p As is known, dialectical materialism is opposed to a rigid demarcation between ontology and epistemology so characteristic of pre-Marxist philosophy. For this reason, the category of the ideal, like any other category of dialectical materialism is conceived as a unity of epistemological and ontological aspects. Of course, this unity permits their theoretical separation and special 102 analysis so that each aspect may even be treated as a separate subject. Such a separation is not only permissible, but even necessary when philosophical inquiry focuses, for instance, on a definite form of motion of matter or on forms and methods of cognition. However, any ontological statement (i.e. an assertion of an object’s existence) evaluated in terms of meaning and verity presupposes reflection of those cognitive means that were instrumental in its formulation. On the other hand, any epistemological statement (asserting the existence of certain knowledge about something) is based, explicitly or implicitly, on definite ontological prerequisites which are bound to be brought to light if we are to make any advance in the solution of epistemological problems. iAll this clearly attests to the insoluble unity of the ontological and epistemological aspects of philosophical knowledge.

p Besides the ontological and epistemological dimensions, there exist no less important axiological and praxiological dimensions which respectively characterise the ideal in terms of value and spiritual activeness (goal-setting, volition, creative intentions, etc.).

p Let us briefly consider the ontological and epistemological aspects of the category of the ideal with due regard for their necessary interdependence.

p The ontological aspect is related to questions of being (such as what exists, where, how, why), whereas the epistemological aspect covers the questions of reflection, knowledge as such (the methods and means of singling out and cognising a definite object, their adequacy, the truth or falsity of self-reflection, etc.). , The analysis of the category of the ideal reveals a two- dimensional character of each of the above aspects. From the epistemological standpoint, the ideal, i.e. subjective reality is, firstly, a reflection of given objective reality and a projection of future objective reality and, secondly, a reflection and a projection of itself. Consciousness is reflexive by nature and includes self- reflection necessarily connected with the reflection of an external object and essential for the understanding of this reflection. In actual investigations, however, the researcher’s attention is usually focused on the process, methods and results of the reflection of objective reality, whereas the specificity and the means of the reflection of subjective reality often remain in the background 103 (the importance of this latter aspect for the theory of knowledge is indubitable).

p From the ontological standpoint subjective reality being a reflection of objective reality is indicative of the existence of certain things, phenomena, processes outside our mind (for instance, a sense image of a house is indicative of its existence confirmed by practice). This example, simple as it is, clearly demonstrates the necessary connection of the ontological and epistemological aspects. Any statement affirming the existence of something is certain knowledge which must often be preceded by careful epistemological analysis. At the same time subjective reality being an individual’s consciousness is the reality of his inner world which is no less authentic to him than what exists outside and independent of his mind. If we may borrow Melyukhin’s apt remark, "this internal subjective reality is frequently not less important for a man than any material things in the external world.”^^11^^

p The category of the ideal represents a unity of all the abovementioned sense dimensions, namely, the unity of the elements expressing the reflection and projection, and the elements expressing the existence and development of objective and subjective realities. Each of the four sense dimensions, though revealing itself through all others is a separate field of investigation into the nature of the ideal. The problems related to the existence and development of subjective reality as man’s inner world have so far received very little attentionln our literature. The exploration of these ontological problems brings into the foreground the corresponding cognitive facilities, i.e. the means of the adequate reflection and effective projection of subjective reality, and calls for their analysis and further improvement. This again brings out the fundamental unity of the ontological and epistemological aspects of research without excluding, however, the specificity of the analysis of subjective reality on the ontological plane.

p In such analysis attention is focused on the nature and specificity of the phenomena of subjective reality, the main forms of their existence, the value structure of subjective reality and the ways of its transformation. A pure epistemological approach to these problems is not sufficient, as it is limited to the analysis of sensuous and discursive components of the cognitive process 104 and usually ignores the spiritual life of a social individual in his wholeness, i.e. as a unity of axiological, intuitive, emotional, goalsetting and volitional components. A subject viewed only from the epistemological angle is but a shadow of a real man actively and creatively engaged in cognitive and practical activity.

p Therefore the investigation of subjective reality as man’s internal world calls not only for the epistemological, but also for the axiological approach, as well as for a special analysis of its structure and active self-transformation. It is only under such conditions that we may expect the category of the ideal to reveal its multidimensional character.

p . Leaving aside this question for discussion in subsequent chapters, I shall make here just one observation. The notion of subjective reality relates both to man’s inner world as a whole and to any separate phenomenon of this world singled out in common language or in psychological terms (thought, representation, belief, wish, etc.). For the time being we shall not distinguish between these meanings, as it is proper to consider first subjective reality as a whole, if only in general outline.

