p Chamberlain and Halifax decided to turn down this proposal as inconsistent with the general tenor of their foreign policy without even so much as bringing it before the government. On March 19, Halifax told the Soviet Ambassador in London that to call the Soviet-proposed conference would be “premature”.^^10^^ The said Soviet proposal was also communicated to the French government but there had been no reply whatsoever from France. The Soviet government could make only one conclusion, and that is that Britain and France were essentially carrying on their former policies. ^^11^^

p Since it was still utterly impossible to fail to react to Nazi Germany’s acts of aggression altogether, Halifax submitted a proposal, formulated together with Chamberlain the day before, to a British Cabinet meeting on March 20 to publish a declaration by the governments of Britain, France, the USSR and Poland whereby they would "pledge to consult together" in the event of any danger to the political independence of any European state. Not even Halifax could fail to admit that the publication of such a declaration about consultations "was not a very heroic decision”. Chamberlain, on the contrary, considered that the draft had an advantage in the sense that it avoided "specific commitments" and left it open what would constitute a “threat” and what particular steps should be taken in the event of such a threat. The draft was approved by the members of the Cabinet. ^^12^^

p After the Cabinet meeting Halifax brought the draft declaration to the knowledge of the French Ambassador in London, Corbin. The latter stated with ample ground that such a declaration would be interpreted by other nations to mean that in the event of fresh aggression the four powers would only talk rather than take any action.^^13^^ Halifax 210 found himself compelled to accept some corrections in the draft declaration.

p On March 21, the British government proposed that Britain, France, the USSR and Poland should join iu producing a declaration to say that, in the event of any action constituting a threat to the political independence of any European nation, they pledged themselves to consult together immediately about steps to be taken for common resistance to such action.^^14^^

p The publication of such a declaration could not have been anything like a serious means to counter aggression. But since even that declaration could have been at least some step forward towards creating a peace-keeping front, the Soviet government took but a day to give its consent.^^15^^ A few days later, however, British Assistant Foreign Secretary Cadogan told the Soviet Ambassador that "the Poles quite categorically, and Romanians somewhat less decisively have announced that they will not join any combination (be it in form of declaration or any other form) that will also include the USSR".^^16^^

p Because of their class hatred of the USSR, the Polish ruling circles did not wish to co-operate with it even in the face of a mortal danger to Poland. In the hope of somehow coming to an understanding with the Nazis, they did not want to commit themselves to any declaration and prevented its publication. On March 25, Beck instructed Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, to assure Ribbentrop that Poland would, as always, oppose the USSR taking part in European affairs.^^17^^ In that way, Poland’s rulers were taking the line of outright betrayal of the national interests and of the Polish people.

p At the talks of Chamberlain and Halifax with French President Lebrun and Bonnet in London on March 21 and 22 it was decided to intensify co-operation between the General Staffs of the two countries. The main thing the talks revealed was Britain’s reluctance to afford real aid even to the French: she intended to send just a few divisions to France and even that not immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. Besides, it was decided that in any event, even if fascist Germany attacked Poland, the strategy of Britain and France would be defensive, not offensive.^^18^^

p The Nazi Reich was increasingly insolent and arrogant. Back on March 21, Ribbentrop had started a diplomatic 211 build-up to the war against Poland. In a peremptory tone he demanded that the Polish government should consent to Danzig being annexed to Germany and to an extra- territorial Autobahn being laid through Polish territory into Eastern Prussia. With a view to creating a "conflict situation" between Germany and Poland, these proposals were framed in such a way as to prevent them from being accepted by the Polish government in any circumstances. On March 22, the Nazis captured Klajpeda. Klajpeda’s status was guaranteed by Britain and France, but they did not budge to aid Lithuania. On March 23, the Nazis struck again by forcing a fettering economic agreement on Romania.

