255

p The postwar period could not help bringing about important regional shifts as well in the distribution of the basic manufacturing industries of capitalist countries. Given that the volume of manufactures was increasing approximately every ten to twelve years, even the most circumstantial studies of the ratio of the industrial potentials of separate countries and regions very quickly become substantially out of date. It is therefore of paramount importance to analyse the long-term trends and tendencies characterising the main directions of the changing geography of manufacturing in the capitalist world as a whole, above all in its main centres.

The most generalised indicator enabling us to judge the main lines of development of tendencies of this sort is the comparative dynamics of the growth and internationalisation 256 of production. Index numbers of the production and export of the manufactures of the industrially developed countries in the regions where the bulk of their output is produced today are given in Table 29.

Table 29 Comparative Estimates of the Annual Growth Rates of the Physical Volume of Production and Exports of the Capitalist Countries’ Manufactures (in percentages) Count ry Production Exports 1938- 1953 1953- 1963 19(53- 1973 I 1)7(1- 1981 North America 7.5 3 5.5 2 7 () USA 7.5 3 5.5 2 6.5 P Canada 7.5 4 6.5 1.5 8.5 (i Western Europe 2.5 0.5 5.5 1 9 5.5 West Germany 2 8 6.5 1 10 5.5 France 2 7 (5 0.5 8.5 6.5 Great Britain 2.5 3 3.5 _ 2 4.5 4 Italy 3 9 5.5 2.5 14.5 7 The Netherlands 3 6.5 6 1.5 10.5 6 Sweden 3.5 5.5 4.5 —0.2 9.5 3.5 Japan 0.5 13.5 12.5 3 17.5 10 Sources: calculated from UN Statistical Yearbook and CN .Monthlu Hnllctin of Statistics tor ttie appropriate years.

p These index numbers of course do not fully reflect either the distribution of the production capacities or the balance of power between the nationally exclusive groupings of monopoly capital. On the one hand, they do not take into account the constant underworking of plant immanent in capitalist production, which often attains a quite significant scale, especially during overproduction crises. On the other hand, as we have already remarked, the increasing international interlocking of the monopoly capital of various countries and considerable broadening, of late, of the operations of international monopolies are making it more and more difficult to define the nationality of many enterprises. Nevertheless the figures adduced make it possible to define the scale and main directions of the dynamics of the growth of manufacturing in the capitalist industrial centres, which has been changing by leaps and bounds in the postwar decades. In addition they also bring out the wave-like character 257 of this dynamics for separate countries, regions, and periods.

p Each of the processes noted in the table undoubtedly stems from a complicated, multi-level set of factors of an internal and international level. When, however, we examine them in the aggregate, certain resultant lines can be discerned from the very start that primarily characterise long-term shifts in the postwar distribution of the industrial potential of capitalism’s main centres. It follows from the approximate estimates in Table 29 that the physical volume of industrial output had increased more than eightfold in North America by the beginning of the 80s compared with prewar (roughly eightfold in the United States and ninefold in Canada), while the corresponding growth in Western Europe was approximately 5.5-fold, although comparatively high growth rates had been achieved in the 50s and 60s. At the same time the volume of Japanese manufacturing production rose nearly 16-fold.

p Still, in spite of the unprecedeutedly rapid upsurge of Japan’s industrial might, its production remains slightly lower than that of_gthe other two industrial centres of monopoly capitalism.£At the beginning of the 80s Japan’s share of the production of industrial items was about two fifths that of Western Europe and a bit^ more than 25 per cent of that of North America.

p At the same time there was a substantial redistribution of industrial potential within Western Europe. The countries there have not all managed to the same degree to make use of the advances of today’s scientific and technical progress, or even of the opportunities presented in the fight for foreign markets by the internationalisation of production. Over the period covered by Table 29 the physical volume of manufactures rose sixfold in West Germany, fivefold in France, eightfold in Italy, nearly sixfold in the Netherlands, but by only 160 per cent in Great Britain.

