them to conduct operations at rapid rates on individual sectors, quickly to disperse troops in anticipation of enemy nuclear strikes, and just as quickly to concentrate them again for further action. Mobility largely decides the ability to deliver unexpected strikes at great depth, to destroy the enemy peacemeal, to foil his attempts to consolidate at favourable positions when retreating, etc.

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p Hence, nuclear power in combination with the mobility of the trotfps is now the main technical factor characterising combat operations; it determines the manoeuvrability of combat operations and the war as a whole.

p The mobility of the troops depends also on the means and methods of control, that is, the rapidity with which information is obtained and decisions are adopted and conveyed to the troops.

p Formerly a general could observe the course of the battle and direct the operations of his troops “with a wave of his hand”; then little time was needed to obtain information, to adopt decisions and to convey them to the troops. At the time when the generals had no other means of communications and control but aides and orderlies on horseback the operational and tactical mobility of troops was also very limited.

The discovery of the telegraph, then the telephone and finally the radio made it possible to control large masses of troops over a vast theatre of operations and even on several theatres. The further development of radioelectronics, the application of computers, of better devices and apparatuses opens up new prospects in this field.

Strength of Troops

p Because of the insufficient power of weapons, fire superiority over the enemy was achieved during the Second World War by the concentration of large numbers of weapons (rifles, machine guns, mortars, guns, tanks and aircraft) on the most important sectors of the front. Each side strove to achieve superiority over the enemy by concentrating a greater number of people and especially fire weapons on the sector from which it intended to launch an attack. Simple quantitative superiority was often preferred to manoeuvrability. However, much time was needed to concentrate a mass of weapons on a comparatively narrow sector, so that it was often necessary to sacrifice the element of surprise and the flexibility of battle formations. This complicated control and the concentrated grouping vulnerable to fire from all kinds of enemy weapons. Nuclear weapons, capable of hitting vast areas, make it unnecessary to concentrate large masses of troops on a narrow sector. Moreover, compact groupings become an excellent target for the enemy’s nuclear strikes.

p Thus, it can be assumed that modern operational-tactical groupings of troops used to mount combat actions and 345 operations on individual sectors will be much smaller than they were in the last war. This does not mean, however, ’that the numerical strength of the armed forces will not grow during the war.

p The numerical strength was determined in different epochs by the population figure, the development of material production, the social system and the financial possibilities of the state.

p In the epoch of early feudalism the armies formed by knights were small (only from 800 to 1,000 knights took part in battles then considered big). The feudal decentralisation, the limited aims of wars, and the high cost of weapons prevented a growth in the numerical strength of the troops. During the period of absolute monarchies the armies generally did not exceed several tens of thousands of men because the state could not afford to support bigger armies.

p The small strength of armies was also due to the difficulty of troop control in the absence of technical means of communication. Besides, the specifics of linear tactics, and the long drilling that was necessary to train the troops for combat, made it difficult to have large numbers of trained reserves.

p Following the French bourgeois revolution, the armies grew much bigger, since recruiting was effected on the basis of conscription. Also, the more complicated equipment required preliminary training and the amassing of human reserves ready for action in case of war.

p The armed forces of the belligerents reached great numerical strength during the Second World War. In modern conditions, when nuclear weapons and other means of destruction may be used, it is still necessary to have big regular armies. This is dictated by the character of modern war: the decisiveness of its aims, the unprecedentedly large territories involved, the complex and numerous equipment and weapons used, the high percentage of losses, the importance of defending the entire territory of the country in conditions when aerial means of destruction and air-borne landing forces will be used, the greater role of communications, their greater length and the necessity to defend them.

p At the same time there is also an opposite tendency towards a considerable limitation of the strength of the armed forces. Military production will need even more skilled labour than before, the more so that the labour force may, as 346 the population as a whole, suffer huge losses from nuclear strikes. More people will be engaged also in organising uninterrupted transport, in restoring destroyed objectives, etc.

