p The British government, wishing no agreement with the USSR and anxious to put the blame for the breakdown of the military conversations on Poland, did not even try to convince the Polish rulers in anything. The German troops were poised in readiness for yet another breakthrough eastward, not westward, so the British ruling establishment saw no particular reason to worry. While the alliance with the USSR "was essential to France from the military point of view”, Beaufre pointed out, since it was the "only means" of preventing war, for the British and French governments the negotiations with the Soviet Union were nothing but a means to achieve their true diplomatic and strategic ends. As he stated these ends, Beaufre wrote that during the talks Britain and France were thinking of a "possible German-Soviet clash".^^136^^

p The way London saw that clash can be judged from some pronouncements of the British military attache in Moscow, Firebrace, about the views the British military mission guided itself by at the negotiations: "In the coming war Germany would remain on the defensive in the West, attack Poland with superior forces and probably overrun her with one to two months. German troops would then be on the Soviet frontier shortly after the outbreak of war. It was not out of the question that Germany would then offer the Western Powers a separate peace on condition that she received a free hand to advance in the East." ^^137^^

p There was no reply to the cardinal question raised by the Soviet government until August 21, which had been fixed in advance for the next session of talks by the military delegations of the Three Powers. Moreover, the British and French missions attempted to get the session postponed again. And at the time when Hitler Germany’s attack on 250 Poland was scheduled for August 25-26 about which the British government had "a good deal of information".^^138^^

p Nonetheless the Soviet military mission did not agree to the session being postponed, so it did take place. Voroshilov addressed it with a statement that, in the absence of any reply from Britain and France to the cardinal question he had raised, "there is every reason to doubt their desire for real and serious military co-operation with the USSR. In view of the foregoing, the responsibility for the procrastination of the military conversations as well as for the suspension of these negotiations lies, naturally, with the French and British sides."

p In view of the situation that had shaped up at the talks, the head of the Soviet delegation had to admit that there was, indeed, no more practical reason to meet again before the replies from the British and French governments wore available. In case they would be affirmative, he declared, "we would have to call our conference as soon as possi- ble". ^^139^^ That was the last session because the British and French missions never received any affirmative reply from their governments to the Soviet question.

p Yet there was an epilogue on August 22 to the negotiations arising from the earlier-stated pretext regarding the position of Poland. Doumenc sent a letter to Voroshilov informing him that he had received from the French government "permission to give the affirmative answer to the question put by the Soviet delegation".^^140^^

p Still when ho called on Voroshilov on the same day, Doumenc turned out to be unable to say anything reasonable either about the position of France or about Poland or Romania. He could not even say whether or not his own communication had been agreed with the Polish government. Voroshilov pointed out in this context that if the Polish government had given its consent to the passage of Soviet troops through the territory of Poland, it must have certainly wished to take part in the negotiations. He stressed that what was required was an answer from Britain and France in agreement with the governments of Poland and Romania. ’When complete clarity has been established and all the replies have been received, then we will work,” ^^141^^ Voroshilov concluded.

p The governments of Britain and France, as well as of Poland were, therefore, responsible for the failure of the 251 military conversations in Moscow. Both the very course of the talks and the attitude of the governments of the Western powers to them quite clearly demonstrated that even within a few days of the outbreak of the war, Britain and France were still building their policies on the hope that they could reach an understanding with Berlin.

p The U.S. Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, describing Britain’s political course at the time, pointed out in his Diaries that Britain could have come to agreement with the USSR long before that, but she "kept hoping against hope that she could embroil Russia and Germany with each other and thus escape scot-free herself”. ^^142^^

The Western powers could not, however, make the events take the course they wanted. The aggressive powers— Germany, Japan and Italy—had thrown the gauntlet to them and openly set out to redraw the map of the world to their advantage. Co-operation of Britain and France with the USSR could have stopped the aggressors. But the West rejected the Soviet proposals for such co-operation. The policy of the ruling circles of the Western powers was built on shaky ground. The peoples had to pay dear for that policy.^^143^^