p Exports of manufactures have become increasingly important for the main capitalist countries. The international monopolies (primarily the very big U.S. corporations) have undoubtedly played an important role in this.  [257•1  An even greater 258 part of these exports consists of intra-corporation transfers of components and parts from one country to another.  [258•1  Even allowing for the specific character of these transfers, however, which in fact are outside the framework of normal international trading operations, these facts allow us to conclude that foreign markets have had an unusually strong impact on the unevenness of the development and distribution of manufacturing in capitalism’s industrial centres.  [258•2  A marked synchronousness of the variations in production and export growth rates is noticeable as regards the North American and West European regions (see Table 29).

p In general the industrial capacity of modern capitalism is still mainly concentrated in Western Europe and North America, though there has been, it is true, a tendency in recent decades for their role in a number of industries to decline. The bulk of capitalist manufacturing output, however, is still produced there. At the beginning of the period under review the countries of these regions taken together accounted for more than 80 per cent of this output, and at the end of it for around 75 per cent. At the same time there were substantial fluctuations in the ratio of production potential between them, which largely determined the specific character of the postwar development and distribution of the productive forces of capitalism. Before World War II Western 259 Europe had, on the whole, surpassed North America in volumo of manufactured goods produced.

p The war, and its direct consequences, by disrupting the economies of most West European countries, led to a marked weakening of their productive power in general, especially as regards their transatlantic rivals. Later, however, as had also happened after World War I, West European manufacturing began to develop much faster than American. Tin’s tendency took on a long-term character and developed over the greater part of the postwar period, although by the end of the 60s its effect had begun to fade. In the second half of the next decade, especially after the 1974-75 crisis, a reverse movement began: the growth rates of Western Europe’s manufacturing industries then proved to be (iO per cent lower than North America’s, which found reflection in the ratio of their volumes of production and in considerable fluctuations in the relative weight of North America and Western Europe, and of other groups of countries, in the non- socialist world.

p The figures that follow present some results of the longterm operation of these trends in recent decades. In turn they help throw light on matters that are of no little importance for a further analysis of the unevenness and spasmodic character of the industrial development of the main regions arid manufacturing industries in the world capitalist economy.

p Fig. 18 shows particularly graphically the fall in the proportions of Western Europe and North America in light industry. Since, however, there was a simultaneous decline in the weight of these regions in the aggregate industrial production of the non-socialist world, the resultant characteristic of the value of these shifts in the individual regions requires us to allow for the changes that are taking place in the whole industrial structure of world capitalist economy, which in turn makes it necessary to attempt a comprehensive estimate of these changes.

p In the period from the 50s through the 70s there was a quite clear tendency (among other long-term processes) toward a decline in the weight both of North America and Western Europe in light industry. It was due to the rapid growth of these industries in certain other regions, above all in Japan, but mainly in developing countries, whose industry increased production of consumer goods by more than 80 per cent in
•
260 Fig. 18 Weight of groups of countries in the light and heavy industries of the world capitalist economy (in percentages) 1931 1954-1955 1980-1981 O LIGHT INDUSTRY . HEAVY INDUSTRY 1 - NORTH AMERICA (USA, CANADA) II - WESTERN EUROPE III - OTHER DEVELOPED CAPITALIST COUNTRIES IV - DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Sources: UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, and Monthly Bulletin of Statistics for the relevant years. 261
•
1968-81 alone (the corresponding figures wore 40 per cent for North America and 30 per cent for Western Europe).  [261•1  Still, as Fig. 18 shows, these two regions control the commanding heights in gross capitalist production of these goods.

p There have also been very marked shifts in the distribution of productive forces between the main industrial regions as regards heavy industry. In 1953 the industrial capacity of North America in this sphere (predominantly of the USA) was a little more than four times that of 1938, while it had risen by only 60 per cent in Western Europe in the same period, and by a third in other capitalist countries. As a result North American heavy industry plants were producing 50 per cent more products in the early 50s than all the other developed capitalist countries put together.