The socialist countries are able to use their human resources much more effectively, purposefully and systematically during war than are the capitalist countries.

Organisation of Troops

p The organisation of troops is the scientifically grounded and experimentally tested form of combining people and weapons for their most effective application in combat.

p The modern armed forces of a big state consist of different services and arms. The services are rocket forces, land forces, air defence forces, the navy, and the air force. The arms of the services in the army are infantry, artillery, and armour; in the navy—the submarine and surface vessels, naval air arm, etc., and the special troops (engineers, signals, chemical defence, railway troops, etc.). These categories formed historically and have undergone a continuous evolution in their equipment and organisation. Thus, until recently the land forces consisted of the infantry, cavalry, artillery and a number of special arms. In the First World War they were supplemented by tank forces. During the Second World War cavalry lost practically all its importance, while the infantry was greatly motorised, as were also all other troops. Rocket-powered weapons have begun to account for a much bigger share in the artillery, while cannon artillery has changed qualitatively and has become highly differentiated.

p Even more far-reaching changes were made in the structure of the armed forces after the Second World War. As we mentioned above, the decisive role was assigned to the strategic missile forces. Missiles became the main means of destruction in the land forces as well, while infantry was completely mechanised, and now uses vehicles for travel and even for combat. The importance of tanks and motor vehicles has grown. Artillery has changed qualitatively. In the air force the role of bomber aircraft has decreased, its key functions having been taken over by various missiles. Surface ships (especially big ones) have lost much of their significance, whereas the role of submarines has increased. A special role is assigned to the air defence troops, whose prime task, in addition to destroying the enemy’s aircraft, is to fight his missiles.

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p The structure and organisation of the armed forces have also changed considerably. Organisation has the aim of securing the successful solution by all troops of their combat tasks, while preserving their controllability and co-operation.

p As before, so in modern conditions the organisation of army units and formations is affected by different, often contradictory, demands. Every unit and formation must have the maximum of combat power, independence, the ability to wage long and intense combat. A necessary condition for this is maximum mobility, the importance of which can hardly be overestimated. However, the demand for mobility, which can be secured only if the troops are unencumbered and possess a very flexible organisation, clashes with the above demands, since the more effective means are often difficult to transport, require a cumbersome support and supply apparatus, etc.

p A definite quantitative and qualitative correlation between the different types of military equipment creates the armament system. The number of artillery to the number of troops in infantry, the number of tanks to the number of all other combat means, the relation between the different calibres of the field artillery, etc., all this is strictly determined. All these ratios are interdependent and may undergo substantial changes if the quality of the given type of armament improves, if its effectiveness rises, or if there is a marked change in the other conditions affecting warfare.

As a result the armed forces assume an organisational pattern that is determined by the development of production and depends on the system of views the given state holds on the nature of war and the methods of warfare.

Training Standard of Troops

p Even technically very well equipped troops cannot be considered strong if they are badly trained and their level of combat readiness is low, that is, if they are unable quickly and with great military skill to carry out the combat tasks assigned to them. The fighting efficiency of the troops is made up of their high material status, high training standard and high combat readiness. Only troops perfectly equipped and possessing a high standard of combat readiness for action in complicated conditions can be considered efficient. The concepts of fighting efficiency and combat readiness are thus indissolubly linked.

p The content of military training changes all the time and 348 becomes ever more complicated because of a number of social factors, as well as because of the fact that the troops have to master ever more complex weapons and combat methods. In the age of nuclear weapons, missiles and electronics, it is highly important that all servicemen should possess adequate engineering and technical knowledge.

p A soldier must not only master his combat equipment and weapons to perfection, but must also know the equipment of the enemy.

p Even though the importance of numerical superiority should not be belittled, it obviously plays a lesser role than the training standard of the troops, their combat experience, their skill to fight at any time of the year, day or night, in any weather conditions. The history of wars abounds in examples illustrating the above.

p The small but well-trained Russian armies led by Rumyantsev and Suvorov smashed the vast Turkish armies. Excellent mastership and military skill were shown by units of the Soviet Guards troops in the violent battles of the Great Patriotic War.

p The training standard of the troops is composed of the training standard of the individual soldiers, sub-units, units and formations.

p Individual training, even if its standard is very high, is not enough by itself. Under feudalism every single knight was extremely efficient. But there was no order in the armies at that time and the elementary qualities marking a smoothly functioning military organism were missing. The linear battle formation of the troops of Frederick II was considered perfect in those days. Yet, outside of that battle formation the Prussian soldiers were practically unfit for combat.