p The statement made by the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the British Secretary for Overseas Trade, Robert Hudson, who arrived in Moscow on March 23, 1939 was of great importance under the circumstances. Proceeding From the fact of an aggressive bloc in existence, the People’s Commissar emphasised, one should not deny the need for meetings, conferences and agreements between nonaggressive states. In particular, the Soviet government had always been willing to co-operate with Great Britain and to consider and discuss any concrete proposals.^^19^^

p Hudson did not even mention that statement in his report to the British government about his trip to Moscow. Instead, he pronounced himself against an extension of relations with the USSR.^^20^^

p Apart from that appeal to Britain, the Soviet government found it necessary to establish contact with its Western neighbours, facing a threatened German attack, for the purpose of resisting aggression. On March 28, 1939, it forwarded a statement to the governments of Latvia and Estonia saying that the USSR was interested in preventing the aggressors’ domination of the Baltic states, for that would run counter both to the interests of the people of those countries and to the vital interests of the Soviet state. The Soviet government declared that it could not stand by looking indifferently at Germany establishing domination of the Baltic area and was prepared to prove that if need be.^^21^^ The Soviet government was likewise anxious for the independence of Poland and Romania to be preserved, notably, because for Germany to have overrun them would have given the Nazi troops an opportunity of reaching the Western borders of the USSR.

p The Soviet government considered it desirable to establish direct contact and co-operation with those countries themselves in opposing aggression. On March 29, 11)31), Litvinov told the Romanian Minister in Moscow, N. Dianu, that the USSR could not "react with indifference to an aggressor nation’s domination of Romania or to the possibility for her lo obtain strongpoints in the vicinity of our frontier or in the Black Sea ports." ^^22^^ On the same day Litvinov, replying to a question from the French Charge d’ Affaires in Moscow, J. Payart, about whether or not the USSR was ready to co-operate with Poland, told him: "We consider it very important to co-operate with Poland and we have always offered her as much." ^^23^^

p Since Poland refused to co-operate with the USSR, the British and French governments were wondering whom they could regard as their more important ally in Eastern Europe, Poland or the USSR. Chamberlain and Halifax considered that Poland and Romania which hated the Soviet Union mattered more to Britain than the USSR.^^24^^ British historian Aster wrote: "The Soviet Union, after a brief diplomatic appearance, was being nudged back into its isolation.” ^^25^^

p It was recognised at a conference which Halifax had with the senior staff of the Foreign Office on March 25, that since a war on two fronts was Germany’s Achilles’ heel, it was necessary to cut Poland off from Germany and draw her into co-operation with Britain and France. Halifax pointed out that in the event of Poland staying neutral, Germany could attack Romania or Western powers. Therefore, he considered it necessary to agree with Poland on mutual assistance and to get her committed to come to Romania’s aid in the event of her being attacked by Ger- many. ^^26^^

p Chamberlain approved this plan and at a meeting of the Foreign Policy Committee on March 27, urged co-operation with Poland. The British Premier could not fail to note on that occasion that the new plan "left Soviet Russia out of the picture”. Even Samuel Hoare, having qualified his statement by saying that no one could accuse him of any predilections in favour of the Soviet Union, stressed that it was very important to bring in to the common front as many countries as possible. Halifax was strongly supported by Chamberlain. "If we had to make a choice between 213 Poland and Soviet Russia,” he declared, "it snomed clear that Poland would give the greater value”. He said, furthermore, that French Foreign Minister Bonnet "had no love for Soviet Russia" either and that "France seemed little interested in Russia”. The British lord pointed out that Poland had "some 50 divisions and might be expected to make a useful contribution”, whereas the Soviet Army’s "offensive value was small".^^27^^

Two days later the matter came before a British Cabinet meeting. Halifax addressed it with arguments to prove that Poland was the "key to the situation”. In spite of the serious doubts expressed by Home Secretary Samuel Hoare and Secretary for Public Health Elliot to the effect that it was undesirable lo exclude the Soviet Union from the group of countries invited to co-operate, the Cabinet approved the course suggested by Chamberlain and Halifax.^^28^^