p The fact thai Poland figured firsl in Ihe plans of German aggression for the summer of 1939 was no secret to any other counlry. The available documenls indicale lhal the Polish ruling circles, too, were aware of the Wehrmachl’s preparalions for an attack on Poland. ^^96^^ Should Ihey have built Ihcir policy on Poland’s real nalional interest, they ought to have made their ulmosl towards creating in Europe a powerful united front of nations anxious lo prevonl war and check Ihe German aggressors. And Ihere is no doubt thai Poland, given her good will, could have played a role of no mean importance in pooling the efforts of the counlries concerned, all Ihe more so since she was already in alliance with France, Britain and Romania.

p The Soviet Union repeatedly offered Poland its co- 236 operation and assistance in opposing aggression. It is particularly worthwhile recalling in this context V. P. Potemkin’s mission to Warsaw in May 1939. In a conversation with J. Beck on May 10 he said that "the USSR would not refuse aid to Poland should she desire it".^^97^^ However, on the following day the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, W. Grzybowski, called on Molotov and declared that Poland did not wish any Anglo-Franco-Soviet guarantees and "does riot consider it possible to conclude a pact of mutual assistance with the USSR".^^98^^

p On May 25, 1939, the Soviet Ambassador in Poland, N. I. Sharonov, once more told J. Beck: "We, of course, would be ready to help, but in order to help tomorrow, we must be ready today, that is, we must know beforehand about the need to help."" But Beck left this statement unanswered.

p The Polish rulers still nurtured the hope that they would somehow reach an understanding with the Nazi Reich and that German aggression, leaving Poland untouched, would turn against the USSR. That calculation accounted for Poland’s continued extremely unfriendly policy with respect to the USSR even in the context of 1939. Not only did the Polish government flatly refuse to accept Soviet aid in case of a German attack, but it was doing everything it could to prevent the successful completion of the AngloFranco-Soviet negotiations. It expected that should Poland keep up an alliance with Britain and France, while the USSR would have no agreement with them, that would encourage the Nazis to attack the Soviet Union, rather than Poland. ^^10^^°

p J. Beck also intimated to the Nazis several times that he was looking forward to an early composition of the German-Polish differences, and said that Poland was willing to yield a good deal of ground to that end. Poland’s Vice- Minister for Foreign Affairs M. Arcizcewski declared to the German Ambassador in Warsaw, H. Moltko, in May that J. Beck "would be prepared to come to terms with Germany had there been any way to prevent that looking like a surrender”. Beck attached great importance to this, he went on to say, as evidenced by the "restraint Poland is exercising in respect of the negotiations about a pact between the West and the Soviet Union".^^101^^

p The Polish rulers proceeded from the assumption that 237 Germany’s first target was Danzig and they were prepared to meet the Nazi demand in this sense. The German government, striving as it did to strain relations with Poland, rather than normalise them, left such appeals unheeded. The more so since all of British subsequent offers of co- ordination convinced Germany that in the event of an attack on Poland, it would have no reason to fear any intervention by Britain and France. As lias been established by documentary evidence, that is precisely the conclusion that Hitler had drawn from Wohlthat’s report about his conversations in London and other similar facts. For instance, Germany’s Air Attache in Poland A. Gerstenberg on a visit to Berlin early in August 1939, said: "We shall be at war with Poland before this year is out. 1 know from a perfectly reliable source that Hitler had so decided. After Wohlthat’s visit to London, Hitler is convinced that Britain will remain neutral in the event of such a conflict." ^^102^^

Speaking before Wehrmacht chiefs, Hitler declared: "I experienced those poor worms Daladier and Chamberlain in Munich. They will be too cowardly to attack. They won’t go beyond a blockade."^^103^^ Anglo-French policy convinced the Nazis that they could attack Poland without fear of any full-scale military action by Britain and France.