p This immense superiority, however, proved quite temporary. In succeeding years there was a strong trend toward restoration of the prewar ratio of industrial potential between Western Europe and North America, largely, moreover, on a fundamentally more advanced technical basis. The average development rates of West European heavy industry in the 50s and 60s were markedly higher than North American.

p The subsequent decline in the industrial growth rates of Western Europe and corresponding rise in those of the USA and Canada did not halt the long-term tendency for the gap between the two main industrial centres of capitalism in this field to close, but apparently only temporarily reversed it. At the turn to the 80s the output of heavy industry in value terms (in 1975 prices) was roughly a quarter less in Western Europe than in North America, whereas it had still been a half 25 years before. Analysis of this long-term trend gives grounds for supposing that the gap will be narrowed further in coming decades, and possibly closed.

p U.S. international corporations, intensively penetrating West European manufacturing (above all heavy industry), played no small role in this, and still do, but we would not bo justified in concluding that they had a determinant influence in subsequent years on the shifts in the distribution of the basic industries between Western Europe 262 and North America. The economic factors of the growth of West European countries themselves were decisive in that.

p No comparison of the dynamics of the changes in the industrial potential of capitalism by regions and countries is adequate unless their populations are taken into account. Western Europe, as we know, considerably outnumbers North America in population: in the early 50s by around 120 million and at the beginning of the 1980s by roughly 100 million. The gap in their per capita levels of industrial development is therefore greater than the gap in absolute terms. Estimates based on UN statistics indicate that the gap for manufacturing as a whole in the mid-50s in annual per capita terms was expressed by a ratio of 5.5:1 in favour of North America (4:1 in light industry and 6.5:1 in heavy industry). Subsequently, however, the ratio altered considerably. A quarter of a century later the first area’s superiority over the other’s was not so significant and was estimated at 1.6:1 (1.3:1 in light industry and 1.8:1 in heavy industry). Thus, although the gap has been markedly closed, the West European ’centre of force’ still lags substantially behind.

p Attention must also be paid, in any analysis of postwar shifts, to the growth of industrial potential, especially of heavy industry, in the ’other developed capitalist countries’. Their weight rose in the mid-50, mainly because of the mounting economic might of Japan. At the same time this process was reinforced by the quickening development rates of the other countries in this group (especially in Oceania, i.e. Australia and New Zealand).

p In per capita production of manufactures Japan and the other capitalist countries outside North America and Western Europe have come much closer to the ‘old’ industrial metropolises of capitalism. There are enormous differences between these groups, of course. Japan, for instance, produced at the end of the 70s roughly 150 per cent more per capita than Australia and New Zealand, but considerably less than North America, and a little less than the average for Western Europe.

p The 1974-75 crisis, which did not affect the various capitalist countries and regions with the same force, was attended with not inconsiderable changes in the proportions, dynamics, and distribution of production, but did not lead to 263 any fundamental shifts in the balance of economic potential between these regions and countries. The long-term trends outlined continued to affect the main lines of development of manufacturing in subsequent years.

p There is consequently still an enormous difference in levels of industrial development in the industrial centres of capitalism. At the same time the mounting unevenness in the distribution of productive forces in current conditions of scientific and technical progress, and the strengthening of integration in capitalist production have promoted a certain levelling out of the differences in per capita levels of production.

p An even greater differentiation has become noticeable in recent decades as regards most developing countries. Their heightened economic growth rates and a certain increase in their weight in the production of manufactured goods have in turn encouraged an objectively inevitable increase in the crisis both of the long-established and neocolonialist foundations of the imperialist monopolies’ domination in the peripheral regions of the world capitalist economy.  [263•1  An idea of the significance and postwar dynamics of the growth of manufactures in the main geographical areas of the developing world can be got from the approximate estimates in Table 30.