In our time of perfect military equipment a low level of individual training is just as intolerable as the absence of smooth teamwork within units and sub-units. The high training standard of the soldiers must correspond to the demands made upon it by modern war, must take into account the present level of military equipment and its development trends.

Commanding Personnel

p The standard of troop training, their high fighting efficiency and constant combat readiness, their will for combat, high moral and political maturity—all this depends largely on the personal qualities of their commanders and chiefs.

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p At all times and in all armies the commanding personnel has been the backbone of army organisation, the bearer, as it were, of military science and traditions. Therefore, the training of officers, their special knowledge, methodological skills, their art of conducting military operations, play a major role in the attainment of victory. A commander of any rank must not only fulfil the will of his senior officer accurately and in a disciplined way, but must also be a skilful and enterprising leader and educator of his subordinates. By his decisiveness, ability to evaluate the situation and quickly to find the best ways of achieving success he must inspire the troops with redoubled courage.

p Particular importance is acquired by the qualities of the officer corps in modern wars, when, in addition to political awareness, officers are required to possess a high level of general and special training, display exceptional decisiveness, endurance and initiative, creativity and heroism. The personal qualities of commanders of all ranks are fostered in them in special military educational establishments and during their practical activity.

p The modern armed forces are an enormous organisation consisting of highly skilled experts. The great amount of technical equipment placed at the disposal of modern armies has greatly changed the nature of military activities. One must not draw a line, as in the past, between the commanders, the bearers, as it were, of military knowledge, and the military technicians and engineers, who generally acted as advisers, consultants and executors of concrete narrow, predominantly tactical-technical tasks. At present the two aspects in the military profession, i.e., the purely military and the engineering-technical and the activity of commanders of all ranks should be represented in harmonious unity since it is practically impossible to distinguish between them. At the same time the commander was and remains a skilled military expert, the educator of his subordinates.

p Since the rational use of military equipment decides the success of the armed struggle, the art of using it in combat and for training purposes in peacetime requires a deep knowledge of technology, and also of the natural sciences, notably mathematics, in combination with a knowledge of the fundamentals of military science and its special subjects. A matter of the greatest importance to the commanding 350 personnel is correct operational-tactical reasoning, the ability to foresee the course of events, the ability to adopt quick decisions and to implement them, strictly and systematically to control the progress made in their execution.

p The specific features of combat action in modern conditions oblige officers not only to display personal initiative, but also to develop and encourage the initiative of their subordinates in every way, constantly to infuse into them high political and combat qualities and a high morale.

p Contrary to pseudo-scientific racialist theories about “ superman" the qualities of the commanding personnel depend on the social environment, historical experience, political and moral education. The personality of the commander is formed by the entire system of ideological influences, the organisation of social life and the way of life in general, by the school, art, literature, the training and education in military educational establishments, in the army.

The business, professional and moral-political qualities of the officers in the Soviet Army (as also in the armies of the other socialist countries) are determined first and foremost by their Marxist-Leninist world outlook, by their deep awareness of their duty to the state and the Party. This world outlook is formed by the CPSU, which has created the first ever Socialist Armed Forces and educated commanding personnel for them with patience and care. Soviet officers are boundlessly devoted to the Communist Party and their country, are excellently trained in military and technical respects and able to maintain the high military preparedness of the Soviet Armed Forces. No bourgeois army has personnel that is so devoted to the people, so experienced and battlehardened.