p The reactionary ruling circles of Poland, who dioamcd of grabbing more land for themselves, that of the Soviet Union, first and foremost, were not idle either. The U.S. Ambassador in Warsaw, A. J. Drexel Biddle, arrived at the conclusion, drawn from his conversations with the Polish Foreign Minister, J. Beck, that Poland was striving for a close relationship with Germany and welcoming GermanItalian co-operation in opposition to communist Russia for she regarded her as her main enemy. ^^36^^ The Nazis proceeded from the belief that Poland’s home and foreign policies fit in perfectly with those of Germany, Italy and Japan, and she should, therefore, be brought into the Anti-Comintern Pact. They made appropriate suggestions to her on several occasions.^^37^^ Finding it inconvenient to join the Anti- Comintern Pact openly (at least for the time being), Poland declared herself to be in solidarity with the signatories to the Pact in many ways, including her policy towards the USSR. On Juno’13, 1938, Beck told Germany’s Foreign Minister von Neurath that he considered combatting Bolshevism "the primary aim of his policy".^^38^^ On March 31, (he new German Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, took the opportunity of his conversation with the Polish Ambas sador in Berlin, Jozef Lipski, to express his "haunting idea of broad anti-communist co-operation”. The Polish Ambassador replied by saying that he was convinced that co- operation between Germany and Poland "in the struggle against communism" was well worthwhile.^^39^^ Whetting 152 the appetites of the Polish ruling establishment, the Nazis made a point of telling Poland that it was "not enough" for her to have an outlet to the Baltic Sea, and that she must also have an "outlet to the Black Sea".^^40^^

p Polish ruling circles had Lithuania, too, as yet another object of their aggressive aspirations. In the night of March 11, Polish frontier guards provoked an incident on the Polish-Lithuanian border to create a pretext for a Polish invasion of Lithuania. The Polish rulers of the day saw the takeover of Lithuania as a “compensation” for the support they gave to Germany’s aggressive plans against Austria.^^41^^ The Polish Przeglad Powszechny magazine wrote: "We must get some compensation because of the AnschluC. . . Qualitatively, because of her geopolitical position, Lithuania is very valuable." ^^42^^

p An emergency conference was called in Warsaw on March 12, attended by the Inspector-General of the Armed Forces Rydz-Smigly, Premier F. Skladkowski, and J. Szembek who deputised for Beck while he was out of Warsaw. It was decided to press for the political subordination of Lithuania to Poland.^^43^^

p A large Polish force was concentrated near the Lithuanian border poised for an invasion of Lithuania at any moment.

p Poland and Nazi Germany acted in the closest contact. For instance, during Beck’s visit to Berlin in January 1938 Goring informed him that Germany considered the Anschlufi to be her top priority. Hitler emphasised that he was prepared to resort to force to this end. Beck told the Nazis that Poland had no objection to the AnschluB: "Poland has only economic interests" in Austria; we have no political interests in that country".^^44^^ During the subsequent discussions with Goring, on February 23 and March 12, Beck and Lipski reaffirmed their statements that Poland did not object to Germany taking over Austria. Goring replied that Hitler "will be obliged to Poland for such a stand".^^45^^

p It was as early as March 16 of the same year that the Nazis “repaid” the Polish ruling circles. On that day Goring invited Lipski to talk over subsequent German and Polish co-operation. The Polish Ambassador informed him of Poland’s designs on Lithuania. In the same terms in which the Poles had couched their consent to the annexation of 153 Austria by Germany, Goring announced Germany’s consent to Poland’s seizure of Lithuania, hedging it in only with a remark regarding Klajpeda. Lipski wrote that Goring showed understanding for our point of view. He stressed Germany’s interest in Klajpeda (Memel), otherwise expressing his desinteressement with regard to Lithuania".^^46^^ Goring expressed some apprehension, however, that Poland’s action might cause complications in her relations with the USSR. In that context, he came out with "an open offer for Polish-German military collaboration against Russia”. Lipski immediately notified Warsaw of the position taken by the German government on "Poland’s possible action against Lithuania”, that is, regarding an invasion of Lithuania by Polish troops.

p A German invasion of Lithuania was also in the preparatory stage. On March 17, Beck instructed the Polish Minister in Berlin to inform Goring confidentially that " relations with Lithuania got strained not only because of the frontier incident”. Lipski was to declare that in case of a rejection of the Polish ultimatum by Lithuania, there would be an invasion of Lithuania by Polish forces, and "German interests in Klajpeda would be respected by the Polish side”. Lipski lost no time in carrying out that instruction and assured Goring that ho would be keeping the German government abreast of the subsequent course of events. Lipski considered the conversation to have been extremely important because that allowed him to inform Warsaw about Germany’s stand on "Poland’s possible action against Li- thuania.’"’^^7^^ That is to say, Poland intended to take over Lithuania, with the exception of Klajpeda which she was prepared to “cede” to Germany.

p Germany’s intentions were to be seen from Ribbentrop’s note of March 17. "In case of a Polish-Lithuanian conflict”, he wrote, "I consider the occupation of the Memel Territory necessary within the first few hours. Appropriate preparations for this have been made”. The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel had prepared a special map showing the German-Polish line of demarcation on the territory of Lithuania, according to which the German forces were to occupy Klajpeda Territory along with some other areas of Lithuania.^^48^^

p Lithuania found herself face to face with the fatal 154 danger from two aggressors at once—Poland and Germany, acting in close contact.

p It was Soviet support alone that saved the Lithuanian people from being enslaved by foreign invaders. On March 1G, 1938, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs summoned the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, W. Grzybowski, to tell him that the gravity of the situation compelled the Soviet government to draw the Polish government’s attention to the fact that the Soviet Union could not stand by, looking indifferently at Lithuania in danger.^^49^^

p Meanwhile the Soviet government took steps to influence Poland through her ally, France. The People’s Commissar gave instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in Paris to see the French Foreign Minister Paul-Boncour immediately and urge him to take the necessary steps in order to "deter Warsaw from undertaking a reckless venture that can set the whole of Fastern Europe on fire”. The Ambassador was also to inform the French Minister about the statement made to Grzybowski.^^50^^ On March 18, the Soviet government, considering the continued aggravation of the situation, gave the Polish Ambassador another strong warning. ^^51^^

p The Soviet government’s intervention prevented Lithuania from being overrun by Poland and Germany. Besides, those events were the best evidence possible to show that the aggressors would have stood no chance of success, in other parts of Europe as well, should the Western powers have acted together with the Soviet Union instead of yielding ground to the aggressors.

p The Polish rulers, however, did not give up their aggressive aspirations. The Polish ministers in Bucharest A. Arciszewski sought to prove to the Romanian King that Hitler Germany was stronger than the Soviet Union and that, in case of an impending war, Poland would join a bloc consisting of Germany, Italy, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Austria and Bulgaria; Poland would welcome the accession of Romania and, together with her—Yugoslavia and Greece—in that bloc.^^52^^ In July 1937, the Chiefs of General Staffs of Poland and Romania concluded an agreement under which Poland committed herself to fielding 350,000 soldiers and Romania, 250,000 in the event of war against the USSR. It was decided that should the territory thus acquired fall into their hands, it would be divided between 155 them: the territory south ol’ the Vinnitsa—Kiev—Desna river line, comprising Odessa, would be annexed by Romania and those North of that line, comprising Leningrad, by Poland. ^^53^^

As will yet be shown, Poland closely co-operated with Ihe Nazi Reich in the aggression against Czechoslovakia as well.