p Having moved into a position of advantage, by occupying Czechoslovakia, to go ahead with its aggression, the Nazi Reich started preparing to attack Poland. An immediate danger of German aggression faced Romania and many other European countries, too.

p Meanwhile, the forces of the European countries, threatened by aggression, turned out to be disunited because of the subversive action by the aggressors and the policy of the Munich “appeasers”. London and Paris did whatever they could to channel German aggression against the USSR, having first put it into international isolation. But when it became clear in the spring of 1939 that the Nazi Reich preferred to deal with weaker opponents for the time being rather than with the USSR, it turned out that by trying to isolate the Soviet Union, Britain, France, Poland and some other countries had placed themselves in a position of still greater and more dangerous isolation.

p The ruling circles of Britain and France finally had to admit that they would never secure "general settlement" with Germany by means of their earlier concessions and handouts.

p Without giving up the earlier objectives of their policies, the British and French governments decided to take some steps towards strengthening their international positions. That was what brought about the Anglo-French guarantees for Poland and some other countries. To try and induce Hitler to change his plans and, eventually, accept the idea of a "general settlement”, that is, one of imperialist collusion with Britain and France, the British and French governments decided to scare the Nazis a bit by a possible Anglo-Franco-Soviet rapprochement.

p Neither Chamberlain nor Daladier, however, had so much as contemplated any rapprochement, let alone co-operation, with the USSR in the struggle against aggression. That was nothing more than a diplomatic trick in a bid to divert the dangerous hurricane that was brewing in the centre of Europe, and turn it eastwards.

p London and Paris saw their links with the countries of Eastern Europe and their contact with the USSR as the last resort they might turn to if the Western powers failed to come to terms with the Nazis and found themselves at war with Germany.

p Besides, the British and French governments feared that should the Soviet Union, faced by the stance of Britain and France, have finally concluded that it was impossible to set up a collective front to safeguard peace, it would have to look for other ways to assure its own security. In particular, they were afraid that the USSR, once forced into 207 isolation, might agree to some form of normalising relations with Germany, for instance, by signing a non-aggression pact with her.^^7^^ Now, Germany’s intention to reduce tensions in relations with the Soviet Union somehow was no longer much of a secret to the diplomatic services of the Western powers.

The ruling circles of Britain and France had to take into account, besides, the mounting demand of the mass of the people in their countries for steps to avert the danger of aggression and, in particular, to establish close co- operation with the USSR.