p Our consciousness is intentional, that is always directed towards a certain object. Therefore subjective reality represents a definite “content” set by outward intention (orientation towards an external object) or by inward intention (orientation towards an internal object—a thought, an assessment, an impression, etc.). Put another way, every act of consciousness includes both these differently oriented intentions and, consequently, the content of subjective reality in a given time interval is always a unity of the outward and inward intentions, one of them being dominant.

p Generally speaking, subjective reality may have any content. We can speak of the criteria of existence only in relation to phenomena of objective reality, but the content of subjective reality cannot be restricted by any criteria. Even the most bizarre, chimerical products of phantasy, arbitrary mental restructuring of real images, hallucinatory states of a sick man come under the head of subjective reality. Such “tolerance” is characteristic only of subjective reality and serves as one of the chief reasons for its opposition to objective reality.

p In order to have a better understanding of epistemological and ontological aspects of the category of the ideal, one must 105 take due account of the difference of the terms “objective” and “subjective”. They are not rigidly tied to "objective reality" and "subjective reality" respectively. The term “objective” is used in a number of meanings different from "objective reality". It would not be correct to identify the "object of cognition" with "objective reality". Firstly, not every objective reality is an object: the latter denotes only those phenomena of objective reality which have already come, in one way or another, within the sphere of reflection and are included in the sphere of human activity. The notion of object is directly related to the notion of subject. Secondly, a phenomenon of subjective reality can also be an object. The object is posited by the investigating subject as existing outside and independent of his mind and in this sense is objective to him. Yet a phenomenon of subjective reality does not pass into the category of objective reality merely because it became an object of study for the simple reason that it does not exist outside and independent of man’s consciousness.

p A peculiar situation arises when a man tries to assess his own thoughts, analyse his impressions or attempts to understand his motives. Such self-cognition is a kind of cognition in the broad sense and the person poses here as the subject and the object simultaneously. The latter is subjective reality, yet it cannot be regarded as existing outside and independent of the consciousness of the investigating subject. This problem has been discussed in detail in the chapter devoted to the structure of subjective reality and I only recall it in this context in order to underline the specific character of the relationship between the ontological and epistemological aspects in the investigation of subjective reality.

p The term “objective” is also used to denote the true or “ objective” content of subjective reality, i.e. the adequate reflection of objective reality in our knowledge. It is contrasted in this sense to “subjective” content, i.e. a false thought, an erroneous opinion, an arbitrary assumption. Subjective reality includes both notions. A false thought is also ideal and not material. Hence, the category of the ideal is defined independently of the category of truth and characterised not only in terms of veracity, but also in terms of value.

p There is yet another meaning of the term “objective” which 106 shows up when we say that every phenomenon of subjective reality is always objectified in one way or another, exists only as a property of a highly organised material system. Using the term in this sense, we underscore the necessary connection between the ideal and the material. By objectification is also understood the process and the result of the materialisation of thought, the ideal. What is meant here is transformation of the ideal into the material. These questions will be discussed later.

p In all the cases indicated above each meaning of the term “objective” is correlated with the corresponding meaning of the term “subjective”.^^12^^ A closer examination reveals the inadequacy (and contradictoriness) of the rather common scheme of subjective-objective relations in which the object is viewed exclusively as objective reality and the ontological aspect of the investigation is taken into account only in the description and explanation of the phenomena of objective reality. Thus the specificity of the phenomena of subjective reality taken as the object of investigation is ignored which results in the oversimplification of the models of the cognitive process (as such models fail to take proper account of the specificity of subjective reality which alone provides the framework and the means for the formation of the "objective content").

p The category of the ideal having interdependent epistemological and ontological aspects preserves its logical opposition to the category of the material in both its aspects, and not only on the epistemological plane. The contrast of these categories on the ontological plane highlights the specificity of subjective reality and brings it in the focus of investigation as a specific object different from objective reality. Such a logical opposition does not mean, of course, that the ideal resides somewhere outside the bounds of the material world and is something external to it. The ideal is nothing more than subjective reality.

p For this reason the category of the ideal is by no means alien to the system of dialectical-materialist monism. The unity of the world consists in its materiality. From the standpoint of Marxism the world can only be described in terms of its real objective existence. Lenin’s statement that there is nothing in the world except moving matter only means that the world is all- embracing objective reality and not that the mind does not exist. It is non-existent as objective reality since it is ideal, i.e. represents 107 subjective reality. The Marxist conception of the ideal does not contradict the principle of Marxist monism.

