250

p The unequal development of the leading manufacturing industries, and consequently the shifts in structure and 251 distribution of industrial capacity among the main groups of countries of the postwar capitalist world considered above, ultimately stem from the immense imbalance in the growth of productivity in the various industries. That in turn is largely governed by the scientific and technical progress in the different industries, the impact of which is felt most in the economies of industrially developed countries.

p It is particularly important in this respect to analyse the dynamics of the growth of productivity in the basic industries of these countries. On the whole the aggregate volume of their manufactures increased by 142 per cent between 1968 and 1978. At the same time the number of workers employed rose by 3 per cent. As a result productivity was roughly 39 per cent (at a mean annual rate of 3.3 per cent). The total growth of productiviiy in the whole industrial output of these countries was roughly the same.  [251•1 

p When we are comparing the scale of the growth of productivity it is quite important to compare it with the corresponding data for a longer time interval. The Soviet economist B. Bolotin has made calculations that provide a basis for such comparisons.’  [251•2  According to his data, the mean annual growth of labour productivity in the countries that are now the industrial centres of capitalism was 2.5 per cent between 1913 and 1970 (2.8 per cent if we exclude the years of the two world wars). This growth was extremely uneven at various stages, e.g. 2 per cent in 1921-38 (4.2 per cent in 1921- 29), while during the overproduction crisis of 1929-33 and following long depression there was a considerable drop in productivity, which did not rise above the level of the late 20s, for the world capitalist economy as a whole, even by the end of the 30s.

p After World War II there was a tendency, while retaining marked fluctuations and instability of productivity growth rates in the various phases of the business cycle, toward a certain rise on the whole in this index. Introduction of the present-day advances of science and engineering undoubtedly stimulated this, but the impact of the scientific and industrial revolution has been far from the same in the various industries. The productivity growth rate in light industry, 252 for instance, in 1968-1978 was 3 per cent in the developed capitalist countries, and 3.5 per cent in heavy industry.  [252•1  The increasing unevenness of the impact of scientific and technical progress is especially marked when we analyse productivity growth by separate industries (see Table 27).
•
Table 27 Index Numbers and Growth Rates of Labour Productivity in the Main Industries of Developed Capitalist Countries 1960-1977 including Industry Index Growtli 1960 -70 1970-77 numbers rates index growth num- rates bers (%) index numbers growth rates Manufacturing food, beverages, tobacco 180 3.5 147 3.9 123 3.0 textiles 208 4.4 158 4.7 131 3.9 clothing & footwear 137 1.9 115 1.4 119 2.5 paper & printing woodworking 162 179 2.9 3.5 139 149 3.3 4.1 117 120 2.3 2.6 building materials 203 4.3 161 4.9 126 3.4 chemicals 278 6.2 200 7.2 139 4.8 basic metals 180 3.5 154 4.4 117 2.3 metalworking 195 4.0 154 4.4 127 3.5 Power (electricity, gas) 249 5.5 188 6.6 132 4.0 Mining 170 3.2 163 5.1 104 0.6 Source: calculated from UN Ktuthlical yearbook 1U7S (United Nations, New York, 1979), pp 44-45.
•
The fluctuations were particularly steep in manufacturing in the period reviewed. The gap between tlie highest and lowest annual growth rates were very considerable: from 6.2 per cent in the chemical industries to 1.9 per cent in clothing and footwear. During the 1974-75 crisis there was an absolute fall in the level of labour productivity in almost all the manufacturing industries of capitalism’s centres.  [252•2 

253

p Comparison of the growth of productivity and of volume of production indicates the existence of a certain correlation between them. Production developed faster, as a rule, in those industries in which productivity growth rates were higher. The dependence, however, is by no means always a direct one, because an increase in volume of production depends to no small degree on changes in the scale of employment in an industry. In the chemical industries, for example, the number of jobs in the industrial centres increased by 5 per cent in 1968-78, in metalworking by 28 to 30 per cent, while il fell by 20 per cent in the textile industries. The productivity growth rates were much higher in most other industries. This was due in no small degree, as well, to the use of the latest chemical products and materials in the textile industry. Among the other heavy manufacturing industries, productivity rose at higher than average rates in the processing of non-metallic minerals. The index numbers in the table can be used as a compass to determine some of the main directions of development; they help us bring out several general trends of the effect of scientific and technical progress on the features of modern production in most industries.

p When analysing these trends we must first of all note that there has been a more and more marked decline in the rate of flow of labour into manufacturing. In the 60s it was 1.05 per cent for all capitalist countries; in the 70s the number of workers in manufacturing even declined a bit. So the increase in output in fact came wholly from a further rise in labour productivity. This rise, moreover, was not directly associated in most industries with the advances of the scientific and technical revolution. It is still coming mainly through the taking up of separate, partial technological innovations and inventions rather than through any profound revolutionary shifts in production. The paramount factor in the taking up of such inventions in the capitalist world is not the inherent social needs of scientific and technical progress but sharpening monopoly competition and rising demands for product quality on the home market, and especially on foreign markets.

The effect of the scientific and technical revolution on the productivity growth rates of the main centres of modern capitalism (the USA, Western Europe, Japan) is undoubtedly growing. In that connection the following facts call for 254 attention. In the first postwar years the USA perceptively outdistanced Western Europe and Japan in growth of labour productivity; later, however, the trend changed. In 1960- 76 the average annual increase in U.S. manufacturing industry was 2.7 per cent, in West German 5.9 per cent, in French 5.6 per cent, in British 3.3 per cent, and in Japanese 8.9 per cent. The change in level of employment in manufacturing was also uneven (see Table 28).

Table 28 Annual Growth liatcs of Labour Productivity in the Main Capitalist Countries (in percentages per employed person) Country 10G3-73 1973-79 USA 1.9 0.1 Japan 8.7 3.4 West Germany 4.6 3.2 France 4.6 2.7 Great Britain 3.0 0.3 Canada 2.4 0.4 Italy 5.4 1.6 Source: Economic Report of the President (Washington, D.G., 1980), p 85.

p Labour productivity rose much more slowly in developing countries. In the 60s and 70s the mean annual rate of increase in their industry was considerably below that in the industrially developed capitalist countries. As a result the gap in levels of productivity continued to widen rapidly and spasmodically. So the increase in the general rate of industrial production noted above compared with capitalist countries came mainly from a marked increase in jobs in manufacturing.  [254•1 

255

p That does not mean, however, that the advances of modern science and engineering have had no real effect on the uplift of developing countries’ technical potential in the most progressive branches of manufacturing. There has been a growing tendency there in recent decades towards a certain quickening of the growth rates of productivity, which became quite distinct in heavy industry. From the beginning of the 60s these rates were increasing on an average by 3.1 per cent per annum, i.e. more than three times as fast as the corresponding indicator for light industry. In metalworking this rate was 4.8 per cent, and in the production of building materials 2.5 per cent.  [255•1 

The boundaries of these changes, and other main postwar ones in the held of labour productivity are quite arbitrary and extremely mobile, of course. Each successive year of spontaneous development of capitalism’s deep contradictions i Iroduces certain changes in our evaluation of the long-term processes and phenomena developing in the manufacturing industries of the different regions and countries of the capitalist world as the scientific and technical revolution evolves.