p On March 29, London received information about the proposals which Ribbentrop had restated to Lipski on March 21 about an “adjustment” of Gorman-Polish relations. That information threw the British government into confusion because it feared a German-Polish collusion as most dangerous to the Western powers. In early March the British government had invited Beck to visit London. But on March 18 it received "absolutely reliable" information from the Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry, A. Leger, that Beck was going to propose an alliance in London but on the understanding that the offer would be found unacceptable (throughout the 1920s and 1930s the British government flatly refused to assume any commitment regarding aid to the countries of Eastern Europe). Beck would then return to Poland and announce that his proposal had been rejected after which lie would say that "there had been two alternatives for Poland, viz. to lean on Great Britain or Germany, and that now it was clear that she must lean on Germany.” Beck was prepared to find a way out "even at the cost of being the vassal (perhaps the chief vassal) of the new Napoleon".^^29^^ The British were alerted also by the information they had about the Nazis planning some pressure tactics to apply against Poland in 214 a matter of days. It was feared in London that this could bring Poland’s politics under Berlin’s control all the faster, which would virtually put her into the opposite camp.^^30^^

p During the discussion of the matter at a British Cabinet meeting on March 30, Halifax proposed to make a clear declaration of Britain’s intention to support Poland if Poland was attacked by Germany. Chamberlain hacked it up. He pointed out that Czechoslovakia’s resources had already been used by Germany, if Poland’s resources fell into the Reich’s hands, too, that would entail very grave consequences for Britain. The Minister of Co-ordination of Defence admitted that in the event of Nazi acts of aggression Poland would hold out no more than two or three months. Nevertheless, Germany would suffer heavy casualties as well, he went on to say. It was pointed out at the meeting that unless the British government took up a firm stand in good time in the face of a threat to Poland, Britain’s prestige throughout the world would be badly damaged.^^31^^

p To sum up, the British ruling quarters were thinking of nothing beyond using Polish cannon fodder for a time. They did not even contemplate any real assistance to Poland to save her from being defeated. But, in fact, Germany’s seizure of I’oland could have been averted! The Soviet Union, being, unlike Britain, profoundly interested in preventing Poland from being destroyed, was ready and willing to throw the full weight of its power on the scales of war for the sake of preserving her independence and inviolability. But the issue of Britain’s co-operation with the USSR was not even raised at the British Cabinet meeting.

p On March 31, 1939, the British government published a statement to announce its readiness to afford assistance to Poland in the event of aggression against her. The Anglo-Polish Communique, issued at the end of Beck’s visit to London, pointed out that Britain and Poland had achieved agreement on mutual assistance "in the event of any threat, direct or indirect, to the independence of either".^^32^^

p The British informed Beck about their plan to conclude an agreement involving Britain, France, I’oland and Romania. However, the Polish government rejected the offer. Ever since 1021 Poland had been in alliance with Romania against the USSR. She did not want to extend her commitments to cover a case of conflict between Germany and Romania.^^33^^ The government of Romania, too, took up a 215 negative stand on this offer, having informed Berlin about it.^^34^^

p Anglo-French guarantees were soon given also to Romania and Greece, and somewhat later to Turkey.

p While offering these guarantees to Poland and other of the above-mentioned countries, the British and French governments presented them as disinterested concern for their fate. The consideration of the issue of guarantees at a meeting of the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee is noteworthy. "The Prime Minister recalled,” the verbatim report of the committee meeting said, "that our general policy towards Germany was directed not to protecting individual states which might be threatened by Germany but to prevent German domination of the continent resulting in Germany becoming so powerful as to be able to menace our security. German domination of Poland or Romania would increase her military strength and it was for this reason that we had given guarantees to those countries. German domination of Denmark would not increase Germany’s military strength and this therefore was not a case in which we should be bound to intervene forcibly to restore the status quo.” ^^35^^

p This means that Britain had no interests on her mind beyond her own. Poland, Romania and Denmark and other countries interested her only in the sense of their potential military, strategic or economic importance for British imperialism. Not even British bourgeois historians can fail to admit that the Britisli Cabinet cared just as little for Poland as for the Sudetenland.^^36^^

p The French government proceeded from a similar position. The German embassy in Paris reported to Berlin ( April 20, 1939) that the position of France was determined not by her sympathy for Poland (it had been destroyed by the co-operation of the Polish ruling element with the Nazis in earlier years) but "only by an intention to bar the way to a German onslaught".^^37^^

p The French General Staff also considered that it was necessary to counter German aggressive designs with regard to the countries of Eastern Europe because otherwise France might find her positions undermined. Poland with her army and geographical position was recognised to be "too important for France to neglect”. As to Romania, the seizure of her oil resources by Germany was considered very 216 dangerous in France. The conclusion made in France was that with Poland and Romania captured, Germany would turn her military machine against France, and she would have to go to war alone, virtually without allies. ^

p However, the importance of the Anglo-French guarantees for Poland, Romania and some other countries was very relative. This was indicated to Chamberlain by Britain’s former Prime Minister Lloyd George back on March 30. He declared that any real resistance to Germany in the East can he organised only with the participation of the USSR; the unilateral British guarantees to Poland were "an irresponsible gamble".^^39^^ Lloyd George spoke in the same vein in the House of Commons debate on April 3. Similar views were stated in the debate by some oilier MPs as well.

