p Language, although the most natural product of the human intellect, is one of its creations that is least adequately known. The exceptional role it plays in intellectual assimilation and comprehension of the world and in human intercourse determines the philosophical importance of analysing it; the ways that modern science provides for tackling its fundamental theoretical problems have methodological and practical consequences of principle.
p A central problem here is analysis of the meaning of linguistic expressions; today it unites the efforts of philosophers, logicians, and linguists, and is the main, most intensively discussed object of their joint consideration. So much depends on the answer to this problem, to mention but: the construction of a general theory of language as a means of forming and transmitting information, solution of a host of practically important tasks of language processing and, last but not least, clarification of language’s place and function in knowing and mastery of the world, grounded determination of the connection of thought, language, and the world, which is of immense methodological significance. This last aspect of the analysis of meaning gives it a philosophical character, while the application of logical methods governs understanding of it as the logico philosophical analysis of language.
p It is my purpose here to present and to critically examine the conceptions of meaning, or semantic conceptions, which have arisen at the junction of modern Western analytical philosophy, logic, and linguistics and which seek to provide a rigorous description and explanation of what constitutes comprehension of linguistic expressions and the human capacity to understand them.
6p The transition from general arguments about meaning to the present stage of semantic studies of natural language has been characterised primarily by attempts to develop a theory of meaning as a theory of semantic properties and relations, of the ‘logical form’ of linguistic expressions, and at the same time as a theory of understanding them.
p The critical study of the various conceptions of meaning presented here aims in the main at clarifying how far these conceptions help determine the functions and place of language in cognition and understanding of the world, and to what extent the logico-semantic elaborations contained in them meet the goals of logico-philosophical analysis and promote solution of its principal problems. In other words, I am primarily interested in elucidating—through investigation of concrete theoretical constructs—the validity of the claims of the respective conceptions to answer the problems of the logico-philosophical analysis of language.
p The following will therefore be examined as components of the problem of meaning: its logical and ontological status; the relation of language and reality:, the problem of the delimitation of the meaningful and meaningless and of the meaningful and the true or false; the role of language in construction of a conceptual picture of the world as some totality of man’s beliefs and knowledge of the world.
p The choice of semantic conceptions was motivated by the following considerations. Problems discussed in them are important theoretically, methodologically, and practically. Like the conceptions themselves, developed over the past several decades, they have not yet been a matter of systematic review in the Soviet philosophical, methodological, and linguistic literature. The conceptions analysed have been constructed in a general context of studies in logic and the methodology of science. They are distinguished from other semantic theories by the use of formal, logical methods and procedures, while a certain methodological foundation has been given to the programme of constructing a theory of meaning put forward in them.
p I have endeavoured, however, not to limit myself to describing and comparing the theories discussed and to bringing out their technical, or even conceptual merits and draw- 7 backs. I have seen it as one of the main tasks to define the general direction of contemporary Western logico-semantic studies of natural language from the standpoint of their capacity to solve fundamental questions of its logico philosophical analysis. I have therefore made critical study of conceptions contained in these theories my cornerstone, rather than critical examination of their separate propositions. Thus I would not substitute selection of typical statements for analysis of the conceptions, reduce it to a comparison of critical points of view and a simple counterposing of them to fundamental theses of Marxist epistemology.
p The study of language has had a long evolution, during which there have been considerable changes both in its methods and in ideas of the object of research itself, in conformity with the advance in knowledge. This is particularly perceptible in such fields as logic and linguistics, which have been intensively mathematised, and are increasingly employing rigorous methods and procedures. The evolution of ideas about language has been characterised above all by a transition from general statements about the nature of human language and its links with other phenomena of human culture to concrete analysis of its semantic structures and, proceeding from that, to examination of its logical and methodological problems, to a methodological generalisation of its results. The theoretical elaborateness of the theories to be discussed here, and the complexity of the constructs employed (due not only to the complexity of the object but also to the use of the advances of present-day logic and linguistics) call for a methodologically substantiated and theoretically argued investigation. This investigation, in accordance with the principle of dialectics that calls for concrete analysis of a concrete situation, should consist in both bringing out the methodological foundations of the conception discussed and in ascertaining how far they are adequate to the facts of reality on which they claim to be built.
p A critical study is really effective only when it contains, as a counterargument, a positive development of the problems discussed. I shall, for this reason, try to provide not 8 only a critical estimate of the present state of semantic analysis of natural language but also a logico epistemological substantiation of new ways of dealing with the problems of the analysis.
p I see the second task of my book, therefore, in suggesting a programme of semantic studies that will be based on conceiving the problematic of meaning as inseparable from examination of the problem of knowing the world and of constructing a conceptual picture of it, which, hopefully, will lead to an adequate posing and solution of the questions being discussed. It seemed very important to me to bring out the nature of the connection of thought and language, thought and reality, and to discover the significance for this of factors (especially non-linguistic ones) that have hitherto not been considered. At the same time I have deemed it necessary to take into account, employ, and develop a number of constructive ideas and arguments, openly or tacitly contained in the theories examined.