p The conception of the ideal as subjective reality is contrasted with all classical non-Marxist solutions to the problem of the ideal and, consequently, to the basic question of philosophy. Indeed, this conception is counterposed to: (1) objective idealism which regards the ideal, spiritual as primary all-embracing objective reality and views the material, the natural, as nothing else than the other-being of spirit; (2) subjective idealism which denies (if it remains true to its basic premises) any objective reality and affirms subjective reality as the only existence; (3) dualism which recognises the existence of two realities—spiritual and material, capable of interacting with one another, but remaining essentially independent; (4) vulgar materialism and radical physicalism of the so-called scientific materialists. The proponents of the latter reject subjective reality in its specific quality and seek to identify the ideal and the material in every respect, thereby eliminating the ideal from reality and from scientific language as superfluous, imaginary and mythological. In their eyes the admittance of the ideal into the system of philosophical categories is tantamount to an outright betrayal of materialist monism; any attempt at contrasting the ideal to the material is unconditionally qualified by them as siding up with dualism or idealism (the conception of scientific materialism will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter).

p In contrast to all these trends dialectical and historical materialism regards the ideal, subjective reality as a specific, unique property of highly organised material systems, as one of the principal manifestations of the social individuals’ ability to act. By virtue of its uniqueness among other properties of material systems and in view of its crucial significance in the life of social individuals (and, consequently, in the life of society in general) this property is singled out and counterposed to other properties of material systems, to everything that exists as objective reality. Such logical counterposition is an indispensable theoretical prerequisite for the setting and investigation of the problem of the ideal as one of the pivotal issues in contemporary philosophy.

p NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

p K. V. Bardin, The Problem of Sensibility Thresholds and Psychophysical Methods, Moscow, 1976 (in Russian); A. N. Leontyev, "Ways of Studying Perception", in: Perception and Activity, Moscow, 1976; idem, "Perceptive Activity with the Inversed Image of the Retina", Op. cit.; G. Somjen, Sensory Coding in the Mammalian Nervous System, Century-Crofts-Meredith, New York, Appleton, 1972. J. Bruner, A Study of Thinking, Chapman and Hall, London, 1956. Indicative of the scale and complexity of the problem is the four volume compendium prepared for the Tbilisi symposium on the subject: The Unconscious. The Nature, Functions and Methods of Investigation, Vols. 1-4, Tbilisi, 1978 (in Russian). This trend of antipsychologism in the Western philosophy of the 20th century has been discussed at length by M. Kissel. See: M. A. Kissel, "A Critical Analysis of the Positivist Conception of the Unity of Sciences", in: Methodological Problems of the Interrelation and Cooperation of Sciences, Leningrad, 1970 (in Russian). V. N. Kostyuk, Elements of Modal Logic, Kiev, 1978; V. A. Smirnov, P. V. Tavanets, "On Interrelations of Logic and Philosophy", in: Philosophy in Contemporary World. Philosophy and Logic, Moscow, 1974 (both in Russian).

p Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 102.

p A. I. Rakitov, Philosophical Problems of Science, Moscow, 1977, p. 103 (in Russian).

p Z. M. Kakabadze, The Problem of "Existentialist Crisis" in the Transcendental Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, Tbilisi, 1966; T. I. Oizerman, "Towards Critique of the Phenomenological Conception of Philosophy", Voprosy filosofii, 1975, No. 12. An interesting critical analysis of Husserl’s antipsychological arguments was provided in: J. W. Meiland, "Psychologism in Logic: Husserl’s Critique", Inquiry, 1976, No. 3.

p M. A. Kissel, "A Critical Analysis of the Positivist Conception of the Unity of Sciences", p, 21.

p Frederick Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy", in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works in three volumes, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 352.

p S. T. Melyukhin, Matter in Its Unity, Infinity and Development, Moscow, 1966, p. 53.

For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between the objective and the subjective see: V. A. Lektorsky, Subject, Object, Cognition, Moscow, 1980; V. F. Kuzmin, Objective and Subjective, Moscow, 1976; T. A. Kuzmina, The Problem of Subject in Modern Bourgeois Philosophy, Moscow, 1979; K. N. Lyubutin, The Problem of Subject and Object in Classical German and Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Sverdlovsk, 1973; N. I. Sychev, Objective and Subjective in Scientific Knowledge, Rostov-on-the Don, 1974 (all in Russian).