p In each of the groups in the table there are countries at various levels of industrial development. Their industrial growth rates are also extremely varied. When, however, we try to determine the main postwar shifts in the distribution of manufacturing among them, we can draw the following conclusions, which can also serve as the point of 264 departure for the more concrete comparative analysis that follows.

p Around nine-tenths of the production potential of Third World manufacturing are still concentrated in Asia and Latin America, from which it follows that it is necessary first of all to compare the postwar industrial development of these two regions. In the 60s and 70s industrial growth rates were rather lower in Latin American countries, on the whole, than in Asia. At the beginning of the 80s they produced almost 50 per cent more manufactures than the developing
•
Proportions of Light and Heavy Industry in Developing Countries Table 30 Latin America Weight of regional groups of developing countries Vn" m Asia Africa Ifl60- *980- 1960- 1980- 1960- 1980- _{lggl lg8J lggl lgfll lggl} In the gross product of world capitalist manufacturing 3 5.5 light industry 4 7 heavy industry 2 5 In the grosa product of the manufacturing industries of all developing countries 30.5 37.5 light industry 31 38 heavy industry 29 37 1 1.5 0.5 1.5 2 1.5 5.5 8 4 8 9 7.5 9 10 8.5 8.5 12 6.5 60.5 54 59 50 62.5 56.5 Sources: Rounded estimates from UNCTAD. Handbook of World Development Statistics, 1979 (United Nations, New York, 1980)’. UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, 1982, 8.
•
countries of Asia, but since their population is less than that of the latter, the per capita gap between them remains very wide. At the end of the period under review it could be expressed as a ratio of 5.7:1 in favour of Latin America (4.4:1 in light industry, and 6.9:1 in heavy industry). The emancipated countries of Africa lag even further behind. At this time their per capita output of manufactures was approximately 87 per cent below Latin America’s (91 per cent in heavy industry).

p The differences in level of industrial development of the various geographical regions of the Third World are not 265
•
only quantitatively but also qualitatively greater than those between the main developed regions of capitalism, and the unevenness of developing countries’ development in manufacturing tends to become greater. At the same time the deep gulf in levels of industrial development between these two main groups of countries remains, as noted above, a distinguishing feature of world capitalism. At the end of the 70s all the developing countries on an average produced 95 per cent less manufactures per capita than the industrial centres (96 per cent less in heavy industry and 93 or 93.5 per cent less in light industry). This gap will undoubtedly remain one of the most distressing consequences in the future of imperialism’s and colonialism’s long, unrestricted domination of the world economy and politics.

p The indicators cited are not, of course, stable values for a comparative estimate of the long-term development of any group of countries. They vary continuously from year to year within certain limits during the world business cycle. The 1974-75 crisis decline in production in the developed countries, which was attended with a quite marked fall in their weight in the non-socialist world’s manufacturing industry, led to a marked closing of the gap between them and developing countries in per capita production of manufactures. Subsequently, it is true, a few years of cyclic upswing again widened the gap, though not to the level of the preceding pre-crisis years.

p In this respect we must bear in mind that the quickening of developing countries’ economic growth rates since the war has been marked not only by the rise in their share in manufacturing noted above but also by the beginning of a comparatively new tendency toward a gradual reduction of the deep gulf in per capita production in the majority of the basic branches of both heavy and light industries established between them under colonialism.  [265•1 

These are some of the resultant processes that characterise the most general features of the structure and main changes in manufacturing in the postwar capitalist world 266 economy. They comhine extremely complicated and contradictory trends in the industrial development of the separate regions and countries. Together with very substantial structural shifts in other highly important spheres these processes largely governed the inner logic of the steady growth of irreconcilable contradictions between capitalism’s system of international economic relations and the objective development needs of social production in the basic industries of the non-socialist world. Clarification of the most important directions and features of the interlocked development of manufacturing and the primary commodity industries of the main groups of capitalist countries is the point of the next chapter.