p Hitler’s troops entered Prague on March 15, 1939. Czechoslovakia was liquidated as an independent slate by German Nazism. Although Britain and France, while foisting the terms of the Munich deal on Czechoslovakia, had promised her their guarantees of aid, they gave her none in those tragic days.

p The British government had precise information about the coming events four days in advance. Yet it feigned ignorance. It was only on March 14 that Halifax, faced by increasingly alarming news reaching London called a conference to consider the line Britain was going to take. It was agreed, his assistant Oliver Harvey wrote later on in his account of that meeting, that "we must make no empty threats since we were not going to fight for Czechoslovakia. . . . We should not, however, regard ourselves as in any way guaranteeing Czechoslovakia".^^2^^

p Chamberlain unofficially informed the Fiihror that he "quite sympathized with Germany’s move" in seizing Czechoslovakia, "even though he was unable to say so in public".^^3^^

p That was also the position of the United States. Assistant Secretary of State A. Berle pointed out in his diaries on March 17 that Roosevelt "was not particularly bothered" by Germany’s seizure of Czechoslovakia: "Like many Englishmen, /he/ may have calculated that a German advance to the East would at least afford relief" to Britain and France.^^4^^

p It was the Soviet government alone that proceeded from a position of principle in its reaction to the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia.

p A detailed account of Soviet foreign policy in the prevailing circumstances was given in the Report by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) to the 18th Party Congress which was presented by Stalin on March 10, 1939. He criticised both the aggressors and the policy of encouraging aggression which was pursued by the Western powers. The Report contained a serious warning that the big and dangerous political gamble started by the partisans of nonintervention policy might well end in a serious failure for them. It pointed out that it was necessary to "show caution and not to allow our country to be involved in conflicts 205 by the instigators of war who are used to having somebody else pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them".

p The Report contained a clear and well-defmed account of the fundamentals of Soviet foreign policy:

p “1. We stand for peace and for the consolidation of business contacts with all nations, we stand and we shall stand by this principle as long as these nations abide by the same type of relationship with the Soviet Union and as long as they refrain from infringing the interests of our country.

p 2. We stand for peaceful, close and good-neighbourly relations with all neighbouring countries having a common border with the USSR...

p 3. We stand for supporting the peoples who have fallen victim to aggression and who are in battle for their national independence. .."^^5^^

p The USSR strongly condemned Nazi aggression against Czechoslovakia and branded the aggressors. On March 18, the Soviet government sent a note to the government of Germany, pointing out that Germany’s action "cannot but be qualified arbitrary, violent and aggressive”. The Soviet government declared that it could not agree to Czechoslovakia being incorporated in the German Empire.^^6^^

By seizing Czechoslovakia, Germany did away with one of the possible allies of France and other opponents of the Reich in the event of war. It is worth recalling that Czechoslovakia could have fielded upwards of 30 well-armed divisions in case of war. Now, however, those arms could be used by the Nazis for an attack on other countries. Having surrounded Poland from three sides, the Nazi Reich obtained extremely good vantage ground for attacking her. The position of Romania had drastically worsened as well, notably because she had been supplied with war equipment by the Skoda factories.