p I will examine the problem of meaning, which consists in indicating the criteria for meaningfulness of linguistic expressions, in disclosing the relation of the meaningful and the meaningless, of the meaningful and the true or false, the meaningful and the grammatically correct, primarily as an epistemological problem. From my point of view, a correct definition of the prospects for the development of modern logico-philosophical analysis of language depends essentially on methodologically correct and theoretically consistent approaches to answering this very problem.
p Matters of the analysis of language will therefore be examined here on the logico-epistemological basis as a consideration of the subjective and objective knowledge, the belief and knowledge of a speaker of a language about the world, and of its conceptual and linguistic models, in the light of modern theoretical constructs. In view of that, too, the basic problem of the analysis, viz., that of meaning, will be discussed as a logico-epistemological problem of understanding linguistic expressions, and not in the narrow, specifically linguistic aspect, not as a lexicographic problem of defining dictionary meanings of these expressions. I see the essential difference between the logico-philosophical and the 9 purely linguistic approach to the problem of meaning in that the former is oriented primarily to explanation of the very possibility of understanding linguistic expressions, understanding construed here as interpretation of them on the basis of the information a person has of the world, i.e. on the basis of what I call a ‘conceptual system’.
p In other words, I examine the problem of meaning as a search for an answer to what a person knows (believes, etc.) when he understands a linguistic expression. To answer that, I shall have to consider how it is possible to understand language, how it can communicate something about a world that is or is not accessible to one’s perception, and on the basis of which a person chooses one meaning or another from the number of possible meanings of a word, sentence, or whole text, and establishes their semantic relations, distinguishes the meaningful from the meaningless, the true from the false, a statement or affirmation from a question, order, vow, promise, etc. made by means of language.
p Therefore, a philosophical, epistemological understanding of the problematic being considered has to bring out the conception of meaning put forward here as part not of an absolutised essence of the ’semantics of language’ but of the conceptual system of a speaker of the language as a system of his ideas and knowledge of the world that reflects his cognitive experience in the prelingual and lingual stages and levels, and is not reducible to any linguistic essence whatsoever. I shall treat this approach as a counterargument to absolutising of the functions of natural language characteristic (as I shall show) of the main trends of modern logico-semantic studies of language, which, to my mind, misrepresent the role of language in knowing and understanding the world.
p This approach (it is my conviction) makes it possible to construct a theoretically promising and methodologically sound programme of semantic studies oriented to disclosing the role and the interrelations both of linguistic and nonlinguistic factors in cognizing the world.
p My discussion of these matters is so arranged as to contrast the different conceptions of the problematic of mean- 10 ing through its constructive development. The concluding section of each chapter, in which the analysis made will be summed up, will, I hope, serve this purpose and make clear the approach I have adopted.
p The book, which presents a field of complex study, is meant for a broad circle of readers, viz. philosophers, logicians, linguists, psychologists, cyberneticists, for those concerned with the practical development of systems of ’ artificial intelligence’, and for everyone who is interested in the philosophical, theoretical, and applied problematic of language, and matters of the theory of knowledge.
p Problems of the clarification, refining, and reassessment of the meaning of terms, and of establishing their cognitive significance, are some of the most pressing ones in present-day science, and to an essential extent govern the progress of knowledge. A considerable part of language of science consists of words of the natural language that have been given a special meaning, and of words employed in their ordinary meaning.
p The use of language in scientific or ordinary discourse is just operating with definite meanings in whatever field of theoretical knowledge or practice the language we use belongs. From that standpoint the problem of meaning has a universal character: everyone who employs language has to do with it.
p In most cases, however, such use of language is rather like knowing how to drive a car without knowing how it works, or similarly to knowing how to walk, run, eat, etc., without knowing how our organism functions. The present volume might thus present interest for all who want to know how our language ’works’, how it is related to thought and the world, and what modern theories say about this.
p It will require a certain effort by readers for them to acquaint themselves with these theories; in order to analyse such a complex thing as our language we obviously need tools of the appropriate complexity. The modern semantic conceptions of language are such tools. We are not concerned here, however, with a popular paraphrase of the theories concerned, but with an exposition of them that will, I hope, present nearly seven decades of intensive re- 11 search in condensed form, and not only be a critical generalisation of the theoretical and practical experience gained but also a kind of theoretical school for all who are just beginning to be interested in the problematic discussed here. In that category I include, above all, students ( philosophers, linguists, psychologists, cyberneticists) following courses ’of semantics.
p The special logical and linguistic terms employed, might present some difficulty for the reader. However, these terms are an inseparable part of the language of science: in employing a special terminology I have tried to follow the accepted standard. Most of other terms contained in the book are generally accepted in the philosophical, logical, and linguistic literature and will be found in the corresponding terminological vocabularies and dictionaries. Wherever necessary the meaning of terms will be defined or explained during the subsequent exposition. In addition an annotated glossary of terms is appended at the end of the book.
p As for the use of the formal symbolism, this has been determined exclusively by considerations of necessity and explicitness dictated by the tasks of the study, and do not exceed the requirements of contemporary elementary courses of logic.
The bibliography includes the sources from which the citations in the text have been drawn, and the literature that has been the theoretical and methodological basis of the research, and which reflects the development of the logico-philosophical analysis of language in the aspect I consider it from.
Notes
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Chapter I
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HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL PREMISSES OF THE ANALYSIS OF NATURAL LANGUAGE |
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