p The Soviet embassy in Britain also wrote on the occasion: "What can, indeed, Britain (or even Britain and France, put together) really do for Poland and Romania in the event of a German attack against them? Very little. Before a British blockade of Germany becomes a formidable threat to her, Poland and Romania will have ceased to exist."”"

p Poland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Beck arrived in London on April 3. The British proposed transforming their unilateral commitments into a bilateral treaty of mutual assistance and that was accepted. The preliminary Anglo-Polish treaty of mutual assistance was signed on April 6. Poland, however, had not agreed to afford assistance to Romania in the event of a German attack against her. Beck also declined the offer to come to agreement witli the USSR on its lending material aid to Poland in case of war. Moreover he did not conceal his extremely hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union.

p The British and French guarantees, however, were not a sufficiently strong instrument of pressure on Germany. That was indicated by the fact that on April 3, Hitler released a directive for German troops to be prepared to attack Poland on September 1, 1931). On April 11, lie signed the notorious Operation WeiB, that is, the plan for the military rout of Poland.

p As the situation continued to deteriorate, there was more action in Britain and France against the masterminds of the Munich sellout and for a reversal of the foreign policies of the two countries. An opinion poll in Britain held 217 in April and early in May showed 87 per cent of the population of that country favoured an alliance between Britain, France and the USSR. The sobering process in France went on even relatively faster than in Britain. And that was understandable because she found herself under a more immediate threat. Paris figured out that Germany and Italy combined could master 250 divisions against 120 French and British. Therefore it was found necessary in Paris to give more careful consideration to co-operation with the USSR. President of the Chamber of Deputies Herriot offered his good offices to Daladier to go to Moscow to conclude the treaty.^^41^^

p The Chamberlain government, however, still considered it undesirable to assume any obligations in common with the USSR. But having offered ils guarantees to Poland and Romania, it started pressing for the Soviet government to assume unilateral commitments to assist the countries of Eastern Europe if they were attacked.

p So on April 11, Halifax, in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in London, referred to "the form in which the USSR could offer assistance to Romania in case of a German attack”. On April 4, Maisky, on instructions from the Soviet government, told Halifax that the USSR could not look at Romania’s fate with indifference and was prepared to join in providing assistance to her, but it wanted lo know how the British government contemplated the forms of assistance to Romania from Britain and other powers concerned.^^42^^ The chief of the British foreign service left the Soviet government’s quite natural and logical counter question unanswered.

p British diplomacy continued to press for the USSR to assume unilateral commitments, disregarding the consequences. On April 15, the British Ambassador in Moscow, Seeds, on instructions from Halifax, officially raised with the Soviet government the question of whether it was agreeable to publish a declaration to the effect that any of the Soviet Union’s European neighbours could count on Soviet assistance in case of aggression should it find that assistance desirable.^^43^^

p This proposal provided for the Soviet assistance to Poland and Romania, which had Anglo-French guarantees, as well as to other European neighbours of the USSR—Latvia, Estonia and Finland, which had no such guarantees. 218 Therefore, the publication of such a declaration by the Soviet government could have left the Soviet Union with no option but to fight Germany alone, in the event of German aggression in the Baltic, while Britain and France would stay out.

p An extremely dangerous situation would have arisen for the USSR even in the event of a German-Polish or German-Romanian conflict. Britain and France, in spite of their guarantees to Poland and Romania, could have virtually kept out of the war (as it did happen in September 1939). The Soviet Union, having spoken out for assistance to Poland or Romania, could, under such circumstances, find itself at war with Germany actually without any allies lo speak of.

p Besides, the commitments about mutual assistance between Britain and France, on the one hand, and Poland, on the other, were of a mutual nature: in the event of an attack on Poland, she was to have been supported by Britain and France, and in the event of an aggressor’s attackon Britain or France, Poland was to have come to their assistance. But the Soviet guarantees to Poland were to have been of a unilateral character, to follow the British demand. For example, if Germany attacked the USSR, Poland was not under obligation to afford assistance to the Soviet Union. The Soviet government even had no guarantees that Poland under the circumstances would not join Germany in a war against the USSR.

p Fven Western diplomats themselves admitted in private that Britain’s position with respect to the USSR was unseemly. The U.S. Ambassador in Paris, Bullitt, pointed out that the British government’s policy with regard to the Soviet Union was "almost insulting".^^44^^ Now even Ambassador Seeds could not fail to admit in his cable to the Foreign Office that the British inquiry created the impression that Britain had no serious intention of reaching agreement with the USSR.

The contacts established in March-April 1939, between the Soviet government, on the one hand, and the governments of Britain and France, on the other, about the ways to maintain peace in Europe showed once more the earnest aspiration of the Soviet Union for collective resistance to fascist aggression. The ruling circles of Britain and France, however, in fact, persisted in their Munich policy, reluctant to co-operate with the USSR.