p At the session of the talks on August 13, Voroshilov asked how the military missions and General Staffs of France and Britain visualised the Soviet Union’s involvement in a war against the aggressor, should the latter have attacked France, Britain, Poland, Romania or Turkey. He explained that he put the question that way because Soviet involvement in war was possible, owing to its geographical position, only on the territory of neighbouring states, above all Poland and Romania.^^122^^ The conversations of August 14 dealt with the same problem. The head of the Soviet military mission emphasised that this was the "cardinal issue" of the conversations. He specified that he meant passage of Soviet troops through some limited areas of Poland, namely the Vilno Corridor in the north and Galicia in the south. The Soviet military mission declared that "without a positive solution to this issue, the whole of the enterprise undertaken with a view to concluding a military convention between Britain, France and the USSR is doomed to failure in advance, in its opinion".

p Voroshilov told the conferees and showed on the map how the USSR could take part in a common struggle against the aggressor with its armed forces. Having heard him produce that information, Doumenc exclaimed: "That will be the final victory".^^123^^

p As to the question raised by the Soviet delegation, Doumenc, avoiding a straightforward answer, pointed out that 244 Poland, Romania and Turkey had to defend their own territory with their own forces, while the Three Powers must he ready to come to their assistance "when they ask for it”. In that context, the head of the Soviet delegation pointed out that Poland and Romania could just as well fail to ask for aid in good time, but surrender. It was, however, not in the interest of Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union to see "additional armed forces of Poland and Romania destroyed”. So it was necessary to agree in advance on the involvement of Soviet forces in the defence of those countries against aggression. ^^124^^

p The Soviet delegation, therefore, raised an issue which was crucial to Soviet active involvement in the struggle against the common enemy. Although Britain and France understood that perfectly well, they had taken no steps whatsoever towards settling the issue.

p The position of Britain and France showed that there was, in effect, no ground for agreement between the Three Powers. "I think our mission is finished,” Drax noted after that session.^^125^^ The French military mission also stated in its diary that the session held on that day "having been of a rather dramatic character, marked the end of the current conversations".^^126^^

p The Soviet government could not, naturally, help drawing similar conclusions and, thus, there was every reason for it to arrive at the conclusion after the session of August 14 that actually there was no hope any more for agreement to be reached.

p At the opening of the session on August 15, Drax announced that the British and French military missions had relayed the Soviet statement to their governments and were now waiting for a reply to it. In this context, the Soviet delegation agreed to continue the discussions.

p The military quarters of Britain and France realised the danger the breakdown of the talks spelled. They were well informed that the projected Nazi attack on Poland was just a few days away. On August 16, the Foreign Office inquired about the judgement of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the three services of the British Armed Forces. The reply came on the same day. Unlike their earlier statements which had played down the importance of co-operation with the USSR, this document said: "We feel that this is no time for half-measures and that every effort should be 245 made to persuade Poland and Romania to agree to the use of their territory by Russian forces.. . It is perfectly clear that without early and effective Russian assistance, the Poles cannot hope to stand up to a German attack on land or in the air for more than a limited time. . . The conclusion of a treaty with Russia appears to us to be the best way of preventing a war ... At the worst, if the negotiations with Russia break down, a Russo-German rapprochement may take place.”^^127^^

p However, this conclusion was not even examined by the British government, nor were any steps taken in this respect.

The French Chief of Staff, General Gamelin, produced his own judgement as well. He declared that France’s inaction could have disastrous consequences for her. Control of Poland would materially strengthen Germany. Should Poland get support, she would be in a position to resist long enough to keep Germany from throwing her forces into action against France in 1939.^^128^^